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AS  ORIGINAL Abstract 
Following  Gramscian  conceptions  of  hegemony,  this  paper  seeks  an  understanding  of  the 
`power  bloc'  in  Malaysia  and  the  evolution  of  the  `Mahathir  project'  as  a  legitimation 
strategy.  As  leader  of  the  ruling  Barisan  Nasional  (National  Front)  (BN),  the  United 
Malays  National  Organisation  (UMNO)  has  played  a  central  role  in  this  enterprise. 
Taking  the  project's  economic,  political  and  ideological  elements  as  cumulative 
expressions  of  power  -a  sort  of  `hegemonic  trinity'  -  the  study  considers  the  shifting 
nature  of  state-class  arrangements,  the  organic  capacities  of  the  `UMNO  network'  and 
the  use  of  Wawasan  2020  (Vision  2020)  as  a  framework  for  intellectual  and  populist 
discourse.  From  the  state  economic  nationalism  of  the  New  Economic  Policy  (NEP)  and 
Malaysia  Inc.  to  the  `post-ethnic  nationalism'  of  Vision  development  and  Bangsa 
Malaysia,  Mahathir's  reconstruction  of  the  state  and  contestation  of  civil  institutions  has 
provided  a  series  of  `hegemonic  opportunities'  for  `liberalisation',  elite  accumulation  and 
social  control.  In  locating  the  project's  antecedents  and  changing  forms  under  Mahathir, 
the  structural  and  contradictory  implications  of  these  shifts  are  assessed,  providing  a 
context  for  the  economic  crisis  from  mid-1997.  As  a  catalyst  for  the  Anwar  affair,  the 
economic  fallout  presaged  a  political  and  ideological  crisis  of  legitimacy  not  just  for 
Mahathir  but  for  the  power  bloc:  all  told,  an  organic  crisis  of  hegemony.  This  requires 
us  to  consider  the  `three-fronted'  ways  in  which  the  UMNO  network  was  seeking  to 
manage  the  situation  by  mid-1999  -  as  in  Mahathir's  economic  `challenge'  to  IMF 
nostrums,  the  consolidation  of  political  power  within  UMNOBN  and  the  articulation  of 
`national  problem  solving'  discourse  and  other  media  ideology.  This,  in  turn,  invites 
analysis  of  the  counter-hegemonic  challenge  from  the  nascent  reformasi  and  the  Parti 
Islam  SeMalaysia  (Islamic  Party  of  Malaysia)  (PAS).  In  seeking  to  construct  a  new 
`moral  order',  a  related  feature  here  concerns  the  opposition's  use  of  new  information 
sites.  Following  the  denouement  to  the  (first)  Anwar  trial,  this  leads  us  to  a  verdict  on 
the  hegemonic  integrity  of  the  Mahathir  project  and  the  extent  of  the  PAS/reformasi 
counter-project  by  this  point. 
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vi Introduction 
The  new  Orientalism 
Malaysia  offers  many  intriguing  images  for  the  Western  observer.  Much  of  this,  of 
course,  has  its  antecedents  in  various  forms  of  colonial  romanticism:  the  enigma  of  the 
East,  the  adventurism  of  Empire,  the  allure  of  alternative  races,  religions  and  cultures. 
But  colonial  images  and  representations  of  Southeast  Asian  societies  have  also  helped 
convey  and  sustain  a  more  particular  language  of  domination.  Through  the  observations, 
studies  and  writings  of  missionaries,  ethnographers,  mercantilist  traders  and  colonial 
administrators,  the  construction  and  dissemination  of  populist  imperialist  discourses 
became  an  intrinsic  part  of  the  process  of  colonial  legitimation.  British,  French,  and 
Dutch  based  histories  and  records  of  the  region  from  the  sixteenth  century  till  the  eve  of 
independence  in  the  1950s  offer  mainly  elitist  accounts  of  colonial  rule  and  Christian 
mission,  with  the  roles  of  indigenous  peoples  subordinated  to  that  of  passive 
dependency.  '  When  Captain  Francis  Light  proclaimed  Penang  as  a  British  possession  in 
1786,  opening  a  route  to  the  Straits  Settlements  of  Malacca  and  Singapore,  he  helped 
found  a  colonial  order  which  came  to  extend  its  authority  over  Malaya  not  only  through 
the  incorporation  of  the  ruling  aristocracy,  but  also  through  the  sponsorship  of  a  racial 
division  of  labour  and  ethnic  ideologies,  constructions  which  would  shape  the  framework 
of  the  state  and  polity  thereafter.  Thus,  at  Merdeka  (Independence)  in  1957,  Malaya  had 
reached  a  settlement  structured  around  communal  politics  and  ethnic  ideologies,  a  system 
of  control  designed  to  secure  domestic  class  interests  and  neo-colonial  dependency. 
At  the  turn  of  the  millennium,  representations  of  Malaysian  society  have  become 
rather  more  expansive,  though  still  conditioned  by  such  constructions.  As  part  of  what 
may  be  termed  the  `new  Orientalism',  Asia-Pacific  discourse  has  used  a  language  of 
`Rim-speak'  to  project  a  very  different  view  of  Malaysia  in  recent  years:  that  of  heroic 
achiever;  the  very  model  of  assertiveness  for  aspirant  states  to  follow  on  the  road  to 
`modernity'  and  economic  development.  In  contrast  to  colonial  representations,  here 
was  a  more  admiring  set  of  evaluations  from  the  West  and  the  key  institutions  of  global 
capitalism.  As  the  economy  forged  ahead  throughout  the  1980s  and  1990s,  the 
Malaysian  Prime  Minister  Dr.  Mahathir  Mohamad  could  claim  that  the  challenges  of 
1 harnessing  a  Malay  business  class,  and  reconciling  Malay  privileges  within  a  fragile  ethnic 
order,  had  now  given  way  to  new  and  more  ambitious  national  goals.  Malay,  Chinese 
and  foreign  enterprise  were  being  used  to  steer  the  country  towards  a  new  age  of  high- 
tech  development,  a  process  of  information-led  economic  adjustment,  signified  by  the 
`intelligent'  Multimedia  Super  Corridor  (MSC),  which  would  take  Malaysia  into  the  21st 
century  as  a  key  player  in  the  new  global  marketplace.  For  Mahathir,  such  projects  and 
ideals  were  a  statement  of  the  new  spirit  of  national  confidence;  a  harbinger  of  growth, 
co-operation  and  social  prosperity  to  come. 
Yet  by  mid-1997  all  such  euphoria  and  Western  admiration  appeared  rather  more 
conditional  as  financial  panic  spread  contagion-like  through  the  region.  Unable  to  resist 
the  onslaught  of  global  market  forces,  Malaysia  felt  the  abrupt  shock  of  currency  and 
stock-market  collapse,  social  dislocation  and  political  upheaval,  culminating  in  the  crisis 
of  Deputy  Prime  Minister  Anwar  Ibrahim's  dismissal,  trial  and  sentencing  by  April  1999. 
As  pressure  from  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (DvIF),  foreign  capital  and  Western 
(notably  US)  political  classes  mounted,  the  calls  for  economic  liberalisation  and  political 
transparency  became  a  critical  test  for  the  ruling  Barisan  Nasional  (BN)  (National  Front) 
government,  notably  its  ruling  party  the  United  Malays  National  Organisation  (UMNO). 
The  BN  also  comprises  the  Malaysian  Chinese  Association  (MCA),  the  Malaysian  Indian 
Congress  (MIC)  and  a  range  of  smaller  component  parties.  2 
Internal  to  that  situation  was  Anwar's  own  complex  relationships  with  Mahathir 
on  the  one  hand  and,  what  may  be  termed,  the  IMF/liberal  capitalist  nexus  on  the  other. 
Although  Mahathir's  anti-Western  diatribes  had  long  been  a  source  of  irritation  to 
Western  diplomats  and  foreign  capital,  this  had  not  undermined  Western/US  geopolitical 
interests  in  the  region  or,  despite  the  contradictions  of  his  `free-market'  agenda, 
Mahathir's  attempts  to  attract  foreign  investors.  Nonetheless,  Anwar's  less  strident 
language  and  close  association  with  IMF  and  World  Bank  heads  Michel  Camdessus  and 
James  Wolfensohn  had  gained  him  a  position  of  considerable  favour  and  prominence 
within  those  circles.  In  effect,  as  Mahathir's  `heir  apparent',  here  was  a  more 
`amenable'  figure,  a  man  Western  leaders  and  the  IMF/World  Bank  could  do  business 
with  both  during  and  after  Mahathir's  time  in  office.  But  the  economic  crisis  and 
Anwar's  removal  was  to  bring  that  whole  set  of  relationships  into  critical  focus  by 
1997/98.  Now,  in  the  biggest  challenge  of  his  sixteen  year  rule,  Mahathir,  the  veteran 
2 statesman  and  fixer,  was  facing  not  only  the  hostility  of  Western  institutions,  but  the 
spectre  of  popular  unrest,  a  gathering  reform  movement,  dissenting  elements  within 
UMNO  and,  of  course,  the  problem  of  Anwar  himself. 
The  tension  had  become  apparent  in  October  that  year  at  the  key  IMF  summit  in 
Hong  Kong  as  Mahathir  clashed  openly  with  financial  speculator  George  Soros.  For 
many  Malaysia  watchers,  it  was  vintage  Mahathir.  In  this  case,  he  had  sought  to  re-make 
the  image  of  Malaysian  assertiveness  by  crafting  himself  in  the  role  of  resistant  crusader 
against  predatory  speculators.  His  depiction  of  amoral  financiers  and  `Western  plots' 
had  not  impressed  the  international  fund-managers  or  many  panic-stricken  Malaysian 
business  people.  But  it  did  signal  the  paradox  of  Mahathir's  relations  with  the  West. 
For  not  only  had  he  coveted  the  `modernist'  imagery  of  growth  and  development  as  a 
sign  of  `approval'  from  the  West  -  thus  providing  a  stimulus  for  inward  investment, 
technological  advancement  and  wealth  creation  -  but  used  it  also  as  a  post-colonial 
lingua  franca  to  challenge  Western  norms  and  posit  Malaysia's  achievement  as  a  specific 
product  of  the  `Asian  way'. 
Alongside  Mahathir,  however,  Asia-Pacific  observers  and  Western  capitalist 
institutions  have  also  indulged  in  the  same  euphoric  language  and  metaphors  to  represent 
the  region:  the  new  global  epicentre,  the  Japanese  miracle,  the  tiger  economies,  the  new 
dawn  of  Chinese  growth,  Japan  Inc.,  and  other  zeitgeist  notions  of  the  `Pacific  Century'. 
Yet,  as  the  new  realities  began  to  dawn  by  mid-1997,  signalling  not  only  regional  but 
global  market  crises,  all  that  imagery  seemed  suddenly  passe.  As  a  defining  symbol  of 
Malaysian  confidence,  Mahathir  had  invoked  the  spectre  of  the  record-breaking  Petronas 
twin  towers  in  Kuala  Lumpur  as  a  celebratory  statement  of  national  achievement  - 
perhaps  even  a  two-fingered  gesture  to  the  old  colonial  order.  Yet,  if  one  was  to  search 
for  an  alternative  metaphor  for  the  towers,  it  might  reflect,  more  appropriately,  this  sense 
of  paradox  and  duality  with  the  West;  a  separation  of  identities  standing  together  in  tense 
proximity;  a  representation  of  the  continuous  convergence  and  conflict  of  ideas. 
As  the  implications  of  the  crisis  unfolded  on  capital  markets  beyond  the  region, 
those  in  the  West  who  had  lauded  the  `Asian  miracle'  now  took  their  distance.  The  IMF, 
Western  academics  and  parts  of  the  business  media  took  refuge  in  scapegoating  `Asian 
crony  capitalists',  chiding  profligate  state  managers  and  warning  sternly  of  the  need  for 
financial  penitence  and  political  reform.  But,  as  Walden  Bello,  pointing  to  the  central 
3 role  of  hedge  funds,  noted,  the  issue  of  transparency  could  not  disguise  the  more 
structural  role  played  by  global  speculative  capital  in  the  crisis.  Nor  was  that  frisson  of 
market  panic  unconnected  with  the  dual  influence  of  the  business  media  and  Western 
academia.  Here: 
...  speculative  forces  and  banks  operated  in  a  hothouse  atmosphere  with  other  critical  actors.  A  key 
player  was  the  business  press.  Business  publications  and  wire  services  proliferated  in  the  region 
beginning  in  the  mid-1980s.  These  news  agents  became  critical  interpreters  of  the  news  in  Asia  to 
investors  all  over  the  world  and  served  as  a  vital  supplement  to  the  electronic  linkages  that  made  real- 
time  transactions  possible  among  the  key  stock  exchanges...  For  the  most  part,  these  media  highlighted 
the  boom,  glorified  the  high  growth  rates  and  reported  uncritically  on  so-called  success  stories...  Their 
advice  on  going  underweight  or  overweight  in  certain  countries...  was  dispensed  to  readers  as  gospel 
3  truth 
This  euphoric  celebration  of  the  East  had  also  been  given  `authority'  by  Western 
academia: 
Indeed,  it  was  economists  and  political  scientists  in  the  West  who  were  primarily  responsible  for  the  idea 
of  the  `Asian  miracle'.  There  was  a  remarkable  consensus  between  the  Left  and  Right  in  academe  that 
Asian  growth  was  exceptional.  4 
Here,  notes  Bello,  the  World  Bank,  arbitrating  between  these  poles  (the  `left'  playing  up, 
viz  Korea  and  Taiwan,  the  interventionist  state,  the  right,  viz  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore, 
the  spectre  of  free-marketism),  declared  the  economic  fundamentals  of  the  Asian  tiger 
economies  favourable  for  continued  prosperity.  Thus,  its  1993  book  The  East  Asian 
Miracle: 
... 
became  a  kind  of  bible,  not  only  in  the  academic  world  but  in  financial  and  corporate  circles...  In  short, 
a  global  network  of  investors,  journalists,  investment  analysts  and  academics  was  locked  into  a 
psychology  of  boom,  where  growth  rates,  expectations,  analysis,  advice  and  reporting  interacted  in  a 
mutually  reinforcing  inflationary  fashion.  What  has  crashed...  has  not  only  been  Asia's  economies,  but 
the  Asian  miracle  establishment.  5 
What  also  has  to  be  emphasised  here,  though,  is  how  domestic  elites  in  the  region 
also  played  their  part  in  helping  to  reproduce  that  discourse  as  ideology,  thus  forming  an 
4 integral  part  of  the  miracle  establishment  -  at  least,  until  the  collapse  of  the  `miracle' 
itself.  At  this  point,  the  crisis  of  ideology  became  not  only  an  internal  affair,  but  part  of  a 
more  complex  dialectic  of  domestic-global  tensions.  Significantly,  by  the  time  of  the 
Anwar  debacle  in  late  1998,  this  became  crystallised  as  a  conflict  of  ideology  between 
the'mainstream  Malaysian  media  and  key  parts  of  the  Western  media. 
Meanwhile,  political  legitimacy  in  the  region  began  to  unravel.  In  Thailand, 
South  Korea  and  Indonesia,  regimes  became  as  fragile  as  the  symbols  of  growth  and 
prosperity  that  had  surrounded  them.  All  were  to  fall  victim  to,  or  be  seriously 
weakened  by,  the  crisis.  Even  Suharto's  eventual  removal  could  not  stem  the  social 
upheaval  in  Indonesia.  In  Japan,  the  economy  lurched  ignominiously  towards  financial 
crisis,  recession,  increased  suicides  and  the  fall  of  the  Liberal  party  under  Hashimoto.  In 
Malaysia,  however,  where  the  symbolism  of  growth  had  been,  perhaps,  most  intense, 
Mahathir  prepared  for  a  concerted  defence  of  `Asian  values'  and  UMNO  hegemony. 
Central  to  Mahathir's  iconography  of  power  has  been  the  project  of  Vision  2020:  a 
millennial  symbol  of  growth,  wealth-creation  and  national  cohesion  on  an  unprecedented 
scale.  In  seeking  to  achieve  economic  maturity  and  NIC  (Newly  Industrialised  Country) 
status  by  that  year,  Mahathir  has  sought  to  galvanise  the  public  imagination  through  the 
ideas  of  nation-building  and  a  shared  vision  of  prosperity.  This  represents  not  only  the 
challenge  of  economic  development,  but  the  very  idealisation  of  national-popular  unity 
and  common  identity:  a  concept  captured  in  the  Vision  ideal  of  Bangsa  (one  nation) 
Malaysia.  By  the  late-  1990s,  the  Vision  also  encompassed  previous  icons  such  as 
Mahathir's  Look  East  and  Malaysia  Inc.  And,  just  as  these  contrived  to  turn  away  from 
the  West  towards  Japan,  so  too  had  Mahathir  sought  to  integrate  another  such  icon  in  his 
role  as  `man-of-the-South':  the  modern  anti-imperial  figure  leading  the  cause  of  the 
oppressed  periphery  against  the  promiscuous  power  of  the  North.  6 
To  understand  the  Vision  as  a  hegemonic  icon  and  discourse,  it  is  important  to 
recognise  its  significance  in  relation  to  macro-economic  planning.  Announced  by 
Mahathir  in  February  1991,  the  Vision  statement  set-out  a  series  of  policy  objectives  for 
growth  and  collective  social  development  to  be  realised  through  the  implementation  of 
policy  measures  beginning  under  the  Sixth  Malaysia  Plan  (1991-95),  the  New 
Development  Policy  (NDP)  (1991)  and  the  Second  Outline  Perspective  Plan  (OPP2) 
5 (1991-2000).  In  effect,  OPP2,  NDP  and  the  Sixth  Malaysia  Plan  all  form  part  of  a 
complementary  set  of  policy  documents  linked-into  Vision  2020.7 
In  Malaysia's  Vision  2020:  Understanding  the  Concept,  Implications  and 
Challenges,  8  we  find  the  connecting  themes  and  multifaceted  policy  features  of  these 
documents,  vis-ä-vis  Malaysia  Inc.,  public-private  sector  relations,  industrial  targets, 
science  and  technology,  education  and  training,  moral  values  in  business,  and  human 
resource  development.  Underlying  all  the  policy  objectives  here  is  the  view  that  an 
average  per  annum  growth  rate  of  7%  in  real  terms  over  the  period  of  OPP2  would  be 
necessary  for  Malaysia  to  attain  NIC  status  by  2020.9  This  ten-year  growth  schedule 
would  set  the  country  on  the  requisite  track  for  economic  maturity  and  provide  the 
impetus  for  sustained  industrial  development  thereafter  towards  2020. 
The  more  acute,  if  idealised,  message  within  the  Vision,  however,  concerns  the 
interrelated  issues  of  socio-economic  and  political-cultural  adjustment  needed  to  realise 
this  objective,  a  set  of  aims  posed  in  the  Vision's  Nine  Challenges  Facing  All 
Malaysians,  a  charter  for  economic  development,  national  integration  and  social 
community: 
The  first  of  these  is  the  challenge  of  establishing  a  united  Malaysian  nation,  with  a  sense  of  common 
and  shared  destiny.  This  must  be  a  nation  at  peace  with  itself,  territorially  and  ethnically  integrated, 
living  in  harmony  and  full  and  fair  partnership,  made  of  one  `Bangsa  Malaysia'  with  political  loyalty 
and  dedication  to  the  nation. 
The  second  is  the  challenge  of  creating  a  psychologically  liberated,  secure  and  developed  Malaysian 
society  with  faith  and  confidence  in  itself,  justifiably  proud  of  what  it  is,  of  what  it  has  accomplished, 
robust  enough  to  face  all  manner  of  adversity.  The  Malaysian  society  must  be  distinguished  by  the 
pursuit  of  excellence,  fully  aware  of  its  potentials,  psychologically  subservient  to  none  and  respected  by 
the  peoples  of  other  nations. 
The  third  challenge  we  have  always  faced  is  that  of  fostering  and  developing  mature  democratic  society, 
practising  a  form  of  mature  consensual,  community-oriented  Malaysian  democracy  that  can  be  a  model 
for  many  developing  countries. 
The  fourth  is  the  challenge  of  establishing  a  fully  moral  and  ethical  society,  whose  citizens  are  strong  in 
religious  and  spiritual  values  and  imbued  with  the  highest  of  ethical  standards. 
6 The  fifth  challenge  that  we  have  always  faced  is  the  challenge  of  establishing  a  mature,  liberal  and 
tolerant  society  in  which  Malaysians  of  all  colours  and  creeds  are  free  to  practise  and  profess  their 
customs,  cultures  and  religious  beliefs  and  yet  feeling  that  they  belong  to  one  nation. 
The  sixth  is  the  challenge  of  establishing  a  scientific  and  progressive  society,  a  society  that  is  innovative 
and  forward-looking,  one  that  is  not  only  a  consumer  of  technology  but  also  a  contributor  to  scientific 
and  technological  civilisation  of  the  future. 
The  seventh  challenge  is  the  challenge  of  establishing  a  fully  caring  society  and  a  caring  culture,  a 
social  system  in  which  society  will  come  before  self,  in  which  the  welfare  of  the  people  will  revolve  not 
around  the  state  or  the  individual  but  around  a  strong  and  resilient  family  system. 
The  eighth  is  the  challenge  of  ensuring  an  economically  just  society.  This  is  a  society  in  which  there  is 
a  fair  and  equitable  distribution  of  the  wealth  of  the  nation,  in  which  there  is  full  partnership  in 
economic  progress.  Such  a  society  cannot  be  in  place  as  long  as  there  is  the  identification  of  race  with 
economic  function,  and  the  identification  of  economic  backwardness  with  race. 
The  ninth  challenge  is  the  challenge  of  establishing  a  prosperous  society,  with  an  economy  that  is fully 
competitive,  dynamic,  robust  and  resilient. 
10 
We  need  not  look  too  hard  here  for  the  rhetorical  flourishes  or  `Asian  values' 
which,  apparently,  `define'  this  endeavour.  Thus,  why  should  Vision  2020  be  held-up  as 
any  more  of  a  nation-building  construct  than,  say,  Malaysia's  Rukunegara  or  Pancasila 
in  Indonesia?  "  Certainly,  Mahathir's  initial  announcement  of  the  Vision  was  received 
with  muted  public  enthusiasm.  But  what  came  to  distinguish  the  Vision  ideal  more 
readily  in  Malaysian  consciousness  was  the  general  perception  of  actual  benefits  and 
opportunities  to  be  realised  in  the  new  growth-driven  landscape  and  the  potential 
prospects  of  economic,  social  and  cultural  advancement  across  the  ethnic  spectrum.  12 
While,  perhaps,  not  conversant  with  the  minutiae  of  Vision  objectives,  there  appeared  to 
exist,  at  least  before  the  crisis,  a  strong  popular  association  between  the  idea  of 
`collective  economic  development'  and  Vision  2020  as  a  signifier  of  future  rewards. 
Significantly,  even  as  the  crisis  dawned  by  1997,  this  sense  of  Vision  development  as  an 
eventual  provider  of  prosperity  was  not  entirely  extinguished.  What  has  to  be  explained, 
thus,  is  how  these  associations  -  albeit  qualified  -  had  come  to  assume  such  popular 
resonance  and  to  what  extent  the  crisis  had  affected  those  perceptions.  13 
7 In  seeking  to  address  this  issue,  we  shall  see  how  Mahathirism  came  to  depend  upon  a 
more  complex  set  of  class-based,  political  and  intellectual  dynamics  in  the  1980s  and 
1990s.  Cultural  production,  the  delineation  of  social  values  and  the  filtering  of 
consensual  ideas  became  an  increasingly  crucial  part  of  the  legitimation  process.  The 
objective  interests  of  the  Malay  bourgeoisie,  based  since  the  early-1970s  around  a 
tightly-ordered  ethnic-class  reward  structure,  came  to  be  situated  not  only  in  relation  to 
processes  of  political  patronage  and  the  bureaucratic  state,  but  to  more  multifaceted 
forms  of  civil  persuasion.  While  continued  economic  growth,  following  the  mid-1980s 
recession,  had  helped  Mahathir  retain  a  substantive  middle-class  support  base,  as 
illustrated  by  his  convincing  mandate  at  the  1995  General  Election,  14  Malaysian  civil 
society  became  an  increasingly  contested  site  requiring  new  and  more  subtle  forms  of 
populist  consensus,  political  co-optation  and  intellectual  enterprise. 
Why  was  this  occurring?  It  is  the  basic  contention  of  this  study  that  alongside, 
and  as  a  condition  of,  the  rapid  economic  transition  and  integration  of  globally  ascendant 
neo-liberal  practices  in  Malaysia  from  the  early-1980s,  a  new-evolving  set  of  state-class 
relations  had  begun  to  unfold,  requiring  new  forms  of  hegemonic  authority  with  which  to 
sustain  it.  As  we  shall  see,  the  economic  crisis,  the  removal  of  Anwar  and  the  civil 
clampdown  was  to  throw  that  process  into  sharp  relief.  However,  it  is  also  important  to 
view  the  crisis  itself  as  a  key  part  of  this  process,  exposing  the  contradictions  of  the 
prevailing  order  and  allowing  new  situations  to  unfold.  What  had  been  emerging,  albeit 
tentatively,  was  a  reward  structure  and  civil  order  legitimised  through  an  increasingly 
consensual  set  of  processes;  an  approach  based  more  consciously  on  the  cultivation  of 
consent,  within  the  arena  of  civil  society,  as  opposed  to  coercion  via  the  strong-arm  of 
the  state.  As  the  crisis  has  shown,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  prevailing  elite  have 
abandoned  the  latter  as  a  response  mechanism.  However,  as  will  be  argued,  this  crisis,  as 
opposed  to  the  one  in  1987,  also  helped  reveal  the  limitations  of  that  option  as  a 
legitimation  strategy.  It  is  in  this  transitional  context,  a  process  given  impetus  by  the 
rapid  economic  developments  of  the  last  two  decades,  that  the  attempted  shift  towards 
legitimation  by  consent  rather  than  coercion  may  be  understood. 
At  the  populist  level,  this  does  not  mean  total  adherence  to  Mahathirism.  It  is 
enough  that  the  Vision  agenda,  as  a  popular  framework  for  national  economic  and  social 
prosperity,  has  the  `TINA  effect'  15  ;  that  it  has  popular  consent.  Of  course,  perceptions 
8 of  the  Vision  depend  upon  actual  benefits  derived  through  the  immediate  reward 
structure.  But  they  are  also  conditioned  by  the  illusion  of  wealth  creation,  potentially 
expanded  opportunities  and  the  idea  of  longer  term  rewards.  Thus,  it  is  not  argued  that 
the  Vision  will,  or  ever  intended  to,  deliver  any  of  this.  The  key  research  issue  here, 
rather,  lies  in  the  way  in  which  it  is  being  presented  as  a  hegemonic  construct  and  the 
legitimation  processes  underlying  it.  So,  as  part  of  this  analysis,  we  have  to  consider  the 
sense  in  which  the  crisis  had  undermined  the  Vision  and  the  elites  which  derive  most 
benefit  from  it.  From  this  perspective,  the  Vision  constitutes  the  key  part  of  an  evolving 
hegemonic  project;  an  all-encompassing  framework  for  continuing  modernisation  and  a 
populist  signifier  with  which  to  give  it  meaning.  In  particular,  it  seeks  to  consolidate  the 
new  configuration  of  state-class  interests  which  became  manifest  within  the  power  bloc 
by  the  late-1980s.  And  it  represents  a  culmination  of  the  challenge  initiated  by  Mahathir 
upon  entrenched  interests  within  the  state. 
The  political  initiatives  of  the  New  Economic  Policy  (NEP),  introduced  in 
response  to  deep-rooted  tensions  and  riots  in  1969,  were  designed  to  lift  the  indigenous 
Malays,  or  Bumiputeras  (sons  of  the  soil),  into  an  enhanced  socio-economic  position 
relative  to  the  Chinese.  Political  control  `depended'  on  harmonisation  of  Malay,  Chinese 
and  Indian  (respectively,  62%,  28%  and  8%  of  the  22  million  population16)  claims 
through  the  ethnic  party  construct  of  the  Barisan  -  though  the  Internal  Security  Act 
(ISA)  and  other  emergency  powers  remained  available  as  prominent  reminders  of  that 
authority.  The  principles  of  the  NEP  (though  altered  to  the  NDP  after  1990)  and  the 
threat  of  state  discipline  remain  in  place.  But  as  Mahathir  came  to  address  the  `imposed' 
conditions  and  the  political  opportunities  of  the  new  neo-liberal/deregulatory  agenda 
from  the  early-1980s,  the  nature  of  the  state  began  to  change.  And  these  changes 
involved  not  only  a  restructuring  and  dispersal  of  bureaucratic  sinecures,  small  Malay 
capital  and  Bumiputera  interests,  but  also  the  need  to  engage  more  consciously  at  the 
level  of  civil  society  as  a  means  of  re-fashioning  social  consensus. 
In  moving  tentatively  towards  forms  of  social  control  more  identifiable  with  the 
liberal  capitalist  democracies  of  the  West,  this  unfolding  shift  towards  a  political  order, 
based  on  what  Gramsci  termed  `national-popular'  consent,  has  also  meant  an  increasingly 
significant  role  for  cultural  production  in  Malaysia.  Media  organisations,  information 
agencies  and  popular  entertainment  have,  thus,  become  crucial  sources  and  means  of 
9 legitimation.  As  part  of  this  shift,  the  `great  debate'  between  `Asian  values'  and  `liberal 
democracy'  has  also  assumed  new  potency.  The  new  circumstances  of  economic 
prosperity,  wealth  restructuring  and  social  dislocation  have  not  only  compelled  the 
political  class  to  contest  the  civil  terrain  more  assertively  as  a  means  of  cultivating 
consensus,  hence  the  promotion  of  `Asian  values,  '  but  has  also  given  rise  to  a  more 
intensive  set  of  debates  amongst  varied  intellectual  communities  over  the  validity  of 
Western  liberal  democracy,  not  least  in  relation  to  the  codes  and  practices  of  Islam. 
The  importance  of  these  underlying  issues,  and  their  bearing  on  the  crisis,  is 
evident  in  an  intriguing  essay  written  by  Anwar  prior  to  his  sacking  and  arrest.  Amongst 
other  telling  observations,  he  asserted  that: 
Only  the  fostering  of  a  genuine  civil  society,  of  which  democracy  is  a  crucial  component,  can  assure  the 
path  of  sustained  growth  -  economically,  socially  and  politically...  Asian  societies  and  governments 
have  acquired  a  fondness  for  the  free  market  of  goods  and  services.  But  increasingly  they  will  have  to 
deal  with  the  free  market  of  ideas.  Some  will  vehemently  oppose  this  Babel  even  though  the  alternative 
is  a  sterile  and  sanitised  uniformity.  " 
This  view  of  civil  society  as  a  contested  site  is  important  in  two  senses.  Firstly,  it 
allows  us  to  understand  some  of  the  emerging  tensions  within  the  power  structure  and 
the  ways  in  which  Mahathirism  has  sought  to  `negotiate'  that  shift  towards  a  more 
consent-based  form  of  control.  While  Mahathir's  idea  of  civil  development  took  its  cue 
from  ideas  of  nation-building,  economic  prosperity  and  social  values  encoded  in  the  Nine 
Challenges,  Anwar's  was  more  about  civil  reconstruction  `from  below',  including  reform 
of  institutions  such  as  the  legal  system  and  the  practices  of  Islamic  jurisprudence. 
Complementing  the  above  view,  a  more  detailed  exposition  of  the  case  for  civil  reform 
had  appeared  in  Anwar's  1996  book  The  Asian  Renaissance.  In  the  context  of  `ongoing 
prosperity,  '  such  offerings  posed  more  of  a  discomfort  than  a  threat  to  conservative 
elements  within  UMNO,  the  Barisan  and  the  wider  power  structure.  However,  the  onset 
of  the  crisis,  the  expression  of  Anwar's  liberal  views  and  their  articulation  through  a 
Western  agenda  for  recovery  now  threatened  to  expose  not  only  the  deficits  of  Malaysian 
civil  institutions  but  the  more  specific  nature  of  power  relations  among  the  political- 
corporate  hierarchy.  Hence  the  showdown  with  Mahathir. 
10 Secondly,  the  idea  of  a  contested  civil  space  allows  for  a  more  qualitative  way  of 
thinking  about  alternative  intellectual  discourse,  dissent  and  the  potential  for  new  forms 
of  democratic  expression  within  Malaysian  society.  Taken  together,  this  is  a  view  of  civil 
society  which  specifically  rejects  orthodox  modernisation  readings,  or  variants  thereof, 
which  seek  to  make  linear  connections  between  economic  development,  the  opening-up 
of  civil  society  and  consequent  pressures  for  liberal  democracy.  Such  pressures  are, 
indeed,  likely  to  surface,  as  they  have  in  Malaysia.  However,  these  pressures  may  be 
seen  as  forming  part  of  a  far  more  contingent  process  than  is  suggested  in  this  type  of 
framework.  An  implicit  part  of  this  critique,  therefore,  involves  fundamental  questions 
about  the  democratic  nature  of  civil  society  in  the  West.  The  crucial  corollary  here 
concerns  the  way  in  which*  shifts  within  Malaysian  civil  society  and  pressures  for 
`democratic  expression'  have  given  rise  to  forms  of  social  control  and  legitimation 
evident  in  the  Western  capitalist  democracies.  This  denotes  the  Gramscian  sense  in 
which  power  is  formed  along  the  continuum  between  domination  and  hegemony  -  that 
is,  through  state  coercion  or/and  civil  consent.  In  short,  the  leading  class's  recourse  to 
coercive  means  in  order  to  maintain  power  (domination)  is  inversely  related  to  the  quality 
of  its  consensual  legitimacy  (hegemony).  Thus,  it  is  not,  (viz  liberal  readings)  the  extent 
of  `democracy'  in  Malaysia  which  is  at  issue  here,  but  the  extent  of  hegemony  in  terms  of 
Mahathir's  problematic  movement  along  this  spectrum  at  different  points  in  the  project 
-a  conceptually  different  issue  from  that  posed  by  liberal  analyses. 
This  takes  us  beyond  any  liberal-bourgeois  view  of  civil  society  as  a  series  of 
freely-competing  intellectual  exchanges.  For  alongside  the  economic  and  political 
components  of  any  hegemonic  order  or  project  lies  the  integrated  role  of  the  intellectual. 
And  this  brings  us  to  a  principal  theme  and  key  question  within  the  study.  To  what 
extent  can  we  begin  to  situate  the  intellectual  as  an  actor  within  the  actual  organisation 
of  hegemony? 
In  following  a  Gramscian  perspective,  we  can  begin  to  view  the  intellectual  as 
rather  more  than  the  academic  analyst  or  purveyor  of  knowledge.  Such  a  departure  does 
not,  of  course,  exclude  or  dismiss  such  roles;  far  from  it.  Rather,  it  takes  us  towards  a 
more  considered  view  of  how  `specialised'  intellectuals  and  `intellectual  communities' 
may  form  part  of  a  power  structure  by  helping  to  construct,  reproduce  and  filter 
dominant  or  `common  sense'  ideas  within  and  across  key  institutions.  The  university,  in 
11 this  sense,  is  not  a  neutral  domain  or  haven  for  `autonomous'  intellectuals.  As  Bourdieu 
also  argues,  it  is  a  protean  site  for  the  construction  of  ideologies;  a  contested  space 
which  power  elites  seek  to  influence,  organise  and  control.  18  Neither  does  this  mean  that 
intellectuals  are  passive  instruments  of  the  state.  What  we  have  to  consider,  rather,  is  the 
sense  in  which  elite  networks  use  this  terrain  to  cultivate  other  intellectuals  as  a  way  of 
internalising  specific  interests  and  ideas. 
This,  then,  brings  us  to  an  initial  point  of  definition.  Intellectuals,  for  present 
purposes,  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  their  location  and  roles  within  key  civil 
institutions  and  cultural  agencies,  rather  than  as  a  discrete  `intelligentsia'.  Thus,  specific 
intellectual  discourses  may  come  to  attain  ideological  prominence  and  social 
acknowledgement  through,  for  example,  the  school  syllabus,  academic  texts,  religious 
writings,  think-tank  reports,  government  forums  or  the  context-setting  and  filtering 
processes  of  the  mass-media.  Following  this  particularised  view  of  `intellectual 
enterprise',  the  task,  therefore,  is  to  consider  how  social  control  is  being  organised  not 
only  through  the  Malaysian  state  apparatus,  but  also  via  the  increasingly  complex 
landscape  of  civil  institutions. 
Towards  an  application 
The  study  will  seek  throughout  to  reflect  the  importance  of  the  three  thematic  aspects 
discussed  above,  namely:  the  circumstances  of  the  1980s  neo-liberal  adjustment;  the 
changing  nature  of  civil  society;  and  the  relevance  of  intellectual  enterprise  within  this 
process.  These  provide  a  basis  for  analysing  the  Vision  as  an  evolving  project,  the 
changing  configuration  of  state-class  relations  and  the  key  features  of  the  crisis.  Besides 
historical  background,  the  principal  time  frame  for  the  study  involves  the  period  of 
Mahathir's  accession  in  1981  to  the  conclusion  of  Anwar's  trial  in  April  1999.  Some 
further  summation  on  the  trial's  fallout  by  late-1999  will  be  noted  in  the  concluding 
chapter. 
As  a  preparatory  task,  the  opening  discussion  in  Chapter  1  will  review  and 
critique  some  of  the  main  literature  concerning  issues  of  class,  state  and  legitimacy  in 
Malaysia.  In  seeking  to  understand  the  emergence  of  Vision  discourse  as  a  hegemonic 
agenda,  this  chapter  will  also  set-out  the  main  historical  background  to  the  study,  with 
12 particular  emphasis  on  the  evolving  configuration  of  state-class  relations  and  the 
construction  of  ethnic  ideology.  The  chapter  will  also  consider  some  of  the  main 
deficiencies  within  mainstream  political  science  with  regard  to  Southeast  Asian  societies. 
This  will  question  not  only  the  analytical  merit  of  liberal  developmentalist-type 
approaches,  but  also  the  intellectual  agendas  underlying  them.  Particular  reference  will 
be  made  to  competing  interpretations  of  `democracy'  in  the  region  and 
conceptualisations  of  `growth'  as  developmentalist  ideology. 
In  response,  Chapter  2  offers  an  alternative  analytical  framework  based  around  a 
defined  set  of  Gramscian-type  perspectives.  Alongside  a  brief  exegesis  of  Gramsci's  own 
conception  of  hegemony,  the  historical  bloc,  civil  society  and  the  intellectual,  this  section 
will  discuss  the  particular  relevance  of  these  constructs  within  the  study.  A  resume  of 
forms  and  examples  of  the  power  bloc,  the  global  context  of  hegemonic  relations, 
hegemonic  projects  and  the  role  of  intellectuals  will  be  offered  here,  together  with  a  brief 
review  of  similar  explanatory  models. 
This  takes  us  to  the  first  substantive  part  of  the  study.  Adopting  the  above 
typology  of  economic,  political  and  ideological  forms,  Chapters  3,4  and  5  will  consider 
the  respective  components  of  the  Malaysian  power  bloc  through  this  three-fronted  view 
of  hegemony.  The  purpose  is  to  illustrate  the  contradictory  tensions  within  the  power 
bloc  from  the  early-1980s,  the  circumstances  within  which  new  power  relations  and 
intellectual  agendas  emerged  and  the  ways  in  which  they  found  expression  through  the 
Vision  project. 
Thus,  Chapter  3  will  assess  the  economic  basis  of  the  bloc  in  relation  to  the 
reward  structure  and  organisation  of  capital.  The  principal  claim  here  is  that  important 
changes  in  state-class  relations  have  occurred  under  Mahathir,  structural  shifts  which  can 
be  understood  both  as  a  response  to  extraneous  neo-liberal  market  forces  in  the  1980s 
and  as  `hegemonic  opportunities'  for  re-shaping  the  power  bloc.  Explored  here  are  the 
ways  in  which  Mahathir  initiated  and  managed  these  changes  through  the  new 
circumstances  of  privatisation,  deregulation  and  the  remodification  of  Bumiputeraism,  an 
institutionalised  social  compact  by  now  constraining  the  new  neo-liberal  agenda.  Taking 
up  these  issues,  the  chapter  proceeds  towards  an  assessment  of  the  economic  crisis  from 
mid-1997  and  the  class/economic  issues  surrounding  the  Anwar  affair. 
13 Chapter  4  considers  the  political  component  of  the  power  bloc  and  the 
underlying  nature  of  the  tensions  within.  Mahathir's  attempts  to  alter  the  rationale  of  the 
NEP,  particularly  in  the  transfer  to  the  NDP,  required  a  consolidation  of  legitimacy  at  the 
political  level.  Attention  is  given  here  to  the  ways  in  which  the  1987/88  UMNO  split 
was  interconnected  with  these  circumstances,  rather  than,  as  many  analysts  have 
portrayed  it,  the  product  of  conventional  political  factionalism  within  the  party.  It  is 
argued  here  that  the  reformulation  of  UMNO  after  the  split  was  a  reflection  of  the 
broader  realignment  within  the  bloc  itself.  The  chapter  is  concerned  with  Mahathir's 
attempts  to  synthesise  a  new  type  of  political  consensus  from  neo-liberal  and  neo- 
corporatist  elements.  It  goes  on  to  assess  Mahathir's  consolidation  of  the  political  bloc 
after  1990,  the  issue  of  the  `Anwar  succession',  the  political  impact  of  the  crisis  upon 
Mahathir's  authority  and  the  implications  of  the  Anwar  purge  for  UMNOBN  itself. 
Chapter  5  turns  more  specifically  to  the  ideological  component  of  the  project. 
This  section  considers  the  reproductive  capacities  of  the  UMNO  party  network  through 
its  engagement  and  control  of  intellectual  discourse  and  cultural  output.  Again,  this  is 
expressed  in  relation  to  the  party  as  organic  intellectual.  With  reference  to  the  emergent 
Vision  project,  the  chapter  argues  that  new  responses  to  social  pressures  were  becoming 
evident  by  the  mid-  1990s  as  Mahathir  tried  to  negotiate  a  more  consent-based  shift 
towards  the  management  of  rewards  and  ideas  within  civil  society.  However,  the  chapter 
will  also  attempt  to  illustrate  the  contradictions  within  that  process.  Here,  the  crisis  will 
be  used  more  substantively  to  illustrate  the  nature  of  ideological  enterprise  and  the 
particular  ways  in  which  the  UMNO  network  sought  to  direct  and  manage  the  situation, 
particularly  through  the  constructed  imagery  of  the  mass-media.  Close  attention  is  given, 
in  this  regard,  to  the  ways  in  which  news  and  popular  output  were  presented  over  this 
period  and  how  such  messages  may  have  been  received  by  a  concerned  public.  This 
takes  us  in  Chapter  6  to  a  more  specific  analysis  of  the  media  vis-ä-vis  the  Anwar  affair. 
Particular  attention  is  given  here  to  the  `competing  agendas'  of  the  domestic  and  foreign 
medias  in  their  respective  coverage  of  the  crisis. 
Bearing  in  mind  our  view  of  Malaysian  civil  society  as  a  contested  site,  the 
remaining  chapters  consider  the  effectiveness  of  this  ideological  enterprise  in  relation  to 
counter-hegemonic  forces.  Chapter  7,  thus,  uses  Gramsci's  typology  of  `organic'  and 
`traditional'  intellectuals  to  illustrate  the  task  for  UMNO  in  managing  the  challenge  from 
14 Parti  Islam  Se  Malaysia  (PAS)  and  `winning-over'  the  traditional  intellectuals.  In  this 
sense,  the  conflict  between  UMNO  and  PAS  represents  not  just  an  immediate  political 
contest,  but  an  intellectual  struggle  between  `Vision-Islam'  and  `PAS-Islam'.  As 
organic  intellectual,  the  UMNO  network  has  sought  to  mediate,  control  and  harness  the 
icons,  symbols  and  images  of  Islam  as  part  of  its  modernist  project.  But  with  political 
support  for  PAS  in  Kelantan  rooted  in  particularised  feelings  of  Islamic  identity  and 
economic  isolation,  the  intellectual  and  popular  appeal  of  the  Vision  here  has  been  highly 
contested.  Attempts  by  Nik  Aziz,  Kelantan's  Menteri  Besar  (Chief  Minister)  and  other 
traditional  intellectuals  to  entrench  shariah  law,  initiate  Islamic  codes  and  build  an 
Islamic  civil  society  in  Kelantan  have,  thus,  been  strongly  resisted  by  Mahathir  as  a  threat 
to  Barisan  hegemony.  While  the  purge  on  sects  like  Al  Arqam  denotes  the  ready  use  of 
coercion  to  control  traditional  Islamic  agencies,  the  tension  between  UMNO  and  PAS  in 
Kelantan,  the  only  state  outside  UMNO's  electoral  control,  has  required  Mahathir  to 
seek  a  more  consensual  endorsement  of  `Vision-Islam'.  Rejecting  Bumiputeraism,  Malay 
nationalism  and  capitalist  consumerism  as  varying  forms  of  assabiyah  (narrow 
chauvinism),  PAS,  in  turn,  have  sought  to  build  an  alternative  discourse  to  the  Vision 
project.  Here,  the  chapter  attempts  to  locate  the  paradoxes  of  the  `PAS  project',  its 
struggle  for  `organicity'  and  its  attempts  to  fuse  Islamic  civil  codes  and  social  collectivist 
ideas  into  a  cross-racial  agenda.  Continuing  this  theme  of  counter-hegemony,  Chapter  8, 
looks  in  more  detail  at  the  growing  strength  of  PAS  since  the  beginnings  of  the  crisis, 
their  view  of  Anwar  as  a  former  Muslim  activist  and  the  prospects  of  a  new  PAS  politics 
emerging  out  of  the  Anwar  situation.  . 
Finally,  as  another  part  of  the  `traditional  intellectual  community',  Chapter  9 
looks  at  the  counter-hegemonic  role  of  `the  left'  in  Malaysia.  In  tracing  the  status  of  `left 
ideas'  and  their  place  within  the  reformasi,  the  discussion  here  reflects  on  how  Islam  and 
other  cultural  sensitivities  have  informed  and  constrained  `radical  agendas'  in  Malaysia. 
With  the  proliferation  of  middle-class/bourgeois  strata  in  the  region,  '9  it  is  also  argued 
that  the  encroaching  values  of  Western  liberalism  and  Islamisation  have  created  new  and 
more  complex  forms  of  embourgeoisement,  political  cultural  identity  and  forms  of 
dissent.  Here,  UMNO  has  sought  to  incorporate  many  individuals  and  groups  through  a 
culture  of  `insiderism',  thus,  keeping  `dissent'  safely  contained  within  the  power 
structure  and  received  framework  of  ideas.  In  the  past,  critical  intellectual  `resistance'  to 
15 this  has  been  nominal.  However,  driven  by  the  new  `networking'  of  parties,  NGOs  and 
ad  hoc  reform  groups,  the  crisis  has  opened-up  fresh  opportunities  for  broad  political  co- 
operation,  critical  debate  and  meaningful  counter-hegemony.  In  considering  the 
prospects  for  the  opposition  realignment  by  mid-1999,  it  is  argued  that  this  nucleus  of 
dissent  was  now  better  placed  to  mount  a  serious  intellectual,  as  well  as  political, 
challenge  to  the  Barisan  and  the  wider  power  bloc. 
Approach  and  methodology 
The  main  research  theme  concerns  the  meaning,  legitimacy  and  contestation  of  the 
Vision  as  a  hegemonic  project.  In  seeking  to  locate  the  underlying  tensions  within  the 
Vision  project,  it  is  necessary  to  recognise  the  specific  Gramscian  meaning  and  tenor  of 
the  terms  `crisis'  and  `contradiction'.  This  suggests  the  ever-present  possibility  of 
challenges,  shifts  and  dislocations  within  the  bloc;  a  constant  dialectic  of  unfolding  state- 
class  relations  and  emerging  pressures  within  civil  society.  It  is  this  need  to  anticipate 
and  offset  such  tensions  through  the  ongoing  management  of  classes,  political  forces  and 
intellectual  production  which'  forms  the  integrated  basis  of  hegemonic  `order'.  It  also 
signifies  the  sense  in  which  the  `new  society'  emerges  out  of  the  crises  points  and 
contradictions  of  the  old.  20 
It  is  argued  from  the  outset,  that  the  specific  Gramscian  perspectives  to  be 
employed  in  addressing  these  questions  -a  set  of  terms  and  concepts  elaborated  in 
Chapter  2-  constitutes  an  important  part  of  the  research  theme  and  methodological 
approach  sui  generis.  It  also  signifies  the  use  of  Gramscian  ideas  as  analytical  tools, 
rather  than  an  attempt  to  `apply  Gramsci'  in  a  uniform  way.  Thus,  drawing  from  the 
`spirit'  of  Gramsci's  work,  this  allows  us  to  think  about  power  as  an  interacting  set  of 
economic,  political  and  ideological  forms  -a  sort  of  `hegemonic  trinity'  -  providing 
cumulative  expression  of  how  the  power  bloc  and  party  network  operates  as  an  organic 
intellectual.  But  it  also  offers  a  basis  for  setting-out  the  concrete  reality  of  the  Malaysian 
situation  in  its  historical  context.  As  one  Gramscian  observer  notes: 
This  concern  to  study  concrete  reality,  the  insistence  on  the  importance  of  the  historic  development  of 
institutions  and  relations  in  specific  conditions  went  beyond  empirical  illustration  and  has  important 
theoretical  and  political  implications.  21 
16 Thus,  an  implicit  aspect  here  has  been  the  need  to  limit  the  empiricist  tone  of  the 
work.  This  relates  to  the  positivist  tendency  within  mainstream  political  science  to 
employ  quantitative  models,  notably  for  `measuring  democracy',  an  approach  which,  it  is 
argued,  forms  part  of  a  `hegemonic  methodology'  in  itself.  Hence,  the  neo-Gramscian 
perspective  adopted  as  part  of  this  critique  seeks  to  illustrate  and  analyse  empirical 
resources  (including  various  forms  of  political  discourse  and  popular  media  output)  in  a 
more  open,  reflexive  way.  Likewise,  the  retrieval  of  interview  material  has  been  focused 
around  more  qualitative  forms  of  participation  and  engagement  of  the  arguments  rather 
than  formalised  questions  and  `non-value'-based  comment.  A  similar  approach  is  taken 
with  regard  to  content  analysis.  In  both  cases,  this  qualitative  approach  is  intended  to 
highlight  the  roles  of  actors  and  institutions  within  the  UMNO  network,  or/and 
opposition.  But  it  also  seeks  to  understand  the  `register'  and  nuance  of  the  language 
being  projected,  in  its  personalised,  media  or  other  discursive  forms.  Again,  this  involves 
a  more  engaged  mode  of  enquiry  by  eliciting  and  `speaking  to'  the  particular  hegemonic 
or  counter-hegemonic  context  of  the  statement.  Thus,  to  reveal  how,  for  example, 
academic  discourse,  media  stories  or  political  statement  becomes  text  for  national- 
populist  output,  we  also  need  to  trace  the  subtext  which  gives  it  meaning  as  intellectual 
enterprise.  This  is  not  `deconstruction'  in  the  `postmodernist'  sense,  something  which, 
ultimately,  denies  the  essence  of  power  in  its  structural  form.  Rather,  it  is  an  attempt  to 
show  how  such  discourse  has  hegemonic  purpose  as  language  and  symbols  reproduced 
through  civil  institutions,  thus  helping  to  articulate  specific  relations  of  power.  The  study 
has,  thus,  sought  to  use  examples  of  Vision  discourse  to  help  illustrate  this  process. 
In  addition,  the  impressions  conveyed  throughout  the  work  have  been  built 
around  many  informal  and  `off-the-record'  discussions  with  academics,  politicians, 
business  figures,  media  people,  political  activists  and  `ordinary  Malaysians'  (an 
unavoidable  term)  in  day-to-day  situations.  It  is  only  through  this  interpersonal 
interaction  that  one  can  connect  what  passes  for  `theoretical  exposition'  with  what  goes 
on  in  the  real  social  world.  This  observer,  at  least,  found  that  what  emerged  in  the 
course  of  such  casual  conversation  was  often  the  most  revealing  to  be  noted  in  the 
fieldwork  diary. 
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The  construction  of  legitimacy: 
Vision  2020  and  the  language  of  control 
The  main  purpose  here  is  to  offer  an  historical  background  against  which  to  locate 
Vision  2020  as  an  emergent  hegemonic  framework.  Integral  to  this  discussion  will  be  a 
review  and  critique  of  literature  concerned  with  the  themes  of  state,  class  and  legitimacy 
in  Malaysia.  An  important  part  of  this  critique  also  involves  consideration  of  certain 
liberal  discourses  and  `assumed'  language  within  mainstream  political  science  with  regard 
to  Southeast  Asia.  These  concern,  most  notably,  liberal  representations  of  `democratic 
transition'  and  the  supposed  `interface'  between  growth  and  democracy  (what  might  be 
termed  the  liberal-development-equation),  liberal  interpretations  of  `Asian  values'  and 
liberal  understandings  of  civil  society  in  the  region.  Although  varied  and  often  highly 
instructive  in  content,  it  is  suggested  that  much  of  mainstream  Asia  Pacific  literature  has 
come  to  `accept'  a  certain  liberal-defined  context  and  mode  of  analysis  -a  received 
idiom  of  thought  which,  in  taking  `dysfunctional'  obstacles  to  `liberal  development' 
within  these  societies  as  its  basic  starting  point,  constitutes  a  form  of  subtextual  ideology 
sui  generis.  However,  such  illustrations  are  also  intended  to  introduce  the  more 
particularised  view  here  that  the  legitimacy  of  domestic  elites  is  constructed  not  only 
within  the  immediate  state  nexus,  but  also  through  the  contestation  of  these  external 
discourses,  notably  at  the  level  of  civil  society.  Thus,  Mahathir  may  employ  the  idea  of 
`Asian  values'  or  `Asian  democracy'  as  a  language  of  populist  legitimation.  But  the 
language  itself  also  has  to  be  `negotiated'  and  reformulated  as  an  intellectual  construct 
against  other  dominant  agendas,  discourses  and  ideas.  It  is  in  this  more  contingent  sense 
that  the  propagation  of  class-based  ideology,  most  notably  ethnic  ideology,  has  been 
used,  in  varying  historical  forms,  by  elites  within  the  Malaysian  state  and  civil 
institutions.  Let  us  look,  then,  at  the  significance  of  such  discourses,  the  context  within 
which  ideas  are  negotiated  and  the  particular  ways  in  which  ethnic  ideology  has  been 
adapted  and  used  to  reproduce  a  particular  language  of  power. 
19 Vision  2020:  development,  society  and  post-ethnicity 
The  populist  message  of  Vision  2020  lies  in  its  base  sentiment  of  common  national 
development.  It  plays  upon  constructed  symbols  of  national  unity,  invoking  a  voxpopuli 
of  social  belonging  and  common  purpose:  `Malaysia  boleh'  (Malaysia  can),  as  the  media 
message  puts  it.  The  Vision  represents,  in  this  sense,  much  more  than  an  industrial  plan 
for  advanced  economic  development.  It  involves  an  attempt  to  stimulate  a  new  social 
context  for  the  emergence  of  an  alternative  social  order.  As  such,  it  seeks  to  project 
challenging  messages  of  economic  co-operation,  ethnic  integration  and  communal 
partnership  as  signifiers  of  a  more  inclusive  nationalism,  reward  structure  and  social 
community. 
But  the  Vision  also  has  to  be  seen  as  an  expression  of  class-based  interests  and 
the  particular  composition  of  the  Malaysian  state.  Hence,  it  is  important  to  understand 
the  evolution  of  state-class  authority  and  ideology  in  Malaya/Malaysia  as  part  of  an 
historical  process  and  the  consequent  sense  in  which  Vision  2020  constitutes  a  newly 
emerging  framework  of  state-class  legitimacy.  In  particular,  this  allows  us  to  confront 
Vision  language  as  a  nascent  discourse  and  form  of,  what  may  be  termed,  `post-ethnic 
nationalism':  that  is,  a  gathering  shift  away  from  NEP  ideology,  ethnic  balancing  and  the 
old  `politics  of  consociationalism'  -  class  constructions  and  state  forms  variously 
designed  to  protect  and  reproduce  the  ideas  and  interests  of  the  dominant  class  fractions 
across  ethnic  lines.  Although  these  ethnic  cleavages  remain  a  perennial  part  of  social  and 
political  consciousness  in  Malaysia,  what  is  also  emerging  is  a  new  type  of  state-class 
construction,  more  relevant  to  the  prevailing  economic  climate  of  global  markets, 
deregulation  and  the  expanded  opportunities  of  capital  accumulation.  In  other  words, 
the  social  changes  effected  by  rapid  economic  development,  neo-liberal  processes  and  the 
new  global  competition  have  involved  the  articulation  of  a  more  inclusive,  `cross-ethnic' 
conception  of  the  `national  interest';  a  growth-driven,  `free-market'  framework  which, 
given  impetus  by  the  structural  demands  of  transnational  capital  from  the  1980s,  yet 
restricted  by  the  claims  of  Bumiputeraism,  the  NEP  state  and  entrenched  bureaucratic 
interests,  seeks  to  move  towards  new  forms  of  accommodation  with  capital,  socio- 
economic  management  and  ideological  persuasion. 
20 In  order  to  situate  this  appeal  to  post-ethnic  nationalism  and  the  crystallisation  of 
Vision  2020  as  a  hegemonic  project,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  the  historical  nature  of 
the  state,  the  evolution  of  class  relations  and  the  role  of  ethnic  ideology  within  that 
process. 
Class,  state  and  the  ideology  of  ethnicity 
Attempts  within  mainstream  political  science  to  understand  the  nature  of  political 
legitimacy  in  `developing'  countries  such  as  Malaysia  have  involved  two  principal 
approaches.  One  has  been  to  view  the  task  as  an  analytical  `problem'  of  `democratic 
transition'  by  considering  the  use  of  `qualified'  forms  of  democracy  as  particular  to  given 
state  forms  and  political  systems.  As  will  be  argued,  the  problem  with  this  approach  is 
that  it  is  both  quantitatively  artificial  and  premised  on  certain  Freedom  House-type 
assumptions  of  what  democracy  actually  is.  The  second  approach  is  to  isolate  a 
particular  aspect  of  the  social  order,  such  as  racial  or  ethnic  cleavages,  and  to  build  an 
explanation  of  the  broader  political  system  around  it.  In  some  cases,  a  convergence  of 
these  approaches  is  used.  For  example,  in  Diamond,  Linz  and  Lipset  (eds.  ),  Democracy 
in  Developing  Countries:  Asia,  Zakaria  takes  up  the  theme  of  ethnic  polarities,  and  their 
`central  significance'  within  the  political  structure,  to  describe  Malaysia  as  a  `Quasi 
Democracy  in  a  Divided  Society'.  '  A  further  variation  of  Zakaria's  communal  theme  can 
be  seen  in  Morley  (ed.  )  Driven  by  Growth:  Political  Change  in  the  Asia  Pacific  Region, 
a  complement  to  the  Lipset-type  literature,  taking,  as  the  title  suggests,  a  similar 
developmentalist  view.  Here,  under  the  concluding  subheading  of  `Race,  Growth  and 
Politics',  Zakaria  has  this  to  say  about  Malaysia: 
...  the  conclusion  seems  inescapable  that  communalism  remains  and  will  continue  for  some  time  to 
remain  the  key  to  Malaysian  politics...  Thus,  in  Malaysia  the  all-enveloping  cloud  of  communal  rivalry 
obscures  the  political  direction  in  which  economic  growth  may  be  driving,  whether  primarily  democratic 
or  authoritarian.  2 
Issues  of  growth  and  state  legitimacy  in  Malaysia  are,  thus,  commonly  situated 
around  the  `dysfunctional'  politics  of  ethnicity.  Ethnic  loyalties,  racial  tensions  and  the 
balancing  of  communal  rewards  are  seen  as  pivotal  features  of  the  overall  political  and 
21 social  order  -a  sort  of  main  gravitational  force  setting  the  motion  of  political  events 
and  pulling  the  connecting  elements  together  into  a  kind  of  revolving  orbit.  It  is,  of 
course,  necessary  to  recognise  the  particular  salience  of  communal  identity  within  this 
process.  One  must  also  be  sensitive  to  the  deeper  seam  of  culture,  custom  and  belief 
which,  quite  simply,  undercuts  class  as  a  form  of  social  identity.  But  this  need  not 
involve  us  in  a  primordialist  view  of  culture  and  communal  identity  as  determinant  forms 
of  analyses.  For  while  racial  affiliations  and  ethnic  loyalties  often  supersede  those  of 
class,  it  is  necessary  to  show  how  class  interests  have  been  structured  around  communal 
divisions  and  the  manipulation  of  ethnic  ideology. 
This  suggests  ideas  of  `the  other'  as  a  signifier  of  power.  In  Orientalism, 
Edward  Said  shows  how  the  West,  in  projecting  the  East  as  other,  gave  coherence  to  an 
ideology  of  distinctiveness  as  a  mode  of  domination,  thus  offering  it  a  means  of 
signifying  and  reproducing  its  own  dominant  identity  through  the  denigration  and 
subjugation  of  another.  Thus  could  Disraeli  find  both  meaning  and  purpose  in  the  idea  of 
the  East,  seeing  it  as  no  less  than  "a  career,  one  in  which  one  could  remake  and  restore 
not  only  the  Orient,  but  oneselfi3  Explored  further  in  Culture  and  Imperialism,  4  Said 
illustrates  the  importance  of  popular  narrative  as  a  medium  of  colonial  ideology,  showing 
how  the  classic  19th  century  novel  and  related  cultural  forms  helped  give  expression  to 
an  ascendant  politics  and  culture  of  Empire.  Colonial  power  depended  not  only  upon  the 
assertion  of  economic  and  political  authority,  but  also  upon  the  legitimation  of  that 
authority  through  the  reification  of  a  popularised  colonial  language.  At  the  same  time, 
though,  Said  is  also  at  pains  to  specify  the  idea  of  resistance  to  power.  Thus,  in  the 
colonial  context,  he  points  to  the  engaged  struggle  of  committed  writers  such  as  Frantz 
Fanon  and  CLR  James,  in  contrast  to  the  imperialist  imagery  of  Kipling's  "white  man's 
burden",  or,  in  Heart  of  Darkness,  where,  despite  Conrad's  implicit  empathy  for 
subverted  natives,  there  is  little  acknowledgement  of  indigenous  cultural  resources  as  a 
form  of  resistance  or  engagement  of  ideas: 
...  to  ignore  or  otherwise  discount  the  overlapping  experience  of  Westerners  and  Orientals,  the 
interdependence  of  cultural  terrains  in  which  coloniser  and  colonised  co-existed  and  battled  each  other 
through  projections  as  well  as  rival  geographies,  narratives  and  histories  is  to  miss  what  is  essential 
about  the  world  in  the  past  century.  s 
22 The  development  of  ideas,  culture  and  language,  for  Said,  is,  thus,  a  contested  process, 
albeit  one  `negotiated'  within  a  particular  context  of  power.  It  also  illustrates  how 
Mahathirism  has  sought  to  `contest'  these  sites  with  the  West  as  intellectual  narratives 
and  constructs. 
In  a  similar  vein,  Maaruf  has  noted  the  failure  of  mainstream  discourse  to 
recognise  the  specificity  of  history  and  tradition  in  shaping  political  and  economic 
development  in  the  region.  For  the  Malays: 
...  consciousness  of  tradition  as  well  as  the  emotional  and  philosophical  attachments  to  it,  is  an 
existential  problem  and  not  merely  a  surface  feature.  It  is  this  single  fact  which  has  gone  a  long  way  in 
moulding  their  culture,  thought  and  character,  and  in  conditioning  their  response  to  the  challenges  of 
social  change,  development  and  modernisation  ... 
[T]here  has  been...  a  lack  of  appreciation  that  tradition 
is  a  living  force  moulding  the  world  view  of  the  Malays.  6 
Addressing  such  themes  as  historical  biography,  Khoo  Boo  Teik's  Paradoxes  of 
Mahathirism  offers  a  more  nuanced  view  again.  Taking  its  core  components  - 
nationalism,  capitalism,  Islam,  populism  and  authoritarianism  -  the  author  sees  the 
complex  and  contradictory  nature  of  Mahathirism  as  an  evolving  ideology.  For  example, 
Mahathir's  consistent,  and  often  zealous,  support  for  Malay  rights  from  the  post-war 
colonial  period  never  involved  any  straightforward  endorsement  of  `Malayness',  an 
identity  which  he  has  always  regarded  as  regressive  and  detrimental  to  Malay 
development.  The  tensions  between  consensual  and  coercive  statecraft  are  also  explored 
in  the  paradox  of  Mahathir  as  both  populist  and  authoritarian.  7  As  such,  this  text 
provides  an  important  set  of  base  issues  for  the  present  study  and  a  departure  point  from 
which  to  consider  the  still-evolving  nature  of  Mahathirism,  post-ethnic  nationalism  and 
the  Vision. 
Complementary  to  this,  Anne  Munro-Kua's  Authoritarian  Populism  in  Malaysia 
offers  a  key  study  of  Mahathirism  as  a  particular  form  of  state  authority  arising  out  of  the 
constructed  circumstances  of  class  and  communalism  in  the  colonial  period.  This 
approach,  moreover,  has  a  special  resonance,  given  its  neo-Gramscian  subtext  and 
particular  view  of  Malaysia  as  an  authoritarian  populist  state,  a  theme  to  be  developed 
further  in  Chapter  2  with  regard  to  hegemony  and  the  power  bloc.  As  in  the  present 
work,  Munro-Kua  is  concerned  to  understand  the  contradictory  tensions  of  authoritarian 
23 populism,  given  the  state's  simultaneous  use  of  repressive  and  consensual  strategies. 
However,  while  mindful  of  the  former,  the  present  analysis  seeks  to  develop  a  more 
particular  understanding  of  the  latter  with  regard  to  Mahathir's  developing  Vision 
agenda.  The  other  main  departure  here  is  to  move  beyond  Munro  Kua's  view  of 
Mahathirism  as  an  essentially  Malay  nationalist  ideology,  a  proposition  noted  in  the 
following: 
[Mahathir's]  rule  has  seen  an  extensive  expansion  of  executive  power  and  consequent  blocking  of 
various  mediations  while  strengthening  his  own  direct  link  to  the  populist  base.  While  nationalism  has 
been  an  important  strand  of  populism,  this  is  essentially  a  `Malay'  nationalism,  which  seeks  to  mobilize 
support  for  the  Malay  bourgeois  class  project  through  communal  appeal.  8 
While  recognising  the  salience  of  Malay  national-populism,  as  exemplified  by  Munro- 
Kua's  class-based  conception  of  Mahathirist  statecraft,  it  is  also  necessary  to  consider 
the  still  emerging  shifts,  undercurrents  and  contradictions  within  that  project.  Moreover, 
despite  the  state's  recourse  to  coercion  during  the  crises  points  of  1987  and  1997-99,  we 
need  to  recognise  how  the  polity  and  civil  order  has  been  manoeuvring  towards  a  more 
consensual  form  of  hegemonic  legitimacy  through  Vision  ideology.  Thus,  intrinsic  to  this 
process  has  been  evolving  forms  of  the  state  based  around  the  ethnic  ideologies  of 
colonialism,  consociationalism  and  Bumiputeraism.  In  chronological  terms,  we  can  trace 
these  ideologies,  respectively,  from  the  colonial  period  to  Merdeka  (Independence)  in 
1957,  through  the  Alliance  phase  (1957-69)  and  into  the  NEP  period  (1971-91).  Let  us 
consider  each  of  these  phases  in  an  attempt  to  locate  the  emerging  nature  of  state-class 
interests,  ethnic  ideologies  and  the  construction  of  `post-ethnic  nationalism'  through  the 
Vision's  Bangsa  Malaysia. 
The  Colonial  phase 
In  1956,  a  year  before  Merdeka,  J.  S.  Furnivall  used  his  classic  conception  of  `the  plural 
society'  to  describe  the  process  of  ethnic  differentiation  in  colonial  Malaya.  Following 
his  previous  studies  of  Indonesia  and  Burma,  Furnivall  argued  in  Colonial  Policy  and 
Practice  that  ethnic  migration  to  Malaya,  in  response  to  the  demands  of  the  colonial 
economy,  had  given  rise  to  a  social  order  segmented  by  race  and  custom: 
24 They  mix  but  do  not  combine.  Each  group  holds  by  its  own  religion,  its  own  culture  and  language,  its 
own  ideas  and  ways.  As  individuals  they  meet,  but  only  in  the  market  place,  in  buying  and  selling. 
There  is  a  plural  society,  with  different  sections  of  the  community  living  side  by  side,  but  separately 
within  the  same  political  unit.  Even  in  the  economic  sphere  there  is  a  division  of  labour  along  racial 
lines.  9 
Pluralism,  as  understood  by  Furnivall,  has  since  been  discarded  for  its  a  priori 
view  of  ethnic  relations.  In  effect,  it  took  communal  divisions  as  given  phenomena, 
rather  than  social  cleavages  requiring  critical  explanation.  1°  Nonetheless,  its  importance 
as  a  discursive  model  within  the  literature,  even  by  the  late  1970s,  as  exemplified  in  texts 
such  as  Pluralism  in  Malaysia,  "  illustrates  the  way  in  which  colonial  representations  of 
the  ethnic  factor  helped  shape  mainstream  analyses  of  the  state  and  polity  in  Malaysia. 
Alongside  an  ambivalent  view  of  the  colonial  legacy,  much  of  the  subsequent  literature 
retained  this  basic  conception  of  ethnic  division  and  communal  politics  as  `primordially 
given'  rather  than  the  historical  product  of  the  colonial  state  itself.  Yet,  the  construction 
of  the  `ethnic  other'  was  itself  an  intrinsic  part  of  colonial  ideology  in  British  Malaya. 
Complementary  to  the  colonial  division  of  labour,  such  images  and  representations 
comprised  a  key  element  of  legitimation  and  social  order. 
It  was  the  manipulation  of  race  as  a  divide  and  rule  strategy  in  British  Malaya, 
involving  the  selective  division  of  labour  along  ethnic  lines  and  the  reproduction  of  ethnic 
ideology,  which  helped  maintain  the  colonial  power  structure,  shaping  the  framework  of 
state-class  politics  after  Merdeka.  Through  the  colonial  office,  the  British  and  other 
commercial  interests  had  sought  to  restructure  the  domestic  economy,  turning  it  from 
subsistence  agriculture  into  a  key  producer  of  primary  products  and  raw  materials  for  the 
British  and  European  markets.  As  capitalist  appropriation  became  fully  organised 
around  the  abundant  resources  of  tin  and  rubber,  the  British  actively  encouraged  a  policy 
of  ethnic  immigration  and  stratified  labour  relations  to  help  realise  an  export-led 
accumulation  strategy.  With  the  consequent  growth  of  Indian  and  Chinese  migrants  to 
Malaya  as  indentured  labour,  most  notably  through  the  credit-ticket-system,  an  ethnic 
division  of  labour  began  to'  form  by  the  early  19th  century.  12  Following  the  development 
of  the  Straits  Settlements  as  key  trading  centres,  the  rising  demand  for  tin  by  the  1850s 
saw  the  expansion  of  Chinese  mining  settlements  into  Perak  and  Selangor.  With  world 
demand  for  rubber  also  growing,  the  British  continued  to  sponsor  the  importation  of 
25 Indian  labour  to  work  on  European-owned  plantations.  13  Thus,  with  the  integration  of 
each  ethnic  grouping  into  different  sectors  of  the  colonial  economy  and  distinct  social 
milieux,  colonial  representations  of  racial  attributes  began  to  find  populist  resonance. 
Indians,  mainly  Tamils,  were  regarded  as  compliant  and  efficient,  suited  to 
routine  agriculture  and  the  administrative  conditions  of  British  colonial  office.  The 
Chinese,  bound  together  through  the  complex  networks  of  the  kongsi  clan  system  and 
Kapitan  labour  pools,  were  viewed  by  the  British  as  a  particularly  industrious  race, 
evidenced  by  their  ready  access  to  capital  and  productive  activity  in  mining  and 
plantation  agriculture.  This  did  not,  however,  protect  the  Chinese  coolie  from 
exploitation  at  the  hands  of  British  or  Chinese  capitalists  -  the  plentiful  supply  of  opium 
helping  to  maintain  labour  dependency,  while  providing  valuable  revenue  for  the  colonial 
office.  14  Meanwhile,  the  Chinese  and  Indian  communities  remained  excluded  from 
political  office,  a  `pro-Malay'  privilege  retained  for  a  select  class  of  Malay  civil  servants 
as  a  means  of  co-opting  the  feudal  aristocracy. 
In  contrast,  the  native  Malay  peasant  came  to  be  portrayed  as  a  dysfunctional 
part  of  the  colonial  mode  of  production:  detached  from  commercial  activity,  unwilling  to 
participate  in  waged  labour  and  unreliable  as  a  racial  type.  It  is  important  to  note  that  this 
view  derives  from  an  `objective'  and  sympathetic  conception  of  the  Malay.  Sir  Thomas 
Raffles,  founder  of  Singapore,  saw  in  the  Malay  a  sense  of  predicament,  his  `negative 
traits'  the  product  of  sensitivities  to  insult  and  previous  colonial  subjugation.  Similar 
sentiments  were  offered  by  other  colonial  observers  such  as  Hugh  Clifford  and  Sir  Frank 
Swettenham  who  both  deplored  the  general  `lack  of  understanding'  towards  Malay 
society.  Yet  despite  this  empathy,  a  colonial  genre  of  travel  stories,  and  ethnographic 
caveats  came  to  reflect  an  idealised  picture  of  the  `real  Malay'  as  indolent,  lazy  and 
untrustworthy,  establishing  a  popular  cultural  stereotype  and  a  rationale  for  `benevolent 
intervention'.  15  Thus,  at  the  height  of  Empire,  could  Swettenham,  as  colonial  Governor, 
offer  a  `definitive'  image  of  a  people  in  his  claim  that  the  "leading  characteristic  of  the 
Malay  of  every  class  is  a  disinclination  to  work.  s16 
As  Alatas  has  shown,  most  definitively  in  The  Myth  of  the  Lary  Native,  not  only 
was  this  an  essential  part  of  colonial  ideology,  but  was  later  to  become  part  of  the 
ideological  context  of  Mahathir's  NEP  nationalism.  17 
26 Other  recent  state-based  analyses  have  also  helped  illuminate  the  colonial  legacy 
and  the  ways  in  which  ethnic,  religious  and  other  cultural  forms  are  used  as  ongoing 
strategies  of  legitimation.  For  example,  Jesudason,  employing  a  state-centred  model 
derived  from  Skocpol,  views  the  historical  construction  of  the  Malaysian  state  as 
`syncretic'  in  form,  namely  because  it: 
... 
is  a  product  of  a  particular  historical-structural  configuration  that  has  allowed  the  power  holders  to 
combine  a  broad  array  of  economic,  ideological  and  coercive  elements  in  managing  the  society, 
including  limiting  the  effectiveness  of  the  opposition  as  a  democratising  force...  The  syncretic  state 
operates  at  a  multidimensional  level,  mixing  coercive  elements  with  electoral  and  democratic 
procedures;  it  propagates  religion  in  society  as  it  pursues  secular  economic  goals;  it  engages  in  ethnic 
mobilisation  while  inculcating  national  feeling;  and  it  pursues  a  combination  of  economic  practices 
ranging  from  liberal  capitalism,  state  economic  intervention,  to  rentier  arrangements.  These  features  are 
in  important  ways  a  product  of  the  externally  implanted  nature  of  the  colonial  state  and  the  colonial 
capitalist  economy.  '' 
Although  Jesudason  correctly  notes  the  colonial  context  of  the  Malaysian  state, 
the  hybrid  nature  of  its  legitimacy  and  the  particular  way  in  which  it  `trades-of  these 
various  elements,  there  is  a  tendency  here  to  view  class  as  something  of  an  adjunct  to 
state-centrism.  By  implication,  class  becomes  a  by-product,  albeit  an  important  one,  of 
the  state;  a  dependent  element  of  the  state's  omnipotence.  Jesudason  does  insist  that  the 
Malaysian  state's  propagation  of  syncretic  measures  is  neither  static  nor  uninfluenced  by 
potential  pressures  from  within  civil  society  and  the  middle-class.  However,  he  sees  any 
real  crisis  of  legitimacy  emerging,  more  likely,  as  a  loss  of  coherence  within  the  state 
itself  as  it  confronts  the  problems  of  social  stability  generated  by  economic  change.  '9  He 
also  notes  here  how  the  state  constrains  particular  forms  of  class  mobilisation  while  also 
lurching  precariously  towards  contradiction  as  it  tries  to  manage  the  social  outcomes  of 
sustained  development. 
Yet,  bearing  in  mind  the  importance  of  the  state  in  articulating  class  interests,  as 
well  as  this  potential  for  internal  state  crises,  what  has  to  be  specified  more  clearly  here  is 
the  idea  of  a  state-class  nexus;  that  is,  a  more  dynamic  conception  of  state-class 
interactions  premised  upon  the  historical,  contingent  relationship  between  competing 
state  elites,  class  elements  and  fractions  of  capital  -  structural  relations  which,  in  turn, 
influence  and  condition  class  formation  at  the  broader  social  level.  Moreover,  civil 
27 society  is  more  significant  than  Jesudason,  perhaps,  allows,  given  its  increasing  relevance 
as  an  arena  of  legitimation  and  medium  for  offsetting  the  propensity  to  state  crises  itself 
-  hence,  as  suggested  below,  the  greater  contestation  of  civil  institutions  by  state  elites 
in  an  attempt  to  build  populist  consensus. 
As  with  Munro-Kua,  K.  S.  Jomo  and  Hua  Wu  Yin  come  closer  to  this  idea  of  a 
state-class  nexus.  Taking  up  class  as  a  more  particular  mode  of  analysis,  both  point  to 
the  historical  implications  of  colonialism,  citing,  for  example,  the  incorporation  of  the 
Malay  middle-classes  into  the  administrative  apparatus  of  the  state  and  the  extent  to 
which  this  served  to  limit  the  formation  of  a  Malay  bourgeoisie.  This,  in  turn,  helps  us 
understand  better  the  consequent  nature  of  the  NEP  state  in  seeking  to  redress  this 
`anomaly'.  Jomo  also  notes,  in  this  regard,  how  the  later  ascendancy  of  "Malay  statist 
capitalists"  and  the  "onus  of  capital  accumulation  on  the  state"  ultimately  gave  rise  to: 
new  contradictions  with  other  capitalist  fractions 
... 
[Hence,  ]...  the  more  pronounced  forms  of  class 
contention  in  contemporary  Malaysia  are  outcomes  of  class  contradictions  generated  by  the  rise  of  the 
20  statist  bourgeoisie. 
For  Hua  Wu  Yin,  communal  division  within  Malaysian  society  is,  again,  rooted  in 
the  colonial  experience.  The  legacy  is  a  dependent  capitalism  in  Malaysia  and  a  ruling 
class  which  must  rely  upon  the  exploitation  of  communal  division  as  a  source  of  class 
domination.  2'  Rejecting  pluralist  explanations  of  the  communal  factor,  he  points  to  the 
"institutionalisation  of  communalism"  by  the  Malay  bourgeoisie  under  the  NEP  as  the 
"cardinal  mechanism  by  which  the  Malaysian  ruling  class..  .  maintain[s]  the  loyalty  of  the 
Malay  masses.  "22 
Brennan  argues,  further,  that  the  Malay  bourgeoisie's  pragmatic  alliance  with 
international  capital  after  Merdeka  not  only  reflected  its  dependent  integration  into  the 
global  economy,  but  also  helped  generate  new  hostilities  by  displacing  sections  of  the 
non-Malay  bourgeoisie  from  that  process.  In  other  words,  class  conflict  has  been  the 
engine  of  communal  conflict,  stoking  ethnic  tensions  and  maintaining  communal 
divisions,  the  traditional  support  bases  for  UMNO,  the  MCA  and  MIC.  23 
In  this  regard,  Brown  shows  how  ethnic  politics  in  Malaysia  is  located  within  a 
more  holistic  context  of  state  forms,  class  relations  and  the  particular  construction  of 
ethnic  ideology.  Again,  this  distinctive  class  approach  sees  ethnic  affiliations  and 
28 communal  divisions  as  state-class  arrangements  arising  out  of  the  prevailing  economic 
structure.  Brown's  analysis  moves  beyond  both  core  Marxist  state  theory  and  later 
`relative  autonomy'  models  -  as  well  as  Jesudason/Skocpol  state-centred  views  -  to  a 
position  which  understands  more  incisively  the  dynamics  of  contending  class  interests 
and  balancing  processes  within  the  state.  Thus,  in  Malaysia  we  can  trace  the  emergence 
of  a  Malay  state  bureaucratic  class  seeking  to  consolidate  their  own  interests  while 
attempting  to  accommodate  international  capital,  mediate  other  bourgeois  class  fractions 
and  control  subordinate  class  groups  through  the  manipulation  of  ethnic  ideology.  24 
Applying  these  insights  to  the  historical  development  of  the  Malaysian  state,  Brown 
notes  how: 
During  the  colonial  period,  the  state  was  characterized  as  the  agency  of  British  capitalist  interests, 
mainly  those  in  plantation  and  mining,  so  that  state  expenditure  was  focused  on  the  infrastructural 
developments  necessary  to  promote  primary  products.  During  the  next  period,  from  Independence  up  to 
1969,  the  state  acted  to  mediate  between  competing  classes  and  between  the  class  fractions  amongst  the 
bourgeoisie,  and  this  was  reflected  in  the  institutionalization  of  a  governing  alliance  between  the  various 
bourgeois  class  fractions.  After  1969,  the  bureaucratic  bourgeoisie  gained  predominant  control  of  the 
state  machinery  and  used  this  to  attain  progressive  dominance  within  the  governing  alliance,  and  to 
acquire  access  to  commercial  and  industrial  capital.  As  the  state  became  more  clearly  the  agency  of  the 
bureaucratic  bourgeoisie,  the  stability  of  the  alliance  was  threatened  both  by  fractional  rivalries  as  the 
other  bourgeois  class  fractions  were  marginalized,  and  by  class  tensions  as  state-based  industrial 
development  exacerbated  disparities  between  the  bourgeoisie  as  a  whole  and  the  subordinate  classes. 
The  bureaucratic  bourgeoisie  then  sought  to  employ  the  machinery  of  the  state  so  as  to  contain  and 
mediate  the  resultant  tensions.  They  did  this  partly  by  granting  political  concessions,  but  primarily 
through  the  manipulation  of  ideology.  One  such  available  ideological  theme,  and  that  which 
predominated,  was  the  ideology  ojethnicity.  25 
It  is  also  necessary  to  set  these  ethnic  ideologies  against  the  particular 
circumstances  of  the  decolonisation  process  itself.  The  first  element  here  concerns  the 
form  of  colonial  rule  between  1946  and  Merdeka.  Although  the  British  had  successfully 
employed  a  form  of  indirect  rule,  by  adhering  to  `pro-Malay'  policies  and  recognising  the 
Malay  Sultans  as  `natural  rulers',  26  their  attempt  to  move  towards  a  more  uniform 
structure  in  1946,  through  the  Malayan  Union  scheme,  was  seen  as  a  betrayal  by  the 
Malay  aristocracy.  It  was  from  here  and  other  conservative  Malay  institutions  that  the 
UMNO  political  class  emerged  in  that  year  to  oppose  the  scheme,  giving  rise  to  a 
29 conservative  Malay  nationalist  coalition.  The  Malayan  Union  had  been  introduced  by  the 
British  as  an  initial  attempt  to  bring  the  nine  Malay  states  of  Perlis,  Kedah,  Kelantan, 
Terengganu,  Pahang,  Perak,  Selangor,  Negri  Sembilan  and  Johore,  plus  the  two  (Crown) 
Straits  Settlements  of  Penang  and  Malacca  under  the  ambit  of  a  stable  central  governing 
body  for  the  first  time.  Under  the  scheme,  administrative  powers  were  to  be  organised 
on  a  cross-ethnic  basis,  an  arrangement  presented,  ostensibly,  as  a  democratic  reform  of 
the  political  system  and  precursor  to  eventual  self-government,  27  but  which  reflected, 
more  acutely,  Britain's  evolved  relations  with  the  multi-ethnic  bourgeoisie  and  the  need 
to  protect  British  foreign  interests.  28 
However,  UMNO  successfully  opposed  the  scheme  over  its  provisions  to  restrict 
the  Sultans'  powers  and  the  threat  to  Malay  rights.  The  scheme  was  replaced  in  1948  by 
the  Federation  of  Malaya  Agreement,  drawn-up  by  British  and  Malay  leaders,  amid 
protests  from  the  non-Malays.  29  Under  this  arrangement,  the  Sultans'  position  and  other 
Malay  rights  with  regard  to  indigenous  status  were  secured.  Despite  some  concessions 
over  immigration,  non-Malays  did  not  get  the  full  citizenship  rights  proposed  in  the  1946 
plan.  Moreover,  the  principle  of  federalism,  enshrined  in  the  agreement,  offered  Malays 
security  that,  while  legislative  control  moved  towards  the  centre,  this  would  not  create  a 
monolithic  Union  with  no  recognition  of  the  states  and  traditional  forms  of  Malay 
government.  Later,  influenced  by  British  interests  and  calculations  of  how  to  curb  the 
threat  of  Chinese  radicalism  in  Singapore,  Tunku  Abdul  Rahman  backed  Singaporean 
entry  into  the  Federation,  despite  Malay  fears  of  Chinese  dominance.  Balanced  by  the 
other  Bumiputera  states  of  Sabah  and  Sarawak,  Singapore's  merger  brought  Malaysia 
into  existence  in  1963.  However,  ongoing  tensions,  reflected  by  an  increasingly  militant 
challenge  to  the  Alliance  from  the  People's  Action  Party  (PAP)  for  expanded  citizenship 
rights,  saw  Singapore  expelled  from  the  Federation  in  1965. 
The  Federation  agreement  had,  thus,  given  rise  to  a  second  key  element  here,  that 
of  communally  located  political  parties.  As  the  main  bourgeois  elements  came  to 
consider  their  place  and  role  within  the  emerging  political  structure,  the  `communal 
agenda'  of  the  Federation  negotiations  became  the  prevailing  context  for  the  political 
mobilisation  of  the  subordinate  classes.  It  was  out  of  this  process  that  the  communal 
positions  of  UMNO,  the  MCA  and  the  MIC  would  emerge  as  class  patrons  of  each 
ethnic  grouping.  Indeed,  it  was  within  this  context  that  Dato  Onn  bin  Jaafar,  the  founder 
30 of  UMNO,  was  forced  to  relinquish  his  post  as  president  in  1951  for  seeking  the  entry  of 
non-Malays  into  the  party.  The  Independence  of  Malaya  Party  (IMP)  which  he 
subsequently  set  up  in  1951  was  not  to  prove  a  significant  force.  Again,  for  Zakaria,  this 
was,  and  remains,  proof  that  the  "failure  of  noncommunal  political  parties  is  simply  a 
consequence  of  the  nature  of  the  polity  in  which  political  mobilization  has  greatest 
success  when  it  appeals  to  race.  s3o  However,  this  view  again  understates  the  vital  sense 
in  which  particular  class  interests  were  being  established  through  the  Federation  process 
and  the  consociational  framework  to  follow. 
Against  this,  the  non-communal  All  Malay  Council  of  Joint  Action  (AMCJA), 
representing  Chinese,  Malays,  Indians  and  others,  had  opposed  the  Federation,  calling 
instead  for  independence  and  a  new  structure  based  on  universal  citizenship,  power 
sharing  arrangements  with  inbuilt  Malay  rights  and  retention  of  the  Malay  monarchy, 
though  deprived  of  prerogative  powers.  Alongside  its  radical  Malay  nationalist  coalition 
partner  PUTERA  (Central  Force  of  the  Malay  People),  it  represented  an  alternative,  if 
weak,  counterpoint  to  UMNO  conservative  nationalism.  However,  it  was  through  the 
latter  political  medium  that  the  colonial  government  chose  to  negotiate. 
And  this  ties  into  the  third  important  factor  of  the  decolonisation  process:  the 
Malayan  Emergency  (1948-60).  In  effect,  this  was  a  class-based  war  fought  between 
the  Malaysian  Communist  Party  (MCP)  and  the  British  and  multi-ethnic  bourgeois 
coalition.  One  of  the  principal  reasons  why  the  British  came  to  favour  the  Federation 
plan  by  1948,  rather  than  the  Union  scheme,  was  the  need  to  develop  the  ethnic  divide 
and  rule  strategy  in  the  face  of  class  pressures  and  communist  insurrection.  By  seeking 
to  portray  the  MCP  as  an  avowedly  Chinese  nationalist  body,  rather  than  a  broad-based, 
anti-colonial  class  movement,  the  British  hoped  to  stifle  Malay  support  for  any  form  of 
class  politics  or  radical  nationalism.  Despite  its  main  Chinese  base,  the  MCP  had,  by 
1948,  built  a  considerable  level  of  support  amongst  Malays  and  Indians.  31  Under  its 
leader  Chin  Peng,  the  MCP  had  fought  a  major  military  campaign  alongside  the  British  to 
defeat  the  Japanese.  32  However,  the  party's  efficient  mobilisation  of  large  sections  of  an 
immiserated  working-class  after  the  war,  notably  through  the  Pan  Malayan  Federation  of 
Trade  Unions,  threatened  the  very  basis  of  the  colonial  order.  Thus,  while  seeking  to 
portray  labour  unrest  and  working  class  dissent  as  MCP  subversion,  the  British  moved 
towards  a  clearer  recognition  of  UMNO  and  conservative  Malay  nationalism  as  the  main 
31 voice  of  `political  reform'.  Nonetheless,  while  consolidating  this  relationship  through  the 
Federation  agreement,  and  in  response  to  the  onset  of  MCP  armed  struggle,  the  British 
still  sought  a  cross-ethnic  independence  arrangement  which  would  ensure  political, 
economic  and  social  stability  -a  settlement  subsequently  realised  through  the 
ideological  framework  of  ethnic  parties  and  consociational  politics. 
The  legacy  of  the  colonial  state  can  thus  be  seen  as  significant  in  three  main 
respects.  Firstly,  it  helped  draw  the  Malayan  economy  into  the  world  capitalist  system, 
thus  setting  the  basis  of  metropole-domestic  class  relations.  Secondly,  as  a  central 
feature  of  this  process,  it  created  an  ethnic  division  of  labour  in  which  racial  attributes 
became  synonymous  with  class  position.  And,  thirdly,  it  provided  the  nucleus  of  a 
pragmatic  alliance  between  the  Malay  aristocracy/state  bureaucracy,  the  main  Chinese 
commercial  bourgeoisie  and  Indian  petite  bourgeoisie,  setting  the  framework  of  class 
accommodations,  consociational  politics  and  ethnic  ideology  to  follow. 
The  Alliance  phase 
Following  Independence,  Malaya  was  governed  by  the  Alliance,  a  communal  party-based 
coalition  which  held  UMNO,  the  MCA  and  the  MIC  together  till  1969.  UMNO  and  the 
MCA  had,  together,  successfully  contested  the  1952  municipal  elections  in  Kuala 
Lumpur.  Joined  by  the  MIC  to  form  the  Alliance,  they  followed  this  by  contesting  and 
winning  the  1955  General  Election,  establishing  a  political  coalition  which  allowed 
Tunku  Abdul  Rahman,  the  country's  first  leader,  to  negotiate  the  Merdeka  settlement  in 
1957.  Under  the  Tunku,  the  colonial  settlement  -  following  the  Reid  Commission's 
report"  -  had  secured  the  formal  powers  of  the  Yang  di  Pertuan  Agong  (King),  the 
Sultans  and  a  privileged  niche  for  a  Malay  administrative  elite.  A  constitutional  system 
had  been  agreed,  based  upon  British  parliamentary  structures  and  Crown  prerogatives 
while  retaining  the  federalist  principle.  The  British  also  saw  in  the  Tunku  someone  who 
would  be  a  stable  figurehead  within  the  coalition,  who  would  retain  a  laissez-faire 
approach  to  foreign  capital,  favour  British  interests  and,  in  the  gathering  Cold  War 
climate,  maintain  opposition  to  communism  in  the  region. 
In  contrast  to  the  Malay  elite,  the  economic  position  of  ordinary  Malays  had  not 
been  substantially  improved  by  decolonisation.  The  colonial  labour  structure,  racial 
32 segmentation  and  hierarchical  social  codes,  based  on  deferential  emotions  of  adat 
(custom),  had  kept  Bumiputeras,  more  generally,  tied  either  to  kampong  (village) 
subsistence  or  conditions  of  urban  poverty.  Yet,  like  their  Malay  counterparts,  large 
sections  of  Chinese  labour  also  remained  locked  into  a  situation  of  class  exploitation, 
economic  dependency  and  social  deprivation.  Following  the  defeat  of  the  Japanese, 
major  restructuring  of  the  country's  primary  sector,  given  impetus  by  the  large  demand 
for  rubber  and  tin  during  the  Korean  War,  had  seen  a  major  enhancement  of  the 
country's  export  base  and  sustained  accumulation  opportunities  for  domestic  and 
metropolitan  capital.  Again,  it  had  been  the  attempted  mobilisation  of  both  ethnic  groups 
against  such  exploitation  after  1948  which  had  formed  the  basis  of  the  MCP's  efforts  to 
wage  a  class  war  of  independence.  But  with  Independence  secured  and  organised 
around  the  consociational  arrangements  of  the  Malay  state  and  Chinese  business 
interests,  class  politics  became  subordinate  to  ethnic  politics. 
The  essence  of  Alliance  power  lay  in  the  `bargain'  struck  between  the  Malay 
aristocracy  who  held  political  authority  through  UMNO  and  control  of  the  civil  service, 
and  the  Chinese  commercial  bourgeoisie  who  were  allowed  to  protect  their  economic 
interests  through  the  MCA.  During  the  1969  Election,  the  Tunku,  acknowledging  the 
discrete  political  and  economic  powers  of  the  Malays  and  Chinese,  restated  how  the 
"blending  of  the  two...  ha[d]  brought  about  peace  and  harmony,  coupled  with  prosperity 
to  the  country.  s34  As  such,  Alliance  ideology  had  helped  institutionalise  an  exclusive 
`partnership  of  understanding'  between  ethnic  patrons  who  between  them  claimed  the 
necessary  abilities  to  manage  racial  tensions  and  promote  social  prosperity.  3' 
Yet,  even  as  economic  production  grew  during  the  1950s,  giving  apparent 
credence  to  the  Alliance  formula,  new  class  pressures  signified  the  gathering  crisis  of 
Alliance  consociationalism.  Under  the  1958  Pioneer  Industries  Ordinance  policy  and  the 
First  and  Second  Malaya  Plans  (1955-65),  import-substitution  manufacturing  had  been 
encouraged  through  credit  incentives,  infrastructure  investment  and  tariff  protection,  a 
process  which,  given  the  government's  ongoing  laissez-faire  commitment,  saw  foreign, 
rather  than  domestic,  investment  grow.  Despite  the  shift  towards  export-oriented 
industrialisation  under  the  First  Malaysia  Plan  (1966-70)  and  diversification  into  palm  oil 
and  other  primary  products  by  the  late-1960s,  these  incentives  to  foreign  capital 
remained  largely  intact.  36  Thus,  as  Khoo  notes,  the  accruing  problems  for  the  Alliance 
33 had  a  number  of  interacting  facets,  not  all  exclusively  linked  to  ethnic  demands.  Firstly, 
the  Alliance  state's  low-capital  support  for  the  rural  sector,  reliance  upon  primary 
commodity  production  and  general  laissez-faire  orientation  saw  it  exposed  to  the 
"familiar  neo-colonial  mode  of  underdevelopment"  by  the  late  1960s,  thus  unable  to  meet 
gathering  expectations  of  "economic  democracy"  to  accompany  the  aspirations  of 
political  independence.  37  Secondly,  marginalised  sections  of  the  Malay  peasantry  began 
to  tie  their  interests  more  specifically  to  the  social  ideas  of  PAS,  which,  at  that  point,  had 
linked  its  Islamic  agenda  to  a  Malay  nationalist  idiom.  Thirdly,  concern  was  being 
expressed  by  middle  and  working-class  non-Malays  that  the  special  Malay  rights 
guaranteed  under  the  constitution  would  undermine  their  access  to  social  provisions, 
such  as  education.  Finally,  and  perhaps  most  significantly,  a  key  section  of  Malay 
bureaucrats,  middle-class  intelligentsia  and  politicians  within  UMNO  began  to  question 
the  Alliance's  laissez-faire  policies  and  relationship  with  Chinese  capital,  demanding  a 
greater  level  of  state  intervention  and  share  of  wealth  for  the  Malays.  38 
In  this  latter  regard,  the  enterprise  and  social  mobility  of  a  nominal  Chinese 
business  community,  tightly  organised  around  ties  of  kinship  and  with  privileged  links  to 
the  Malay  political  class,  had  given  rise  to  increasing  anti-Chinese  resentment  at  the 
broader  social  level.  At  the  same  time,  mainstream  Chinese  support  for  the  MCA  and  its 
role  as  communal  patron  within  the  Alliance  began  to  erode.  Again,  this  reflected  a 
certain  search  within  each  ethnic  group  for  alternative  parties  to  represent  their  economic 
and  cultural  interests.  But  the  rejection  of  the  Alliance  structure,  particularly  amongst 
the  Chinese,  can  also  be  seen  as  coincident  with  the  flowering  of  a  more  vibrant  `class 
politics'  at  that  point.  Although  mainly  regarded  as  Chinese  parties,  the  Democratic 
Action  Party  (DAP),  Gerakan  and  People's  Progressive  Party  (PPP),  unlike  the  Alliance, 
had  campaigned  on  broad  socio-economic  rather  than  racial  issues.  In  the  General 
Election  of  1969,  the  three  `Chinese'  opposition  parties  took  56.4%  of  the  non-Malay 
vote  as  opposed  to  40.4%  for  the  Alliance.  Together  with  the  movement  of  many  rural 
Malays  from  UMNO  to  PAS,  giving  PAS  40%  of  the  Malay  vote,  this  shift  saw  electoral 
support  for  the  Alliance  fall  from  a  high  of  79.6%  in  1955  to  48.5%  in  1969.39 
Disenchantment  with  the  Alliance  formula  was  thus  being  expressed  across  racial 
lines.  For  the  Chinese,  it  was  fostered  by  the  need  to  find  new  ways  of  articulating  their 
socio-economic  and  cultural  interests.  On  the  Malay  side,  it  was  motivated  by 
34 perceptions  of  increasing  Chinese  economic  dominance  and  fears  that  the  1969  Election 
outcome  threatened  their  political  position  and  constitutional  rights.  Thereafter,  social 
enmities,  stoked  in  large  part  by  ethnic  chauvinism  and  fratricidal  language  during  the 
Election  campaign,  erupted  into  ethnic  riots  on  May  13th  1969,  most  notably  in  Kuala 
Lumpur.  Yet,  as  Khoo  Boo  Teik  notes,  this,  again,  should  be  seen  within  the  context  of 
wider  class  pressures  and  the  contradiction  of  consociationalism: 
The  inability  of  the  Alliance's  laissez-faire  capitalism  to  satisfy  these  demands  accentuated  the  ethnic 
dimensions  of  Malaysia's  decolonization  and  laid  the  conditions  for  the  violence  of  13  May  1969...  In 
that  sense,  the  13  May  incident,  which  has  often  been  taken  to  mean  the  breakdown  of  Malaysia's  multi- 
ethnic  consociationalism  exclusively,  also  brought  about  a  rupture  in  the  balance  between  the  Malay 
state,  domestic  non-Malay  capital  and  foreign  capital.  That  is  to  say,  the  "Merdeka  compromise"  was 
not  simply  the  casualty  of  ethnic  polarization  and  extreme  communalism.  It  was  also  the  victim  of 
"class"  onslaught  mounted  by  an  immiserated  Malay  peasantry,  an  urban  non-Malay  working  class 
suffering  from  unemployment,  a  non-Malay  middle  class  clamouring  for  political  and  cultural 
liberalization  (with  implications  for  social  mobility),  and  a  Malay  petit  bourgeois  demand  for  economic 
regulation  (of  non-Malay  capital)  and  state  intervention.  40 
The  structural  instability  and  ultimate  crisis  of  Alliance  consociationalism  by  the 
late  1960s,  thus,  reflected  two  class-based  contradictions  within  the  state:  firstly,  the 
dependent  development  of  the  economy  under  neo-colonialism  involving  laissez-faire 
forms  of  surplus  appropriation  and  gathering  economic  stagnation;  secondly,  the 
emergence  of  tensions  between  competing  bourgeois  fractions  seeking  enhanced  access 
to  state  resources  as  economic  conditions  contracted.  4'  These  contradictions,  in  turn, 
helped  fuel  the  ethnic  animosities,  fear  and  suspicions  which  became  the  hallmark  of  the 
1969  riots.  This  is  not  to  deny  the  `primal'  nature  of  Malay  and  Chinese  reaction  during 
that  crisis.  But  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  the  popular  motivation  of  that 
reaction  and  the  essential  causes  of  such  consciousness.  In  effect,  the  practice  and 
ideology  of  consociational  politics  had  allowed  political  and  social  identity  to  become 
structured  around  ethnic  polarities,  thus  providing  the  basis  for  a  groundswell  of  ethnic 
fears  to  emerge  at  a  key  point  of  economic  dislocation. 
35 The  NEP  phase 
Although  the  NEP  is  considered  more  fully  in  Chapter  3  vis-a-vis  Mahathirism,  it  is 
necessary  here  to  sketch  some  of  the  background  circumstances  of  emerging  class 
pressures  and  ethnic  ideologies  within  the  state  by  the  late  1960s.  Since  Merdeka,  the 
Chinese  had  harboured  fears  that  their  language,  educational  traditions  and  culture  were 
under  threat  from  an  increasingly  dominant  Malay  political  class.  It  is  within  this  context 
that  the  DAP,  offering  a  more  egalitarian,  universalist  vision  of  a  `Malaysian  Malaysia', 
found  itself  the  main  repository  of  Chinese  disenchantment  with  the  Alliance  throughout 
the  1960s,  culminating  in  the  erosion  of  the  Alliance  vote  in  1969.  For  the  Malays,  in 
turn,  this  rise  of  Chinese  opposition  represented  a  dangerous  challenge  to  their 
constitutional  rights.  Moreover,  it  fed-into  more  pressing  concerns  across  Malay 
bourgeois,  middle-class  and  peasant  groups  that  the  `Malay  share'  of  national  wealth  and 
incomes  had  declined  relative  to  Chinese  incomes.  Certainly,  as  Brown  notes,  statistical 
evidence  does  show  Malay  incomes,  relative  to  Chinese,  falling  from  a  ratio  of  1:  2  to 
1:  2.5  between  1958  and  1967.42  However,  as  Brown  also  shows,  the  more  significant 
disparities  of  wealth  under  the  Alliance  had  been  inira-racial  rather  than  inter-racial  in 
composition.  Between  1957  and  1970,  intra-racial  disparities  grew  by  36.2%  amongst 
Malays  and  by  21.6%  amongst  the  Chinese.  In  the  same  period,  the  wealthiest  20%  of 
Malays  saw  their  share  of  national  wealth  increase  from  42.5%  to  52.5%,  while  the 
poorest  40%  of  Malays'  share  fell  from  19.5%  to  12.7%.  For  the  Chinese,  the  respective 
shares  were  45.8%  to  52.6%  and  18%  to  13.9%.  43  Nonetheless,  Malay  grievances  and 
the  crisis  of  1969  had  allowed  inter-ethnic,  rather  than  intra-ethnic  disparities  to  take 
centre-stage,  thus  providing  a  new  set  of  Malay  `priorities'  within  the  state. 
Reflecting  this  rupture  in  state-class  relations,  the  Tunku  handed  over  the 
premiership  to  Tun  Abdul  Razak  in  1970,  giving  way  to  a  new  generation  of  UMNO 
leaders  from  mainly  bureaucratic  backgrounds.  In  February  1971,  following  a  period  of 
emergency  rule,  imposed  under  the  National  Operations  Council  (NOC),  the  Alliance 
coalition  (later  reformed  as  the  Barisan  Nasional  for  the  1974  General  Election), 
proceeded  to  address  Malay  inequalities  through  the  interventionist  strategies  of  the 
NEP.  But  while  offering  socio-economic  redress  and  employment  guarantees  for 
upwardly-mobile  Malays  within  the  public  sector,  the  new  ethnic  ideology  of 
36 Bumiputeraism  on  which  it  was  predicated  also  allowed  the  emergent  `NEP  class' 
privileged  use  of  the  state  as  a  new  accumulation  site.  Here,  in  essence,  was  a  `state 
bureaucratic  bourgeoisie'  in  the  making. 
It  is  necessary  to  locate  the  class  basis  of  this  group  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  it 
helps  illustrate  the  sense  in  which  consociationalism  was  reformulated  and  rationalised  as 
an  amended  political  system  and  ideology  by  the  new  bureaucratic-bourgeois  alliance. 
Secondly,  it  helps  set  the  context  for  the  subsequent  evolution  of  Mahathirism  itself  from 
a  position  of  overt  NEP  nationalism  to  that  of  post-ethnic  nationalism  via  the  Vision. 
As  noted,  this  amalgam  of  Malay  bureaucrat  and  middle-class  elements  had 
begun  to  assert  its  influence  by  the  late  1960s  in  response  to  the  Alliance's  laissez-faire 
policies  and  relationship  with  Chinese  capital.  But  their  rise  also  indicated  an  increasing 
class  challenge  within  UMNO  itself.  This  was  partly  motivated  by  a  gathering  disdain  for 
the  Malay  aristocracy,  whose  conservatism  and  feudal  orientations  were  coming  to  be 
seen  as  increasingly  anachronistic  by  bureaucrats,  teachers  and  other  professionals  within 
UMNO.  Such  perceptions  were  also  linked,  more  specifically,  to  the  sectoral  interests  of 
this  class  fraction  within  the  state.  The  rapid  expansion  of  the  state  bureaucracy  over  the 
1960s,  prompted  by  decolonisation,  had  seen  the  sizeable  recruitment  of  lower-middle- 
class  Malays  into  the  civil  service.  44  Not  only  did  this  class  set  the  scene  for  the 
emergence  of  an  `ultra'  political  faction  within  UMNO,  it  also  acted  as  a  new  cohesive 
force  within  the  public  sector,  pushing  for  economic  restructuring  and  controls  over 
Chinese  capital,  pressures  which  were  to  provide  the  impetus  for  state  interventionism 
after  1969. 
This,  in  turn,  signified  a  shift  in  the  form  of  ethnic  ideology  employed  by  the 
state.  The  Alliance  variant  had  defended  Bumiputera  political  rights  as  a  key  part  of  the 
consociational  construct,  but  not  at  the  expense  of  cross-racial  bourgeois  interests  or  the 
free  role  of  metropolitan  capital.  In  contrast,  the  new  state-class  placed  Bumiputeraism 
at  the  core  of  both  its  political  and  economic  agenda.  The  outcome  was  a  set  of  state 
institutions  more  amenable  to  the  mutual  interests  of  small  indigenous  capital  and  state 
bureaucrats.  But  the  need  to  legitimate  these  relations  through  state  interventionism  also 
required  a  fuller  articulation  of  Bumiputeraism  as  an  ethnic  ideology.  Thus,  by  appearing 
to  promote  expanded  economic  rights  for  all  Malays,  the  new  state-class  were  able  to 
37 establish  a  populist  rationale  for  selective  direction  of  the  economy,  privileged  access  to 
state  resources  and  control  over  the  distribution  of  wealth. 
As  we  shall  see,  this  conjuncture  of  state-class  forces  and  nationalist  ideology  by 
the  early  1970s  was  to  provide  the  main  context  for  the  Mahathirist  project  to  follow  in 
the  1980s.  However,  as  with  that  evolving  process,  Mahathir's  own  development 
through  decolonisation  to  1969  and  the  emergence  of  the  NEP  state  suggests  some 
contradictory  elements.  Mahathir  had  been  closely  associated  with  both  the  anti-Union 
movement  from  1946  and  the  Malay  nationalist  agenda  of  1969.  Yet  he  occupied  a 
somewhat  paradoxical  position  with  regard  to  both.  He  fought  for  the  Malay  Federation 
cause  in  1948  without  being  specifically  wedded  either  to  conservative  or  radical 
nationalist  wings.  In  particular,  he  harboured  a  deep  resentment  towards  the  Malay 
aristocracy,  seeing  in  them  a  feudal,  rentier  class  indifferent  to  the  subsistence  existence 
of  poor  rural  Malays,  hardships  which  Mahathir  had  himself  partly  experienced  during  his 
study  years  and  then  witnessed  first-hand  as  a  young  medical  doctor  in  Alor  Star 
. 
45  As 
doctor-politician,  Mahathir  had  campaigned  vociferously  as  a  Malay  nationalist  in  the 
1965  election,  attacking,  in  particular,  the  PAP's  `Chinese  chauvinism'  and  `socialistic 
doctrines',  thus  making  his  mark  against  the  PAP's  vibrant  young  leader  Lee  Kuan  Yew. 
Mahathir's  most  notable  statement  as  an  `adopted  ultra'  came  in  his  letter  to  the  Tunku 
after  the  1969  riots.  Denouncing  his  `placatory'  gestures  to  the  Chinese  and  `betrayal'  of 
the  Malays,  he  called  for  the  Tunku's  resignation,  an  act  which  resulted  in  his  own 
expulsion  from  UMNO,  but  which  secured  his  place  as  a  symbol  of  Malay  nationalism 
amongst  the  ultra  faction.  `  As  we  shall  see  in  Chapter  3,  Mahathir  was  to  develop  the 
case  for  Malay  nationalism  during  the  1970s  via  the  arguments  of  the  Malay  Dilemma. 
Yet,  he  did  so  without  being  closely  identified  with  the  new  NEP  bureaucratic  elite,  an 
element  which  he  gradually  came  to  regard,  after  coming  to  office  in  1981,  as  an 
impediment  to  `modernisation',  economic  reform  and  Malay  development  itself. 
A  more  focused  analysis  of  nationalism  as  ethnic  ideology  is  taken-up  in  the  discussion  of 
the  NEP  to  follow.  However,  following  the  theme  of  constructed  ideology,  we  also  need 
to  consider  here  how  representations  of  `democracy',  `development'  and  `Asian  values' 
have  been  used  and  contested  as  forms  of  hegemonic  discourse. 
38 Democracy,  Asian  values  and  the  ideology  of  growth 
It  is  instructive  to  note  how  the  interests  of  Western  capitalism  and  the  Mahathir  project 
have  been  underwritten  by  an  ideology  of  growth.  For  Mahathir,  this  has  involved  the 
selective  use  of  neo-liberal  language  to  promote  privatisation,  initiate  state  reforms  and 
assuage  foreign  capital.  Mahathir  has  also  made  the  2020  growth  target  an  ideological, 
as  well  as  practical,  signpost  for  the  Vision  project.  For  the  key  capitalist  institutions, 
the  ideology  of  growth  suggests  an  ongoing  attempt  to  `remake'  the  region  in  its  own 
image  -a  kind  of  `Disraelian  task',  pace  Said  in  Orientalism  -  through  the 
propagation  of  liberal  capitalist  business  practices.  The  main  feature  of  this  has  been  the 
long-term  promotion  and  idealisation  of  the  liberal  developmentalist  state:  in  essence,  a 
set  of  growth-led  arguments  for  the  minimalist  (or  `facilitative')  state,  wholesale 
deregulation  and  open-market  policies.  Here,  the  shared  neo-liberal  ideas  of  finance 
ministers  and  transnational  capital  have  come  to  inform  the  very  framework  within  which 
such  economies  and  societies  may  act  47 
Still,  this  is  not  an  argument  against  growth  -  even  though  the  idea  of 
sustainable  growth  has  been  largely  ignored  or  marginalised  by  governments  and 
capitalist  institutions.  Neither  can  we  overlook  the  `push  for  growth'  as  part  of  the 
intrinsic  struggle  for  global  capitalist  competitiveness.  However,  it  is  also  necessary  to 
see  how  liberal  discourse  has  helped  reify  the  language  of  growth.  With  the  shift 
towards  a  global  neo-liberal  agenda  from  the  late  1970s,  `growth-led'  became  the  in- 
term  and  intellectual  leitmotif  of  key  agencies  such  as  the  IMF,  World  Bank  and 
Trilateral  Commission.  Thus,  the  `imperative  of  growth'  has  become  hegemonic  code 
for  free-market  arrangements  and  private-sector  accumulation.  As  mainstream  Asia- 
Pacific  texts  such  as  Driven  by  Growth  more  than  imply,  capitalist  development 
constitutes  the  essential  progenitor  for  liberal  democracy  in  developing  countries  -  or, 
in  more  complementary  form,  the  liberal-market  promotes  the  emergence  of  democracy, 
while,  vice  versa,  democratic  structures  help  stimulate  investment,  growth  and  capitalist 
development. 
As  the  Southeast  Asian  economies  finally  faced  the  reality  of  structural 
weaknesses,  global  overcapacity  and  the  anarchy  of  financial  markets  by  1997,  such 
assumptions  of  growth-led  development  looked  rather  exposed,  while  the  supposed 
39 correlation  between  growth  and  democracy  looked  even  more  problematic.  During  the 
boom  years,  the  populist  appeal  of  growth-driven  development  had  helped  sustain 
Mahathirism  as  a  project,  placating  the  middle-class  and  offsetting  demands  for 
democratic  reform.  The  irony  was  that  it  had  taken  an  actual  crisis  of  growth  by  1997  to 
stimulate  pressures  for  democratic  change. 
As  demands  for  greater  transparency  and  political  reform  were  articulated  on 
behalf  of  foreign  capital  by  the  IMF,  finance  ministers  and  influential  sections  of  the 
Western  media,  Mahathirism  found  itself  under  serious  attack.  The  consequent 
denunciations  of  George  Soros  can,  of  course,  be  seen  as  part  of  a  populist  diversionary 
strategy.  Yet  it  also  signified  a  more  specific  aspect  of  the  legitimation  process  in 
Malaysia:  the  sense  in  which  Mahathir,  unlike  Suharto,  was  prepared  to  contest  the 
issues  on  more  purely  ideological  grounds  by  setting  the  case  for  Vision  development 
against  a  particular  critique  of  Western  institutions  and  ideas.  Thus,  for  Mahathir,  the 
Vision  involves  the  positive  assertion  of  Western  growth-led  images  as  statements  of 
Malaysian  modernity.  But  it  also  involves  a  negative,  or  reactive,  response  to  the 
assumptions  of  Western  liberal  development. 
The  prevailing  tendency  within  mainstream  political  science  towards  growth-led 
models  of  democratic  transition  has  its  genealogy  in  modernisation  theory.  48  Early 
modernisation  literature,  typified  by  Huntington's  `Great  Dichotomy'  between 
`traditional'  and  `modern'  societies  -  an  `imitation'  of  Weber's  traditional/rational 
`ideal-types'  -  is  now  in  disrepute,  its  view  of  `inexorable'  social  transition  criticised  for 
its  linearity  and  ethnocentricity.  49  Yet,  the  privileged  academic  position  given  to  such 
ideas  in  the  US  during  the  1950s  and  1960s,  remains  remarkably  intact.  SO  Seeking  a 
rationale  for  nuclear  strategies  and  Cold-War  geopolitics,  the  US  state  utilised  `realist' 
academics  from  across  the  disciplinary  spectrum,  with  scientists,  technologists  and 
political  scientists  adopting  the  role  of  `policy  planners'.  "  Integral  to  Soviet 
containment  was  the  view  here  that  free-market  capitalism  led  to  modernity  and 
Western-style  democracy.  Hence,  notes  Preston,  modernisation  theory  took  the  role  of  a 
"descriptive  general  policy  science"  seeking  to  show  how  `dysfunctional'  practices  in 
`traditional'  societies  impeded  `modern  development'.  52 
In  Rethinking  Development:  Essays  on  Development  and  Southeast  Asia, 
Preston  shows  how  orthodox  social  science  has  come,  via  modernisation  theory  and  its 
40 present  variants,  to  inherit  this  policy-oriented  view  -  one  which  "...  clearly  `arguing  on 
behalf  of  the  planners'  can  hardly  be  called  'value-neutral'.  -)03  Such  discourse,  thus, 
retains  a  certain  policy-planner  understanding  (or  epistemology)  of  what  development 
goals  should  mean.  Typical  examples  within  the  Asia-Pacific  genre  would  include 
Mohamed  Ariff  s  The  Malaysian  Economy:  Pacific  Connections  and  Jong  S.  Jun  (ed) 
Development  in  the  Asia  Pacific.  54  Effectively  negating  state-class  relations  and 
ideological  production,  such  texts  have  tended  to  reconstitute  issues  of  social 
development  as  generic  `policy  issues'. 
Other  accounts  have  taken-up  the  issue  as  `flawed'  capitalist  development  in  the 
region.  For  example,  in  Behind  the  Myth:  Business,  Money  and  Power  in  Southeast 
Asia  Clad,  linking  money-politics,  clientelism  and  state  largesse  to  the  late-retention  of 
patrimonial  capitalism  and  the  subversion  of  bourgeois  innovation,  argues  for  large-scale 
privatisation  and  state  disengagement  in  order  "to  give  marketplace  economics  a  real 
chance.,,  5'  This  complements  Yoshihara's  portrayal  of  Southeast  Asian  capitalism  as 
`ersatz'  in  type,  built-around  rent-seeking  activity  inimical  to  productive  development.  56 
Of  course,  much  of  this  `fits'  the  Malaysian  case.  Yet,  it  is  also  an  apt 
description  of  the  City  of  London,  the  whole  edifice  of  which  is  built  precisely  around 
speculation,  short-term  dealing  and  rentier  accumulation.  57  More  instructively,  Gomez 
and  Jomo  show  in  Malaysia's  Political  Economy:  Politics,  Patronage  and  Profits  how 
the  allocation  of  rents  through  state  licences,  concessions  and  subsidies  is  linked-into  a 
more  class-based  assemblage  of  party  politics  and  corporate  networks  across  UMNO 
and  the  Barisan.  Yet,  while  valid,  this  attack  on  internal  corruption  was,  again,  being 
used  by  1997  to  reinforce  the  rather  conceited  claims  of  Western  agencies  that 
`dysfunctional'  `crony  capitalism'  was  mainly  responsible  for  the  Southeast  Asian  crises 
rather  than  the  anarchic  practices  of  global  markets.  SB 
Despite  a  revised  `developmentalist  literature',  precipitated  by  the  `new  wave'  of 
`democratisations'  in  Latin  America  and  East  Asia  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  (Case,  Pye, 
Lipset,  Diamond  and  others),  there  remains  here  a  taken-for-granted  view  of  democratic 
development  as  an  analytical  premise.  In  Political  Oppositions  in  Industrialising  Asia, 
Rodan  notes  how  this  forms  part  of  a  dual  distortion: 
...  two  very  powerful  themes  are  discernible  in  this  vast  body  of  literature  on  political  change  in  late 
industrialising  countries  of  East  and  Southeast  Asia.  The  first  of  these  is  a  propensity  to  equate  the 
41 challenge  to,  or  demise  of,  authoritarian  rule  with  the  advance  of  `democracy'.  This  concept  is  generally 
employed  unproblematically,  but  implicitly  endorses  a  liberal  democratic  or  formalistic  definition  of  the 
term...  [and]  remains  the  point  of  reference  for  these  analyses...  A  second  theme...  is  a  not  unrelated 
romanticisation  of  civil  society  ... 
depicted  as  the  natural  domain  of  personal  and  group  freedoms...  [a] 
59  tendency  [which]  downplays  the  significance  of  gross  inequalities  of  power  and  resources  [therein]. 
The  broad  assumption  here  is  that  economic  development  and  the  expansion  of 
democratic  freedoms  are  mutually-evolving  forces.  Another  is  the  implicit  use  of  liberal 
capitalist  democracy  as  a  synonym  for  democracy.  But  is  `democracy',  in  the  liberal 
capitalist  meaning  of  the  term,  the  most  likely  outcome  of,  or  necessary  framework  for, 
growth  and  development?  The  received  liberal  wisdom  has  been  to  regard  democracy, 
the  free-market  and  growth  as  mutual  concepts.  The  corollary  is  that  an  expanding, 
educated  middle-class,  the  product  of  that  process,  come  to  demand  individual  rights  and 
freedoms,  thus  posing  an  inevitable  threat  to  authoritarian  regimes.  Yet,  as  Vatikiotis 
clinically  puts  it: 
The  problem  with  this  well-worn  conceptual  framework  is  that  it  is  based  on  a  simplistic  and  even 
subjective  interpretation  of  actual  events.  Southeast  Asia  has  not  been  kind  to  the  neat  predictions  of 
Western  social  science...  Political  reality  in  Southeast  Asia  is  amorphous  and  often  defies 
categorisation.  60 
The  varying  experiences  of  the  Asian  NICs  makes  assumptions  of  growth-driven 
democracy  highly  questionable.  Taiwan  and  South  Korea,  although  now  nominally 
`democratic',  achieved  NIC  status  under  authoritarian  regimes.  Yet,  this  does  not  mean 
that  development  was  dependent  on  either  this  regime  type  or  that  of  liberal  democracy. 
What  we  have  to  consider,  rather,  is  the  particular  set  of  historical  circumstances  in 
which  these  countries  found  themselves  in  the  post-war  period:  namely,  global  economic 
reconstruction,  US  aid  and  intervention,  the  expansion  of  Japanese  capital  and  sensitive 
geopolitical  factors  in  the  region.  In  this  sense,  `democracy'  in  Japan  was  shaped  by  a 
particular  conjuncture  of  US  security  imperatives  and  the  consolidation  of  internal 
conservative  alliances  in  the  post-war  period.  Thus,  for  Friedman: 
...  what  is  assumed  about  the  West's  imperatives  for  democratisation  is  dangerously  misleading  Western 
mythology...  Contrary  to  the  conventional  Western  misperception,  East  Asia's  paths  to  democracy  are  as 
42 diverse  as  is  any  other  region's...  It  is  most  useful  to  assume  that  all  people  and  all  cultures  are  alive 
with  a  democratic  potential.  Consequently,  the  binary  of  tradition  versus  modernity,  understood  as  a 
way  of  stigmatizing  and  marginalizing  non-European  civilization  as  backward,  should  be  critically  re- 
examined  to  ferret  out  parochial  misconceptions...  It  hypostatizes  a  prettified,  one-dimensional  West  that 
obscures  the  actual,  contradictory,  and  complex  reality  of  the  West  that  includes  ugly  political 
potentials...  1 
Beyond  `authoritarian  developmentalism'  and  variations  of  the  `anomalous 
democratisation'  argument,  Friedman  sees  the  potential  for  democracy  in  all  cultures, 
with  political  actors  as  key  agents  in  that  struggle.  Yet,  even  this  universal/human 
agency  view  rather  understates  the  more  dynamic  sense  in  which  political,  economic  and 
cultural  factors  together  condition  that  process.  Moreover,  it  lacks  insight  into  how 
particular  constructs  of  democracy  and  development  represent  ideological  discourse 
within  that  process. 
Upholding  the  link  between  liberal-democracy  and  `economic  freedom',  the 
Economist  view  also  refutes  any  necessary  correlation  between  authoritarianism  and 
growth: 
It  is  absurd  to  conclude  from  East  Asia's  success,  and  from  that  fact  alone,  that  non-democratic 
government  is  best  for  development...  [If  one  observes  the  political  map,  ]  it  remains  true  that  nearly  all  of 
the  world's  richest  countries  are  free  and  nearly  all  of  the  poorest  countries  are  not.  62 
Citing  empirical  and  econometric  studies  of  the  link  between  democracy  and  growth,  63  a 
three-way  typology  of  political  systems  is  shown  here  classifying  countries  as  "free, 
partly  free,  or  not  free"  according  to  such  indices  as  free  elections,  civil  liberties,  multi- 
party  legislatures  and  an  unfettered  press.  Malaysia  is  categorised  as  partly  free,  with  the 
US  and  Iraq  at  opposite  ends  of  the  continuum.  The  main  claim  here  is  that  economic 
freedom  is  not  the  only  stimulus  to  growth: 
...  civil  and  political  freedoms  do  the  same.  [Specifically,  the  reason  why]  political  freedom  adds  to  the 
economic  benefits  already  secured  by  economic  freedom  [is  because]  it  encourages  firms  and  people  to 
behave  as  if  those  freedoms  will  endure.  [Thus,  while]  economic  freedom  looks  at  the  security  of 
property  in  the  present,  by  asking  whether  taxes  are  non  confiscatory,  contracts  are  enforced,  trade  is 
free  and  so  on...  people  also  need  to  know  that  these  freedoms,  where  they  exist  will  not  disappear.  Here 
43 lies  the  decisive  advantage  conferred  by  political  freedom  -  meaning  democracy,  and  the  dispersion  of 
political  power  that  goes  with  it.  64 
This  analysis  is  persuasive  in  that  `authoritarian  development'  is  not  an  essential 
condition  for  economic  expansion.  On  the  other  hand,  we  have  to  recognise  the 
particular  free-market  values  informing  this  view.  Reflecting  Lockean  property  ideals,  it 
constitutes  not  only  a  liberal  (or  neo-liberal)  paradigm  for  development,  but  an 
entrenched  framework  of  thought.  Thus,  consistent  with  the  Economist  view,  orthodox 
liberal  criteria,  and  the  value  judgements  which  inform  them,  have  come  to  represent  a 
standard  against  which  countries  are  accorded  democratic  status. 
William  Case's  portrayal  of  Malaysia  as  a  `semi-democracy'  is indicative  of  that 
set  of  assumptions.  Case  accepts  Samuel  Huntington's  definition  here,  arguing  that 
"democratic  content  can  be...  measured  along  two  lines:  liberal  participation  and  electoral 
contestation.  "65  While  open,  competitive  elections  and  political  opposition  are  permitted 
in  Malaysia,  electoral  contestation  remains  circumscribed  by  gerrymandering  (giving 
weighted  priority  to  the  mainly  Malay  rural  constituencies66)  and  a  broad  array  of 
underhand  strategies  designed  to  marginalise  the  opposition,  such  as  bans  on  outdoor 
opposition  rallies.  Thus,  for  Case,  in  "bracket[ing]  liberal  participation  and  electoral 
contestation  with  semi-democratic  controls..  .  the  government  in  Malaysia  has  been  able 
to  perpetuate  its  semi-democracy.  ,  67 
As  we  shall  see,  the  repressive  apparatus  of  the  state  does,  indeed,  act  as  a 
serious  constraint  on  political  opposition  in  Malaysia.  For  example,  the  Societies  Act  has 
been  used  to  proscribe  `seditious'  groups  (such  as  the  Malayan  Communist  Party  and  the 
Islamic  sect  AI  Argam),  the  Internal  Security  Act  (ISA)  to  imprison  dissidents,  the 
Printing  Press  Act  to  control  the  media  and  the  Universities  and  University  Colleges  Act 
(UUCA)  to  limit  student  dissent.  However,  the  problem  with  Case's  view  is  twofold. 
Firstly,  it  assumes,  viz  the  liberal  separation  between  state  and  civil  society,  that  the 
Western  state  does  not  resort  to  coercion.  Secondly,  in  using  quantitative  liberal  criteria 
to  `measure'  democracy,  it  helps  internalise  liberal  democracy  as  ideological  discourse  in 
itself,  in  effect,  the  language  employed  becomes  not  only  the  premise  of  the  study,  but 
part  of  a  more  incorporated  vocabulary.  The  result  is  the  proliferation  of  categorisation- 
based  enquiry  and  the  artificial  arrangement  of  countries  into  neat  compartments:  `semi- 
democratic',  `quasi-democratic',  `pseudo-democratic'  and  so  on. 
44 This  narrow  definition  of  `representative  democracy',  68  and  preoccupation  with 
quantitative  categorisation,  affirms,  for  Chomsky,  the  sense  in  which  liberal-capitalist 
institutions  have  specifically  sought  to  `deter  democracy'  by  limiting  its  definition  and 
participation.  69  Indeed,  reflecting  ascending  neo-liberal  interests,  Huntington's  1975 
report  The  Crisis  of  Democracy  argued  that  there  was  too  much  democracy  in  Western 
societies,  that  the  media  was  promoting  a  dangerous  "adversary  culture"  and  that  the 
education  system  and  -  other  key  institutions  should  control  this  "democratic 
distemper".  70  As  such,  `minimalist  democracy'  has  been  absorbed  and  filtered  as  `Free- 
World'  discourse  across  the  centre-liberal  and  right-wing  spectrum,  informing  both 
liberal  academia  and  the  labyrinth  of  conservative  institutions,  notably  in  the  US. 
One  of  these,  Freedom  House,  a  major  compiler  of  `democratic  country  ratings' 
is  frequently  cited  in  mainstream  political  science  literature.  71  For  example,  both 
Means's  standard  reader,  Malaysian  Politics:  the  Second  Generation,  72  and  Jesudason's 
more  critical  account  of  the  Malaysian  "syncretic  state"  take  Freedom  House's  ranking 
of  political  rights  in  Malaysia  as  an  assumed  reference.  73  Thus,  the  idea  of  minimal 
democracy,  an  axiom  of  the  Western  capitalist  state,  74  has  been  adopted  as  a  `definitive' 
point  of  reference  for  academic  enquiry. 
Although  superficial,  this  exercise  in  `democratic  ranking'  can  still,  of  course, 
offer  informative  insights.  For  example,  Crouch  shows  how  the  political  elite  in  Malaysia 
oscillates  between  positions  of  liberal  relaxation  and  repression  in  response  to  social 
pressures  from  below.  75  In  this  sense,  the  polity  exhibits  both  democratic  and 
authoritarian  tendencies  simultaneously,  granting,  for  example,  greater  middle-class 
freedoms,  while  suppressing  working-class  labour  power.  Similarly,  citing  Malaysia  as 
`semi-democratic',  Thompson  offers  four  basic  reasons  for  the  `limitation  of 
democratisation'  in  the  region:  the  fostering  of  economic  growth  and  limited  wealth 
inequality;  the  persuasive  elite  claim  that  these  polities  are  founded  on  alternative  forms 
of  democracy;  the  successful  cultivation  of  ethnic  balancing;  and  the  popular 
receptiveness  of  nationalist  anti-Western  rhetoric.  76 
Such  factors  do,  indeed,  help  illustrate  patterns  of  control  and  regime 
legitimation.  The  more  nuanced  point,  however,  concerns  the  analytical  context  within 
which  they  are  addressed.  The  methodological  task  of  ranking  countries  according  to 
liberal  democratic  criteria  (for  Thompson:  "...  competitive  elections,  free  participation  of 
45 individuals  and  groups  in  the  political  process,  and  the  autonomy  of  democratic  leaders 
and  institutionss77;  for  Crouch,  a  similar  set  of  conditions  derived  from  Schumpeter  and 
Dahl)78  helps  reproduce  an  idealised  mode  of  analysis;  allowing,  in  effect,  the  terms  of 
debate  to  be  set-around  the  liberal-determined  `problem'  of  `democratic  dysfunctions' 
within  `the  other  society'.  This  not  only  helps  cloak  liberal  language  in  the  ideological 
clothing  of  `neutral  policy  science',  it  also  `conceals'  the  sense  in  which  it  represents 
hegemonic  discourse  in  itself. 
At  the  same  time,  we  need  to  recognise  the  way  in  which  this  discourse  is  itself 
`traded'  as  `Asian  values'  by  domestic  interests.  The  problem  here  is  that  with  loaded 
meaning  and  pejorative  associations  now  surrounding  `Asian  values',  their  relevance 
tends  to  be  obscured.  Thus,  the  `value  of  Asian  values'  has  been  overshadowed  by  an 
agenda-setting  debate  between  two  competing  hegemonies.  There  are  such  things  as 
Asian  values,  as  will  be  noted  in  relation  to  the  Anwar  affair,  conventions,  codes  and 
ways  of  seeing  society  which  are  `indigenous'  to,  though  not  homogeneous  within,  Asia. 
These  include  complex  interactions  of  the  extended  family,  tight  business  practices 
(derived  from  the  Chinese  clan  system),  Malay  custom  (adat),  social  deference,  kampong 
collectivity  and,  of  course,  communitarian  concepts  of  Islam.  However,  as  the  rise  of 
consumer  individualism  in  Malaysia  shows,  this  does  not  preclude  receptiveness  to  other 
values  and  aspirations.  The  key  point  to  note  is  the  way  in  which  `Asian  values'  have 
been  appropriated  both  as  domestic  ideology  and  as  liberal  `anti-discourse'. 
The  further  twist  here,  though,  is  the  dialectical  sense  in  which  liberal  discourse 
and  Asian  values  assume  both  contested  and  convergent  forms.  Thus,  we  find  both 
discourses  promoting  the  same  ideology  of  growth  in  pursuit  of  capital  accumulation.  At 
the  same  time,  Western  conservatives  seek  lessons  from  the  `Asian  way'  to  growth  while 
upholding  liberal  values.  Here,  some  Western  academics  have  also  flirted  with  `Asian 
values'  as  a  mirror  to  social  disorder  in  Western  societies.  On  the  other  hand,  having 
almost  invented  itself  as  a  free-market  entrepot  economy,  Goh  Chok  Tong  in  Singapore 
seeks  to  maintain  Confucian  values.  Thus,  having  created  a  capitalist  hub,  the  avuncular 
Lee  Kuan  Yew  can  attribute  the  success  of  Singapore  to  its  very  rejection  of  liberal 
democracy: 
46 I  do  not  believe  that  democracy  necessarily  leads  to  development.  I  believe  that  what  a  country  needs  to 
develop  is  discipline  more  than  democracy.  The  exuberance  of  democracy  leads  to  indiscipline  and 
disorderly  conduct  which  are  inimical  to  development  79 
Mahathirism  has  defended  a  similar  `Asian  Way'  to  development.  Thus,  rather 
than  leading  to  greater  `democracy',  Mahathir's  modernising  endeavours  have  been  used 
to  limit  and  redefine  the  meaning  of  democratic  participation.  Aware  of  the  potentialities 
of  an  expanding  civil  society,  Anwar  had  also  argued  (pre-crisis)  for  a  more 
`particularised'  democracy,  rather  than  the  Western  liberal  model: 
The  Western  media  deride  us  for  failing  to  emulate  their  model  of  democracy.  But  Malaysia  is  guided 
by  the  cultural  and  value  systems  and  the  religious  beliefs  of  its  people  ... 
[W]e  have  to  choose  between 
responsible  democracy  and  destructive  democracy...  for  our  race,  religion  and  nation8° 
Thus,  the  issue  of  democracy  here  is  rationalised  not  only  in  terms  of  whether  it 
complements  growth,  but  also  in  relation  to  wider  issues  of  civil,  cultural  and  `moral 
development'.  Again,  notes  Vatikiotis,  this  forms  part  of  a  negotiated  complex  of  ideas: 
All  the  modem  political  ideologies  espoused  by  contemporary  Southeast  Asian  states  draw  on  tradition 
but  present  themselves  as  modern,  forward  thinking  creeds.  Indonesia's  Pancasila  state  ideology, 
Singapore's  `Core  Principles',  and  Malaysia's  Rukunegara,  all  espouse  Western  civil  society  principles 
such  as  freedom,  justice  and  human  dignity.  They  also  emphasise  the  traditional,  and  for  the  most  part 
collective,  foundations  of  society:  the  need  for  tolerance,  a  strong  sense  of  community,  collective 
discipline,  respect  for  leadership,  and  spirituality.  This  common  approach  to  defining  the  state  in 
ideological  terms  underlines  the  fact  that  for  most  countries  in  Southeast  Asia,  the  challenge  presented 
by  Western  influence  was  not  how  to  assimilate,  but  how  to  adapt  or  synthesise  the  old,  the  traditional, 
with  the  new.  81 
At  this  point,  however,  the  distinction  between  an  `ethical'  state  paternalism  and 
latent  authoritarianism  becomes  increasingly  blurred.  The  notion  of  a  `limited 
democracy'  becomes  reified  as  an  ideological  statement  of  political  cultural  identity;  a 
necessarily  `different  form  of  democracy'  for  a  `different  set  of  cultural  values'.  This 
interplay  of  indigenous  values  and  constructed  ideology  involves,  in  turn,  an  appeal  to 
anti-Western  populism.  Thus,  any  criticism  of  Mahathir  by  foreign  politicians  or  the 
Western  media  can  be  counterposed  as  an  attack  not  merely  upon  Mahathir  himself,  but 
47 upon  the  integrity  of  the  nation.  For  example,  in  imposing  a  ban  on  British  trade  and 
imports  (February-August  1994)  in  response  to  the  Sunday  Times  Pergau  Dam  `aid  for 
arms'  allegations,  82  Mahathir  charged  the  British  with  having  a  "colonial  brain",  and  of 
portraying  Malaysia,  gratuitously,  as  a  "tin-pot  country  or  banana  republic.  "83  In  Hidden 
Agenda,  a  propagandist  tract  written  by  Mahathir  acolytes  during  the  crisis,  the  Prime 
Minister  has  this  to  say  about  the  West: 
Some  in  Asia  believe  that  the  West  engineered  the  currency  crisis  to  forcibly  open  the  Tiger  markets  that 
were  closed  to  it.  Some  think  it  is  to  stop  East  Asia  in  its  development  track,  preventing  it  from 
becoming  a  potent  rival  and  competitor...  Until  recently,  it  seemed  the  East  Asian  train  was  unstoppable 
and  would  have  smashed  into  the  21st  century,  long  designated  the  Asia-Pacific  Era,  and  snatched  from 
the  West  the  window  of  global  opportunities...  Then  came  the  unrelenting  currency  attacks  that  brought 
down  the  value  of  local  currencies  and  the  share  markets,  throwing  the  region  into  turmoil  ... 
To  this,  add 
the  relentless  Western  media  attacks  on  East  Asia  with  reports  that  are  negative,  damaging  and 
destructive,  further  eroding  confidence.  84 
The  anti-colonial  soundbite  is  none-too-gracefully  deployed  here.  But  the  use  of 
nationalist  polemic  for  political  consumption  should  not  disguise  Mahathir's  willingness 
to  contest  the  issues  of  development  and  democracy  as  ideological  constructs.  Nor 
should  it  disguise  the  wider  debate  taking  place  amongst  Malaysian  intellectuals  over  the 
nature  of  democracy  and  its  application  within  civil  society.  In  effect,  some  ask,  can  a 
polity  incorporating  the  ideals  of  qualitative  participation  and  human  rights  be  formed 
around  the  conventional  norms  of  liberal  capitalist  democracy?  83  Again,  while 
identifying  the  expedient  motives  underlying  the  Mahathir  rhetoric,  Vatikiotis  notes  both 
its  popular  persuasiveness  and  the  sense  in  which  it  complements  a  wider  ambivalence 
about  the  West: 
Mahathir's  rhetorical  view  that  the  West  is  distorting  democracy  may  not  sway  the  urbane  Western- 
educated  minority  already  sold  on  the  materialistic  ephemera  of  Western  culture,  but  it  is  potentially 
persuasive  in  less  privileged,  less  worldly-wise  strata  of  society.  Ironically  enough,  exposure  to  Western 
media  considered  as  a  measure  of  openness  in  Southeast  Asia  is  allowing  ordinary  people  of  the  region 
to  witness  some  of  the  very  problems  with  Western  society  their  leaders  would  have  them  reject.  When 
Cable  News  Network  brings  scenes  of  ethnic  rioting  in  Los  Angeles  into  the  living  rooms  of  Southeast 
Asians,  they  might  think  again  about  the  strictures  of  their  own  political  freedom...  86 
48 Thus,  taking  these  elements  together,  we  see  how  liberal  democracy,  Asian 
values  and  the  ideology  of  growth  have  been  contested,  contextualised  and  filtered  as 
intellectual  constructs.  In  these  regards,  the  dissemination  of  language,  images  and 
ideology  forms  a  critical  element  in  the  process  of  hegemonic  legitimation.  Labelling  and 
ranking  of  countries'  democratic  status  has  also  allowed  an  artificial  discourse  to 
proliferate,  disguising  the  more  particular  sense  in  which  dominant  institutions  define 
and,  ultimately,  limit  democracy  through  their  ability  to  set  the  terms  of  debate.  Hence, 
we  see  the  hegemonic  context  of  intellectual  activity  within  this  process.  Let  us  now  set- 
out  these  assertions  in  more  applied  terms. 
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52 2 
Hegemony,  the  power  bloc  and  the 
intellectual:  a  Gramscian  perspectivism 
Having  reviewed  some  of  the  main  historical  background  and  associated  literature,  we 
are  now  in  a  position  to  set  out  a  more  specific  Gramscian  framework  concerning  state- 
class  relations,  power  politics  and  ideological  production  in  Malaysia.  These  will  be 
illustrated  through  consideration  of  Gramsci's  concepts  of  hegemony,  the  historical  bloc 
(power  bloc),  and  the  intellectual.  Before  outlining  the  relevance  of  each  to  the 
Malaysian  case,  it  may  be  helpful  to  make  some  preliminary  comments  concerning 
methodology  and  the  application  of  this  analysis. 
It  should  be  noted,  firstly,  that  such  constructs  are  to  be  viewed  here  as  useful  tools  of 
analysis  rather  than  rigid  theory  -a  heuristic  approach  consistent  with  the  open- 
reflexive  tenor  of  Gramsci's  own  writings.  This  does  not  suggest  any  `relativist'  or 
postmodernist  view  of  social  relations  `free-floating'  or  disconnected  from  structures  of 
power.  Rather,  it  leans  towards  what  may  be  more  appropriately  termed  `perspectivism' 
and  the  use  of  `critical  dialogue'  as  a  means  of  seeking  underlying  contradictions  and 
dialectical  tensions  within  given  relations  of  power  -a  sense  of  contingency,  again, 
implicit  in  Gramsci's  own  work. 
This  reflects  the  need  to  be  alert,  as  Foucault  argued,  to  the  problems  of  grand- 
theorising  and  `totalising'  systems.  '  Using  genealogy  as  a  mode  of  enquiry,  Foucault 
was  concerned  with  the  specificity  of  `localised'  forms  of  power,  thus  rejecting  grand- 
narratives  and  reductionist  Marxism.  Yet,  in  his  understanding  of  `power-knowledge',  2 
Foucault,  like  Gramsci,  also  saw  how  the  appropriation  of  civil  institutions  represented 
multiple  sites  of  social  control.  Alongside  Frankfurt  School  Critical  Theory  (notably, 
Adorno,  Marcuse  and  the  `earlier',  Habermas),  both  saw,  in  this  regard,  the  vital  role  of 
culture  and  aesthetics  as  key  sources  of  ideology  within  capitalist  societies.  For  Mouffe, 
Foucault's  understanding  of  how  power  is  exercised  at  all  social  levels  "converges  to- 
53 wards  a  new  conception  of  politics  and  power  which  is  anticipated  on  several  points  by 
Gramsci's  thought.  v13 
Secondly,  there  is  an  ethical  political  dimension  here.  Morera,  for  example, 
identifies  an  Aristotelian  influence  in  Gramsci's  politics,  expressed  in  the  idea  that  human 
emancipation  and  `the  good  life'  are  attainable  through  the  transformation  of  ethics, 
ideas  and  cultural  values.  In  this  sense: 
... 
Gramsci's  analysis  of  culture  represents  the  effort  to  understand  the  subtle  ways  in  which  power  is 
manifested,  or  alternatively,  the  ways  in  which  a  new  conception  of  the  world  begins  to  emerge  in 
popular  culture.  4 
A  third  caveat  here,  though,  concerns  the  need  to  see  Gramsci's  conception  of  hegemony 
as  a  specific  expression  of  class  society.  Although  an  apparently  obvious  point,  there  has 
been  a  tendency  to  reduce  Gramsci's  insights  to  a  somewhat  singular  concern  with 
culture  and  the  ethico-political.  5  What  this  fails  to  recognise  is  the  implicit  nature  of 
Gramsci's  analyses  of  class,  vis-ä-vis  state  formation,  class  relations  within  the  historical 
bloc  and  the  role  of  intellectuals  as  class-based  actors.  As  Gramsci  insists  in  the  Prison 
Notebooks: 
...  though  hegemony  is  ethical-political,  it  must  also  be  economic,  must  necessarily  be  based  on  the 
decisive  function  exercised  by  the  leading  group  in  the  decisive  nucleus  of  economic  activity.  6 
However,  while  Gramsci's  critique  of  historical  materialism  reflected  the  vital 
significance  of  economic  relations,  he  similarly  avoids  the  reduction  of  ideas,  culture  and 
human  agency  to  that  of  monocausal  economic  imperatives.  Hence: 
Gramsci  contrasted  historical  materialism,  which  recognises  the  efficacy  of  ethical  and  cultural  sources 
of  political  action  -  though  always  relating  them  with  the  economic  sphere  -  with  what  he  called 
'  historical  economism  or  the  reduction  of  everything  to  technological  and  material  interests. 
Thus,  we  see  how  capitalist  relations  of  production  in  conjunction  with  political  and 
ideological/cultural  power  represent  a  cumulative  expression  of  dominant  class  rule. 
This  relates,  fourthly,  to  the  `problem'  of  class  analysis  in  Gramsci's  work. 
Mouffe,  amongst  other  Gramscian  writers,  has  stressed  a  `non-essentialist'  reading  of 
54 Gramsci,  negating  the  view  that  the  proletariat/working-class  constitute  the  only  possible 
agents  of  opposition  and  change  in  capitalist  societies.  8  This  is  a  most  important 
dimension  for  present  purposes,  given  the  increasingly  diverse  nature  of  capitalist 
development,  class  formation  and  `new-middle-class'  identity  in  Malaysia.  One  might 
note,  in  passing,  that  Gramsci's  focus  on  proletarian  struggle  does  not  of  itself  denote  an 
essentialist  position.  Rather,  consistent  with  his  attack  upon  positivist  sociology  viz 
`Lorianism'  and  Bukharin's  `scientific  materialism',  9  and  willingness  to  incorporate  the 
ideas  of  non-marxist  figures  like  Croce,  we  find  in  Gramsci  an  open  thinker  who,  in 
keeping  with  a  later  stream  of  humanist  marxist  thought,  reveals  a  prescient  view  of  civil 
society  and  class  relations  as  a  dynamic  and  shifting  site.  10 
This  also  implies,  fifthly,  a  pedagogical  element  in  which  the  `engaged  writer' 
recognises  the  specificity  of  `discourse  as  praxis',  an  idea  consistent  with  Gramsci's 
particular  philosophy  of  praxis  wherein  the  educational  relationship  is  "active  and 
reciprocal  so  that  every  teacher  is  always  a  pupil  and  every  pupil  a  teacher.  ""  In  other 
words,  our  own  endeavours  as  academics  and  writers  are  neither  detached  or  neutral,  a 
view  captured  in  the  idea  of  self-reflexive  discourse  in  which  teachers  as: 
...  transformative  intellectuals  are  themselves  ideological  subjects  who  must  somehow  both  recognise  and 
partly  `transcend'  their  own  structural-consciousness  formation...  Teachers,  in  this  Gramscian  sense  of 
intellectuals,  would  use  their  recognition  of  their  own  initial  constitution  as  ideological  subjects  as  the 
basis  for  actively  promoting  awareness...  This  is  [to  accept]  that  social  reproduction  is  an  active  and 
contested  business.  '2 
In  these  senses,  Gramsci  shows  that  the  control  and  reproduction  of  ideas  is  part 
of  an  ongoing  and  contested  process  of  class  struggle,  political  statecraft  and  intellectual 
enterprise  -  connecting  elements  of  hegemony  which  take  us  beyond  any  liberal  analysis 
of  power. 
Forms  and  nature  of  the  power  bloc 
The  next  task  here  is  to  set  out  a  power  format  which  recognises  both  the  structural 
complexities  and  dynamic  nature  of  state-class  relations.  The  model  followed  is  that  of 
the  `historical  bloc'  (or  power  bloc,  as  we  shall  use  it)  as  intimated  by  Gramsci  in  On  The 
55 Southern  Question.  13  It  should  be  noted  here  that  Gramsci  uses  the  idea  of  the  historical 
bloc  in  two  related  senses:  firstly,  as  an  abstract  critique  of  both  Marx's  economistic  and 
Croce's  idealistic  understandings  of  the  relationship  between  `structure'  and 
`superstructure';  and,  secondly,  at  a  more  concrete  level  of  social  reality  with  regard  to 
actual  class  formation.  14  Here,  we  are  concerned,  more  particularly,  with  the  latter 
element.  As  outlined  in  our  discussion  of  colonial  and  post-colonial  development  in 
Malaya/Malaysia,  this  helps  illustrate  the  particular  historical  conjuncture  of  class 
relations,  political  forces  and  ideological  constructs  which  give  rise  to  new  formations  of 
power.  The,  historical  bloc  should  also  be  seen  as  having  within  it  apolitical  bloc, 
allowing  competing  elements  to  hold  power  over  time  without  necessarily  changing  the 
class  basis  of  the  historical  bloc  itself.  " 
In  On  The  Southern  Question,  the  historical  bloc  is  closely  connected  to 
Gramsci's  observations  on  the  socio-economic  disparities  between  the  industrialised 
Italian  North  and  the  agrarian  South.  Noting  the  complex  formation  of  class  alliances 
between  these  blocs,  Gramsci  shows  that  while  the  rural  agrarian  South  provided  the 
Italian  state  with  a  strata  of  bureaucrats,  the  North  had  witnessed  an  expansion  of 
technocrats,  managers  and  other  groupings  more  closely  identified  with  the  rational 
interests  of  big  industrial  capital  and  the  urban  bourgeoisie.  "'  In  the  Prison  Notebooks 
(written  during  his  incarceration  from  1926  till  his  death  in  1937),  Gramsci  develops  this 
analysis  of  class  forces,  forms  of  production  and  political  alignments  (notably  in 
Americanism  and  Fordism),  discussing,  in  turn,  the  contradictions  of  Italian  political  and 
capitalist  development  posed  by  corporate  syndicalism,  fascist  alliances  with  the  rural 
bourgeoisie,  the  state's  liaison  with  the  Catholic  Church  and  the  persistence  of  a 
reactionary  intelligentsia.  17 
This  attempt  to  locate  the  interdependence  of  state-class  forces  and  intellectual 
currents  in  Italy  under  the  fascists  follows-on  from  Gramsci's  writings  on  the 
Risorgimento  (culminating  in  Italian  unification  in  1861).  Here,  in  contrast  to  the 
Jacobin  revolutionary  struggle  in  France,  the  Italian  bourgeoisie  and  the  Moderate  Party 
had  initiated  a  `passive  revolution'  from  above  through  the  mobilisation  of  the 
Piedmontese  state  and  the  Italian  intelligentsia.  The  problem,  argued  Gramsci,  invoking 
Marx's  Eighteenth  Brumaire,  was  that  state-class  power  here  was  of  a  premature  form, 
based  upon  transient  alliances  rather  than  national  popular  support.  In  describing  the 
56 Risorgimento  as  a  form  of  `Caesarism',  Gramsci  shows  that  the  weakness  of  liberal- 
bourgeois  institutions  and  popular  support  contributed  to  a  vacuum  in  state-class 
relations  allowing  for  the  subsequent  rise  of  fascism.  '$ 
The  principal  point  to  be  drawn  here  is  that  state-class  formation  at  given 
historical  junctures  has  a  vital  bearing  on  power  relations  to  follow.  The  idea  of  a  power 
bloc,  thus,  involves  much  more  than  a  political  coalition  or  corporatist  alliance.  19  It 
represents  the  particular  coincidence  of  state-class  interests,  instrumental 
accommodations  between  dominant  groups  and  pragmatic  concessions  to  subordinate 
groups.  (See  the  discussion  of  hegemony  below.  )  Thus,  state-class  arrangements  in 
colonial  Malaya  involved  British  protection  of  foreign  capitalist  interests,  the  co-optation 
of  the  Malay  aristocracy  and  accommodations  with  Chinese  capital.  Under  the  Alliance 
state,  dominant  Malay  elites  and  the  Chinese  bourgeoisie  used  `consociational'  politics  as 
a  basis  for  the  power  bloc,  an  arrangement  again  incorporating  the  laissez-faire  interests 
of  international  capital  and  pragmatic  concessions  to  subordinate  Indian  class  groups. 
The  ensuing  NEP  state  saw  bureaucratic  class  interests  redress  the  balance  in  favour  of 
the  Malay  state  bourgeoisie.  And,  the  evolving  power  bloc  under  Mahathir  can  be  seen 
as  a  gradual  curtailment  of  the  state  bourgeoisie  and  affirmative  Malay  policies;  an 
attempt  to  move  towards  a  more  `expansive'  set  of  state-class  relations  involving 
selected  elements  of  Malay  business  and  new  accommodations  with  big  Chinese  and 
transnational  capital. 
Global  forms  of  the  power  bloc 
However,  our  analysis  of  the  domestic  power  bloc  in  Malaysia  also  needs  to  be  set 
against  global  relations  of  power.  This  does  not  imply  a  reductive  role  for  the  domestic 
state  or/and  state-class.  Rather,  it  denotes  relationships  of  conflict,  mediation  and 
accommodation;  a  `state-class  complex'  of  shifting  alignments  between  domestic  elites, 
fractions  of  capital  and  key  capitalist  institutions.  The  emergence  of  Gramscian  ideas 
within  and  contra  International  Relations/neo-realist  theory  offers  a  further  dimension  of 
analysis  here.  For  example,  in  Gill's  (ed)  Gramsci,  Historical  Materialism  and 
International  Relations,  Gramscian  conceptions  of  the  power  bloc  have  been  used  to 
trace  the  structural  transformation  of  the  global  order  from  the  1970s  to  the  1990s.  2°  In 
57 an  earlier  formulation,  Cox  notes  how  the  dialectical  nature  of  power  bloc  relations 
suggests  a  process  of  ongoing-contradiction  and  "the  potential  for  alternative  forms  of 
development  arising  from  the  confrontation  of  opposed  social  forces  in  any  concrete 
historical  situation.  v721 
Following  this  line  of  enquiry,  the  key  elements  of  a  contemporary  global  power 
bloc  can  be  traced  to  shifts  within  the  economic,  political  and  cultural  institutions  of  the 
advanced  capitalist  states  from  the  mid-1970s.  Reflecting  the  greater  diversification  of 
global  power  and  the  gathering  transnationalisation  of  the  world  economy  from  that 
period,  the  post-war  Pax  Americana  has  given  way  to  a  more  complex  set  of  hegemonic 
relations.  The  decisive  context  of  this  historic  shift  has  been  the  new  technological 
capacities  available  to  capital  and  -  to  borrow  from  Castells  -  the  new  spatial 
landscape  of  `informational  capitalism'.  22 
In  particular,  the  greater  autonomy  of  financial  capital  through  the  new 
opportunities  of  information-led  accumulation  has  allowed  this  component  of  capital  to 
set  the  terms  of.  (a)  the  accumulation  strategies  of  other  fractions  of  capital;  (b)  the 
political  boundaries  and  policy  parameters  of  the  nation-state;  (c)  a  new  international 
division  of  labour  based  on  stratified  national  and  regional  accumulation  sites;  (d)  a  new 
global  managerial  middle-class  to  oversee  this  process;  and  (e)  the  ideological  and 
cultural  signifiers  which  give  reproductive  meaning  to  that  amalgam  of  power  relations. 
Thus,  at  the  economic  level  of  the  bloc,  the  growing  disjunction  between  national 
and  transnational  fractions  of  capital  has  given  the  latter,  notably  in  the  sphere  of 
financial  markets,  greater  power  to  shape  the  global  order.  The  "internationalisation  of 
production"  has  become  synonymous  with  the  "internationalisation  of  the  state"23  and 
has  seen  the  relative  subordination  of  domestic  capital  to  that  of  capital  associated  with 
the  wider  global  economy.  24  As  Cox  has  argued,  this  has  occurred  most  notably  within 
"...  ministries  of  finance  [where]  a  new  axis  of  influence  [links]  international  policy 
networks  with  the  key  central  agencies  of  government  and  big  business.  "25  Hence,  a 
more  globalised  managerial  class  has  emerged,  connecting  financiers,  production 
managers  and  finance  ministers  through  the  agenda-setting  medium  of  the  IMF,  World 
Trade  Organisation  (WTO),  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD),  World  Bank  and  Trilateral  Commission. 
58 An  illustration  of  this  hegemonic  agenda,  can  be  seen  in  the  negotiations  over  the 
Multilateral  Agreement  on  Investment  (MAI) 
. 
2'  The  MAI  plan  set-out  for  the  first  time 
the  rights  of  corporate  interests  over  the  state.  Under  the  initial  plan,  negotiated  for  the 
first  three  years  in  secret  by  OECD  ministers  and  top  global  (notably,  Fortune  500) 
companies,  signatories  were  to  be  subject  to  litigation  through  newly-formed 
international  courts  where  states  sought  to  restrict  corporations  from  moving  their 
operations  freely  around  the  globe.  Developing  countries  such  as  Malaysia  would  be 
invited  to  sign  despite  not  having  taken  any  meaningful  part  in  the  negotiation  process. 
In  late  1998,  new  proposals  to  include  development  agencies  and  pursue  negotiations 
through  the  wider  ambit  of  the  WTO  were  launched  following  internal  wrangling  and 
widespread  opposition.  27  Its  postponement  had  also  been  influenced  by  the  emergent 
global  crisis  (see  following  chapters)  as  finance  ministers  moved  into  emergency  mode  in 
a  bid  to  stave-off  world  recession.  Yet,  while  the  crisis  deepened,  the  case  for  a  `MAI  2' 
was  maintained.  Greater  investor  freedom  and  a  more  `level  playing  field',  it  was 
argued,  would  be  necessary  to  promote  open  trade,  growth  and  higher  living  standards. 
As  the  director-general  of  the  WTO  had  noted:  "We  are  writing  the  constitution  of  a 
single  global  economy.  "2'  Thus,  in  preparation  for  the  WTO  gathering  in  Seattle  by 
November  1999,  renewed  strategies  were  being  formulated  by  multinationals  and  state 
ministers  to  ensure  a  common  agenda  on  free  trade  and  corporate  rights.  21 
The  imperatives  of  transnational  capital  now  also  shape  the  political 
configuration  of  the  global  bloc  more  decisively  than  ever.  By  narrowing  the  abilities  of 
political  classes  to  initiate  domestic  policy  objectives,  executive  powers  and  government 
functions  are  being  radically  transformed.  To  a  considerable  extent,  it  is  this  `crisis 
response'  of  the  nation-state  to  the  `new  sovereignty'  of  transnational  capital,  and  the 
volatile  propensities  of  financial  capital  in  particular,  which  has  led  to  new  supranational 
forms  of  political  organisation.  European  Monetary  Union,  for  example,  can  be  seen  as 
part  of  a  putative  attempt  by  European  states  to  formalise  conditions  for  capital 
accumulation  while  sustaining  some  element  of  economic  control,  political  authority  and 
social  cohesion.  Here,  in  turn,  we  see  the  paradox  of  `globalisation  as  regionalisation', 
as  NAFTA,  the  European  Union  and  a  Japan-led  trade  zone  in  East  Asia  each  seek  to 
protect  and  control  specified  sites.  Indeed,  Mahathir  has  been  particularly  supportive  of 
the  latter  in  his  bid  to  build  intra-regional  trade. 
59 Geopolitical  sensitivities  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region  over  Japan  and  China  also 
remain  the  basis  for  US-led  security  arrangements,  one  which  Malaysia  has  remained 
tied-into  via  the  Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN),  formed,  in  part 
(1967),  as  a  bulwark  to  communist  Vietnam.  While  ASEAN  member  states  have  not 
always  shared  a  common  outlook  vis-a-vis  the  superpowers,  Malaysia's  pragmatic 
support  for  US  security  arrangements  in  the  region  have  been  evident  in,  for  example, 
the  ASEAN  Regional  Forum  (ARF),  set  up  in  1993  in  response  to  the  rising  power  of 
China.  30  This  essentially  pro-US  security  position  should  be  borne  in  mind  when  we 
come  to  address  the  circumstances  of  Mahathir's  anti-Western  rhetoric,  particularly  at 
the  height  of  the  Anwar  crisis.  It  is  also  instructive  to  note  how  US  political  elites  came 
to  play  a  key  role  in  pressurising  Suharto  to  accept  the  terms  of  the  IMF  bail-out  in  1998 
at  the  height  of  the  crisis.  And,  as  we  shall  see,  it  was  also  Malaysia's  own  bilateral 
relations  with  the  US  which  became  a  critical  factor  in  the  country's  recovery  agenda  and 
Mahathir's  very  survival  at  this  point.  Thus,  despite  this  diminution  of  state  sovereignty, 
the  US  remains  the  key  political  influence  within  the  bloc.  31 
The  ideological-cultural  complexion  of  any  global  bloc  is,  perhaps,  more 
problematic.  As  noted,  this  is  not  only  because  cultures  and  ideas  -  particularly  in  an 
age  of  global  information  and  entertainment  -  are  fluid  and  interacting,  but  also,  as  Said 
shows,  because  `dominant'  ideological  forms  are  always  subject  to  contradictory 
processes  of  convergence  and  resistance.  Nonetheless,  a  key  feature  of  late-capitalist 
society  has  been  the  hegemonic  status  of  corporate  power  and  the  evolution  of  capitalist 
culture,  or  a  culture  of  capitalism;  in  effect,  a  convergence  of  neo-liberal  ideas,  the  values 
of  marketisation  and  the  cult  of  `post-fordist'  consumption.  Sklair's  neo-Gramscian 
account  of  "transnational  practices"  (economic,  political  and  cultural-ideological) 
illustrates  how  transnational  corporations  (TNCs)  have  sought  to  internalise  a  culture  of 
liberal  freedoms  and  popular  capitalism  through  the  reification  of  consumer  imagery  and 
the  representation  of  all  social  life  as  a  set  of  bourgeois  opportunities,  products  and 
desires: 
The  systematic  blurring  of  lines  between  information,  entertainment  and  the  promotion  of  products  lies 
at  the  heart  of  this  practice...  transform[ing]  all  the  public  mass  media  and  their  contents  into 
opportunities  to  sell  ideas,  values,  products,  in  short  a  consumerist  worldview;  the  transnational  class  in 
60 the  United  States  has  assumed  leadership  of  the  culture-ideology  of  consumerism  in  the  twentieth 
century.  32 
For  Miliband,  this  represents  both  the  objectification  of  corporate  values  and  the 
coalescing  of  state  and  corporate  influence  in  the  field  of  ideological  communication: 
[Such]  ideological  struggle  from  above  constitutes  a  gigantic  enterprise  in  political  socialisation  and 
indoctrination,  and  amounts  in  effect  to  a  daily,  massive  assault  on  popular  consciousness...  [While 
corporate  attention  is]  increasingly  given  to  advertising  not  only  its  products,  but  also  its  philosophy  and 
views,  [the  state  has  also]  assumed  ever  greater  responsibilities  in  the  business  of  persuasion, 
indoctrination  and  the  striving  for  hegemony.  33 
The  fundamental  point  here  is  that  this  intersection  of  forces  -  financial  capital, 
information-led  markets,  autonomous  networks  of  production,  the  realignment  of  nation- 
states  and  political  classes,  globalised  middle-classes,  new  stratified  labour  markets  and 
corporate  `cultural  philosophy'  -  has  created  a  new  type  of  power  order.  Coinciding  in 
time  and  space  with  the  information  revolution,  it  represents  the  most  dynamic  and 
socially  momentous  complex  of  power  relations  in  history.  And  it  is  in  relation  to  these 
new  globalised  forms  of  economic,  political  and  ideological  power  that  hegemonic 
relations  at  the  national  level  may  be  understood.  In  effect,  the  domestic  form  of  the 
power  bloc  stands  in  `devolved',  yet  dialectical,  relationship  to  the  global  power  bloc. 
Hegemony  and  hegemonic  projects 
For  Gramsci,  `domination'  and  `hegemony'  represented  two  antithetical  expressions  of 
power.  This  relates  to  his  observations  on  the  distinction  between  the  specifically 
coercive  role  of  the  state,  as  exemplified  by  Tsarist  Russia  in  the  East,  and  the  consensual 
bourgeois  civil  societies  of  the  West.  The  former  -  equated  as  political  society  -  sees 
the  state  as  the  direct  agent  of  coercion  and  "domination",  while  the  latter  is  equated 
with  civil  society  and  a  form  of  power  based  more  specifically  on  "intellectual  and  moral 
direction".  34  Alongside  other  related  couplets,  such  as  `force  and  consent',  `authority 
and  hegemony',  `violence  and  civilisation',  Gramsci,  with  a  penchant  for  military 
symbolism,  also  applies  the  respective  metaphors  `war  of  manoeuvre'  and  `war  of 
61 position'  to  represent  the  contrasting  nature  of  power  and  its  contestation  within  these 
contexts.  35 
The  Gramscian  conception  of  hegemony  can  also  be  contrasted  with  the  term's 
use  in  neo-realist  theory,  36  and  used  to  signify  power  relations  at  the  national  and  global 
levels: 
... 
in  neorealist  discourse  the  term  `hegemony'  is  reduced  to  a  single  dimension  of  dominance,...  a 
physical  capabilities  relationship  among  states.  The  Gramscian  meaning  of  hegemony  joins  an 
ideological  and  intersubjective  element  to  the  brute  power  relationship.  In  a  hegemonic  order,  the 
dominant  power  makes  certain  concessions  or  compromises  to  secure  the  acquiescence  of  lesser  powers 
to  an  order  that  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  a  general  interest...  The  consensual  element  distinguishes 
hegemonic  from  nonhegemonic  world  orders.  It  also  tends  to  mystify  the  power  relations  upon  which 
the  order  ultimately  rests.  37 
Thus,  in  contrast  to  outright  domination  by  the  coercive  state,  hegemony,  as  a 
specific  statement  of  the  modern  state  and  manifestation  of  class  rule  for  Gramsci,  3ß 
involves  a  higher  form  and  synthesis  of  power.  In  particular,  it  requires: 
...  political,  intellectual  and  moral  leadership  over  allied  groups...  [wherein] 
...  a  class  is  dominant  in  two 
ways,  that  is  to  say  it  is  dominant  and  ruling.  It  rules  the  allied  classes  and  dominates  the  opposing 
classes.  39 
Yet,  also  of  vital  significance  for  Gramsci: 
...  the  fact  of  hegemony  presupposes  that  one  takes  into  account  the  interests  and  tendencies  of  the  group 
over  which  hegemony  will  be  exercised  [wherein]  hegemonic  groups...  make  some  sacrifices  of  a 
corporate  nature.  40 
Gramscian  hegemony,  thus,  involves  two  important  elements  for  the  dominant 
class,  both  relevant  to  the  power  bloc.  Firstly,  the  organisation  of  strategic  alliances  and 
concessions  to  subsidiary  groups.  Secondly,  and  more  importantly,  the  articulation  of 
the  dominant  group's  interests  and  values  through  moral  and  intellectual  leadership. 
While  the  first  may  be  nominally  instrumental  in  character,  the  second  helps  forge  both 
these  and  broader  national  popular  relations  into  a  consensual  `collective  will'.  This 
involves: 
62 the  disarticulation  of  the  ideologies  of  subordinate  groups  and  rearticulation  of  the  relevant  elements  into 
the  ideology  of  the  dominant  group.  In  other  words:  the  hegemonic  ideology  includes  ideological 
elements  from  all  groups,  but  the  unity  comes  from  the  articulating  principle,  which  is  always  provided 
by  the  hegemonic  group...  The  unity  forged  is  active  and  direct,  resulting  from  genuine  adoption  of  the 
interests  of  the  other  groups  by  the  dominant  group.  41 
It  is  crucial  to  understand  that  Gramsci's  conception  of  ideology  does  not  conform  to 
any  `Marxist'  notion  of  `false  consciousness';  that  is,  hegemony  cannot  be  reduced  to  a 
process  of  ideological  domination  where  class  ideology  is  imposed.  42  With  this  in  mind, 
notes  Mouffe,  we  can  begin  to  see  the  real  meaning  of  Gramsci's  concept  of  hegemony: 
...  a  class  is  hegemonic  when  it  has  managed  to  articulate  to  its  discourse  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
ideological  elements  characteristic  of  a  given  social  formation,  in  particular  the  national-popular 
elements  which  allow  it  to  become  the  class  expressing  the  national  interest  43 
Of  course,  any  alternative  power  bloc  also  needs  to  build  its  own  hegemony. 
Thus,  it  is  necessary  to  remove  the  term's  `pejorative'  label,  for,  quite  clearly,  Gramsci 
saw  the  construction  of  an  alternative  hegemony  as  the  key  to  a  socialist  order  - 
though,  Gramsci  envisaged  the  latter  as  qualitatively  different,  in  an  organic  and 
intellectual  sense  (see  below)  from  that  of  bourgeois  hegemony. 
As  part  of  this  hegemonic  struggle,  economics  and  the  ethical  both  become,  in  a 
specifically  Gramscian  sense,  political.  '  With  important  relevance  to  Mahathir's  Vision 
agenda,  Gramsci's  concept  of  hegemony  thus  illustrates  the  national  popular  and 
ethical-moral  challenge  for  the  leading  class  in  using  state  and  civil  institutions  to  build 
an  ideology  of  developmentalism.  Here,  notes  Gramsci,  the: 
...  state  is  ethical  in  as  much  as  one  of  its  most  important  functions  is  to  raise  the  great  mass  of  the 
population  to  a  particular  cultural  and  moral  level...  which  corresponds  to  the  needs  of  the  productive 
forces  for  development,  and  hence  to  the  interests  of  the  ruling  classes.  45 
Hegemonic  projects 
Coalescing  around  a  given  framework  of  leading  interests  and  ideas,  all  these  elements 
can  be  seen  to  constitute  a  `hegemonic  project'.  While  this  relates  mainly  to  the 
domestic  power  bloc,  it  also  recognises  the  historical  and  global  contexts  within  which 
63 those  arrangements  are  shaped.  Moore,  for  example,  has  used  Gramscian  perspectives 
on  hegemony  and  intellectuals  to  illustrate  the  development  of  the  ruling  class  in  post- 
independence  Zimbabwe.  The  experience  of  post-apartheid  South  Africa  also  shows 
how  the  exigencies  of  white  privilege  and  foreign  capital  still  inform  domestic  state-class 
relations.  47  Southall's  comparative  analysis  of  South  Africa  and  Malaysia  offers  further 
insights  here  concerning  the  problems  of  growth  and  redistribution  faced  by  the  African 
National  Congress  (ANC)  and  UMNO,  indicating  the  tension  between  global 
capitalism's  terms  of  investment  and  the  respective  attempts  of  each  to  redress  black 
inequalities  and  Bumiputera  rights.  48  Significantly,  South  Africa  had  also  come  to  see 
Malaysia,  pre-crisis,  as  a  model  of  economic  development,  with  Mandela  endorsing 
Mahathir's  growth-led  strategy  as  a  precondition  of  social  prosperity.  (See  Chapter  4.  ) 
More  notably,  the  Gramscian  perspective  has  been  applied  by  Stuart  Hall  in  his 
consideration  of  Thatcherism  as  a  hegemonic  project.  Although  first  using  the  concept 
`authoritarian  populism'  to  signify  the  ideological  rationale  of  Thatcherism,  Hall  is  at 
pains  to  stress,  in  answer  to  earlier  objections  by  Jessop  et  al,  that  the  project  was  built 
around  economic  strategies  in  conjunction  with  political  and  ideological  ones.  49  Hall's 
view  is  thus  consistent  with  that  of  Jessop  et  al: 
By  `hegemonic  project'  we  refer  to  a  national-popular  programme  of  political,  intellectual  and  moral 
leadership  which  advances  the  long-term  interests  of  the  leading  sectors  in  the  accumulation  strategy 
while  granting  economic  concessions  to  the  masses  of  the  social  base.  We  would  suggest  that  such  a 
task  requires  the  creation  of  a  `power  bloc'  that  unifies  -  around  a  common  political  and  economic 
programme  -  the  most  powerful  social  forces  in  the  society,  and  also  the  establishment  of  a  broader 
complementarity  between  the  institutions  and  forces  of  civil  society  and  the  polity,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
those  of  the  economic  order,  on  the  other,  that  is,  a  `historic  bloc'  50 
Hall  is  also  faithful  to  Gramsci's  view  of  hegemony  as  an  ongoing  enterprise,  and 
the  need  to  cultivate  control  strategies  within  the  state  and  civil  society.  Thus, 
Thatcherism,  seeking  to  build  upon  a  `two-nation',  rather  than  `one-nation' 
conservatism,  embodied  strategies  of  electoral  co-optation,  neo-liberal  attacks  on  the 
welfare  state,  privatisation  and  City  deregulation,  while  invoking  ideals  of  law  and  order, 
individual  responsibility,  enterprise  culture,  wealth  creation  and  popular  capitalist  ideals 
such  as  shareholding  and  home-ownership.  Yet,  significantly,  Hall  points  out  that  he: 
64 ...  never  advanced  the  proposition  that  Thatcherism...  achieved  'hegemony'...  [rather,  seeing]  Thatcherite 
politics  [as]  'hegemonic'  in  their  conception  and  project:  the  aim  is  to  struggle  on  several  fronts  at  once, 
not  on  the  economic-corporate  one  alone;  and  this  is  based  on  the  knowledge  that,  in  order  really  to 
dominate  and  restructure  a  social  formation,  political,  moral  and  intellectual  leadership  must  be  coupled 
to  economic  dominance.  The  Thatcherites  know  they  must  'win'  in  civil  society  as  well  as  the  states' 
Here,  it  is  instructive  to  note  how  Thatcherism  was  articulated  through  the 
populist  press,  in  her  case  by  ascendant  right-wing  `media  intellectuals.  '52 
Thatcherism  was  thus  defined,  to  a  large  extent,  not  in  specialist  journals  or  elite  forums  but  in 
newspaper  columns  and  in  well  publicised  reports  and  position  papers;  it  represented  a  well  thought-out 
(and  effective)  use  of  the  media  by  intellectuals.  53 
Despite  the  more  obvious  threat  of  coercive  mechanisms  in  Malaysia,  Mahathirism's 
appeal  to  populist  Vision  modernity  can  also  be  seen  as  a  concerted  attempt  to  win  in 
civil  society.  While  the  Malaysian  press  and  wider  media  is  more  overtly  controlled  than 
in  the  West,  it  is  important  to  see  that  Mahathirism  has  been  built  around  similar  forms  of 
intellectual  populism. 
As  `modified  Thatcherism',  New  Labour's  re-articulation  of  state-class  relations, 
`political  modernity'  and  populist  ideology  is  also  of  comparative  value  here.  The  first  of 
these  elements  can  be  denoted  in  Blair's  new  liaison  with  corporate/City  interests  -  as 
evidenced  by  the  handover  of  interest  rate  policy  to  the  Bank  of  England,  a  key  surrender 
of  power  and  indication  of  the  `new  fit'  between  Blairite  economics  and  global  capital.  54 
The  second  concerns  the  renewal  of  the  middle-class  reward-structure  and  centre-ground 
alliance  in  an  attempt  to  sublimate  class  politics  to  the  new  `post-class'  language  of 
`middle-England'.  Here,  control  over  party  policy  has  become  concentrated  around  a 
select  core  of  advisers  and  spindoctors  whose  principal  task  is  the  presentation  of 
Blairism  as  the  new  site  of  moderate-centrist  politics.  The  third  aspect  involves  the 
invocation  of  populist  ideas  such  as  `stakeholding',  `new  welfare  reform'  and 
`communitarian  citizenship'.  It  is  not  without  significance  that  Blair  used  the  political 
props  of  `Asian  values'  and  `tiger  achievement'  during  his  visit  to  Singapore  in  1995  to 
launch  the  `stakeholding'  agenda.  Here,  new  Blairite  intellectuals  like  Anthony  Giddens 
and  think-tanks  like  Demos  have  provided  a  `Third  Way'  discourse  for  New  Labour, 
allowing  it  to  adapt  and  use  the  tenets  of  free-market  individualism.  At  the  populist 
65 level,  Blair  has  also  cultivated  a  new  `understanding'  with  the  Murdoch  press  as  a  means 
of  entrenching  its  ideas.  "  Thus,  the  Blair  project  has  sought  to  position  itself  as  more 
`corporate-friendly',  `politically  modem'  and  `tabloid  intellectual'  than  Thatcherism.  56 
Again,  allowing  for  its  own  idiosyncratic  features  and  coercive  elements,  similar 
forms  of  statecraft  and  populist  enterprise  can  be  discerned  within  the  Mahathir  project. 
Of  particular  salience  to  what  will  be  understood  here  as  `late-Mahathirism',  this  has 
involved  a  reconfiguration  of  UMNO's  state-corporate  relationship  with  Malay,  Chinese 
and  foreign  capital,  the  building  of  a  new  `post-ethnic'  middle-class  electoral  base,  and 
an  increasing  articulation  of  these  ideas  through  the  media  and  other  populist  channels. 
As  with  the  reformulation  of  these  areas  under  Blair,  the  Mahathir  project  has  been 
attempting  to  realise  a  gradual  re-ordering  of  its  hegemonic  base  in  response  to  structural 
changes  in  the  economy  and  society.  While  this  appeal  to  consensus  was  to  be  tested  by 
1997,  it  had  helped  protect  the  power  bloc  throughout  much  of  the  pre-crisis  period.  It 
may  be  noted,  in  this  regard,  that  while  Mahathir  and  UMNO  were  being  riven  by 
allegations  of  cronyism  amid  the  Anwar  situation,  serious  corruption  scandals  and  money 
politics  were  being  unearthed  by  this  point  in  the  West.  "  While,  in  contrast  to 
UMNOBN,  such  activities  may  be  subject  to  fuller  forms  of  `parliamentary  scrutiny'  and 
media  insight,  each  situation  illustrates  the  more  central  issue  here  of  state-class  relations 
as  the  key  foci  of  power,  wherein  political  elites,  as  holders  of  state  office,  provide 
access  for  corporate  interests,  while  the  latter  offer  wealth,  connections  and  support  for 
the  project  in  hand. 
As  noted,  Munro-Kua  comes  closest  to  this  type  of  hegemonic/state-class 
approach  in  Authoritarian  Populism  in  Malaysia.  In  this  view,  the  Malay  state-class  has 
internalised  power  through  repressive  functions  and  populist  policies,  while  allowing 
competing  class  fractions  to  shape  political  and  ethnic  relations.  "  However,  while 
Munro-Kua,  correctly,  sees  this  populism  as  a  legitimating  function  of  the  coercive  state, 
the  orientation  of  the  present  study  places  more  emphasis  on  how  the  Mahathirist  project 
has  sought  to  create  legitimacy  by  consent  under  the  aegis  of  a  Vision  2020-type  agenda. 
Moreover,  it  is  concerned  to  place  this  within  the  more  specific  context  of  the  power 
bloc,  rather  than  the  state  per  se.  In  essence,  it  is  a  Gramscian  attempt  to  locate  the 
transitionary  nature  of  the  legitimation  process  -  and  the  problematic  factors  therein  - 
from  that  of  overt  domination  via  the  repressive  state,  to  one  of  hegemony  via  more 
66 consensual  control  over  civil  society.  Again,  the  specific  purpose  here  is  not  to  make 
claims  of  any  inexorable  movement  towards  the  latter  pole,  but,  rather,  to  understand  the 
tensions  and  contradictions  within  that  process  itself,  the  crisis  situation  from  mid-1997 
being  an  acute  test  of  Mahathir's  attempts  to  build  hegemonic  legitimacy. 
Hegemony  and  civil  society 
Again,  this  takes  us,  following  Gramsci,  back  to  Rodan's  concern  about  civil  society  as  a 
site  of  inequality  and  contested  power.  Gramsci's  distinctive  insight  here  lies  not  in  any 
narrow  conception  of  class  power  vis-a-vis  the  state,  but  in  the  specific  relationship 
between  the  state  and  civil  society.  (Bobbio  emphasises,  in  this  regard,  how  Gramsci's 
concept  of  civil  society  derives  from  a  critique  of  Hegel  rather  than  Marx,  and  that  the 
"revaluation  of  civil  society  is  not  what  links  him  to  Marx,  but  what  distinguishes  him 
from  Marx.  "59)  Gramsci  was  critically  aware  of  the  rapid  expansion  of  civil  institutions 
as  bourgeois  society  developed,  a  shift  apparent  today  in  the  growth  of  trade  unions, 
clubs,  churches,  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs),  voluntary  organisations, 
political  parties,  newspapers,  pressure  groups  and  other  popular  cultural  outlets.  With 
the  rapid  expansion  of  the  economy  and  state  sector  in  Malaysia,  civil  society  has  come 
to  assume  greater  potential  for  organised  dissent  and  opposition.  But  this  does  not  make 
it  a  proto-liberal  realm  of  pluralist  contestation.  Rather,  like  the  state,  it  is  a  site  of 
power  inequality.  But  where  the  state  involves  control  through  the  threat  of  coercion, 
hegemony  requires  that  control  within  civil  society  be  organised,  more  subtly,  around  the 
principles  of  populist  consent.  Here,  notes  Morera: 
...  the  state  should  expand  its  functions  and  acquire  an  educative  role.  With  this  the  relation  between 
state  and  civil  society  changes  considerably.  The  transformation  of  the  state  requires,  Gramsci  suggests, 
that  its  repressive  character  should  diminish  and  its  ethico-political  character,  its  hegemonic  function 
should  grow  in  importance.  60 
In  this  regard,  the  subject  of  democracy  within  civil  society  in  the  Prison 
Notebooks  is  not  well  developed.  But  it  is  certainly  intrinsic  in  Gramsci's  overall  work. 
More  recently,  Gramscian  writers  such  as  Morera,  Mouffe,  Laclau  and  Golding  have 
begun  to  theorise  Gramsci's  ideas  on  civil  society  as  the  basis  for  a  new  post-liberal 
67 democracy.  "'  Implicit  here  is  the  idea  of  extending  the  open,  reciprocal  and 
participatory  principles  which  Gramsci  argued  for  in  any  proto-revolutionary  movement 
to  that  of  civil  society  more  generally.  More  immediately,  this  allows  us,  following 
Rodan,  to  recognise  the  emergence  of  New  Social  Movements  (NSMs)  and  NGOs  as  a 
new  form  of  political  opposition  in  Malaysia  (see  below)  and  the  region.  62  Hewison  and 
Rodan  also  reflect  this  view  in  their  analysis  of  `the  Left'  within  the  civil  societies  of 
Southeast  Asia: 
... 
in  the  contemporary  period,  the  political  space  associated  with  civil  society  is,  to  varying  extents, 
again  being  created  in  the  societies  of  Southeast  Asia.  However...  it  is  no  longer  socialists  and 
Communists  who  are  leading  this  movement.  Rather,  a  range  of  liberals  and  social  reformers  are 
playing  the  leading  roles  in  establishing  civil  society  through  various  non-state  groups.  Nevertheless, 
while  the  revolutionary  Left  may  be  overshadowed  by  a  range  of  other  contending  political  forces,  this 
does  not  necessarily  mean  social  reformism  is  an  entirely  spent  force  in  contemporary  Southeast  Asia. 
Instead,  the  inequities  and  contradictions  of  the  market  system  continue  to  generate  social  problems  that 
cannot  be  alleviated  by  liberal  reformism.  63 
This  suggests  an  alternative  way  of  thinking  about  Left  politics  and  is  consistent  not  only 
with  a  new  NSM/NGO-type  politics,  64  but  with  the  Gramscian  view  of  opposition  as  a 
broad  counter-hegemonic  alignment  based  upon  non-hierarchical  relationships. 
Intellectuals:  the  organisers  of  hegemony 
Integral  to  this  process  is  the  participation  of  the  intellectual  as  a  competing  political 
actor.  In  the  Prison  Notebooks,  Gramsci  provides  a  new  theoretical  basis  for  the  special 
role  of  the  proactive  intellectual  in  the  construction  of  national-popular  hegemony.  For 
Gramsci,  this  involved  a  gradual  departure  from  the  idea  of  intellectuals  as  an  exclusive 
elite  or  clerisy,  to  a  more  structural  view  of  intellectual  enterprise  within  capitalist 
societies.  It  is  within  this  context  that  Gramsci  discusses  the  Italian  liberal  intellectual 
Benedetto  Croce's  efforts  in  galvanising  support  in  the  South  for  a  national  bourgeois 
state.  65  Gramsci's  intellectual,  thus,  moves  towards  a  new  synthesis  of  understanding. 
He  sees  hegemony  not  only  as  a  specific  set  of  historical  class  circumstances,  but  also  as 
a  form  of  intellectual  praxis;  an  actual  expression  of  hegemony.  Thus,  Gramsci  asks: 
68 What  are  the  `maximum'  limits  of  acceptance  of  the  term  `intellectual'?  Can  one  find  a  unitary 
criterion  to  characterise  equally  all  the  diverse  and  disparate  activities  of  intellectuals  and  to  distinguish 
these  at  the  same  time  and  in  an  essential  way  from  the  activities  of  other  social  groupings?  The  most 
widespread  error  seems  to  me  that  of  having  looked  for  this  criterion  of  distinction  in  the  intrinsic  nature 
of  intellectual  activities,  rather  than  in  the  ensemble  of  system  of  relations  in  which  these  activities  (and 
therefore  the  intellectual  groups  who  personify  them)  have  their  place  within  the  general  complex  of 
social  relations.  66 
Gramsci's  main  concern  here  is  the  structural  context  of  intellectual  activity  and 
the  roles  of  given  `intellectual  groups'  within  that  process.  One  element  of  this  process 
concerns  potential  intellectual  activity  as  a  `universal'  expression  of  human 
consciousness  and  communicative  action,  collective  capacities  which,  for  Gramsci,  are 
always  conditioned  by  dominant  social  relations  through  state  and  civil  institutions: 
The  school  as  a  positive  educative  function,  and  the  courts  as  a  repressive  and  negative  educative 
function,  are  the  most  important  state  activities  in  this  sense:  but,  in  reality,  a  multitude  of  other  so- 
called  private  initiatives  and  activities  tend  to  the  same  end...  67 
Thus,  the  `neutral  intellectual'  within  class  societies  is  a  liberal  myth;  an  ideology.  68  If  all 
human  beings  have  the  potential  for  intellectual  thought  and  action,  not  all  have  the 
opportunity  to  use  it: 
All  men  are  intellectuals,  one  could  therefore  say,  but  not  all  men  in  society  have  the  function  of 
intellectuals.  69 
Gramsci's  view  of  intellectual  consciousness  and  human  agency  derives  from  a  broader 
stream  of  Italian  thinkers,  notably  Vico.  But  while  Vico  saw  intellectual  consciousness 
`narrowly  defined',  Gramsci  extends  it  to  all  human  actors,  noting  that  the  task  for 
critical  intellectuals  is  to  articulate  the  very  idea  of  intellectual  universality.  70  But 
intellectual  activity,  for  Gramsci,  is  also  an  expression  of  hegemony.  And  it  is  this  aspect 
of  the  term  that  we  need  to  consider  more  fully.  Let  us,  therefore,  note  the  main  senses 
in  which  the  idea  of  `intellectual  enterprise'  is  relevant  to  the  present  study. 
69 1.  Organic  intellectuals  and  the  UMNO  network 
The  first  of  these  requires  us  to  think  about  the  organisation  of  hegemony  as  a  mode  of 
control  and  how  we  might  apply  this  in  the  Malaysian  case.  Here,  Gramsci's  conception 
of  the  organic  intellectual  gives  practical  meaning  to  the  interactive  process  of 
legitimation  conducted  around,  what  we  might  term,  the  `UMNO  network'.  This  helps 
convey  the  sense  in  which  individuals  and  institutions,  both  within  and  beyond  the  party, 
help  sustain  hegemony  through  the  reification  of  dominant  interests  and  `common-sense' 
social  meaning.  Thus,  actively  aware  of  their  links  to  a  particular  social  order,  the 
organic  intellectual  gives  coherence  to  the  power  structure  at  the  economic,  political  and 
cultural  levels: 
Every  social  group,  coming  into  existence  on  the  original  terrain  of  an  essential  function  in  the  world  of 
economic  production,  creates  together  with  itself,  organically,  one  or  more  strata  of  intellectuals  which 
give  it  homogeneity  and  an  awareness  of  its  own  function  not  only  in  the  economic  but  also  in  the  social 
and  political  fields.  The  capitalist  entrepreneur  creates  alongside  himself  the  industrial  technician,  the 
specialist  in  political  economy,  the  organiser  of  a  new  culture,  of  a  new  legal  system,  etc.  71 
Gramsci's  concept  of  the  organic  intellectual  is  thus  extended  to  include: 
...  not  only  those  strata  commonly  described  by  this  term,  but  in  general  the  entire  social  stratum  which 
exercises  an  organisational  function  in  the  wide  sense  -  whether  in  the  field  of  production,  or  in  that  of 
culture,  or  in  that  of  political  administration.  72 
In  this  sense,  the  organic  intellectual  performs  the  cumulative  task  of  hegemonic 
organisation  and  control  across  the  state  apparatus,  mode  of  production  and  civil 
society.  73  For  example,  Gramsci's  schema  would  perceive  civil  servants  and  judges, 
managers  and  technocrats,  academics  and  journalists,  as  respective  parts  of  the 
hegemonic  order.  74 
And  this  takes  us  to  a  further  point  of  definition  here.  For  Gramsci  also  saw  the 
organic  intellectual  in  a  more  particularised  context:  that  of  the  party.  In  other  words, 
the  party,  as  a  manifestation  of  Machiavelli's  Prince,  was  the  organic  intellectual  writ 
large: 
70 For  Gramsci,  the  specific  vehicle  whose  necessary  task  would  be  to  ensure  that  those  conditions  might 
come  into  existence...  was  precisely  the  political  party  ... 
But  the  notion  of  `party'  for  Gramsci  was  not  the 
usual  vanguardist  concept.  It  was  to  be  understood,  first  and  foremost,  as  an  `organic  intellectual', 
...  as 
precisely  that  organism  that  was  able  to  present  or  bring  into  existence,  to  codify  or  make  more 
75  `coherent',  a  world-view  in  a  way  that  would  be  `directive  and  organizational,  educative,  intellectual'. 
Therefore,  not  only  was  the  party  the  embodiment  of  the  organic  intellectual  for 
Gramsci,  it  represented,  in  its  hegemonic  or  counter-hegemonic  forms,  the  critical  mass 
of  intellectual  praxes,  helping  to  provide  an  integrative,  educative,  national  popular 
basis  for  the  articulation  of  strategic  interests  and  ideas.  76  In  particular,  the  capacity  of 
writers,  academics  and  journalists  to  communicate  the  ideas  and  political  interests  of  an 
ascendant  class  represented  a  decisive  function  of  organic  intellectual  activity.  Indeed,  it 
is from  this  perspective  that  Gramsci  saw  his  own  endeavours  as  a  writer  and  editor  of 
the  revolutionary  publication  L'Ordine  Nuovo,  in  forging  an  intellectual  proletarian 
consciousness.  As  alluded  to  above,  Gramsci  also  sees  the  need  here  for  a  concrete 
expression  of  such  via  an  even  more  organic  relationship  between  leaders  and  led  than  is 
the  case  with  the  bourgeoisie: 
The  mode  of  being  of  the  new  intellectual  can  no  longer  consist  in  eloquence,  which  is  an  exterior  and 
momentary  mover  of  feelings  and  passions,  but  in  active  participation  in  practical  life,  as  constructor, 
organiser,  `permanent  persuader'...  " 
With  the  `massification'  of  specialised  knowledge  sites,  intellectual  enterprise  and 
the  construction  of  intellectual  discourse  has  become  a  vital  aspect  of 
hegemonic/counter-hegemonic  struggle.  In  Representations  of  the  Intellectual,  Edward 
Said  acknowledges  this  expansion  of  civil-intellectual  activity  and  the  "reality"  of 
Gramsci's  intellectual  as: 
...  a  person  who  fulfils  a  particular  set  of  functions  in  the  society  ... 
[,  particularly  when]  so  many  new 
professions  -  broadcasters,  academic  professionals,  computer  analysts,  sports  and  media  lawyers, 
management  consultants,  policy  experts,  government  advisers,  authors  of  specialised  market  reports,  and 
indeed  the  whole  field  of  modem  mass  journalism  itself  -  have  vindicated  Gramsci's  vision.  78 
71 With  the  proliferation  of  new  professions,  civil  institutions  and  cultural  sites  in 
Malaysia,  the  role  of  UMNO  as  an  organic  party  apparatus  and  extended  intellectual 
network  has,  in  this  sense,  become  pivotal  in  linking  state  elites  with  corporate  clients, 
business  forums,  media  owners,  editors,  publishers,  Islamic  think  tanks,  academics, 
NGOs,  voluntary  organisations,  and  many  other  civil  agencies.  Thus,  the  articulation  of 
Mahathirism  and  Vision  ideas  through  such  institutions  can  be  seen  as  a  crucial  part  of 
consensus-building,  illustrating  the  importance  of  intellectual  enterprise  as  a  component 
of  hegemony. 
2.  Traditional  intellectuals  and  organic  assimilation:  Mahathirism  and  Islam 
However,  Gramsci  also  presents  us  with  a  category  of  traditional  intellectuals  whose 
historical  significance  and  social  identity  represent  potential  constraints  upon  the  new 
organic  order.  In  this  sense,  the  Mahathir  `modernity  project'  and  Vision  agenda  have 
been  subject  to  ongoing  intellectual  challenge  from  traditional  Islamic  sources,  most 
notably  that  of  `PAS  Islam'  in  Kelantan.  (See  Chapter  7.  )  Gramsci's  observations  on  the 
traditional  intellectual  thus  offer  an  instructive  paradigm  for  present  purposes: 
...  every  `essential'  social  group  which  emerges  into  history  out  of  the  preceding  economic  structure,  and 
as  an  expression  of  a  development  of  this  structure,  has  found  (at  least  in  all  of  history  up  to  the  present) 
categories  of  intellectuals  already  in  existence  and  which  seemed  indeed  to  represent  an  historical 
continuity  uninterrupted  even  by  the  most  complicated  and  radical  changes  in  political  and  social 
forms.  79 
Typically  composed  of  ecclesiastics,  scholars  and  other  status-based  types,  Gramsci 
notes  how,  in  contrast  to  the  organic  type,  traditional  intellectuals  saw  themselves  as 
detached,  free-thinking  individuals  removed  from  the  immediate  interests  of  the  dominant 
class: 
Since  these  various  categories  of  traditional  intellectuals  experience  through  an  `esprit  de  corps'  their 
uninterrupted  historical  continuity  and  their  special  qualification,  they  put  themselves  forward  as 
autonomous  and  independent  of  the  dominant  social  group.  This  self  assessment  is  not  without 
consequences  in  the  ideological  and  political  field,  consequences  of  wide  ranging  importance.  8° 
72 Gramsci  is  referring  mainly  here  to  the  pervasive  power  of  the  Catholic  Church  in  the 
areas  of  philosophy,  science,  education,  morality  and  culture.  81  In  class  terms,  he  also 
shows  how  hegemonic  ideology  becomes  analogous  to  popular  religion  itself.  82  In  a 
more  complex  sense,  though,  traditional  intellectuals  may,  simultaneously,  provide,  or 
aspire  to,  an  organic  function  -  as  with  Croce's  role  in  keeping  radical  intellectuals  in 
the  South  isolated  from  the  peasant  classes,  thus  preventing  splits  in  the  agrarian  bloc.  83 
The  key  task  for  organic  intellectuals  thus  becomes  the  universalisation  of  its  ideas 
through  the  assimilation  and  control  of  traditional  elements,  as  Gramsci  indicates  in  the 
following  keynote  passage: 
One  of  the  most  important  characteristics  of  any  group  that  is  developing  towards  dominance  is  its 
struggle  to  assimilate  and  to  conquer  `ideologically'  the  traditional  intellectuals,  but  this  assimilation 
and  conquest  is  made  quicker  and  more  efficacious  the  more  the  group  in  question  succeeds  in 
simultaneously  elaborating  its  own  organic  intellectuals.  84 
For  Gramsci,  it  is  the  party,  through  the  sphere  of  civil  society,  which  carries  the 
organisational  task  of  winning-over  the  traditional  intellectuals: 
The  political  party  ... 
is  precisely  the  mechanism  which  carries  out  in  civil  society  the  same  function  as 
the  State  carries  out...  in  political  society.  In  other  words,  it  is  responsible  for  welding  together  the 
organic  intellectuals  of  a  given  group  -  the  dominant  one  -  and  the  traditional  intellectuals  ss 
In  building  a  competing  organic  network,  subordinate  groups  and  traditional 
intellectuals,  lacking  the  use  of  the  state,  must  build  their  organic  base  more  consciously 
around  civil  society,  again  through  the  key  direction  of  their  own  organic  party. 
As  a  paradigm  for  the  present  case,  Mahathir  and  influential  parts  of  the  UMNO 
network,  such  as  Islamic  institutes  and  the  media,  have  engaged  in  a  concerted 
elaboration  of  modernist  Islamic  principles  in  an  attempt  to  `win-over'  traditional 
elements  and  rationalise  Vision-type  development.  Indeed,  responding  to  the  Islamic 
resurgence  in  Malaysia  from  the  early  1980s,  Mahathir  has  taken  the  intellectual 
argument  for  Islamic  modernity  directly  into  the  PAS  heartland  of  Kelantan,  notably  as  a 
bulwark  to  charismatic  PAS  leader  Nik  Aziz's  ideas  of  `pure'  Islamic  development  and 
hudud  law.  Hence,  this  is  not  only  apolitical  contest,  in  the  conventional  sense,  between 
UMNO  and  PAS.  It  is  a  crucial  intellectual  -  that  is,  hegemonic  -  struggle  of  ideas 
73 between  organic  and  traditional  elements  over  the  meaning  and  practices  of  Islam  and  its 
place  within  the  development  process. 
3.  Intellectual  agencies  and  agenda-setting  discourse 
Intellectual  agencies  and  agenda-setting  discourse  helps  illustrate  the  sense  in  which 
dominant  ideas  become  part  of  a  received  idiom  of  power.  For  example,  at  the  global 
level,  Stephen  Gill's  case  study  American  Hegemony  and  the  Trilateral  Commission 
reveals  how  such  forums  help  generate  a  shared  understanding  of  ideas  between  top 
business  figures,  policy  makers  and  academics,  thus  giving  transnational  interests 
hegemonic  status: 
Intellectuals  are  involved  because  of  their  ability  to  combine  theoretical  and  practical  aspects  of  their 
activity  within  the  Commission's  major  discourses,  which  are  liberal  and  functional.  They  are  also 
chosen  because  of  their  place  in  wider  intellectual  networks,  and  because  of  their  vantage  point  from 
within  their  discipline(s).  For  example,  Samuel  Huntington,  one  of  the  co-authors  of  the  Commission's 
contentious  report,  The  Crisis  of  Democracy,  became  President  of  the  American  Political  Science 
Association  in  1987.  He  is  of  course  also  involved  in  a  wide  range  of  programmes  as  Director  of  the 
Harvard  Centre  for  International  Affairs.  Thus,  Commission  intellectual  networks  are  based  on  an 
international  circle  of  theorists  and  policy  specialists  who  generally  tend  to  direct  the  major  institutes  in 
which  they  operate.  86 
The  scope  and  influence  of  such  agencies  is  extensive,  incorporating  not  only  the  IMF, 
World  Bank,  G7,  OECD  and  WTO,  but  other  institutes  like  the  Ford  Foundation,  the 
Brookings  Institute  and  the  Institute  for  International  Economics.  87  Whether  such  an 
amalgam  comprises  a  discrete  `global  class'  is  not  the  key  issue  here.  The  more  salient 
point  is  that  these  agencies  represent  a  converging  set  of  interests  -a  de  facto  global 
establishment  -  bringing  together  the  intellectual  resources  of  academics  and  other  key 
figures,  thus  institutionalising,  notes  Holub,  a  "Western  economic,  financial  and  cultural 
point  of  view.  "  88 
By  the  same  principle,  key  intellectual  agencies  in  Malaysia,  linked  to  the  UMNO 
network,  help  create  a  shared  understanding  of  policy  ideas,  social  development  and 
cultural  values.  Together  with  UMNO's  extensive  corporate  links  (see  Chapter  3),  these 
include  government-sponsored  think  tanks  such  as  the  Institute  for  Policy  Research  and 
74 forums  like  the  Malysian  Business  Council.  As  noted,  it  was  the  MBC's  inaugural 
meeting,  bringing  together  key  politicians  and  captains  of  industry,  which  was  used  to 
launch  the  Vision  plan  in  1991.89  Others  linked  into  the  network  would  include  the  key 
`independent'  think-tank  the  Malaysian  Institute  for  Economic  Research  (MIER). 
Reflecting  the  government's  `Islamization  policy'  from  the  1980s  (including  the  creation 
of  the  International  Islamic  University),  UMNO  also  extends  its  influence  through 
religious  institutes  such  as  the  Islamic  Economic  Foundation,  the  Dakwah  Foundation 
(both  set  up  by  Mahathir),  90  Pusat  Islam  (Islamic  Centre)  and  the  Institute  for  Islamic 
Understanding  Malaysia  (IKIM). 
A  good  illustration  of  the  latter's  agenda-setting  role  can  be  seen  in  An 
Inspiration  for  the  Future  of  Islam.  91  Setting-out  the  history  and  objectives  of  IKNL  it 
maps  a  course  for  Islamic  understanding  and  development  which  is  integral  to  Mahathir's 
broad  Vision  project.  This  is  evident  from  the  foreword  praising  Dr.  Mahathir  to  the 
review  of  its  seminar  activities  (such  as  `Islam's  Contribution  Towards  Achieving  the 
Objectives  of  Vision  2020')  to  its  main  research  priorities  (including  `The  policy  of 
assimilating  Islamic  values  in  the  government  administration').  92  Alongside  extensive 
sponsorship  of  Islamic  conferences,  the  government  has  also  promoted  Vision-type 
Islamic  ideas  through  bodies  such  as  the  Asia  Pacific  Mosque  Council.  93  As  will  be 
shown,  UMNO's  co-optation  of  Anwar  as  the  leader  of  Angkatan  Belia  Islam  Malaysia 
(Malaysian  Islamic  Youth  Movement;  ABIM)  in  the  1980s  was  also  a  key  instance  of  the 
organic  assimilation  of  traditional  intellectuals  linked  to  dakwah  (Islamic  revival)  groups. 
At  the  broader  cultural  level,  Mahathir  has  also  sought  to  engage  forums  such  as  the 
Congress  of  Malay  Intellectuals  for  similar  agenda-setting  purposes.  94 
The  production  of  agenda-setting  discourse  through  intellectual  agencies  is,  thus, 
a  central  feature  of  this  process.  Following  Said's  insight  that  all  texts  are  `facts  of 
power',  Strine,  for  example,  asks  why: 
...  under  particular  historical  circumstances...  certain  beliefs,  values,  ideologies,  interests,  and  power 
relations  inscribed  in  discursive  formations  achieve  cultural  authority?  What  particular  contextual 
factors  account  for  the  circulating  and  privileging  of  certain  cultural  discourses/texts  as  inherently 
important,  valuable  or  true  over  other  possible  discourses/texts  which  are  marginalised,  discredited  or 
displaced?  95 
75 Huntington's  The  Clash  of  Civilisations  is  a  good  example  of  such  `privileged 
discourse'.  96  Here  we  find  a  new  post-cold-war  language  warning  of  an  irreconcilable 
gulf  between  the  West  and  other  civilisations,  such  as  Confucianism,  but  more  notably 
Islam.  Thus,  a  monolithic  Islamic  bloc  (the  other)  is  depicted  as  an  alien  threat  to  the 
West,  itself  viewed  as  an  idealised  community  requiring  renewal  and  a  reassertion  of 
identity.  In  The  West  v  the  Rest,  a  derived  article  given  wide  media  coverage, 
Huntington  argues  that: 
No  such  convergence  is  possible  with  Asian  societies.  Asia  instead  is  likely  to  pose  continuing  economic 
and  political  challenges  to  the  United  States  specifically  and  the  West  more  generally...  Western  peoples 
have  far  more  in  common  with  each  other  than  they  have  with  Asian,  Middle  Eastern  or  African 
people...  Promoting  the  coherence  of  the  West  means  both  preserving  Western  culture  within  the  West 
and  defining  the  limits  of  the  West.  97 
Complementing  Huntington's  cultural  other,  Fukuyama  also  offers  an  End  of  History  in 
which  the  `ideological  project'  of  the  West  is  realised  in  the  political  triumph  of  liberal- 
capitalist-democracy  and  a  transcendent  New  World  Order.  98 
As  critical  considerations  of  Islam,  `the  East'  and  post  cold-war  relations,  these 
are  crude  representations.  99  Why  then  have  they  managed  to  attain  such  `intellectual 
gravitas'?  Part  of  the  reason,  at  least,  appears  to  be  the  dominant  institutions  and 
interests  which  help  sponsor  them.  While  other  academics  may  offer  more  informed 
accounts  of  Islam  in  the  New  World  Order,  10°  the  point  about  these  texts  is  that  they 
represent  agenda-setting  literature;  central  discursive  paradigms  around  which 
mainstream  academic  debate  takes  place  and  idealised  conceptions  of  the  other  take 
root.  As  Said  notes,  such  discourses  are  symptomatic  of  a  more  pervasive  institutional 
bias  against  Islam,  101  taking,  as  Akbar  Ahmed  argues,  little  account  of  Islam's  diversity, 
inner  contradictions  or  egalitarian  potential.  102 
With  Islamic  modernity  an  integral  part  of  Mahathir's  Vision  project,  the 
reproduction  of  religious  and  cultural  ideas  through  agenda-setting  discourse  is  a  crucial 
aspect  of  intellectual  enterprise.  Again,  this  involves  numerous  intellectual  agencies  with 
close  ties  to  UMNO,  such  as  Pelanduk,  publisher  of  a  broad  range  of  `Vision  literature' 
(mainstream  texts  widely  available  in  Malaysian  bookshops).  103  But,  reflecting  IKIM's 
output,  it  also  encompasses  the  views  of  `independent'  agencies  with  a  shared 
76 understanding  on  issues  of  social  and  religious  development.  For  example,  in  Hudud  in 
Malaysia,  a  critical  treatise  on  PAS's  proposals  for  hudud  law  (notably  the  Kelantan 
Syariah  Criminal  Enactment),  Rose  Ismail  and  the  Sisters  of  Islam  Forum  express  a 
common  interest  in  the  promotion  of  Islamic  modernity: 
Our  push,  as  a  country  and  nation,  towards  industrialisation  envisages  the  creation  of  a  fully  modem 
society  based  upon  a  Malaysian  culture  of  modernity.  This  is  clearly  oulined  in  our  own  Wawasan  2020. 
Central  to  an  authentically  Malaysian  modernity  must  be  an  Islamic  culture  of  modemity.  104 
The  articulation  of  a  policy-type  language  amenable  to  the  shifting  claims  of  the 
Malay,  Chinese  and  Indian  communities  has  also  required  the  incorporation  of  academics 
as  `policy  planners'  in  order  to  rationalise  NEP  redistribution  and  Vision  `liberalisation'. 
For  example,  in  the  switch  from  the  NEP  to  the  NDP  in  1991,  Mahathir  encouraged  the 
idea  of  `consultative  dialogue'  between  academics  and  policy-makers  to  help  ensure  a 
smooth  transition.  Vision  ideology  had,  thus,  at  least  before  the  crisis,  become  the  main 
subtext  of  mainstream  policy  literature;  an  agenda-setting  discourse  consistent  with  the 
`new'  ideas  of  economic  development,  post-ethnic  nationalism  and  social  modernity. 
This  has  involved  an  intensive  politics  of  intellectual  incorporation  and  assimilation  to 
help  institutionalise  such  ideas  within  academic  discourse  and  other  parts  of  the  UMNO 
network. 
4.  Intellectual  agencies:  the  media  as  filtering  process 
As  a  populist  outlet  for  dominant  ideas,  the  key  intellectual  agency  in  Malaysia,  as 
elsewhere,  is  the  mass-media.  Linking  state  and  corporate  elites,  Malaysian  media 
institutions  represent  an  increasingly  vital  part  of  the  UMNO  network,  helping  to  filter 
information,  entertainment  and  civil  values.  Again,  this  requires  us  to  think  about  the 
hegemonic  context  of  state-class  power,  intellectual  enterprise  and  the  cultivation  of 
legitimacy  by  consent.  In  `democratic'  polities,  the  key  axiom  of  that  task  for  Chomsky 
is  the  production  of  `necessary  illusions': 
In  the  democratic  system,  the  necessary  illusions  cannot  be  imposed  by  force.  Rather,  they  must  be 
instilled  in  the  public  mind  by  more  subtle  means.  A  totalitarian  regime  can  be  satisfied  with  lesser 
77 degrees  of  allegiance  to  required  truths.  It  is  sufficient  that  people  obey,  what  they  think  is  a  secondary 
concern.  But  in  a  democratic  political  order,  there  is  always  the  danger  that  independent  thought  might 
be  translated  into  political  action,  so  it  is important  to  eliminate  the  threat  at  its  root.  Debate  cannot  be 
stilled,  and  indeed,  in  a  properly  functioning  system  of  propaganda,  it  should  not  be,  because  it  has  a 
system-reinforcing  character  if  constrained  within  proper  bounds.  What  is  essential  is  to  set  the  bounds 
firmly.  Controversy  may  rage  as  long  as  it  adheres  to  the  presuppositions  that  define  the  consensus  of 
elites,  and  it  should  furthermore  be  encouraged  within  these  bounds,  thus  helping  to  establish  these 
doctrines  as  the  very  condition  of  thinkable  thought  while  reinforcing  the  belief  that  freedom  reigns.  In 
short,  what  is  essential  is  the  power  to  set  the  agenda.  '05 
As  noted,  part  of  this  ideology  in  the  West  involves  the  routine  diffusion  of  `self- 
representations'  and  `us'  images.  Thus,  the  `free-West',  derived  in  relation  to  the  `non- 
free'  other,  forms  part  of  a  reproductive  imagery;  a  set  of  necessary  illusions  and 
frameworks  of  meaning  within  which  dominant  ideas  can  be  filtered,  played-out  and 
received,  notably  through  the  agenda-setting  norms  and  values  of  the  `free-media'.  For 
Chomsky: 
....  the  media  and  other  ideological  institutions  will  generally  reflect  the  perspectives  and  interests  of 
established  powers...  According  to  this  `propaganda  model'...  the  media  serve  the  interests  of  state  and 
corporate  power,  which  are  closely  interlinked,  framing  their  reporting  and  analysis  in  a  manner 
supportive  of  established  privilege  and  limiting  debate  and  discussion  accordingly!  06 
It  is  important  to  recognise  the  non-reductive  context  of  Chomsky's  claim  here: 
The  propaganda  model  does  not  assert  that  the  media  parrot  the  line  of  the  current  state  managers  in  the 
manner  of  a  totalitarian  regime;  rather,  that  the  media  reflect  the  consensus  of  power  elites  of  the  state- 
corporate  nexus  generally,  including  those  who  object  to  some  aspect  of  government  policy,  typically  on 
tactical  grounds.  The  model  argues,  from  its  foundations,  that  the  media  will  protect  the  interests  of  the 
powerful,  not  that  it  will  protect  state  managers  from  their  criticisms;  the  persistent  failure  to  see  this 
point  may  reflect  more  general  illusions  about  our  democratic  systems.  107 
This  theme  of  corporate-media-power  and  its  implications  for  social  control  is 
specified  in  a  more  Gramscian  context  by  Kellner  in  Television  and  the  Crisis  of 
Democracy.  Kellner  broadly  aligns  himself  with  the  Chomsky/Herman  view  of  the  media 
as  a  site  controlled  by  corporate  elites  engaged  in  the  filtering/organisation  of  news, 
78 information  and  popular  culture.  However,  taking  critical  theory  as  a  guide,  he  sees 
hegemony,  rather  than  propaganda,  as  the  more  appropriate  model  of  analysis  here.  The 
distinction  is  not  overly  significant,  Kellner's  (questionable)  view  of  Chomsky  as  veering 
close  to  an  `instrumentalist'  position  being  one  of  emphasis  rather  than  substance.  More 
importantly,  both  accounts  offer  complementary  perspectives  on  the  structure  and  output 
of  the  Western  media.  Nonetheless,  For  Kellner: 
The  hegemony  model  of  culture  and  the  media  reveals  dominant  ideological  formations  and  discourses 
as  a  shifting  terrain  of  consensus,  struggle,  and  compromise...  Television  is  best  conceptualized...  as  the 
terrain  of  an  ever-shifting  and  evolving  hegemony  in  which  consensus  is  forged  around  competing 
ruling-class  positions,  values  and  views  of  the  world...  According  to  this  approach,  different  classes, 
sectors  of  capital,  and  social  groups  compete  for  social  dominance  and  attempt  to  impose  their  visions, 
interests,  and  agendas  on  society  as  a  whole.  Hegemony  is  thus  a  shifting,  complex,  and  open 
phenomenon,  always  subject  to  contestation  and  upheaval.  108 
The  key  point  here  is  that  this  is  always  a  contested  terrain,  but  that  for  both  Chomsky 
and  Kellner  corporate  and  state  elites  have  been  able  to  control  this  space,  allowing  them 
predominant  influence  in  media  organisation  and  output.  Thus,  CNN  or  Murdoch  media 
managers  come  to  select  and  package  `generic  representations'  of  events,  conflicts,  ideas 
and  oppositions  as  simplified,  sanitised  information.  Thus  was  the  Gulf  War  `imagined' 
as  a  `clean  war',  a  task  accomplished  through  compliant  reporting  and  a  new  lexicon  of 
war  reportage:  `the  clean  strike',  `minimum  collateral  damage',  `smart  bombs'  and  so 
on.  109  As  a  tacit  understanding  emerges  about  what  constitutes  news  and  information, 
there  is  `partisan  political  discussion',  but  little  mainstream  analysis  of  the  actual  power 
structure  -  hence  the  privileged  coverage  of  `constitutional  events'  and  an  articulation 
of  `the  political'  as  the  narrow  realm  of  party  politics,  a  liberal  view  of  civil  participation 
reproduced  through  the  filter  of  `public  service  broadcasting'.  '  10  At  the  same  time,  what 
does  not  get  reported  can  be  as  significant  as  what  does.  " 
In  Malaysia,  media  representations  of  civil  participation  have  become  increasingly 
situated  around  the  values  and  imagery  of  Vision  2020.  Significant  here  is  the  way  in 
which  economic  development,  changes  in  class  composition  and  consumer  identity  have 
given  rise  to  new  media  forms  and,  notwithstanding  the  crisis,  a  more  subtle  filtering  of 
news  and  information.  This  coincides  with  the  deregulation  and  greater  corporatisation 
79 of  the  Malaysian  media  from  the  1990s.  In  the  rush  for  share  of  this  lucrative  market  and 
advertising  revenue,  the  Malaysian  press  and  electronic  media  became  more  attentive  to 
the  nuances  of  market  segmentation  and  the  promotion  of  `new-middle-classness',  both 
as  lifestyle  imagery  and  as  a  medium  of  `social  commentary'.  New-middle-class  styles, 
aspirations,  values  and  social  concerns  have  thus  become  subsumed  into  a  form  of  `role- 
model'  media  discourse.  When  government  ministers  raise  the  `problem'  of  lepak 
culture  (loafing)  or  the  threat  of  Western  images  being  propagated  via  satellite  TV,  the 
appeal  is  to  middle-class  sensibilities  and  the  need  for  `responsible  civil  dialogue'.  The 
promotion  of  this  discourse  can  be  seen  as  complementing  the  `responsible  development 
journalism'  internalised  by  Malaysian  media  proprietors  and  managers.  From  1997,  the 
economic  crisis,  thus,  became  contextualised  as  a  collective  problem  within  middle-class 
`media  debate',  including  a  certain  level  of  criticism  towards  the  government  itself 
However,  the  purpose  of  this  was  to  keep  `dissent'  firmly  within  the  bounds  of  passive 
media  discourse,  safely  distanced  from  any  meaningful  critique  of  the  power  structure. 
5.  Critical  intellectuals:  constraints,  co-optation  and  opposition  networks 
What  role  then  for  intellectual  opposition?  Implicit  in  Gramsci's  traditional  intellectual  is 
the  idea  of  the  critical  intellectual  whose  task  is  to  build  a  new  type  of  organicity  between 
intellectuals  and  the  people.  As  Said  has  shown,  this  is  particularly  important  given  the 
new  social  context  of  Gramsci's  organic  intellectual.  But,  of  course,  intellectual  activity 
is  also  a  subjective  process  involving  conscious  individual  action.  Thus,  for  Said,  critical 
intellectual  praxis  has  an  existentialist  quality: 
...  the  intellectual  is  an  individual  endowed  with  a  faculty  for  representing,  embodying,  articulating  a 
message,  a  view,  an  attitude,  philosophy  or  opinion,  to,  as  well  as  for,  a  public.  And  this  role  has  an 
edge  to  it,  and  cannot  be  played  without  a  sense  of  being  someone  whose  place  it  is  publicly  to  raise 
embarrassing  questions,  to  confront  orthodoxy  and  dogma  (rather  than  to  produce  them),  to  be  someone 
who  cannot  easily  be  co-opted  by  governments  or  corporations,  and  whose  whole  raison  d'etre  is  to 
represent  all  those  people  and  issues  that  are  routinely  forgotten  or  swept  under  the  rug.  "2 
However,  intellectual  activity  is  always  conditioned  by  institutional  limitations: 
80 ...  the  question  remains  as  to  whether  there  is  or  can  be  anything  like  an  independent,  autonomously 
functioning  intellectual,  one  who  is  not  beholden  to,  and  therefore  constrained  by,  his  or  her  affiliations 
with  universities  that  pay  salaries,  political  parties  that  demand  loyalty  to  a  party  line,  think  tanks  that 
while  they  offer  freedom  to  do  research  perhaps  more  subtly  compromise  judgement  and  restrain  the 
critical  voice.  ''  3 
Yet,  for  Said,  the  definitive  idea  of  the  critical  intellectual  is  that  of  `the  outsider' 
-  even  (as  in  his  own  case)  the  exile.  The  critical  faculty  of  the  intellectual  is  necessarily 
outwith  the  mainstream;  a  conceptually  specific  space  for  addressing  authority.  This 
follows  Rousseau's  philosophe,  l14  Sartre's  ideal  of  the  `committed  writer'  and  the 
engaged  activism  of  Gramsci  himself.  This  is  not  the  closeted  professional  or  academic 
specialist  -  who  Said  indicts  as  having  narrowed  critical  enquiry  -  but  the  proactive 
critic  or  vocational  campaigner  undeterred  by  the  opprobrium  of  authority.  Said's 
intellectual: 
... 
is  neither  a  pacifier  nor  a  consensus  builder,  but  someone  whose  whole  being  is  staked  on  a  critical 
sense,  a  sense  of  being  unwilling  to  accept  easy  formulas,  or  ready  made  cliches,  or  the  smooth,  ever  so 
accommodating  confirmations  of  what  the  powerful  or  conventional  have  to  say,  and  what  they  do.  Not 
just  passively  unwilling,  but  actively  unwilling  to  say  so  in  public.  '  15 
In  Malaysia,  there  is  limited  space  for  the  critical  outsider.  This,  of  course,  is 
often  the  case  elsewhere.  But  the  process  of  intellectual  incorporation  in  Malaysia  has  a 
number  of  `idiosyncratic'  features  centred  around  what  might  be  termed  the 
`encouragement  of  insiderism'.  As  noted,  this  can  be  seen  in  a  range  of  co-optive 
processses,  such  as  the  inclusion  of  academics  onto  `national  advisory'  boards,  the 
practice  of  `responsible  journalism'  and  the  `collective  problem-sharing'  discourse  taken- 
up  by  `critical  media  intellectuals'  during  the  crisis.  (See  Chapter  6.  )  While  Accuracy  in 
Academia  monitors  `subversive'  intellectual  activity  on  US  campuses,  116  potential 
dissent  in  Malaysian  universities  has  been  mediated  and  managed,  at  least  before  the 
crisis,  through  more  subtle  forms  of  `social  incorporation',  including  the  characterisation 
of  student  radicalism  as  `socially  deviant'.  Thus,  it  is  not  only  the  co-optation  itself 
which  is  significant  here.  It  is  the  culture  of  insiderism  which  informs  it.  In  Malaysia,  to 
be  on  the  outside  is  not  only  to  be  oppositional,  it  is  to  be  dysfunctional.  And  this 
ideology  permeates  all  parts  of  the  social  order.  When  the  government  talk  of  the  need 
81 for  debate  or  consultation,  they  mean  within  the  Barisan.  When  Mahathir  denounces 
UMNO  members  for  raising  the  issue  of  corruption,  it  is  because  they  have  done  so  in 
public,  rather  than  within  UMNO.  And  when  academics  and  NGOs  address  social 
issues,  they  are  encouraged  to  do  so  from  within  an  internalised  `problem-solving'  mode 
of  analysis.  In  effect,  the  marginalisation  of  opposition  is  not  only  about  the 
centralisation  of  executive  functions  and  selective  patronage,  it  is  also  about  the  fostering 
of  insiderism  as  a  `national  value'. 
Insiderism  informs  not  only  the  `inclusive'  messages  of  Bangsa  Malaysia  and 
Vision  collectivism,  but  also,  in  more  subtle  ways,  the  context  of  opposition  party 
politics.  In  a  cautious  game  of  `proving  patriotism',  Lim  Kit  Siang,  as  leader  of  the 
opposition  DAP  has,  for  example,  repeated  his  willingness  to  `work  with'  the  BN  as  well 
as  opposition  parties.  More  readily,  the  DAP  have  incorporated  Vision  ideals  into  its 
`Malaysian  Malaysia'  agenda,  a  mirror  discourse  to  Bangsa  Malaysia.  (See  following 
chapters.  )  While  criticising  the  government's  handling  of  the  economic  crisis,  and 
making  political  capital  in  the  process,  the  DAP  and  PAS  have  carefully  refrained  from 
`disloyal'  language  deemed  to  be  against  the  `collective  recovery  effort'.  Indeed,  at  key 
stages  of  the  crisis,  both  Lim  Kit  Siang  and  Nik  Aziz  gave  outright  backing  to  Mahathir, 
sentiments  broadly  replicated  in  the  positions  of  trade  unions  and  many  NGOs.  Thus, 
while  still  consistent  in  opposing  the  Barisan,  the  more  nuanced  point  here  is  the  sense  in 
which  insider  values  and  Vision  concepts  have  managed  to  acquire  an  agenda-setting 
status  within  mainstream  political  discourse. 
Despite  this,  Malaysia  has  seen  the  steady  growth  of  a  critical  `intellectual 
community'  based  around  established  NGOs  (such  as  Aliran,  Suaram,  Tenaganita  and 
Hakam)  and  the  emergent  reformasi  movement.  (See  Chapter  9.  )  Although  still  small, 
marginalised  and  susceptible  to  the  above-noted  processes,  these  groups  have  come  to 
play  an  important  role  alongside  the  main  opposition  parties.  Significantly,  the  common 
task  being  promoted  here  as  the  crisis  unfolded  was  the  need  for  greater  `networking'. 
The  immediate  question,  thus,  was  whether  this  community  could  be  moulded  into  an 
effective  political  opposition.  In  Gramscian  terms,  though,  it  raised  the  more  meaningful 
question  of  whether  it  could  provide  the  nucleus  of  an  alternative  organic  bloc,  with 
radical  strategies  and  ideas  for  transcending  the  existing  power  structure. 
82 The  cohesion  of  the  power  bloc  thus  depends  upon  hegemonic  control  through  the 
cultivation  of  consensual  state-class  relations,  political  alliances  and  cultural  forms. 
Implicit  at  all  these  levels  is  the  need  for  intellectual  enterprise  in  organising  the  power 
bloc  and  articulating  popular  social  meaning.  In  this  way,  the  reproduction  of  dominant 
interests  and  ideas  becomes,  effectively,  indivisible  from  the  `national  interest'  -  as 
captured  in  Chomsky's  axiom  `the  manufacturing  of  consent'.  117  It  is  through  this  set  of 
perspectives  that  we  may  now  consider,  more  fully,  the  evolving  nature  of  Mahathirism, 
the  Vision  project  and  the  crisis  of  hegemony  from  1997. 
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87 3 
Constructing  the  Vision: 
state-class  relations,  the  power 
bloc  and  the  origins  of  crisis 
This  section  considers  the  economic-class  basis  of  the  power  bloc  from  the  early-1980s 
to  the  unfolding  economic  crisis  of  1997.  The  main  purpose  is  to  illustrate  the  new 
configuration  of  state-class  relations  and  the  changing  nature  of  the  `reward  structure'  at 
the  social  level.  Here,  Mahathir's  project  is  considered  in  relation  to  three  main 
reference  points:  the  `Malay  dilemma',  NEP  distribution  and  the  spectre  of  privatisation. 
The  contradictions  and  tensions  noted  here  provide,  in  turn,  a  basis  for  addressing  the 
emerging  crisis  and  the  Anwar  affair. 
The  Malay  dilemma  and  the  challenge  of  modernity 
The  essence  of  the  dilemma  can  be  traced  to  Mahathir's  own  portrayal  of  Malay  political 
culture  as  a  deep-rooted  predicament.  In  The  Malay  Dilemma,  Mahathir  cited  hereditary 
and  environmental  influences  as  key  causal  impediments  to  Malay  development.  Initially 
banned  on  publication  in  1970,  following  the  riots  of  1969,  this  book  came  to  crystallise 
Bumiputera  grievances  at  a  critical  period,  becoming,  effectively,  the  intellectual 
rationale  for  the  NEP. 
But  while  highlighting  disparities  of  wealth  and  opportunity,  Mahathir  sought  to 
probe  deeper,  arguing  that  the  Malays  suffered,  intergenerationally,  from  a  subservient 
inner-psyche.  In  seeking  reasons  for  the  absence  of  bourgeois  motivation  -  loosely  akin 
to  a  Calvinist  work  ethic  -  Mahathir  adopted  an  eclectic  mix  of  genetic,  psychological 
and  socio-cultural  argument  to  illustrate  the  inherent  weaknesses  of  Malay  codes. 
Certain  Malay  qualities  were  portrayed  as  obstacles  to  progress,  most  notably,  a  concern 
with  form,  and  a  tendency  towards  fatalism.  Thus: 
88 [The]  adherence  to  form  as  prescribed  by  adat  [custom/convention]...  is  so  important  that  it  is  preferred 
to  the  actual  substance.  Thus,  the  formality  of  official  status  is  regarded  as  more  important  than  the 
authority  which  should  go  with  it...  [Then  there  is]  the  fatalism  which  characterises  the  Malay  attitude  to 
life 
... 
It  makes  acceptance  of  everything,  whether  good  or  bad,  possible  with  unprotesting  tolerance  and 
resignation! 
For  Mahathir,  such  passivity,  alongside  a  misconstrued  understanding  of  Malay 
politeness,  interpreted  by  foreigners  as  deference,  precluded  the  development  of  a 
dynamic  business  culture.  Symptomatic  of  this  was  the  Malay  conception  of  property: 
For  most  Malays  property  and  land  are  synonymous  [and]...  attachments  to  the  land  are  deeply  ingrained, 
... 
[while]  money  is  a  convenience  to  the  Malays.  [It  is  this]  inability  to  understand  the  potential  capacity 
of  money  [which]  makes  the  Malays  poor  businessmen.  2 
In  short,  Malay  underachievement  was  rooted  in  an  absent,  or  dysfunctional,  business 
culture,  stunting  the  development  of  a  Malay  bourgeoisie  and  Malay  society.  Here,  in 
Mahathir's  `diagnosis',  lay  the  essence  of  the  Malay  dilemma. 
As  noted,  indigenous  cultural,  religious  and  social  forms  are  vital  factors  in  the 
formation  of  any  historical  bloc.  In  this  respect,  Mahathir's  Dilemma  does  reveal  some 
indication  of  cultural  conditioning,  though  little  explanation  of  the  historical-class  context 
within  which  this  conditioning  occurred.  Alongside  many  speculative  assertions  about 
inherent  racial  traits,  it  relied  on  a  discourse  of  cultural  determinism  to  explain  the 
Malays'  subservient  place  within  the  capitalist  order  of  the  early-1970s  and  the  measures 
needed  to  correct  that  imbalance.  As  regards  the  prognosis  itself,  Khoo  observes  that 
while  claiming  to  highlight  intrinsic  Malay  traits  as  impediments  to  development,  though 
avoiding  claims  to  scientific  objectivity,  "Mahathir  plunged  into  a  Social  Darwinism  all  of 
his  own.  i3 
Yet,  for  all  its  intellectual  shortcomings,  the  `Malay  dilemma'  had  become  a 
potent  narrative  and  source  of  reflection  for  Malays.  And  it  provided  Mahathir,  in 
coming  to  office  in  1981,  with  an  immediate  backdrop  against  which  to  launch  a 
reformist  project. 
In  seeking  to  usher-in  this  new  agenda,  Mahathir  was  aware  of  the  need  to 
balance  the  drive  for  prosperity  with  a  sense  of  social  consciousness.  More  specifically, 
any  promotion  of  a  materialist  ethic  had  to  be  measured  against  Islamic  social  codes.  For 
89 Mahathir,  this  reflected  the  need  for  a  reassertion  of  Malay/Islamic  values.  Here, 
Mahathir  argued  that  the  values  of  Malay  community  were  being  profaned  by  an 
obsessive  individualism.  Yet,  invoking  the  tenets  of  the  Quran  and  other  sacred  text,  the 
indictment  was  not  of  accumulation  and  wealth  generation  per  se,  but  of  materialism.  In 
his  1986  book  The  Challenge,  a  further  exposition  of  Malaysian  society,  Mahathir 
considers  the  seductive  influence  of  materialism  and  the  need  for  a  transcendent 
modernism: 
In  recent  times,  the  ideology  and  logic  of  materialism  have  all  too  easily  influenced  human  society.  This 
is  the  direct  result  of  the  impact  of  Western  thought  and  system  of  values,  which  fanatically  focus  on  the 
material  as  the  basis  of  life.  Valges  based  on  the  spiritual,  on  peace  of  mind,  and  on  belief  in  feelings 
loftier  than  desire,  have  no  place  in  the  Western  psyche  ... 
[I]n  a  situation  where  materialism  holds  sway, 
it  is  hardly  surprising  that  materialist  values  are  used  to  control  the  movements  and  activities  of 
society.  4 
For  the  PAP  in  Singapore,  the  response  to  growing  `consumer  consciousness' 
has  involved  calls  for  a  reassertion  of  respect  for  traditional  forms  of  authority.  5 
Concerned  also  by  the  threat  of  external  cultural  influences,  Mahathir's  conception  of  a 
redefined  Malay/Islamic  identity  was  posed  as  an  intellectual  counterpoint  to  Western 
individualism.  At  the  same  time,  material  acquisition  was  denounced  by  Mahathir  as  the 
basis  of  non-spiritual  socialism,  with  its  `obsessive'  redistributive  ideologies,  rather  than 
a  necessary  product  of  capitalism.  This  was  not  to  `excuse'  capitalism,  which  for 
Mahathir,  involved  not  only  wealth,  but  power  and  the  capacity  to  corrupt  society. 
Rather,  the  task  was  to  harness  its  productive  qualities: 
Inevitably,  a  capitalist  society  experiences  moral  decadence  since  it  is  obsessed  with  materialism  and 
corruption  and  rejects  spirituality  and  religion...  [But,  where  capitalist  enterprise  can  be] 
...  controlled  or 
brought  back  to  the  right  path,  [its  benefits  to  society  are  critical]...  The  more  commerce  and  industry 
flourish  the  more  job  opportunities  there  will  be  for  the  jobless...  6 
Thus,  while  Mahathir  equates  socialism,  communism  and  capitalism  as  devoid  of 
spirituality,  the  latter's  redemptive  qualities  lie  in  its  capacity  to  generate  economic  well- 
being  through  wealth  creation.  The  central  message,  thus,  is  that  acquisition  and 
inequality  of  wealth  does  not  necessarily  undermine  individual  spirituality,  nor  should 
90 they  be  regarded  as  the  main  determinants  of  social  values.  This,  for  Mahathir,  was  the 
key  problem  in  socialist  doctrine.  In  its  `fixation'  with  issues  of  wealth,  distribution  and 
poverty,  he  argues,  it  fetishises  materialism,  and  is  inconsistent  with  Islam,  which  places 
a  premium  value  on  spirituality  and  recognises  the  legitimacy  of  hierarchy: 
Based  upon  these  materialistic  concepts  and  values,  a  slogan  has  been  concocted  to  influence  the  minds 
and  hearts  of  the  people:  it  goes:  `the  poor  are  poorer,  the  rich  richer'.  Created  by  socialists  in  the  West, 
the  slogan  has  spread  and  infected  the  rest  of  the  world.  Among  the  communities  caught  in  its  trap  are 
the  Malays  of  Malaysia! 
Mahathir's  view  of  socialism  rather  misses  its  deeper  moral  and  humanist 
meaning.  The  more  immediate  question  here,  however,  concerns  the  extent  to  which  a 
modem  Malay-Islamic  value  system  could  be  reconciled  with  an  evolving  capitalist 
culture.  For  Mahathir  the  modernist  challenge  involved  the  need  for  measured 
assimilation: 
The  East  is  now  going  through  a  phase  in  which  independence  in  the  physical  sense  has  been  achieved, 
but  the  influence  of  Western  imperialism  is  still  pervasive...  This  makes  it  difficult  to  screen  such 
influence  so  that  only  the  good  aspects  are  assimilated.  [At  the  same  time,  there  is]  no  reason  why  the 
influence  of  the  ex-colonialists,  or  more  accurately,  Western  influence,  cannot  be  analysed  and 
systematically  and  judiciously  assimilated  by  a  nation  or  group.  ' 
Thus,  Mahathir's  treatise  on  imperialism  and  his  criticisms  of  the  West  did  not 
spring  from  any  fundamental  objection  to,  or  radical  critique  of,  capitalism  itself.  As 
Khoo  notes: 
At  heart  it  was  a  condemnation  of  Western  motives,  machinations  and  manipulations...  It  was  a  language 
of  disillusionment,  disenchantment  and  indignation.  But  intemperate  as  the  language  sometimes 
sounded  by  diplomatic  standards,  it  was  not  the  anti-imperialist  language  of  radical  Asian,  African,  or 
Latin  American  nationalists.  Mahathir  would  be  unrecognizable  among  Ho  Chi  Minh,  Frantz 
Fanon...  or  Fidel  Castro...  He  was  not  an  anti-capitalist,  but  a  capitalist.  He  was  only  against 
`imperialism'  as  protectionism  but  would  have  hardly  conceived  of  imperialism  in  the  form  of  `foreign 
investments'.  ' 
91 Here,  Mahathir  saw  not  only  the  unstoppable  momentum  of  Western  capitalist 
culture,  but  also  the  potent  symbolism  of  modernity  in  crafting  popular  consciousness. 
The  Challenge,  thus,  invoked  the  need  for  a  new  understanding  of  Malay  development  as 
a  specific  issue  of  Islamic  modernity,  providing,  in  the  process,  a  new  nationalist-popular 
direction  for  the  Islamic  resurgence  in  Malaysia: 
To  Mahathir's  mind  -  that  is  to  say,  to  the  ideologue  of  Malay  economic  participation  and  the 
rehabilitation  of  the  Malays  -  what  Islam  most  urgently  required  of  the  Malays  was  for  them  to  attain 
`a  balance  between  this  world  (dunia)  and  the  next  (akhirat)'...,  or,  what  comes  to  the  same  thing,  a 
balanced  attitude  towards  the  pursuit  of  `worldly  wealth'  and  `worldly  knowledge'...  The  Islamic 
resurgence  in  Malaysia  compelled  Mahathir  to  turn  inward  to  the  Islamic  core  of  the  Malay  community 
to  counter  the  `retrogressive',  `narrow-minded',  `divisive',  and  `destructive'  interpretations  of  Islam 
advanced  by  some  sections  of  the  Malay  community  ... 
[Mahathir] 
... 
had  begun  to  offer  a  reading  of  Islam 
which  came  not  from  an  Islamic  theologian  but  a  Malay  nationalist.  The  result  was  that  the  Malay 
dilemma  was  recast  as  a  Muslim  dilemma.  10 
Hence,  from  the  discourse  of  `dilemma'  in  the  1970s  to  the  `challenge  of  modernity'  in 
the  1980s,  Mahathir  had  sought  to  promote  a  reformist,  growth-driven  agenda  conducive 
to  modern  Islamic  thinking;  one  which  would  give  impetus  to  Bumiputera 
competitiveness  and  lift  Malays  out  of  their  `dependent'  socio-economic  condition. 
The  main  vehicle  for  that  aim  from  the  early-1970s  had  been  the  NEP.  Yet,  out 
of  one  contradiction  another  had  unfolded.  Having  institutionalised  Bumiputera 
rewards,  patronage  and  access  to  the  state,  the  modernist  vision  of  sustained  economic 
growth  was  now  being  constrained  by  the  reluctance  of  Malays  and  Malay  capital  to 
compete  in  a  more  open-market  environment.  As  a  framework  for  social  redistribution 
vis-a-vis  the  Chinese  and  Indians,  the  NEP  had  given  rise  not  only  to  new  brooding 
ethnic  resentments,  but  to  a  concentration  of  middle-class  interests  within  the  public 
sector,  an  entrenched  bureaucracy  and  an  increasingly  inflexible  relationship  between  the 
state  and  domestic  capital. 
92 The  NEP:  class  formation  and  contradictions 
The  key  outcome  of  the  1969  conflict  had  been  the  implementation  of  the  NEP, 
precipitating  a  fundamental  realignment  of  state-class  relations.  The  dual  aims  of  the 
NEP,  contained  within  the  Outline  Perspective  Plan  (1971-90)  (OPP1),  were: 
...  to  achieve  national  unity  through  the  two-pronged  objectives  of  eradicating  poverty  irrespective  of 
race,  and  restructuring  society  to  eliminate  the  identification  of  race  with  economic  function.  II 
Underlying  this  set  of  objectives,  enshrined  in  the  Second  Malaysian  Plan  (1971- 
75),  were  positive  discrimination  policies  designed  to  achieve  a  30%  target  of 
Bumiputera  commercial  ownership  by  1990.  There  followed  a  series  of  interventions  to 
create  the  conditions  for  a  new  state-sponsored  bourgeoisie,  protected  from  the 
predatory  impulses  of  international  and  other  domestic  (namely,  Chinese)  capital  -a 
notable  indication  of  intent  being  the  Malaysian  government's  City  of  London  `raid'  on 
British-owned  Guthrie  stock  in  1971.12  Accompanied  by  complementary  forms  of 
preferential  treatment  for  Malays  in  education,  jobs  and  other  key  areas,  the  state 
appeared  set  to  resolve  the  contradiction  of  its  own  subordinate  bourgeoisie.  13 
Under  Mahathir,  the  imperatives  of  ethnic  redistribution  were  to  be  linked  more 
specifically  to  a  drive  for  NIC  status.  Yet,  limiting  the  heavy  industrialisation  strategy 
envisaged  by  Mahathir  was  his  view  that  the  Malay  entrepreneurs  created  by  the  NEP 
were  not  yet  able  to  function  as  an  independent  capitalist  class.  In  response,  domestic 
capital's  weaknesses  were  being  met  with  a  heavy  programme  of  state  investment 
(through  the  Heavy  Industries  Corporation  of  Malaysia  -  HICOM)  and  protection  of 
infant  industries.  But  it  also  involved  an  easing  of  the  state's  relationship  with  non- 
Malay  capital,  though  one  in  which  Malay  capital  still  played  the  decisive  role,  with 
Malaysia  Inc.  providing  the  framework  for  this  hegemonic  modification.  14 
This  was  still  `statist  economic  development',  "  a  top-down  model  of  capitalist 
transformation  which  kept  the  domestic  bourgeoisie  politically  dependent..  Yet,  while 
aware  of  its  necessity  as  a  keystone  of  the  reward  system,  Mahathir  was  under  no 
illusions  about  its  long-term  effects  in  harbouring  complacency: 
93 The  core  problem,  as  Mahathir  saw  it,  was  the  unintended  effect  that  the  NEP  had  on  the  Malays 
themselves.  -The  many  forms  and  levels  of  state  sponsorship  and  financial  assistance  given  to  the 
Malays  under  the  political  ambit  of  the  NEP  had  not  led  the  Malays  from  backwardness  to  economic 
independence.  Instead,  the  NEP  state  had  become  the  `soft  environment'  owing  to  wrong  `perceptions' 
and  abuses  of  the  NEP.  16 
Although  facilitating  Malay  entrepreneurship  through  the  selective  provision  of 
business  contracts,  licences,  financing  and  other  forms  of  state  assistance,  the  30%  NEP 
target  proved  an  untenable  aim.  Nonetheless,  between  1970  and  1990  Malay  ownership 
of  domestic  corporate  equity  rose  from  2.4%  to  an  impressive  19.3%.  The  bulk  of  this 
(14.2%)  was  owned  directly  by  individual  Bumiputeras  and  institutions,  "  the  rest  being 
controlled  through  state-based 
, 
trusts  such  as  Permodalan  Nasional  Berhad  (PNB  - 
National  Equity  Corporation),  a  structure  designed  to  attract  and  utilise  small-scale 
Malay  investment.  Reflecting  the  traditional  presence  of  the  Chinese  diaspora  and  its 
capital  networks  in  Southeast  Asia,  the  29%  ethnic  Chinese  community  in  Malaysia 
continued  to  represent  the  largest  share  (44.5%  in  1990).  18 
Table  3:  1  Malaysia:  Ownership  of  Share  Capital  (%)19 
1970  1990  1995 
Bumipitera  2.4  19.3  20.6 
Bumiputera  individuals  and  institutions  1.6  14.2  18.6 
Trust  agencies  0.8  5.1  2.0 
Non  Bumiputera  28.3  46.8  43.4 
Chinese  27.2  45.5  40.9 
Indians  1.1  1.0  1.5 
Others 
-  0.3  1.0 
Nominee  companies  6.0  8.5  8.3 
Foreigners  63.4  25.5  27.7 
Yet,  it  was  clear  that  by  1990  the  Malay  state  had  secured  control  of  the  more 
significant  corporate,  industrial  and  financial  sectors  of  the  economy  (notably  in 
petroleum,  plantations,  mineral  extraction  and  banking).  Gomez,  Jomo  and  others  also 
note  that  the  actual  size  of  the  Bumiputera  share  of  corporate  wealth  has  been 
considerably  underestimated.  Coincident  with  the  state's  leading  role  in  generating  20 
94 corporate  Bumiputera  wealth,  through  equity  investment  agencies  and  state-based 
development  corporations,  was  the  flourishing  of  UMNO's  own  corporate  empire  in  this 
period.  And,  alongside  the  more  complex  development  of  a  political-corporate  elite, 
there  emerged  a  rapidly  expanded  Malay  middletservice  class.  In  the  NEP  years  1970- 
1990,  the  proportion  of  the  Malay  workforce  employed  in  middle-class  jobs  rose  from 
12.9%  to  27%  (an  increase  from  33.6%  to  48.1%  of  total  share  of  the  main  middle-class 
occupational  categories).  In  the  same  period,  the  number  of  Chinese  and  Indian  middle- 
class  jobs  held  (as  a  proportion  of  their  respective  workforces)  also  rose,  from  28.6%  to 
43.2%,  and  from  23.4%  to  27.3%.  21  The  key  point  here  is  that  while  continued  growth 
provided  more  upward  social  mobility  for  all  three  ethnic  groups,  the  Chinese  and  Indian 
share  declined  relative  to  Malay  middle-class  employment.  In  particular,  Bumiputeras 
became  predominant  in  government  services.  22 
Table  3:  2  Occupation  and  Income  by  Ethnic  Group  (%)  (1995/96)23 
Occupation  (1995)  Bumiputera  Chinese  Indian  Other 
Professional  and  technical  64.3  26.2  7.3  2.2 
Teachers  and  nurses  72.3  20.5  6.6  0.6 
Administrative  and  managerial  36.1  54.7  5.1  4.1 
Clerical  workers  57.2  34.4  7.7  0.7 
Sale  workers  36.2  51.9  6.5  5.4 
Service  workers  58.2  22.8  8.7  10.3 
Agriculture  workers  63.1  12.9  7.5  16.5 
Production  workers  44.8  35.0  10.3  9.9 
Professionals  (selected)  (1996) 
Architects  28.1  70.3  1.4  0.2 
Accountants  14.4  78.8  5.7  1.1 
Engineers  36.5  56.6  6.8  0.1 
Dentists  32.1  45.1  21.1  1.7 
Doctors  34.4  31.6  31.1  2.9 
Veterinary  surgeons  40.2  24.2  33.2  2.4 
Surveyors  46.3  48.9  3.9  0.9 
Lawyers  28.8  46.6  23.2  1.2 
95 Mean  monthly  gross  household 
income  (RM)  (1995)  1600  2895  2153  1274 
The  importance  of  middle-class  support  must  also  be  seen  in  relation  to  the  ethnic 
divisions  within  the  working-class  and  the  control  of  labour  power  in  Malaysia.  Again, 
class-based  ethnic  ideology  has  featured  prominently  here,  serving  to  fragment  class 
alliances,  thus  allowing  working-class  political  consciousness  and  dissent  to  remain 
communally-focused  and  channelled  through  the  various  MCA,  MIC  and  UMNO  party 
machineries. 
Table  3:  3  Employment  by  sector  (%)  (1997)24 
Manufacturing  27.7 
Other  sectors  21.0 
Wholesale  and  retail  trade,  hotels  and  restaurants  16.5 
Agriculture,  forestry,  livestock  and  fishing  15.2 
Government  services  10.5 
Construction  9.1 
Table  3:  4  Total  labour  force  (1998)25  9,006,500 
Employed  8,563,300 
Unemployment  rate  (%)26  1985  1992  1995  1996  1997  1998 
6.9  3.7  2.8  2.6  2.6  4.9 
This,  in  turn  has  made  it  easier  to  marginalise  labour  power  and  implement  anti- 
trade  union  legislation.  From  the  early-1980s,  Mahathir  promoted  Japanese-based 
employer-labour  relations,  principally  through  the  encouragement  of  `in-house'  trade 
unions.  By  1998,  only  12%  of  the  8.5  million  workforce  in  Malaysia  was  unionised.  27 
The  strategy  here  has  been  to  marginalise  national  unions  by  promoting  `enterprise 
union'  practices,  where  union  leadership  is  specifically  geared  to  the  needs  of  the 
company,  productivity  and  corporate  investment: 
96 The  main  targets  of  the  new  model  seem  to  be  the  workers  in  the  relatively  recently  established,  large 
factories  which  have  been  set  up  in  Malaysia  since  the  1970s.  The  main  intended  beneficiaries  of 
enterprise  unionism,  in  other  words,  are  the  big  industrial  employers,  mainly  transnational  corporations 
(TNCs)  and  public  enterprises. 
The  labour  model  being  pursued  here  bears  comparison  with  Singapore.  Under 
the  PAP,  the  Singaporean  state-class  sought  a  conspicuously  international  environment 
for  capital  accumulation.  While  projecting  ideals  of  state  paternalism,  it  did  so  within  a 
context  of  social  co-optation  and  pragmatic  alliance  with  those  sections  of  capital 
(foreign  and  domestic)  most  amenable  to  an  open-door  entrepot  economy.  This  required 
a  compliant,  low-cost  labour  base  as  a  stimulus  to  mass  manufacturing  and  export-led 
growth. 
Table  3:  5  Malaysia:  Export  structure  (°%)  (1970  -  98)30 
1970*  1993  1998 
Electrical  and  electronic  products  -  45.5  54 
Other  manufactured  goods  -  24.0  23.3 
Palm  oil  6.0  4.8  5.8 
Other  exports  -  3.4  4.8 
Textiles,  clothing  and  footwear  -  4.5  3.2 
Liquefied  natural  gas  (LNG)  -  0.4  2.9 
Crude  oil  -  6.6  2.6 
Timber  5.9  6.2  1.5 
Rubber  39.6  1.7  1.1 
Tin  24.1  2.2  0.2 
Other  commodities  19.0  0.7  0.6 
*  (Selected  1970  figures  are  for  West  Malaysia) 
The  structural  base  of  the  Singaporean  economy  has  largely  shifted  from 
industrial  manufacturing  to  specialised  technology  and  services,  with  much  of  its  manual 
labour  pool  situated  in  the  neighbouring  Malaysian  state  of  Johore.  From  the  1970s, 
Malaysia's  shift  from  agriculture  to  services  and  manufacturing,  high  GDP  output  and 
positive  balance  of  payments  situation  had  placed  it  in  a  favourable  position  to  follow 
97 Singapore  in  the  more  capital-intensive  and  technology-based  sectors.  31  Steady  growth 
rates  of  around  8%  following  the  1985  recession  to  1996  had  given  further  impetus  to 
this  process.  32  However,  in  following  the  Singaporean  model,  concessions  to 
international  capital  had  left  the  Malaysian  economy  exposed  to  the  insecurities  of  FDI 
and  the  volatility  of  world  markets. 
Accordingly,  between  1980-1989  Malaysia's  share  of  foreign  investment.  fell  from 
2.3%  -  0.7%,  as  a  percentage  of  global  FDI,  33  a  situation  exacerbated  by  the  emergence 
of  Laos,  Vietnam,  and,  most  notably,  China  as  more  lucrative  accumulation  sites  in  the 
region.  Intensified  by  recession  and  budget  crises,  these  new  forms  of  dependency  had 
become  particularly  evident  by  the  mid  1980s.  34 
Despite  NEP  nationalisation,  the  Malaysian  state  has  always  sought  a  close 
relationship  with  international  capital.  One  reason  for  this  was  that  the  domestic-led 
industrialisation  models  of  Taiwan  and  South  Korea  would  have  been  undesirable  for 
Malaysia  since  this  might  have  allowed  Chinese  capital  even  more  power  over  Malay 
capital.  Rather,  the  argument  went: 
... 
it  would  be  best  for  Malaysia  to  emulate  Singapore  instead...  by  allowing  TNCs  to  determine  the  nature 
and  progress  of  industrialisation,  with  Malaysians  essentially  piggybacking  them  while  trying  to  make 
Malaysia  as  desirable  an  investment  location  for  foreign  capital  as  possible.  35 
Mahathir's  courting  of  Japanese  TNCs  in  a  bid  to  build  a  globally  competitive 
electronics  sector  illustrates  this  underlying  dependency.  Outwith  the  OECD  states, 
Malaysia  and  the  other  `second-tier'  Southeast  Asian  NICs  (Thailand,  Indonesia  and  the 
Philippines)  became  major  recipients  of  Japanese  FDI  by  the  late-1980s,  with  the 
Southeast  Asian  region  comprising  Japan's  largest  investment  area  outside  the  US 
market.  36  Reflecting  Japan's  burgeoning  trade  surpluses  and  the  appreciating  yen 
(endaka),  initiated  under  the  Plaza  Agreement  of  1985,  a  new  wave  of  investment  saw 
the  concentration  of  off-shore  branch-assembly  production  and  the  utilisation  of  cheap 
labour.  This  restructuring  -  or  `global  localisation'  -  of  Japanese  TNCs  saw  top 
companies  such  as  Sony  and  Hitachi  opt  for  new  forms  of  off-shore  activity  based  on  the 
location  needs  of  middle-range  contractors.  37  Production  of  quality  goods  was 
controlled  by  foreign  firms'  own  subcontractors  located  in  the  host  country,  with  local 
companies  confined  to  supplying  basic  materials.  With  Japanese  conglomerates  38 
98 maintaining  ownership  of  the  production  process,  this  allowed  limited  scope  for 
technology  transfer  to  Malaysian  franchises.  39  Thus,  Malaysia  has  been  used  as  a  low- 
cost  production  site,  with  hi-tech  research  and  development  (R&D)  concentrated  in 
Europe  and  North  America.  40  Yet,  despite  these  limitations,  acquired  technology  and 
low-priced  labour  became  the  new  orthodoxy  of  development  for  countries  like  Malaysia 
by  the  1980s.  41 
This  new  dependence  also  saw  the  removal  of  investment  controls,  the  provision 
of  tax  incentives  and  assurances  over  capital  repatriation  to  foreign,  particularly 
Japanese,  investors,  (measures  beginning  under  the  Fourth  Malaysian  Plan,  1981-85).  42 
At  the  same  time,  Malaysia's  growing  concentration  on  electronics  exposed  it  to  large- 
scale  retrenchment  of  labour  in  the  wake  of  the  mid-1980s  downturn  in 
semiconductors,  43  a  situation  exacerbated  by  Malaysian/ASEAN  export  dependence  on 
Japan  and  its  longstanding  failure  to  penetrate  Japanese  protectionist  markets.  44 
Table  3:  6  Gross  Domestic  Product  by  sector  (1995-98)45 
Growth 
1995  1997  1998 
9.4%  7.7%  -4.8% 
Services  44.2%  44.9%  48.1% 
Manufacturing  33.1%  35.7%  35.4% 
Agriculture,  forestry  and  fishing  13.6%  11.9%  11.8% 
Mining  7.4%  6.7%  7.0% 
Construction  4.4%  4.8%  4.1% 
Less:  imputed  bank  service  charges  -  8.2%  9.2% 
Plus:  import  duties  -  4.1%  2.8% 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
An  associated  trend  here  was  the  widening  regional  disparities  in  manufacturing  and 
growth  between  states  in  Malaysia  itself,  with  concentrations  of  investment  and  wealth  in 
the  Free  Trade  Zones  (FTZs)  of  Penang,  Selangor  (the  Klang  Valley)  and  Johore, 
contrasting  with  slower  industrial  development  in,  for  example,  Kelantan,  Perlis  and 
Terengganu.  46 
99 Another  key  factor  in  NEP  and  subsequent  capitalist  arrangements  has  been  the 
steady  influx  of  foreign  labour.  The  government  claim  that  around  1.2  million  workers  in 
Malaysia  are  foreign  migrants,  though  varying  NGO  estimates  put  the  figure  at  3  million, 
half  of  them  undocumented.  47  The  use  of  foreign  workers  has  served  the  dual  purpose 
of  filling  unskilled  labour  shortages,  notably  in  the  low-paid  service  and  manufacturing 
sectors,  while  helping  to  control  labour  power  by  keeping  unit  labour  costs  low.  This 
has  been  especially  important  in  view  of  increasing  competition  within  and  between  these 
sectors  and  with  regard  to  Malaysia's  regional  competitiveness. 
The  traditional  source  of  Malaysia's  cheap  labour  pool  has  been  Indonesian 
migrants  -  mostly  concentrated  in  the  domestic  service,  agricultural  and  transportation 
sectors.  48  However,  many  more  form  part  of  the  black  economy,  notably  in  the 
construction  sector.  By  the  early-1990s,  the  pattern  of  foreign  labour  had  come  to 
comprise,  more  particularly,  young  Bangladeshi  workers,  many  brought  in  by 
unscrupulous  agents,  to  fill  severe  labour  shortages  in  the  low-paid  textile  industries  and 
sweatshops,  for  example  in  and  around  the  Penang  FTZs.  49  This  has  further  altered  the 
ethnic  composition  of  the  labour  force,  though  the  low-paid  sectors  all  still  depend  on 
Malaysian  women  from  across  the  ethnic  spectrum. 
An  important  consequence  of  the  growth  in  foreign  labour  has  been  the  social 
isolation  and  victimisation  of  migrant  workers,  adding  another  tier  of  ethnic-class 
division  and  means  of  social  control.  As  the  crisis  unfolded  in  1997,  the  government 
carried  out  an  extensive  clampdown  on  illegal  immigrants  (raising  wide  concerns  about 
their  treatment  in  detention  camps),  "  while  announcing  their  intention  to  repatriate 
agency  workers  on  completion  of  their  contracts.  This  was  both  a  political  overture  to 
fearful  Malaysians,  and  an  attempt  to  prop-up  the  currency  by  stemming  the  outflow  of 
migrant  earnings. 
Shaping  the  NEP  society:  ethnicity,  poverty  and  the  new  middle-class 
While  major  disparities  remain,  there  is  little  doubt  that  two  decades  of  growth  and  NEP 
redistribution  has  given-rise  to  a  new  Malay  middle-class.  Reflecting  the  experience  of 
black  people  and  other  socially  marginalised  groups  in  the  United  States,  affirmative 
action  in  Malaysia  can  be  defended  as  a  progressive  ideal.  However,  mainstream 
100 discussion  of  the  NEP  tends  to  obscure  the  point  that  Bumiputera  policies  arose  as  crisis 
responses  to  the  contradictions  of  capitalist  development  under  the  Alliance  state. 
But  the  NEP  also  bred  a  new  sense  of  uncertainty  amongst  many  Malays 
themselves.  In  an  openly  searching  reference  to  the  moral  ambiguities  of  the  NEP,  the 
writer  Rehman  Rashid,  in  A  Malaysian  Journey,  offers  the  following  vignette: 
In  1971  there  was  designed  a  new  five  part  Code  of  Conduct  called  the  Rukunegara,  the  `National 
Credo',  which  was  patterned  after  Indonesia's  Pancasila.  Belief  in  God,  Loyalty  to  the  King  and 
Country,  Good  Behaviour  and  Morality,  that  sort  of  thing.  There  was  a  nationwide  school  essay 
competition  to  popularise  the  concept,  and  I  won  first  prize  in  my  age  group.  A  reporter  came  to  take 
my  picture,  and  soon  I  received  a  cheque  for  RM  250...  Later  I  was  brought  down  to  Kuala  Lumpur  with 
the  other  prize  winners  for  the  ceremony.  We  were  given  certificates  [and]  taken  on  a  tour  of  the  New 
Straits  Times  which  had  sponsored  the  competition.  They  made  a  fuss  over  us,  calling  us  fine  young 
Malaysians  and  the  like.  It  was  winning  the  Rukunegara  Essay  Competition  that  made  me  first  think 
that  under  this  New  Economic  policy,  no  Bumiputra  could  ever  be  really  sure  that  such  `victories'  as 
came  his  way  were  fully  deserved.  Certainly,  I  hadn't  thought  that  my  essay...  was  markedly  better  than 
those  that  received  the  lesser  prize.  And  the  second  prize  winner  had  been  a  Chinese,  and  the  third 
prize  winner  Indian!  Happenstance?  I  didn't  think  so.  51 
As  with  the  Alliance  state,  NEP  class  interests  had  given  rise  to  new  communal 
tensions.  The  affirmative  benefits  of  the  NEP  had  also  stimulated  a  greater  tendency 
towards  Islam  as  a  source  of  communal  status  among  the  newly-educated  Malay  middle- 
classes,  primarily  those  in  the  public  sector.  With  Islamic  codes  becoming  more  fully 
institutionalised  in  key  areas  like  education,  commerce  and  civil  law,  52  Chinese  and 
Indian  fears  of  cultural  marginalisation  intensified  during  the  1980s. 
At  the  same  time,  the  focus  upon  ethnic  redistribution  had  led  to  an  effective 
diminution  of  the  other  NEP  policy  objective,  that  of  poverty  eradication  across  the 
ethnic  communities: 
Of  the  two  prongs  of  the  NEP  it  has...  become  quite  clear,  especially  in  the  1980s,  that  for  both  Malays 
and  non-Malays...  the  restructuring  prong  of  the  NEP  has  taken  precedence  over  poverty  reduction 
efforts.  53 
Despite  problems  of  reliability  over  the  government's  statistical  calculations  (and 
other  sensitive  data),  54  there  is  little  doubt  that  poverty  has  been  significantly  reduced 
101 across  all  ethnic  groups.  During  the  NEP  period  1970-90,  the  poverty  rate  fell  from 
49.3%  to  13.5%.  55  However,  key  disparities  were  still  evident  in  the  gaps  between  the 
urban  and  rural  populations  in  Peninsular  Malaysia  (with  respective  sectoral  poverty 
rates  of  8.1%  and  17.3%  in  1987).  56  In  the  rural  sector,  the  NEP  also  provided 
expanded  opportunities,  but  this  had  benefited  capital  rather  than  low-paid  workers.  As 
Halim  Salleh  notes,  the  Federal  Land  Development  Authority  (FELDA)  land.  schemes 
had  created  new  indebtedness  for  the  settlers,  while  providing  new  accumulation  sites  for 
Malay,  Chinese  and  foreign  investment,  including  "a  secure  avenue  for  the  World 
Bank...  to  accumulate  capital"  through  agrarian-aid-type  loan  arrangements.  57 
The  imbalance  in  NEP  priorities  and  the  sense  in  which  the  `issue  of  poverty' 
became  an  issue  of  development,  is  evident  in  Fong  Chan  Onn's  The  Malaysian 
Economic  Challenge.  Written  as  an  academic  work  by  the  Barisan  Deputy  Education 
Minister,  this  policy-planner  view  of  the  `poverty  problem'  makes  its  resolution 
dependent  on  NEP  development  and  the  creation  of  a  Malay  commercial  class.  58 
However,  Mahathir's  attempts  to  pacify  Bumiputera  interests  while  pursuing  a 
reformist  agenda  had  become  a  new  expression  of  the  Malay  dilemma:  that  is,  how  to 
introduce  greater  levels  of  socio-economic  competition  as  a  stimulus  to  growth  while 
retaining  the  support  of  Malay  bourgeois,  bureaucrat  and  middle-class  interests.  The 
NEP  had  now  created  an  interdependency  between  rewards  and  political  power: 
The  ethnic  underpinnings  of  the  policy  are  most  apparent  in  the  way  in  which  public  institutions  are 
geared  towards  the  goal  of  incubating  a  Malay  capitalist  class.  Non  Malays  are  reacting  to  this  with  as 
much  chauvinism  by  setting  up  their  own  ethnic  outfits...  So  strong  is  this  culture  that  it  has  now  become 
the  overwhelming  reality  in  Malaysian  society.  As  the  drive  towards  wealth  accumulation  within  the 
Malay  capitalist  class  becomes  more  intense,  the  desire  to  acquire  more  and  more  political  power 
becomes  even  greater.  59 
Yet,  the  modernity  project  invoked  by  Mahathir  had  come  to  require  precisely  the 
opposite  configuration  of  favoured  Malay  patronage,  social  dispensation  and  the  `subsidy 
mentality'  encouraged  for  political  reasons.  60  The  problem  also  reflected  fears  of  Malay 
disaffection  emerging  from  the  forthcoming  New  Development  Policy  (1991), 
modifications  to  the  NEP  which  would  offer  relatively  fewer  guarantees  to  Malays  in  an 
effort  to  generate  competition.  61  Mahathir  was  also  aware  of  the  need  to  avoid 
alienating  rural  Malays  dependent  on  NEP  infrastructure.  However,  by  the  early-1990s, 
102 a  more  assertive  language  was  emerging,  giving  cautionary  notice  of  a  scaled-down 
system  of  Malay  privileges.  As  Anwar,  taking-up  Mahathir's  concerns,  had  warned: 
If  you  flunk  your  exams,  we  won't  keep  passing  you  just  because  you  area  Malay.  If  you  cannot  perform 
62  on  a  contract,  you  won't  get  another  one. 
And  the  significance  of  contracts  and  rewards  can  be  seen  as  vital  in  this  regard.  For  it 
was  through  the  new  opportunities  of  privatisation  that  Mahathir  had  sought,  and  found, 
a  `resolution'  of  the  NEP  dilemma. 
Privatisation:  the  new  hegemonic  opportunity 
Mahathir's  `endorsement'  of  the  privatisation  ideal  in  the  early-1980s  reflected  the 
ascendant  neo-liberal/monetarist  orthodoxy  which  had  taken  a  grip  in  the  West.  This  had 
become  evident  in  the  United  States  under  Carter  by  the  late-1970s,  63  and  then  in 
Europe,  most  notably  in  Britain  under  Thatcher. 
A  more  immediate  question  here,  however,  was  how  Mahathir  would  structure 
any  domestic  privatisation  programme,  and  its  attendant  ideals  of  a  `hands-oii  state, 
with  Look  East  and  Malaysia  Inc.,  which  required  -  Japanese  style  -a  neo-corporatist 
`hands-on'  approach.  Moreover,  there  was  no  clear  explanation  of  how  NEP 
interventionism  and  the  security  of  Malay  investment  was  to  be  balanced  against  the 
laissez-faire  ideals  of  privatisation.  The  profile  broadly  adopted  by  Mahathir  was  to  cast 
the  state  as  `facilitating'  private  sector  development,  while  emphasising  the  values  of 
mutual  co-operation  with  the  business  community  as  a  stimulus  to  growth.  64 
It  is,  of  course,  the  case  that  all  modern  capitalist  economies  involve  some  form 
of  state-intervention.  There  is  no  fundamental  contradiction,  in  this  sense,  between  the 
NEP  on  the  one  hand,  and  privatisation  on  the  other.  Privatisation  under  Thatcher  also 
allowed  top  Tory  political  elites  greater  access  to  the  new  corporate  sector  -  `crony 
capitalism'  differentiated  only  by  the  veil  of  multi-directorships  and  respectable 
boardroom  practices.  What  made  privatisation  so  significant  in  Malaysia,  though,  was 
the  fact  that  UMNO  had  become  a  key  private  sector  player  as  a  party  through  corporate 
ownership  and  holding  companies  (such  as  the  Hatibudi  Group,  and  Fleet  Holdings.  ) 
Privatisation  and  financial  deregulation  were,  in  this  sense,  closely  identified  from  the 
103 mid-1980s  with  the  expansion  and  modernisation  of  the  Kuala  Lumpur  Stock  Exchange 
(KLSE),  a  project  directly  overseen  by  Mahathir.  Here,  noted  the  Economist: 
...  the  stockbrokers  dealing  in  Kuala  Lumpur's  booming  market  have  little  doubt  that  politics  and 
business  are  deeply  interlocked  in  Malaysia.  The  brokers  have  noticed  that  the  hottest  properties  are 
often  'UMNO  stocks',  meaning  those  thought  to  be  tied  to  the  political  fortunes  of  rising  stars  within  the 
party...  Other  companies  become  hot  tips  when  they  are  taken  over  by  politically  well  connected  people 
who  stand  to  benefit  from  public  contracts  65 
The  more  critical  point  about  privatisation,  however,  was  that  it  offered  a  new 
means  of  reconfiguring  the  NEP  state  through  the  transfer  of  wealth  and  resources  to 
selectively  designated  political-corporate  elites.  The  `contradiction'  of  privatisation  in 
Malaysia,  thus,  lay  in  the  particular  use  of  deregulated  state  resources  to  strengthen 
UMNO/proxy  corporate  control.  By  shifting  the  dispensation  of  projects  and  services 
from  the  site  of  NEP  sinecures  to  the  Economic  Planning  Unit  (EPU),  part  of  the  Prime 
Minister's  Department,  rentiers  -  Bumiputeras  and  non-Bumiputeras  -  became  more 
closely  dependent  on  the  UMNO  hierarchy,  allowing  Mahathir  and  Finance  Minister 
Daim  Zainuddin  more  effective  control  over  the  patronage  process.  66  As  a  milestone 
policy  of  economic  modernisation,  privatisation  thus  offered  a  more  flexible  set  of 
arrangements  for  altering  the  class  base  of  the  power  bloc,  checking  elements  hitherto 
protected  by  the  state,  while  promising  new  forms  of  wealth  and  political  access  for 
large-scale  capital: 
Mahathir's  `Privatization'  policy  found  its  logical  supporters  among  the  captains  of  Malaysian  industry 
and  commerce  who  sensed  the  opening  of  new  business  opportunities  in  the  impending  transfer  of  state 
enterprises  and  services  to  private  capital...  'Privatization',  however,  had  its  detractors  among  the 
employees  of  statutory  bodies  and  public  enterprises  whose  unions  or  staff  consultative  councils  were 
unsure  about  its  implications  for  their  terms  of  employment  ... 
Still  others  suspected  that  `Privatization' 
within  the  existing  Malaysian  "political/bureaucratic/business  complex"  was  "unlikely  to  be  more  than  a 
rearrangement  of  economic  and  political  power.  "67 
The  new  opportunities  of  privatisation  can  be  identified,  in  particular,  with  the 
rise  of  Daim  Zainuddin.  From  1984,  and  with  no  prior  experience  of  political  office, 
Daim,  close  friend  and  confidant  of  Mahathir,  used  the  Finance  portfolio  to  distribute 
104 privatised  assets,  while  in  the  process  enhancing  his  own  personal  wealth  base.  68 
Reflecting  the  ethos,  if  not  the  practice,  of  the  Thatcherite  `enterprise  culture',  Daim's 
tenure  coincided  with  the  expansion  of  a  nouveau  riche  political  culture  in  Malaysia.  69 
Yet,  while  this  parvenu  represented  a  challenge  to  `old  money'  and  traditional  elites, 
privatisation  itself  was  more  carefully  projected  by  Mahathir  as  a  radical  challenge;  an 
opportunity  to  assert  the  new  independent  stature  of  a  Malay  business  class. 
The  Mahathir-Daim  endorsement  of  privatisation,  however,  must  be  seen  in 
relation  to  the  neo-liberal-monetarist  ascendancy  of  the  mid-1980s,  a  structural  shift 
which  had  drawn  Western  Finance  ministers  into  policy  networks  more  amenable  to 
transnational  capital.  70  The  demise  of  Keynesian  corporatism  in  the  West,  71  coupled 
with  the  greater  mobility  and  volatility  of  financial  flows,  notably  through  the  new 
Eurocurrency  markets,  had  created  a  sharper  disjunction  between  national  and 
transnational  forms  of  capital,  allowing  the  latter  a  more  autonomous  role  in  shaping  the 
global  business  climate.  72 
At  the  same  time,  a  monetarist  network  had  crystallised  around  the  US  Treasury, 
investment  banks,  Friedmanite  academics  and  assorted  political  elites  in  the  US 
Congress;  a  collective  influence  signifying  "the  triumph  of  the  American  banking 
complex  and  of  monetarist  ideas  in  the  United  States.  i73  This  emergent  hegemony  was 
illustrated  by  "the  way  in  which  monetarist  ideas  about  the  need  to  control  inflation 
became  widely  accepted  and  embodied  in  deflationary  policies  in  Western  countries.  "74 
Related  policy  ideas  -  tight  public  spending,  deregulated  markets,  and  the  privatisation 
of  state  assets  -  thus  became  standard  doctrine.  75 
In  seeking  FDI-led  development,  countries  such  as  Malaysia  became  increasingly 
subject  to  this  free-market  agenda  from  the  1980s.  But  rather  than  greater  productive 
investment  in  sectors  like  manufacturing,  this  allowed  for  the  rapid  emergence  of  shorter- 
term  capital  inflows  and  portfolio-type  investment  comprised  mainly  of  stocks  and 
shares.  Indeed,  as  Jomo  has  argued,  the  ascendance  of  finance  capital,  neo-liberal 
reforms  and  the  proliferation  of  portfolio-based  FDI  from  the  1980s  -  rather  than 
`crony  capitalism'  -  can  be  viewed  as  the  critical  structural  factors  explaining  the 
emergent  crisis  in  Malaysia  by  1997  -  see  below.  In  this  regard,  financial  liberalisation 
has  been  the  "centre  piece"  of  IMF  stabilisation  and  World  Bank  Structural  Adjustment 
Programmes  (SAPs),  with  agencies  such  as  the  International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC), 
105 an  arm  of  the  latter,  imposing  "conformist  behaviour"  on  the  South.  76  As  another 
commentator  notes,  in  the  context  of  IMF  and  World  Bank  debt  and  aid  programmes: 
...  the  role  of  these  institutions  cannot  be  reduced  to  their  budgets.  They  help  create  and  maintain  the 
rules  for  the  global  economy.  They  sustain  its  momentum  and  make  sure  that  any  alternative  vision 
proves  impractical  and  unworkable.  " 
And  through  this  process  of  intellectual  enterprise,  the  possible  parameters  of  state 
action  are,  effectively,  set  out: 
What  may  have  been  crucial  in  the  adoption  of  monetarist  policies  was  the  growing  acceptance  of  a 
policy  outlook  among  political  leaders,  as  well  as  central  and  private  bankers,  which  prevented 
significant  alternatives  to  market  monetarism  from  being  contemplated...  Where  such  policies  are 
adopted  with  little  reflection  on  or,  more  realistically,  belief  in  the  credibility  of  possible  alternatives,  the 
power  of  capital  attains  hegemonic  status.  79 
It  is  against  this  neo-liberal  shift  that  changes  in  the  domestic  power  bloc  may  be 
understood.  For  Mahathir,  it  offered  an  opportune  moment  to  initiate  key  policy 
adjustments  and  assuage  foreign  capital  while  redefining  the  nature  of  the  state's 
relationship  with  those  sections  of  domestic  capital  linked  to  the  public  sector.  Although 
augmented  by  other  brooding  political  factionalisms,  it  was  this  strategy  which  came  to 
expose  critical  fissures  within  UMNO,  culminating  in  the  1988  UMNO  split.  Just  as 
Look  East  had  been  invoked  to  placate  Japanese  investors,  so  too  did  Mahathir  use 
privatisation  to  send  positive  messages  to  foreign  capital,  while  hoping  that  the  policy 
would  transform  emerging  Malay  rentiers  into  an  internationally  competitive  business 
group.  79 
However,  with  government  policy  being  conditioned  by  the  `new  rules'  of  the 
liberal-monetarist  agenda,  this  posed  the  considerable  problem  for  Mahathir  of  how  to 
allow  a  more  open-market  while  preserving  UMNO's  political-corporate  influence.  Two 
fundamental  situations  remain  inimical  to  foreign  investment:  one  is  political  instability; 
the  other  is  the  over-entanglement  of  the  state  in  market  processes,  particularly  where 
this  involves  `narrow'  state  control  over  key  economic  enterprises  or/and  selective 
monopolisation  of  rewards  to  state-sponsored  groups.  This  relates,  in  part,  to  the 
perceived  contradiction  between  NEP-based  development  and  conditions  for  foreign 
106 investment,  an  impediment  cited  in  the  World  Bank's  1986  report  on  the  Malaysian 
economy  which  called  for  the  "unshackling"  of  state-sponsored  market  controls  designed 
to  serve  Bumiputera  interests.  80  Moreover,  while  the  Malaysian  media  had  pointed  to 
the  prevalence  of  `political  stability'  as  the  top  reason  for  continued  foreign 
investment,  81  what  such  representations  concealed  was  the  qualitative  nature  of  that 
investment.  International  capital  will  do  business  with  repressive  regimes;  risk, 
_after 
all, 
is  an  intrinsic  feature  of  the  market,  with  fund  managers  thriving  on  market  uncertainty 
-  and  often  creating  political  instability.  However,  while  Mahathir  had  attempted  to 
provide  greater  guarantees  to  foreign  capital,  the  international  business  community 
remained  sensitive  to  UMNO's  increased  concentration  of  executive  control.  Hence,  a 
special  report  on  the  Malaysian  economy  in  1988  by  financial  consultants  Merril  Lynch 
expressed  serious  concern  over  these  two  issues,  noting  in  the  wake  of  the  1987-88  crisis 
that  "political  uncertainty  is  the  single  largest  risk  to  sustained  recovery",  while  pointing 
to  "the  government's  over-extended  and  inefficient  intervention  in  business.  "82 
At  the  same  time,  instability  continued  to  be  reflected  in  the  social  resentment  of 
the  non-Malays: 
...  the  non  Malays  generally  -  especially  the  highly  influential  but  discontented  middle  class  who 
dominate  the  managerial  and  professional  positions  in  the  private  sector  -  remain  quite  frustrated, 
contributing  to  a  continuous  brain  drain  and  capital  flight.  Ironically,  many  influential  members  of  the 
Malay  elite  seem  quite  pleased  with  this  haemorrhage,  believing  that  this  will  advance  their  share  of 
wealth,  lucrative  positions  and  economic  power,  besides  consolidating  their  political  hegemony...  Hence, 
this  tremendously  destabilising  ethnic  polarisation  continues  unfettered.  83 
The  Malaysian  economy  was  also  exposed  to  other  problems  by  the  mid-1980s:  a 
massive  increase  in  foreign  debt;  the  halving  of  oil  prices  in  1982;  the  collapse  of  the  tin 
market  (caused,  partly,  by  the  Malaysian  government's  failed  attempt  to  influence  the 
price  through  cartel  activity  on  the  London  Exchange);  and  the  plummeting  of  rubber 
and  palm  oil  prices  in  1984.84  On  top  of  this,  the  state's  NEP  obligations  had  led  to 
major  fiscal  overstretch. 
With  the  new  monetarist  climate  offering  a  rationale  for  reform,  an  effectively 
imposed  set  of  policy  adjustments  from  without  could,  thus,  be  presented  as  a  new  and 
dynamic  set  of  political  initiatives  from  within.  Hence,  between  1982-87,  public 
107 spending  was  drastically  reduced,  borrowing  restrained,  and  other  austerity  measures 
such  as  job  and  wage  freezes  introduced.  The  budget  deficit  in  this  period  fell  from  20% 
-  7%  of  GNP,  this  being  accompanied  by  a  relaxation  of  NEP  constraints  on  foreign 
investment  and  a  change  in  the  Industrial  Co-ordination  Act  (ICA)  which  had  set 
limitations  on  foreign  participation  and  equity  holdings.  8S  Deflationary  cuts,  austerity 
measures  and  deregulatory  initiatives  had,  thus,  been  used  to  keep  the  IMF  at  bay, 
placate  the  international  money  markets  and  maintain  financial  stability.  86  As 
Saravanamuttu  notes,  denationalisation  offered  an  opportune  moment  for  structural 
adjustment  by  the  domestic  state-class: 
Denationalisation  occurs  in  as  far  as  the  foreign  bourgeoisie  is  able  to  dominate  production  decisions  of 
the  state,  and  there  is  evidence  in  past  as  in  present  developments  that  the  World  Bank  and  other 
transnational  interests  have  been  able  to  dictate  terms  to  Malaysia  against  the  grain  of  certain  national 
policies.  On  the  other  hand,  transnational  interests  are  often  harnessed  to  promote  various  national 
goals  spelled  out  by  the  state.  87 
Resumed  growth  following  the  mid-1980s  recession  showed  that  the  government 
had  managed  to  ride-out  the  storm.  Indeed,  such  was  the  extent  of  national  optimism  by 
the  early-1990s  that  Anwar,  speaking  on  behalf  of  the  Southeast  Asia  Group  of 
developing  countries  at  the  1994  IMF  summit,  felt  confident  enough  to  press  for  a 
selective  issue  of  Special  Drawing  Rights  (SDRs)  for  poor  nations  in  order  to  avoid  a 
growing  rift  with  the  G7  economies.  88  But  such  confidence  also  reflected  the  way  in 
which  Mahathir  had  used  the  doctrines  of  private  enterprise  and  privatisation  to 
reconfigure  economic  and  political  power.  Underpinning  this  process  was  Daim's 
financial  management.  89  While  Mahathir  proclaimed  the  virtues  of  privatisation  as  a  new 
means  of  weaning  Bumiputeras  away  from  state  dependency,  Daim's  transfer  of 
resources  to  strategic  elites  helped  secure  a  new  corporate  support  base.  Significantly, 
this  involved  not  only  the  flow  of  wealth  to  UMNO  patrons,  but  also  to  key  clientele 
within  the  MCA  and  MIC.  Indeed,  in  1986,  Samy  Vellu,  President  of  the  MIC,  revealed 
his  tacit  approval  of  these  practices  by  publicly  defending  such  political-corporate 
relationships.  90  By  appearing  to  transfer  the  burden  of  state  services  to  the  private 
sector  -a  process  facilitated  by  the  absence  of  any  open  tender  system  -  UMNO  had 
brought  all  the  key  public  sector  assets  under  closer  party  control.  91 
108 Since  the  policy  was  first  announced  in  1983,  patronage,  wealth  opportunities 
and  the  centralisation  of  UMNO  power  have  increased  interdependently.  Between  1983- 
1990,37  privatisation  projects  had  been  completed,  with  another  93  in  preparation 
during  1992-93.  The  Privatisation  Master  Plan  (1991)  showed  that  various  forms  of 
privatisation  had  been  utilised.  The  most  notable  were  Sales  of  Equity,  and  Build- 
Operate  Transfer  (BOT)  licences.  The  former  was  used,  for  example,  in  relation  to 
Malaysia  Airlines  (1985),  Sports  Toto  (M)  Bhd  Gaming  (1985),  Syarikat  Telekom  (M) 
Bhd  (1990)  and  Perusahaan  Otomobil  Nasional  (Proton)  Bhd  (1991).  The  latter 
involved  the  granting  of  privatised  licences/contracts  for  the  operating/building  of  Sistem 
Televisyen  (M)  (TV3)  (1983),  the  Kuala  Lumpur  Interchange  (1987)  and  the  North- 
South  Highway  (1988).  92  In  addition,  around  40  government-controlled  administrative 
services  were  transferred  to  UMNO's  PNB  and  other  trust  agencies,  and  another  120 
companies  hived-off  to  the  private  sector.  93  By  1990  equity  sales  had  raised  RM1.18 
billion,  RM8.2  billion  had  been  saved  through  the  BOT  schemes,  and  RM7.45  billion  of 
state  debt  had  been  off-loaded  to  the  private  sector.  By  1992,  the  sale  of  state  utilities, 
such  as  telephone,  postal  and  electricity  services,  had  saved  the  government  RM3.2 
billion  in  operating  costs,  with  combined  equity  sales  by  1992  amounting  to  RM6.7 
billion  in  acquired  revenue.  4  With  further  divestments,  such  as  Petronas  Gas  Bhd 
(1995),  completed  by  the  mid-1990s,  the  government  claimed  that  it  had  saved  around 
RM40.6  billion  in  operating  expenditure,  with  92,700  jobs  rationalised  in  the  state 
bureaucracy.  9S 
This  new  arrangement  for  the  distribution  of  patronage  illustrates  the  ways  in 
which  hegemonic  relationships  are  constructed  through  material  concessions  to  strategic 
interests.  For  example,  in  granting  the  licence  for  a  privatised  broadcasting  channel  to 
TV3,  the  major  shareholding  interests  emerged  as  UMNO's  Fleet  Holding  Group,  Daim 
Zainuddin  himself  and  the  MIC's  Maika  Holdings  Group,  thus  bringing  all  the  major 
broadcasting  media  and  press  in  Malaysia  under  UMNO  control.  96 
Privatisation  has  also  created  a  closer  alignment  between  UMNO  and  large-scale 
domestic  capital,  notably  well-connected  Chinese  business.  97  Reflecting"UMNO's  near- 
successful  takeover  of  the  MCA's  principal  investment  arm  Multi  Purpose  Holdings 
(MPH),  the  1980s  saw  a  new  stream  of  Chinese  capitalists  moving  away  from  the 
traditional  MCA  political-corporate  nexus  in  an  effort  to  establish  closer  links  with 
109 UMNO.  98  As  Heng  Pek  Koon's  study  of  Chinese  business  elites  notes,  this  reflects  an 
increasingly  sophisticated  network  of  reciprocal  ties  and  pragmatic  alliances: 
Accepting  the  fact  of  Malay  political  dominance  and  seeing  the  need  to  establish  their  own  lines  of 
communication  with  prominent  UMNO  leaders,...  the  successful  Chinese  businessmen  have  carefully 
chosen  their  Malay  partners  and  allies...  [Thus,  ]  the  orientation  of  the  individual  tycoons  is  away  from 
the  Chinese  community  in  a  quest  for  Malay  patronage  and  overseas  business  opportunities.  By 
distancing  themselves  from  their  communal  roots,  the  group  may  become  inclined  to  identify  itself  more 
closely  with  the  interests  and  the  needs  of  the  Malay  capitalist  class...  To  the  extent  that  these  tycoons 
have  also  maintained  their  distance  from  the  Chinese  political  leadership,  they  make  it  more  difficult  for 
parties  such  as  the  MCA  to  exercise  influence  at  the  political  centre.  9 
While  small-medium  Chinese  businesses  continue  to  utilise  Malays  as  nominal 
directors  under  so-called  `Ali-Baba'  arrangements  -  in  order  to  circumvent  NEP 
restrictions  on  the  dispensation  of  licences  and  contracts  -  the  interests  of  top  Chinese 
capital  are  now  patterned  around  access  to  state  elites: 
The  one  factor  which  most  clearly  unites  the  Chinese  business  leaders  is  their  reliance  on  a  relationship 
with  Malays  in  state  power...  State  governments,  state  run  enterprises,  and  state  supported  savings  and 
investment  institutions  are  also  courted  vigorously  as  financial  partners.  10° 
Table  3:  7  State-class  relations:  key  corporate  elites  closely  linked  to  UMNO1  11 
Main  holding  company  and 
selected  corporate  interests 
Bumiputeras 
Wan  Azmi  Wan  Hamzah 
Halim  Saad 
Samsudin  Abu  Hassan 
Tajudin  Ran-di 
Yahya  Ahmad 
Ahmad  Sebi  Abu  Bakar 
Azman  Hashim 
Ibrahim  Mohamed 
Non-Bumiputeras 
Vincent  Tan  Chee  Yioun 
Land  &  General,  R.  J.  Reynolds 
(Renong),  United  Engineers  (M)  Bhd 
Aokam  Perdana  Bhd,  Landmarks  Bhd 
Technology  Resources  Ind.,  Malaysia  Airlines  (MAS) 
(HICOM  Holdings  Bhd),  Gadek  Bhd. 
Advance  Synergy  Bhd 
(Arab  Malaysian  Group) 
(Unipheonix  Corp.  Bhd) 
(Berjaya  Group),  Sports  Toto  (M)  Sdn  Bhd, 
110 T.  Ananda  Krishnan 
Dick  Chan 
T.  K.  Lim 
Ting  Pek  Ming 
Quek  Leng  Chan 
Loy  Hean  Heong 
(Pacific  States  Investments),  MAI  Holdings,  Usaha  Tegas,  Tanjong 
Metroplex  Bhd 
Kamunting  Bhd 
Ekran  Bhd 
(Hong  Leong  Group) 
(Malayan  Borneo  Finance  Bhd) 
The  new  opportunities  of  privatisation  have  made  these  links  with  the  UMNO 
elite  increasingly  valuable.  Indicative  of  the  shift  was  the  awarding  of  70%  of  Sports 
Toto,  the  state  gaming  concern,  to  Vincent  Tan  Chee  Yioun,  a  sale  directed  by  Daim 
through  the  Ministry  of  Finance  Inc.,  a  state-based  holding  company  under  his  control. 
Tan  and  other  key  Chinese  capitalists  are  understood  to  have  developed  close  ties  with 
the  UMNO  leadership,  including  the  likelihood  of  having  acted  as  nominal  business 
proxies  for  top  UMNO  figures.  102 
What  must  be  appreciated  here  was  the  scale  of  such  awards.  For  example,  in 
relation  to  the  Sports  Toto  sale,  three  gaming  concerns  formed  part  of  Malaysia's  ten 
largest  companies,  in  terms  of  market  capitalisation,  with  five  major  gaming  groups 
accounting  for  over  10%  of  the  KLSE  listing  in  1994.103  The  sale  of  other  key  public 
assets  such  as  Tenaga  Nasional  Bhd  (National  Electricity)  replaced  state  monopolies 
with  private  ones,  offering  vast  opportunities  for  corporate  elites. 
However,  while  Mahathir  could  cite  all  this  as  evidence  of  state  efficiency,  there 
remained  both  the  negative  effects  of  profit-oriented  services  and  the  pervasive 
entrenchment  of  political-corporate  corruption.  104  There  is,  perhaps,  no  more  apposite 
symbol  of  this  than  the  North-South  Highway  project.  When  Mahathir  finally  declared 
the  road  open  in  September  1994,  the  media,  in  congratulatory  tones,  sought  to 
emphasise  its  early  completion  rather  than  mention  the  scandal  associated  with  the 
contract  itself.  Awarded  in  1988  to  United  Engineers  Bhd  (UEM),  a  low  prestige 
subsidiary  of  UMNO's  investment  company  Hatibudi,  105  Malaysia's  biggest-ever  public 
works  project  offered  a  RM3.4  billion  bonanza  for  well-placed  corporate  elites.  The 
legality  of  the  contract  was  challenged  in  the  courts  by  the  DAP  leader  Lim  Kit  Siang, 
the  litigation  being  stifled  by  his  arrest  under  Operation  Lalang.  (See  next  chapter.  ) 
The  other  key  strand  of  the  patronage  network  to  emerge  from  the  privatisation 
scenario  was  that  associated  with  Anwar.  Despite  his  longstanding  criticisms  of 
111 political-business  ties,  a  select  cohort  of  (mainly  Bumiputera)  business  elites  with  control 
over  some  of  the  newly-privatised  public  assets  had  established  themselves  around 
Anwar  by  the  early  1990s,  helping  him  to  defeat  Ghafar  Baba  for  the  post  of  UMNO 
Deputy  President  in  1993.  -  Many  of  these  were  part  of  a  younger,  more  ambitious 
corporate  circle  frustrated  at  Daim's  control  of  the  patronage  apparatus.  lo6  Indeed,  as 
we  shall  see,  disputes  over  the  dispensation  of  privatised  contracts  had  been  a  key  source 
of  tension  between  Anwar  and  Daim. 
By  the  early-1990s,  privatisation  had,  thus,  come  to  offer  a  vital  new  source  of 
accumulation,  with  new  alliances  built  upon  the  allocation  of  privatised  rewards  to 
corporate  interests  across  the  ethnic  spectrum.  Now  the  Vision  was  helping  to  nurture 
these  accommodations.  The  period  1991-93,  notes  Jomo,  had  seen  "the  most  rapid 
expansion  and  transformation  in  Malaysian  history",  with,  for  example,  the  balance  of 
payments  at  a  peak  of  RM16.7  billion  in  1992  (RM5.3  billion  in  1990)  and  exports  and 
capital  inflows  at  record  levels.  107  With  this  surge  in  economic  activity,  Vision  policy 
was  now  changing  the  class  composition  of  the  bloc: 
The  confirmation  of  the  change  in  policy  direction  came  with  the  adoption  of  Vision  2020,  seen  to 
favour  growth,  modernisation  and  industrialisation  over  the  NEP's  emphasis  on  inter-ethnic 
redistribution.  While  foreign  investors  continued  to  be  courted,  the  government  has  also  started  to  allow 
local  Chinese  capital  more  room  to  move.  Chinese  capital  has  also  been  encouraged  by  various  other 
reforms,  e.  g.  easier  access  to  listing  on  the  stock  market,  greater  official  encouragement  of  small  and 
medium  industries  (SMIs)  as  well  as  other  government  efforts  ... 
108 
At  the  national-popular  level,  the  Vision  had  also  provided  a  system  of  rewards 
and  incentives  sufficient  to  realise  a  considerable  degree  of  consensual  legitimacy.  Thus, 
at  the  high  point  of  `late-Mahathirism'  (circa  1991-early  1997): 
Most  Malaysians  could  not  remember  a  time  of  greater  prosperity  or  lesser  inter-ethnic 
recrimination...  Economic  indicators  alone  would  not  have  captured  the  pride  that  Malaysians  had 
discovered,  perhaps  for  first  time,  in  being  Malaysian.  109 
Yet,  by  mid-1997,  the  fragility  of  the  Vision  project  had  become  all  too  evident. 
112 1997:  the  emerging  crisis 
The  economic  implications  of  the  crisis  following  Anwar's  removal  will  be  addressed  in 
subsequent  chapters.  For  the  moment,  let  us  consider  the  basis  of  the  crisis  and  its  more 
structural  dimensions  vis-a-vis  the  power  bloc  and  state-class  relations.  Again,  it  is 
pertinent  to  see  this  as  a  hegemonic  crisis  in  the  sense  outlined  above. 
The  volatile  fluctuations  within  the  financial  markets  across  the  region  by  mid- 
1997  offered  a  stark  illustration  of  how  external  forces  could  critically  undermine 
domestic  policy.  But  it  also  exposed  a  new  crisis  point  in  domestic  state-class  relations 
and  the  contradictions  of  Mahathir's  deregulatory  agenda. 
The  rout  itself  had  started  in  Thailand,  but  spread  rapidly  through  the  region. 
Reminiscent  of  Mexico  in  the  1980s,  fund  managers  had  poured  capital  into  Thailand, 
allowing  domestic  bankers  easy-access  to  international  money  markets  and  the  means 
with  which  to  fuel  a  massive  credit  boom.  When  the  international  banks,  fearful  of 
overheating  and  burgeoning  trade  imbalances,  took  fright,  the  exposure  of  an  economy 
built  on  services  and  lavish  consumption  became  all  too  apparent.  The  knock-on-effect 
saw  the  calling-in  of  domestic  loans,  the  freezing  of  credit  to  property  developers,  a 
collapse  of  the  construction  industry,  the  shedding  of  labour  and  major  social  dislocation. 
Intensifying  the  crisis,  the  value  of  the  Thai  baht  came  under  severe  fire  from 
international  speculators,  leaving  the  government  -  and  Treasury  elites  who  had  hidden 
the  extent  of  the  state's  debt  -  effectively  helpless  to  contain  the  mounting  panic.  "' 
And  just  as  international  capital  had  helped  set  the  terms  of  the  economic  boom,  so  again 
did  it  determine  the  remedial  agenda  through  the  medicine  of  an  enforced  IMF  austerity 
package. 
Investors  who  had  enjoyed  years  of  rapid  growth  in  Malaysia,  while  turning  a 
blind-eye  to  the  underlying  structural  problems  of  labour  shortages,  increasing  wage 
costs,  a  widening  trade  gap  and  loss  of  export  competitiveness  in  the  electronic  sector,  "' 
now  began  to  express  more  serious  concern.  As  the  crisis  gathered  momentum,  the 
value  of  the  ringgit  fell  to  its  lowest  point  against  the  US  dollar  for  26  years,  a  signal  of 
intensive  downward  pressure  on  the  currency  in  the  months  to  come.  't2  Meanwhile,  an 
environmental  disaster  of  immense  proportions  was  unfolding  as  the  effects  of  slash  and 
burn  forest  clearance  in  Kalimantan  and  Sumutra,  exacerbated  by  the  freak  El  Nino 
113 weather  phenomenon,  began  to  spread  a  dense  cocktail  of  poisonous  smog  fumes  over 
the  entire  region.  Together  with  the  omnipotent  influence  of  international  capital,  here  in 
stark  reality  was  the  actual  effects  of  globalisation  and  the  virtual  irrelevance  of  state 
borders  and  governments  to  control  such  processes.  113 
Denouncing  the  international  speculators,  and  George  Soros  in  particular,  as 
"racists"  for  deliberately  undermining  Malaysia's  economy,  Mahathir  intervened  with  a 
RM60  billion  rescue  package  designed  to  prevent  short-term  share  trading  in  key  blue- 
chip  companies,  while  threatening  other  punitive  measures,  including  arrest,  for  those 
helping  foreign  dealers  to  `sell-short'.  "4  With  fund  managers  unable  to  sell  their  stock 
freely,  the  US  Securities  Exchange  Commission  stood  poised  to  declare  Malaysia  a 
controlled  market,  obliging  US  pension  funds  to  withdraw  their  investment  interests  in 
the  country.  The  uncertainty  within  government  circles  and  ad  hoc  announcement  of  the 
measures  were  interpreted  as  further  signs  of  instability  by  edgy  fund  managers,  leading 
to  an  increased  state  of  panic.  As  the  pressure  mounted,  Mahathir,  realising  the  scale  of 
the  crisis  and  the  negative  signals  from  the  markets,  abandoned  the  curbs.  "'  The 
damage  limitation  exercise  which  followed  also  saw  the  postponement  of  key  `mega 
projects'  such  as  the  Bakun  Dam  and  the  proposed  new  international  airport  at  Kedah, 
developments  which  would  now  be  subject  to  higher  external  currency  costs.  Of  more 
concern  was  the  threat  to  Mahathir's  flagship  Cyberjaya  project.  Having  slated  the  IMF 
for  its  unhelpful  intervention  in  Thailand,  Mahathir  condemned  attempts  by  the  Fund  to 
"subvert"  Malaysian  growth  by  calling  for  the  cancellation  of  such  projects.  116 
As  tensions  rose,  Mahathir  and  Soros  engaged  in  an  acrimonious  exchange  at  the 
IMF/World  Bank  gathering  in  Hong  Kong.  Responding  to  Mahathir's  calls  for  an  end  to 
the  unwarranted  attacks  on  the  Malaysian  economy,  Soros  countered  by  urging  Mahathir 
to  look  firstly  at  Malaysia's  own  internal  problems,  labelling  him  "a  menace  to  his 
country.  "'  17  Mahathir's  moral  objections  to  Soros's  speculation  might  have  been 
reasonable  if  not  for  the  inconvenient  truth  that  the  Bank  Negara  had  itself  been  one  of 
the  most  zealous  players  in  the  currency  markets  throughout  the  1990s,  including  its 
attack  upon  sterling  during  the  UK's  ERM  crisis  in  1992.118  Moreover,  it  was  apparent 
that  alongside  many  institutional  bodies  such  as  pension  funds,  other  Southeast  Asian 
speculators  were  themselves  involved. 
114 With  the  choking  smog  enveloping  the  whole  country  by  September,  a  gloomy 
apocalyptic  mood  descended,  intensifying  the  economic  crisis.  A  further  closeted  truth 
here  was  that  many  Malaysian  logging  companies,  with  links  to  Mahathir,  were  also 
involved  in  the  slash  and  burn  disaster  in  Indonesia  -  hence  Malaysia's  softly-softly 
dealings  with  Suharto  over  the  problem.  While  Anwar's  measured  interventions  helped 
calm  the  rift  at  the  IMF,  enhancing  his  own  standing  in  the  process,  deep  unease  over  the 
continued  viability  of  Malaysia's  banking  and  credit  institutions  began  to  emerge.  The 
international  credit  rating  agency  Standard  and  Poor  revised  Malaysia's  rating  from 
`stable'  to  `negative',  while  panic  withdrawals  by  investors  at  the  country's  biggest 
finance  house  Malaysia  Borneo  Finance  Bhd  (MBF)  continued  despite  assurances  from 
its  senior  managers  and  the  Bank  Negara.  119 
A  key  aspect  of  Malaysia's  exposure  to  the  crisis  lay  in  the  particular  type  of 
foreign  capital  investment  it  was  attracting  by  the  1990s.  Throughout  the  1980s,  the 
major  element  of  FDI  was  directed  towards  the  industrial  and  manufacturing  sectors. 
Despite  an  increasing  level  of  foreign  ownership  and  outflow  of  profits,  this  form  of  FDI 
had  been  relatively  `rooted'  as  physical  capital  investment,  contributing  to  the  rapid 
growth  in  industrial  output  during  the  1980s.  By  the  1990s,  however,  the  predominant 
basis  of  capital  inflow  had  shifted  to  that  of  portfolio  investment. 
Table  3:  8  Kuala  Lumpur  Stock  Exchange:  selected  indices  (1990-98)120 
Composite  Number  of 
Index  listed  companies 
1990  505.92  285 
1996  1,237.96  621 
1997  594.44  708 
1998  389.08  734 
Market  Capitalisation 
(RM  billion) 
131.66 
806.77 
375.80 
255.00 
Vigorously  promoted  by  Mahathir,  the  KLSE's  market  capitalisation  had  grown 
rapidly  between  1990  and  1996  through  a  rush  of  short-term  bonds,  shares  and  other 
speculative  instruments.  Thus,  the  relatively  easier  process  of  capital  withdrawal 
associated  with  portfolio  investment  had,  unlike  the  mid-1980s  downturn,  led  to  a 
quicker,  sharper  and  more  debilitating  shock  to  the  Malaysian  financial  system,  as  noted 
in  the  figures  for  1997.121 
115 Another  important  factor  here  was  that  most  of  the  Southeast  Asian  economies 
had  sought  to  maintain  a  de  facto  currency  peg  against  the  US  dollar  -  again,  as  Jomo 
notes,  reflecting  the  priorities  of  finance  capital  in  the  region  rather  than  domestic, 
particularly  export-based,  capital.  122 
Meanwhile,  the  confidence  of  international  fund  managers  continued  to  erode. 
Mahathir  had  championed  the  KLSE  as  the  new  dynamic  financial  centre  to  rival 
Singapore  and  Hong  Kong.  Within  the  proclaimed  new  era  of  deregulated,  open  trading, 
selective  intervention  on  behalf  of  given  companies  would  severely  undermine  such 
claims.  Mahathir's  belligerent  interventions  and  measures  to  defend  domestic  stocks  had 
already  been  interpreted  as  inept  interference  and  a  serious  impediment  to  future  market 
activity.  As  one  analyst  from  the  Political  and  Economic  Risk  Consultancy  concluded,  it 
had  "damaged  Malaysia's  credibility"  and  "cast  doubts  on  its  ability  to  regulate  and 
maintain  the  sophisticated  financial  system  needed  to  make  Malaysia  into  a  regional 
financial  centre.  s123 
As  the  crisis  developed,  threatening  to  wipe-out  the  wealth  base  of  corporations 
tied  to  UMNO,  the  special  emergency  assistance  granted  to  such  companies  revealed  the 
contradiction  of  the  deregulatory  agenda.  For  example,  by  August  1997,  the  government 
had  intervened  to  cover  the  additional  RM300  million  cost  of  a  UEM  contract  for  sports 
complex  facilities  being  built  for  the  1998  Commonwealth  Games.  124  In  November 
1997,  the  government  took-over  the  Bakun  Dam  project  from  Ekran  Bhd  following 
contractual  problems  arising  from  the  crisis.  125  By  December  1997,  the  privatised 
Tenaga  Nasional,  Malaysia's  second  biggest  company,  was  touting  for  assistance, 
warning  of  a  fall  in  demand  for  electricity  and  impending  RM2  billion  losses  in  its  forex- 
based  loan  repayments  against  the  US  dollar.  126 
More  crucial still  was  the  selective  bail-out  of  the  giant  Renong  conglomerate, 
controlled  by  UMNO  through  top  businessman  Halim  Saad.  Renong  had  been  at  the 
forefront  of  Mahathir's  Cyberjaya  and  Putrajaya  projects.  As  concern  over  the 
company's  viability  in  the  wake  of  the  crisis  mounted,  foreign  investors  began  to  voice 
serious  misgivings  about  corporate  transparency  and  the  government's  commitment  to 
open  financial  practices.  This  followed  Anwar's  decision  to  allow  a  special  waiver  to 
Renong's  subsidiary  UEM  in  the  rescue  buy-out  of  its  parent  company.  Malaysian  stock 
market  rules  for  takeovers  specify  that  where  the  purchasing  group  acquires  a  holding  of 
116 over  33%,  it  must  also  make  a  general  offer,  at  optimum  rates,  to  the  remaining  minority 
shareholders,  a  process  which  would  have  proved  extremely  difficult  for  UEM  to 
finance.  '27 
In  effect,  it  was  a  critical  test  case  of  the  government's  new  regulatory 
credentials,  watched  closely  by  the  broader  business  community.  Deeply  suspicious  of 
the  circumstances  surrounding  the  deal,  investors  dumped  Renong  and  UEM  stock, 
halving  the  share  value  of  both  companies  and  wiping  almost  25%  off  the  value  of  the 
KLSE  in  the  process.  12'  Although  temporarily  withdrawn  due  to  the  critical  response  of 
the  markets  and  plunge  in  share  prices,  '29  the  waiver  was  finally  re-affirmed  by  Anwar  in 
January  1998,  a  dispensation  read  by  the  markets  as  confirmation  of  special  protection 
for  politically-linked  clients,  producing  a  further  collapse  in  market  confidence  and  a  run 
on  the  ringgit.  l3o  By  mid-1998,  favourable  low-interest-based  loans  were  being  directed 
to  struggling  corporations  from  the  national  Employees  Provident  Fund  (EPF) 
(investment  assets  in  1997:  RM129  billion),  including  a  deal  to  rescue  the  shipping 
operations  and  liquefied  gas  interests  of  Mahathir's  son  Mizran  through  a  Petronas  buy- 
out.  131 
The  Renong  bail-out  and  use  of  EPF  assets  was  symptomatic  of  the 
government's  attempts  to  hold  the  new  political-corporate  edifice  together.  But  the 
adverse  market  reaction  had  exposed  the  deep-rooted  contradictions  of  the  post-NEP 
transition  and  created  new  tensions  with  foreign  capital.  Despite  Mahathir's  liberal 
overtures  to  foreign  investors  following  the  stock-market  debacle,  the  premier  had  come 
to  be  seen  as  a  serious  liability  by  key  sections  of  the  foreign  business  class,  a  fear 
reflected  in  the  editorial  positions  and  content  of  key  journals  such  as  the  Economist, 
Asiaweek,  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  Newsweek  and  Time.  The  foreign  media's 
view  of  the  crisis  will  be  dealt  with  more  closely  in  subsequent  chapters.  However,  it  is 
worth  noting  here  how  these  organs  provided  intellectual  support  for  foreign  capital  at 
this  point  by  `advising'  Mahathir  to  heed  IMF  help,  undertake  financial  reforms,  allow 
greater  deregulation  and  refrain  from  using  intemperate  language.  132 
And,  perhaps  for  the  first  time,  this  reaction  began  to  find  serious  resonance 
amongst  the  domestic  business  class.  The  underlying  sentiment  was  that,  despite 
recognised  problems,  the  fundamentals  of  the  Malaysian  economy  were  good  -  in 
contrast  to  Thailand  -  and  that  neither  the  KLSE's  rating  nor  the  ringgit's  true  value 
117 merited  the  extent  of  the  fall  brought  about  by  the  speculative  onslaught.  Neither  did 
they  see  Mahathir  as  unjustified  in  pointing  this  out.  The  deeper,  if  more  quietly  spoken, 
feeling,  however,  was  that  without  Mahathir's  acerbic  interventions,  both  could  have 
been  prevented  from  sliding  as  far  and  as  fast  as  they  did. 
Moreover,  despite  the  public  show  of  solidarity  for  Mahathir  from  big  Chinese 
business  and  agencies  like  the  Malaysian  Chinese  Chamber  of  Commerce,  similar 
concerns  were  being  privately  expressed  in  these  quarters  over  Mahathir's  tirades.  To 
some  extent,  this  unease  was  dependent  upon  the  relative  exposure  of  different  parts  of 
Chinese  business  to  the  crisis.  For  example,  those  involved  in  rent-seeking  such  as 
property  development  could  expect  to  be  hit  harder  than  the  domestic  export  sector,  the 
latter  hoping  for  a  boost  in  overseas  markets  due  to  the  low  value  of  the  ringgit.  133 
Anwar's  interventions 
As  the  crisis  deepened,  the  broad  business  community  looked  to  Anwar  to  produce  a 
more  comprehensive  set  of  confidence-building  measures.  As  noted,  small  business  had 
not  been  averse  to  showing  its  displeasure  at  the  power  of  big  corporations,  seeing  the 
denial  of  bailouts  as  necessary  to  recovery.  '34 
The  first  main  opportunity  came  in  the  October  1997  Budget.  But  while  directed 
at  business  generally,  the  Budget  also  offered  Anwar  the  space  in  which  to  address  the 
concerns  of  particular  components  of  capital.  In  the  preface  to  the  accompanying 
Economic  Report  1997/98,  Anwar  noted  that:  "The  immediate  challenge  we  now  face  is 
to  restore  investors'  confidence  and  stability  in  the  markets.  s135  Again,  while  generally 
applicable,  this  suggested  an  urgent  need  to  send  reassuring  signals  to  foreign  capital.  At 
the  same  time,  the  government  needed  to  correct  the  internal  economic  structure,  and, 
thus,  its  relationship  with  domestic  capital.  The  flawed  calculation  here  seems  to  have 
been  that  by  demonstrating  a  willingness  to  take  hard  decisions  in  relation  to  the  latter, 
the  former  would  read  it  as  an  appropriate  signal  of  intent,  paving  the  way  for  a  return  of 
foreign  investor  confidence.  Hence,  the  principal  Budget  message  to  the  domestic 
business  class  was  that  it  must  use  the  circumstances  of  the  slowdown  and  the  weak 
ringgit  to  restructure,  improve  productivity  and  help  boost  the  country's  export 
competitiveness. 
118 However,  small-medium  industries  (SMIs)  had  also  been  given  a  special  Budget 
allocation  of  RM1  billion.  Accounting  for  84%  of  all  manufacturing  in  Malaysia,  136 
SMIs  represent  the  mainstream  area  of  Chinese  business  activity.  Thus,  Anwar's 
initiative  also  suggested  the  need  to  maintain  the  support  of  domestic  Chinese  capital. 
Indicating  a  certain  juxtaposition  of  state-class  relations  `in  favour'  of  domestic  capital, 
Anwar's  measures  were  broadly  welcomed  by  small  business.  The  main  elements 
included: 
*  Measures  to  curb  imports  through  increased  duties  on  a  range  of  capital  and  consumer  goods,  most 
notably  luxury  cars. 
*A  10%-15%  range  of  tax  incentives  for  high-performing  exporters. 
*  The  removal  of  levies  and  raising  of  quotas  on  foreigners'  property  purchases. 
*A  2%  reduction  in  corporate  tax  to  28%. 
*  The  deferment  of  more  mega-projects. 
Alongside  a  broad  austerity  package,  a  relative  tightening  of  monetary  policy  and  control 
on  credit,  the  recovery  strategy,  thus,  comprised  incentives  to  assist  lagging  sectors  of 
the  economy,  stimulate  demand  for  domestic  products  (notably  electronics  and  cars), 
boost  exports,  hold-up  the  construction  industry  and  alleviate  the  threat  of  inflation.  137 
Other  emergency  initiatives  included  the  discouraging  of  foreign  travel  (including  the 
doubling  of  passport  costs),  cutbacks  on  overseas  study,  and  plans  to  repatriate  foreign 
workers,  notably  Bangladeshi  and  Indonesian  service  sector  employees.  13'  Mahathir  also 
announced  the  creation  of  a  National  Economic  Action  Council  (NEAC),  a  body  of 
`independent'  advisers  charged  with  formulating  recovery  measures  . 
139 
Viewed  from  the  perspective  of  foreign  capital,  things  looked  less  optimistic. 
The  markets  remained  unimpressed  by  the  Budget,  anticipating  many  of  the  measures, 
expressing  scepticism  about  the  up-beat  nature  of  the  government's  economic  forecasts 
(notably,  the  projected  GDP  growth  rate  of  7%)  and  taking  a  lukewarm  view  of 
increased  import  duties.  140  As  the  ringgit  and  KLSE  continued  to  fall,  the  more 
immediate  message  from  foreign  investors  and  fund  managers  was  the  need  for  much 
greater  transparency  and  financial  deregulation.  141  And  underlying  this  disenchantment 
lay  a  further  implication:  the  need  for  political  reform,  even  a  change  of  leader. 
119 For  the  UMNO  leadership,  the  crisis  had  involved  serious  policy  dilemmas,  most 
notably  whether  to  pursue  a  recovery  programme  tailored  to  the  desires  of  foreign 
capital  or  an  internally-driven  one  based  on  domestic  restructuring  and  an  enhanced  role 
for  domestic  capital.  Perhaps  realising  that,  in  any  event,  confidence  would  not  return  to 
the  region  for  some  time,  Mahathir  and  Anwar  still  leaned  towards  the  latter,  seeking  to 
demonstrate  a  capacity  for  tough  economic  management  and  hoping  for  a  positive 
reaction  from  the  financial  markets.  But  as  the  negative  responses  of  both  foreign  and 
domestic  investors  began  to  grow,  142  the  more  immediate  task  became  that  of 
maintaining  economic  stability.  It  is  also  significant  to  note  the  emerging  role  played  by 
Daim  at  this  point  in  trying  to  discount  rumours  of  a  gathering  crisis  in  the  banking 
sector,  '43  signalling  his  appointment  by  Mahathir  as  head  of  the  NEAC.  (See  also 
Chapter  3.  )  Related  measures  were  to  include  plans  for  the  merger  of  big  bank  and 
finance  companies  such  as  Hong  Leong  Finance  and  Arab-Malaysian  Finance.  144 
Nonetheless,  withdrawals  of  deposits  from  domestic  banks  intensified  as  investment 
funds  continued  to  flow-out,  putting  pressure  on  the  Bank  Negara  to  hike-up  interest 
rates,  a  move  now  being  resisted  by  Mahathir  through  fears  that  this  would  stunt 
borrowing,  investment  and  growth.  145  Again,  highlighting  the  dependence  of  the 
Malaysian  economy  on  short-term  funds,  a  RM13.9  billion  net  outflow  of  `hot-money' 
had  contributed  to  the  RM19  billion  services  account  deficit  and  an  overall  balance  of 
payments  deficit  of  RM8.2  billion.  146 
Thus,  as  capital  flight  and  the  ringgit's  slide  continued,  Anwar  was  forced  in 
December  1997  into  a  further  set  of  emergency  `post-budget'  measures.  Recognising 
the  markets'  deep  reservations  over  the  government's  Budget  forecasts: 
*  The  growth  projection  for  1998  was  revised  downwards  from  7%  to  4%-5%. 
*A  further  18%  was  to  be  trimmed  from  Federal  expenditure. 
*  The  current  account  deficit  was  to  be  reduced  from  5%  to  a  new  target  of  3%  of  GNP. 
*  Ministerial  salaries  were  to  be  cut  by  10%. 
*  All  proposed  megaprojects  were  to  be  deferred. 
*  Fuller  corporate  regulation  and  transparency  (no  more  Renong-type  bail-outs)  was  to  be  initiated.  147 
As  the  markets  reacted  favourably  to  the  revisions  and  perceptions  that  Anwar  might  be 
poised  to  check  the  privileges  of  UMNO  business  clients,  Lim  Kit  Siang,  who  had  called 
120 for  further  measures,  urged  Anwar  to  convene  a  "third  1998  Budget"  to  develop  the 
package  and  "show  the  world  that  the  Malaysian  Government  and  its  people  have 
completely  purged  the  `denial  syndrome'.  "'" 
Although  Mahathir  had  chaired  and  approved  the  cabinet  austerity  plan,  it  was 
broadly  seen  as  Anwar's  initiative,  enhancing  his  position  amongst  the  international 
financial  community,  even  though  it  represented  a  tacit  admission  of  the  government's 
own  culpability  and  final  acceptance  of  its  share  of  the  blame  for  the  crisis.  More 
importantly,  it  signalled  the  onset  of  policy  differences  between  Anwar  and  his  allies  in 
the  Bank  Negara  on  the  one  hand  and  Mahathir  and  Daim  on  the  other.  Seeking  to 
counterbalance  this  momentary  loss  of  authority,  Mahathir,  had  taken  refuge  in  a  joint 
ASEAN  appeal  to  the  US,  the  EC,  Japan  and  the  IMF  to  recognise  the  global  context  of 
the  crisis  and  take  action  to  stabilise  the  region's  currencies.  "' 
Herein  lay  the  paradox  of  Mahathir's  `liberalisation'  agenda.  Deregulation  had 
been  embraced  by  Mahathir  and  Daim  as  a  Faustian  process  to  help  reconfigure  domestic 
wealth.  But  the  proliferation  of  portfolio-based  FDI  and  the  concessions  granted  to 
finance  capital  by  Mahathir,  alongside  inadequate  market  transparency,  had  unleashed 
forces  capable  of  pushing  an  already  exposed  economy  with  gathering  structural 
problems  to  the  brink  of  collapse.  As  the  implications  of  the  Asian  crisis  for  the  Western 
economies  became  more  obvious,  '"  so  too  did  the  ersatz  nature  of  liberalisation  in 
Malaysia.  In  turn,  the  IMF  and  US  political-corporate  axis  now  sought  to  `set  the  terms' 
of  recovery  through  demands  for  more  transparent  business  conditions. 
The  `IMF  debate' 
At  the  same  time,  the  crisis  in  Southeast  Asia  also  sparked  a  more  searching  debate  on 
the  interventionist  policies  of  the  IMF.  's'  In  particular,  many  observers  asked  whether 
its  standard  austerity  package  of  public  spending  cuts  and  tighter  monetary  and  fiscal 
policies  were  really  appropriate  to  the  region.  Unlike  the  South  American  debt-crises  of 
the  1980s  and  1990s,  these  economies  had  been  relatively  stable.  The  generic  remedial 
approach  not  only  negated  the  diverse  nature  of  each  country's  particular  problems,  but, 
more  critically,  threatened  to  plunge  them  into  deep  recession  by  cutting  off  the  stimulus 
121 to  investment.  Thus,  analysts  began  to  warn  of  the  serious  knock-on  effect  for  the  West 
should  financial  confidence  deteriorate  in  the  region. 
However,  the  issue  of  IMF  intervention  here  misses  the  more  critical  point.  The 
IMF  acts  in  the  hegemonic  interests  of  free-market  global  capital.  Thailand  may  have 
fallen  due  to  an  excessive  frenzy  of  credit  and  out-of-control  debt.  But  the  debt  itself 
was  stimulated  by  Western  banks  and  global  finance  capital  in  particular  seeking  a  slice 
of  this  speculative  activity.  The  key  issue  here  is  deregulation  and  free-access  to 
financial  markets,  a  principal  which  the  IMF  has  consistently  urged  upon  all  countries. 
And  when  the  inexorable  cycle  of  boom  gives  way  to  bust,  the  belt-tightening  remedy  is 
presented  with  very  little  variation. 
In  South  America,  economies  were  now  just  emerging  from  this  `rehabilitation', 
though  the  ensuing  crisis  of  the  real  in  Brazil  by  1998  was  to  reveal  the  ongoing  nature 
of  the  boom-bust  capitalist  cycle  and  bailout  process.  Thus,  in  one  sense,  this  was  a 
form  of  old-fashioned  capitalist  shakeout  and  shedding  of  unproductive  forces. 
However,  the  circumstances  within  which  the  cycle  comes  to  crisis  point  was  also  being 
determined  by  the  increasingly  complex  gyrations  of  speculative  capital  and  non- 
productive  accumulation.  Thailand  may  have  accumulated  a  mountain  of  bad  debt,  thus 
presaging  a  failure  of  confidence,  but  it  was  the  collapse  of  the  baht  and  the  associated 
panic  triggered  by  currency  speculation  in  the  region  which  helped  spread  and  intensify 
the  crisis.  In  Malaysia,  fears  of  overheating  were  evident  before  1997,  for  example,  in 
the  property  price  spiral  and  high  levels  of  domestic  bank  lending  towards  consumer  and 
other  non-productive  outlets.  Yet,  was  it  conceivable  that  foreign  fund  managers,  with 
the  most  complex  array  of  market  indicators  and  analysts  at  their  disposal,  could  have 
been  so  `unaware'  of  the  looming  problems?  152  Thus,  the  Asian  crisis  needed  ready 
scapegoats: 
In  the  wake  of  the  crisis,  what  annoyed  the  free-marketeers,  neoliberals,  or  bearers  of  the  'IMF- 
Washington  consensus'  was  the  hubris  of  a  historical  form  of  economic  nationalism  which,  having 
achieved  `East  Asian  competitiveness',  wanted  globalization,  but  still  wanted  to  `govern  the  market'!  33 
Those  hailed  by  the  IMF-Washington  nexus  were  now  chastised  as  errant  and  profligate 
offenders.  Intrinsic  to  the  Fund's  approach  here  was  to: 
122 ...  promote  the  idea  that  the  crisis  represented  the  well-warranted  punishment  of  Asian  economies  by 
international  financial  markets  for  the  governments'  gross  mismanagement.  As  First  Deputy  Managing 
Director  Stanley  Fischer  kept  repeating,  the  crisis  was  due  to  homegrown  causes  that  became,  in  the 
words  of  other  commentators,  `Asian  crony  capitalism'.  This  was  propounded  by  an  organisation  that, 
until  September  1997,  lavished  praise  on  these  countries'  economic  performance  and  attributed  it  in 
good  part  to  their  financial  liberalization.  '  34 
Yet,  it  also  served  the  broad  interests  of  capital  to  resolve  the  crisis.  The  world's 
stock  managers  had  watched  the  panic  sweep  like  a  whirlwind  through  Thailand, 
Malaysia,  Indonesia,  Singapore,  Hong  Kong  and  Japan,  fearing  it  would  strike  China  and 
spread  outwards  to  the  West,  plunging  the  global  economy  into  a  1930s-type  depression. 
The  initial  legs  of  the  crisis  had  fed  a  voracious  bout  of  speculation,  particularly  as  the 
crisis  hit  Hong  Kong  -  with  the  Malaysian  authorities  indulging  in  a  spot  of 
schadenfreude  as  George  Soros  himself  took  a  US$2  billion  loss  during  the  assault  on 
the  Hang  Seng.  '55  But  as  Wall  Street  and  the  other  global  bourses  felt  the  downward 
impact  of  the  Hong  Kong  wipe-out  on  their  share  indexes,  a  more  concentrated  agenda 
for  regional  assistance  began  to  emerge. 
Some  signals  of  a  potential  recovery  in  Malaysia  had  become  evident  by  January 
1998.  As  noted,  international  investors  had  shown  cautious  optimism  over  Anwar's 
`revised  budget'.  Bill  Clinton  had  also  sent  a  strong  message  of  `support'  for  continued 
investment  in  Malaysia.  156  By  early  February,  the  World  Bank  president  James 
Wolfensohn  had  expressed  confidence  in  Malaysia's  recovery  efforts,  echoing  a  previous 
visit  and  assessment  by  the  IMF  managing  director  Michel  Camdessus.  '57  Alongside 
quieter  `advice'  to  tone-down  the  rhetoric,  the  main  message  from  both  was  that  while 
reduced  spending  and  increased  interest  rates  were  needed  to  restrict  credit  growth, 
Malaysia's  structural  problems  could  be  seen  as  distinct  from  Thailand,  Indonesia  and 
South  Korea  -  in  effect,  not  requiring  an  IMF  bail-out.  Responding  to  these 
developments  and  other  bullish  regional  stock  markets  (buoyed  by  these  three  countries' 
`positive  reactions'  to  IMF  aid),  the  KLSE  rallied  by  an  impressive  23%  on  the  first  day 
of  trading  following  the  five  day  Chinese  New  Year  and  Aidil  Fitri  holidays.  158  The 
KLSE  had  also  fined  UEM  in  an  apparent  effort  to  appear  more  even-handed  to  the 
foreign  business  community.  ls9 
123 Managing  the  crisis:  policy  schism  and  the  Anwar  factor 
While  resisting  IMF  orthodoxy  and  the  indignity  of  a  direct  bail-out,  Mahathir  still 
appeared  to  accept,  for  the  moment,  Anwar's  reform  agenda.  Moreover,  despite 
Mahathir's  renewed  offensive  against  the  West,  the  case  for  fuller  liberalisation  being 
pushed  by  Camdessus  from  without  and  Anwar  from  within  was  still  being  endorsed  as 
government  policy.  In  seeking  to  project  the  importance  of  his  initiatives,  Anwar  was  to 
note  at  this  point  how  the  crisis  had  been  a  watershed  for  the  country,  concluding  that  it 
would  emerge  more  confident  and  committed  to  greater  openness: 
The  great  lesson  we  have  learned,  which  is  actually  a  major  transformation  and  a  revolution  by  itself,  is 
that  it  has  called  for  greater  transparency,  greater  accountability  and  for  greater  democracy.  16° 
However,  by  mid-1998,  it  was  apparent  that  the  country  still  faced  the  longer 
haul  to  recovery  with  economic  output  contracting  by  1.8%  (first  yearly  quarter)  and 
currency  and  share  values  still  in  the  doldrums.  161  Neither  had  export  competitiveness 
been  enhanced  by  the  falling  ringgit,  with  the  rising  price  of  imported  goods  contributing 
to  gathering  inflation.  162  Meanwhile,  the  `ourselves  alone'  road  to  recovery  was  being 
invoked,  with  Mahathir  now  counselling  Malaysian  youth  on  the  insidious  dangers  of 
`emerging  absolute  capitalism'.  163  The  government  even  ran  a  national  public  collection 
to  help  `save  the  country'  from  economic  ruin.  164  With  little  to  show  for  the  austerity 
package  and  countenancing  global  expansion  of  the  crisis,  Mahathir  began  easing-up  on 
monetary  policy  in  an  attempt  to  offset  looming  recession,  stimulate  growth  and  save 
healthy  companies  -a  snub  to  the  high  interest  rate/tight  credit  strategy  still  suggested 
by  the  IMF  and  thought  necessary  by  Anwar  and  the  central  bank  to  limit  further  attacks 
on  the  currency.  165  Other  factors  such  as  the  worrying  fall  in  the  value  of  big 
Bumiputera  trust  funds  run  by  some  Malaysian  states  may  also  have  contributed  to 
Mahathir's  reflationary  efforts  here.  166  With  the  austerity  measures  now  beginning  to 
bite  and  the  economy  heading  for  recession,  Mahathir  was  also  concerned  about  the 
impact  on  small  business  and  the  erosion  of  middle-class  confidence.  And  there  was  also 
now  the  question  of  Anwar's  own  support  base  within  UMNO  and  the  `IMF  circle'. 
With  Daim's  restoration  as  chief  financial  guru,  a  key  policy  collision  was  now  evident. 
124 Anwar,  the  IMF  circle  and  the  UMNO  network 
The  wider  implications  of  Anwar's  positions  within  the  IMF  circle  and  the  UMNO 
network  will  be  developed  in  subsequent  chapters.  For  the  moment,  it  is  necessary  to 
note  here  the  particular  class  context  of  these  relationships.  It  is  notable,  firstly,  that  the 
West  by  this  point  saw  Anwar,  Habibie  and  Estrada,  three  close  intimates,  as  the  `new 
generation'  for  the  region.  Like  Estrada  in  the  Philippines,  Habibie  was  the  Indonesian 
`reformer  of  choice'  for  the  West,  someone  who,  despite  his  role  as  co-architect  of  the 
Golkar  regime  and  Suharto's  cohort,  could  protect  Western  interests  in  the  run-up  to 
new  elections.  If  Anwar's  case  was  somewhat  more  `respectable',  it  is,  nonetheless,  safe 
to  say  that  he  was  being  `sponsored'  by  the  IMF-Washington  circle  as  the  man  to  do 
business  with;  someone  who,  in  the  name  of  `new  civil  reform',  would,  hopefully,  lift 
restrictive  barriers  to  capital  and  move  business  dealings  beyond  the  caustic  relationship 
with  Mahathir.  In  this  regard,  Anwar  had  developed  close  associations  with  key  Western 
figures  such  as  James  Wolfensohn  at  the  World  Bank,  Madeleine  Albright  and  Michel 
Camdessus  at  the  IMF  with  whom  he  planned  to  co-author  a  book  on  Asian  civil  reform. 
It  is  too  simplistic  to  say  that  Anwar  was  being  manipulated  here  or  that  he 
lacked  reformist  intentions.  While  the  Asian  Renaissance  image  he  cultivated  as  a 
backdrop  was  questionable,  Anwar  did  have  his  own  agenda  and  ideas  on  economic  and 
intellectual  matters,  including  the  development  of  Islam:  Yet,  he  also  had  his  own 
cronies  within  the  UMNO  machine.  167  After  sixteen  years  playing  the  game  of  heir 
apparent  to  Mahathir,  Anwar  was  not  some  naive  politician  unaware  of  the  stakes. 
Similarly,  business  elites  linked  to  Anwar  were  now  caught-up  in  a  complex  scenario  of 
financial  bail-outs  and  judgements  over  who  to  back.  As  in  the  mid-1980s,  competing 
corporate  interests  were  seeking  to  manoeuvre  themselves  into  positions  of  power. 
Some  of  `Anwar's  boys',  an  extensive  political-corporate  circle  in  its  own  right, 
appeared  to  believe,  because  of  the  crisis,  that  its  own  ascendancy  was  imminent.  While 
the  naivety  of  this  view  was  to  be  revealed  in  the  failure  of  Anwar  ally  Zahid  Hamidi's 
(then  UMNO  Youth  leader)  anti-corruption  platform  at  the  June  1998  UMNO  Assembly 
(see  next  chapter),  Anwar  himself  had  been  more  muted,  realising  that  any  perceived  split 
within  UMNO  over  the  crisis  might  wreck  their  chances  completely.  Anwar  was  also 
trying  to  stabilise  investor  confidence  while  placating  Mahathir  and  Daim.  In  the 
background,  corporate  elites  feared  that  any  practical  show  of  transparency  and  shakeout 
125 would  mean  a  denial  of  bailouts.  Anwar's  ambivalence  over  rescue  packages  for  Renong 
and  Mahathir's  son  Mirzan,  alongside  fears  that  he  was  dropping  `big  names'  to  the  Anti 
Corruption  Agency  (ACA)  can  be  seen  as  critical  to  these  tensions  within  the  UMNO- 
corporate  network.  While,  seemingly,  more  prudent  to  keep  Anwar  on  the  inside,  given 
what  he  now  knew  about  internal  corruption  and  nepotism,  it  was  the  emerging  policy 
differences  over  crisis  management  and  the  implications  of  an  IMF  scenario  vis-a-vis 
bailouts  which  may  have  tipped  the  balance,  prompting  Mahathir  to  use  the  sodomy 
allegations  and  corruption  charges  as  part  of  a  strategy  to  contain  him.  Again,  the 
ubiquitous  presence  of  Daim  here  was  not  coincidental. 
This  now  signalled  a  policy  crisis  within  UMNO  and  a  decisive  impasse  in  state- 
class  relations.  Mahathir  was  turning  sharply  away  from  a  recovery  agenda  based  on 
IMF  adjustments  and  the  appeasement  of  foreign  investors  to  one  built  around  more 
immediate  domestic  interests  and  the  preservation  of  middle-class  support.  In  practice, 
this  meant  selected  bailouts  and  continued  protection  for  top  corporate  elites.  But  it  also 
pointed  to  a  more  fundamental  movement  of  priorities,  one  with  more  serious 
implications  for  the  domestic  bloc's  relationship  with  international  capital. 
Mahathir  was  now  `challenging'  the  `free-market'  axioms  that  he  and  Daim  had 
used  to  `reform'  the  economy  from  the  1980s.  Not  only  did  this  call  into  question 
Malaysia's  (already  dubious)  claim  to  be  the  region's  new  financial  centre,  it  also  brought 
Mahathir  into  direct  confrontation  with  Western  financial  institutions,  a  clash  of  interests 
which,  as  we  shall  see,  was  to  lead  to  a  serious  deterioration  in  Malaysian-US  political 
relations.  By  late-  1998,  this  would  be  focused  around  Anwar's  incarceration  and 
international  calls  for  liberal  reform  in  Malaysia,  a  defining  moment  being  Al  Gore's 
speech  in  support  of  Anwar  and  the  reformasi  during  the  APEC  gathering  in  Kuala 
Lumpur.  168  Again,  though,  the  motives  underlying  US  and  other  Western  `concerns' 
here  were  also  connected  with  Anwar's  prior  efforts  to  bring  about  new  liberalised 
business  conditions.  In  this  regard,  notions  of  an  actual  external  `conspiracy'  to  remove 
Mahathir  are  not  only  unverifiable,  but  diversionary.  Again,  the  central  point  was  that 
Anwar  had  been  courted  as  Mahathir's  heir  apparent  by  the  West  and  foreign  capital. 
(See  following  chapters  for  further  discussion  of  this  aspect  in  relation  to  Mahathir's 
domestic  controls.  ) 
126 Thus,  hegemonic  crises  were  being  played-out  at  both  levels,  domestic  and 
global.  Although  very  different  in  scale,  both  situations  shared  a  common  problem:  a 
crisis  of  consensus.  At  the  global  level,  the  legitimacy  of  the  financial  system  was  being 
called  into  question  as  finance  ministers  and  bankers  sought  to  stem  the  contagion.  Most 
Southeast  Asian  currencies  had  been  severely  battered.  In  Indonesia,  half  the  population 
were  edging  towards  poverty.  Now  the  collapse  of  the  rouble  and  social  dislocation  in 
Russia  was  being  followed  by  an  onslaught  on  the  Brazilian  real,  threatening  to  plunge 
Central  America  into  recession.  On  Wall  Street,  the  Federal  Reserve  and  an  inner  cabal 
of  international  bankers  had  launched  an  emergency  $3.5  billion  `lifeboat'  to  rescue 
Long-Term  Capital  Management,  a  250  times  over-leveraged  hedge  fund.  Without  the 
bailout,  they  argued,  the  whole  global  system  would  have  faced  its  worst  shock  in  fifty 
years,  , 
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Nonetheless,  as  at  the  global  level,  crisis  management  and  emergency  measures 
could  not  conceal  the  fundamental  contradictions  now  emerging  within  the  domestic 
bloc.  Even  Mahathir's  `post-free-market'  calls  for  a  `new  financial  order',  now  being 
played-up  as  a  spirited  denunciation  of  Western  capitalist  values,  could  not  disguise  the 
loss  of  international  confidence  in  Malaysia  as  an  investment  location,  the  growing 
apprehension  within  UMNO  and  the  spectre  of  popular  unrest.  It  is  at  this  point  of 
internal  and  populist  pressure  that  the  power  bloc  may  begin  to  unravel,  setting  in 
motion  new  state-class  alignments  from  within  and  new  social  forces  from  below.  For 
the  hegemonic  group,  this  becomes  a  key  test  of  legitimacy;  a  measure  of  its  ability  to 
maintain  control  through  consent  rather  than  coercion. 
Thus,  from  the  early-1980s  to  the  crisis,  key  shifts  had  occurred  within  the  power  bloc. 
Privatisation  did  not  constitute  a  volle  face  on  NEP  intervention.  Rather,  it  created  a 
more  subtly  modified  reward  structure,  removed  from  the  immediate  site  of  the  state  and 
repositioned  around  a  new  set  of  political-corporate  accommodations.  While  fostering 
closer  links  to  foreign  capital,  UMNO's  wealth  base,  lack  of  corporate  transparency  and 
use  of  selected  bailouts  still  constrained  free-market  activity,  contradicting  Mahathir's 
deregulation  agenda.  Mahathir  had  played  to  the  domestic  gallery  by  denouncing  Soros 
and  the  IMF.  But  behind  this  rhetoric,  a  more  fundamental  contest  was  being  waged 
over  the  case  for  fuller  liberalisation,  Anwar's  part  in  this  process  being  central  to  the 
127 unfolding  conspiracy  against  him.  Again,  as  in  1987,  it  had  been  policy  issues  and  the 
spark  of  economic  crisis  which  had  ignited  these  tensions.  As  the  global  implications  of 
the  crisis  emerged,  a  more  critical  debate  had  opened-up  over  IMF  policies.  However, 
this  discourse  still  focused  on  the  slogan  explanation  of  `crony  capitalism'  rather  than  the 
problem  of  capitalist  speculation  and  the  social  impact  of  financial  retrenchment  across 
the  region.  By  proceeding  with  expansionist  measures  to  keep  domestic  business  and  the 
middle-class  on  board,  Mahathir  was  trying  to  steer  a  consensual  course.  However, 
there  was  still  the  considerable  hazard  of  the  Anwar  situation  and  unknown 
undercurrents  of  popular  dissent  to  navigate.  Fearing  not  only  Anwar's  influence  within 
the  party,  but  his  first-hand  knowledge  of  corruption  and  nepotism  within  the  cabinet  and 
corporate  circles,  alarm  bells  had  began  to  sound  at  the  highest  levels  of  the  power 
structure.  It  is  at  this  point,  with  a  decisive  putsch  unfolding  against  Anwar  himself,  that 
the  economic  crisis  moved  towards  political  crisis. 
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Mahathirism  and  the 
politics  of  the  power  bloc 
Having  used  the  new  business  climate  from  the  early-1980s  to  realise  a  shift  in  class 
relations,  Mahathir  needed  to  embed  these  changes  more  concretely  within  the  political 
bloc.  Throughout  the  early  import-substitution  and  export-orientated  phases  of  post- 
colonial  development,  the  Alliance  state  had  kept  domestic  class  interests  tied  to  those  of 
international  capital.  '  By  the  1970s,  these  laissez-faire  orientations  had  given  way  to 
state-corporate  regulation  of  the  economy,  firmer  control  of  labour  and  the  anchoring  of 
political  rewards  to  the  NEP.  From  the  mid-1980s,  Malaysia  Inc.  had  been  the  leitmotif 
of  `corporatist  consensus'.  And  by  1997,  the  project  had  seen  a  more  conscious 
propagation  of  Bangsa  Malaysia  and  neo-liberal  nostrums  in  an  attempt  to 
`consensualise'  the  Vision. 
But  while  tri-partite  arrangements  between  government,  business  and  labour 
denotes  corporatism,  it  is  not  hegemony  in  the  Gramscian  meaning  of  that  term.  For  a 
hegemonic  order  must  also  be  understood  in  terms  of  the  ensemble  of  ideas  which  a 
ruling  group  is  able  to  project  as  a  basis  for  political  legitimacy.  In  this  sense,  hegemonic 
rule  transcends  what  Gramsci  calls  `economic-corporate'  consensus  for  one  which  strives 
for  a  `universalisation'  of  consent  within  the  bloc  and  civil  society.  2  For  Gramsci,  this 
signified  a  convergence  between  economic,  political  and  intellectual-moral  objectives.  3 
Let  us  consider  how  Mahathir  has  sought  to  build  consensus  by  managing  tensions 
within  the  political  bloc  and  crafting  national-popular  support,  taking  us  to  an  analysis  of 
the  political  crisis  by  1997. 
Politics,  conflicts  and  institutions:  building  the  new  consensus 
As  Mahathir  and  Daim  came  to  implement  their  own,  attenuated,  liberalisation  during  the 
1980s,  they  needed  to  move  beyond  NEP  corporatism,  entrenched  Bumiputeraism  and 
old  forms  of  technocratic  statism  towards  a  leaner  use  of  capital  and  labour  more 
135 appropriate  to  the  new  competitive  landscape  of  information-led  global  markets.  As  this 
transitional  phase  unfolded,  throwing  up  new  forms  of  social  dislocation,  the  task  of 
maintaining  political  consent  became  more  complex.  Thus,  alongside  an  economic 
challenge,  the  Vision  project  came  to  invoke  the  need  for  new  civil  and  cross-ethnic 
accommodations. 
Despite  the  proclaimed  ideals  of  consensus  within  the  BN,  the  Mahathir  style  is 
not  easily-given  to  political  consultation.  In  assuming  office  in  July  1981,  it  was  clear 
that  Mahathir's  approach  would  not  only  be  proactive  and  reformist,  but  highly 
individualised.  Mahathir  can  be  seen  as  a  political  motivator  of  the  Thatcher  type,  his 
self-initiated  assault  on  civil,  administrative  and  elite  institutions  reflecting,  in  many  ways, 
the  `rational  populism'  of  the  Thatcherite  project.  Indeed,  an  underlying  social  class 
parallel  might  be  suggested  here.  Both  figures  emerged  from  non-elite,  middle-class 
environments,  unsocialised  by,  and  not  easily  disposed  to,  traditional  establishment 
codes,  class  closure  and  protocols.  While  Thatcher,  the  grocer's  daughter,  sought  to 
wrest  power  from  the  Tory  grandees  and  popularise  `enterprise  culture',  4  Mahathir,  the 
first  Malaysian  leader  not  educated  abroad,  brought  with  him  his  own  middle-class 
experience  and  reserved  view  of  privileged  institutions.  Mahathir  also  epitomises  the 
proclaimed  Thatcherite  `qualities'  of  diligence,  hard-work  and  self-improvement;  the 
ethos  of  the  self-made  man  inherited  from  his  father,  himself  a  model  figure  of  the 
colonial  petite  bourgeois  Malay  schoolmaster.  5  Here,  one  can  observe  in  Mahathir's 
relationship  to  traditional  elites  a  hybrid  tone  of  qualified  respect  and  latent  ressentiment. 
Much  of  this  stemmed  from  an  admixture  of  disdain  for  the  colonial  administration  and 
position  of  the  Malay  sultans,  a  privileged  detachment  which,  in  the  struggle  for 
independence,  Mahathir  saw  as  a  betrayal  of  the  Malay  cause.  Thus,  in  assuming  power 
`from  below',  such  `class  prejudice'  has  never  been  far  from  the  surface  in  Mahathir's 
challenge  to  elite  institutions.  Yet,  it  also  helped  set  a  rationale  for  the  `modernist 
project'  in  Mahathir's  mind  through  its  invocation  of  hard-work  and  diligent  enterprise, 
qualities  perceived  as  an  antidote  to  Malay  `fatalism'  and  a  stimulant  to  the  new 
economic  growth. 
Mahathir  was  to  serve  notice  of  this  approach  in  his  early  political  initiatives. 
The  formative  stages  of  his  premiership  thus  witnessed  a  systematic  rationalisation  of  the 
civil  service,  the  streamlining  of  public  sector  jobs  and  the  appointment  of  a  select 
136 nomenclature,  reflecting  the  interdependent  sense  in  which  `modernisation'  and  the 
displacement  of  existing  power  bases  was  to  be  achieved. 
Symbolising  this  process  was  Mahathir's  attempt  to  check  the  prerogative 
powers  of  the  Malay  royalty,  leading  to  the  first  of  a  series  of  constitutional 
confrontations  in  1983.  In  seeking  to  pass  the  Constitution  (Amendment)  Bill,  Mahathir 
wanted  to  dispense  entirely  with  the  Yang  di-Pertuan  Agong's  powers  of  royal  assent. 
Although  no  Agong  had,  in  practice,  ever  refused  assent,  the  proposed  amendment  (to 
Article  66)  meant  that  removal  of  this  power  could,  in  theory,  lead  to  the  abolition  of  the 
monarchy  by  a  Parliamentary  Act  after  fifteen  days,  a  prospect  sufficiently  alarming  for 
the  Royals  to  refuse  assent  to  the  Amendment  itself.  While  the  Agong's  supporters 
invoked  deference  and  tradition,  Mahathir,  using  the  BN  media,  depicted  the  clash  as  a 
modernist  challenge  to  feudal  privilege.  6  The  subsequent  compromise  gave  Mahathir  the 
right  to  check  royal  assent,  with  the  Agong  retaining  nominal  emergency  powers.  In  a 
further  challenge,  following  the  Sultan  of  Johor's  attack  on  a  hockey  team  coach  in 
1992,  Mahathir  alleged  that  the  legality  of  the  Rulers'  immunity  from  prosecution.  was  a 
colonial  legacy,  a"  `feudal  principle'  inconsistent  with  modern  development..  "'  Assisted, 
again,  by  detailed  press  coverage  of  their  ostentatious  lifestyle,  '  Mahathir  was  seeking 
to  gamer  support  for  populist  reform  by  invoking  liberal  themes  of  modern  civic 
nationalism  and  the  sovereign  will  of  the  Dewan  Rakyat  (people's  parliament). 
In  reality,  the  1983  skirmish  signified  an  emerging  strategy  to  transfer  more 
power  to  the  centre.  Another  important,  if  less  obvious,  feature  of  the  royal  conflict  was 
the  attempt  to  acquire  symbolic  custodianship  over  national  Islamic  interests, 
traditionally  the  remit  of  the  Sultans  through  the  National  Council  for  Islamic  Affairs.  " 
In  turn,  the  government  proceeded  to  usher-through  federal  legislation  giving  it  "the 
absolute  right  to  interpret  Islamic  precepts,  tenets  and  shariah  law.  s10  Backed  by  the 
Amendments  to  the  Societies  Act  (1981),  this  allowed  it  overall  power  to  proscribe 
`seditious'  organisations  seeking  to  challenge  the  government,  Bumiputera  rights  or 
Islamic  doctrine  -  legislation  used  to  ban  Al  Argam  in  August  1994.11 
But  while  these  decrees  indicated  UMNO's  coercive  side,  Mahathir  was  also 
intent  on  fostering  consent  through  reform  of  social  ideas.  An  important  consideration 
here  was  the  global  Islamic  resurgence  which  had  taken  root  in  Malaysia  from  the  early- 
1980s.  Attempting  to  harness  that  shift  to  the  project  throughout  the  1980s,  Mahathir 
137 had  established  the  Malaysian  Institute  for  Islamic  Understanding  by  1992.  Promoting 
reappraisal  of  Islamic  doctrine,  Mahathir  was  seeking  a  balance  "between  spiritual 
attainment  and  material  development.  "  12  More  specifically,  such  forums  were  now 
serving  as  an  intellectual  counterpoint  to  PAS  in  an  attempt  to  keep  Malays  within 
UMNO's  political  constituency. 
Likewise,  Mahathir  was  aware  of  the  need  to  maintain  UMNO's  support  base  in 
the  rural  environs.  But  this  was  not,  and  never  has  been,  for  Mahathir  a  surface  gesture. 
A  deep-rooted  part  of  his  own  political  socialisation  lies  in  the  rural  experience. 
Mahathir's  own  birthplace  and  parliamentary  constituency  lies  in  rural  Alor  Setar,  Kedah. 
In  his  early  writings  (under  the  pseudonym  C.  H.  E.  Det),  Mahathir  had  vented  powerful 
criticism  of  the  colonial  padi  kunca  (rice  land  system)  and  its  exploitative  effects  upon 
the  Malay  peasantry,  a  view  (carried-over  into  his  polemics  on  behalf  of  the  South) 
which  helps  explain  Mahathir's  own  long-standing  Malay-centred  rural  populism.  13 
In  this  regard,  much  of  UMNO's  populist  base  has  been  built  at  the  local  level. 
Significant  here  has  been  the  practical  role  played  by  Village  Security  and  Development 
Committees,  Jawatankuasa  Kemajuan  dan  Keselamatan  Kampung  (JKKK),  in  filtering 
ideas  and  values.  14  A  vital,  if  low-key,  part  of  the  UMNO  network,  JKKKs  provide  an 
integrated  system  of  localised  political  and  social  control  across  each  Malaysian  state. 
Appointed,  rather  than  elected,  (as  are  local  district  councillors)  in  a  top-down  process 
via  the  Chief  Minister/Menteri  Besar  (CM/MB)  and  State  Exco  Council,  local  Barisan 
members  control  JKKK  activities  (no  opposition  parties  are  invited  to  participate), 
helping  to  collect  village  data,  co-ordinate  local  development  projects,  advise  on  the 
allocation  of  local  contracts  and  maintain  local  security  by  acting  as  intermediary  and 
informer  to  the  municipal  state  authority.  Thus,  within  each  mukim  (district/ward  - 
comprising  lots,  or  streets)  JKKKs  cultivate  local  co-operation  through,  for  example,  the 
initiation  of  new  kampong  road  works  and  local  employment  projects.  Increasingly, 
JKKK  activities  have  been  absorbed  into  Vision  development  strategies  directed  by  the 
Rural  Development  Ministry.  "  In  1997,  plans  were  announced  to  send  village 
committee  members  on  specially  designed  training  courses  to  help  boost  growth.  '6  At 
the  same  time,  they  play  an  `on-the-ground'  role  in  identifying  recalcitrant  elements  and 
`providing  feedback',  thus  acting,  in  (Penang  CM)  Dr.  Koh's  words,  as  the 
"Government's  eyes  and  ears"  at  the  state  level.  17  In  seeking  to  extend  the  scope  and 
138 representation  of  JKKKs,  Dr.  Koh  has  also  urged  them  to  adopt  a  more  socio-cultural 
role,  while  Sanusi  Junid  in  Kedah  has  called  for  the  involvement  of  more  women.  '8  In 
these  ways,  JKKKs  help  project  the  Barisan  as  the  main  provider  of  community  services 
and  source  of  social  stability.  19 
There  has,  nonetheless,  been  disquiet  in  the  rural  hinterlands  over  UMNO's  urban 
identity  and  centralised  network.  Guinness's  ethnographic  account  of  social 
development  in  the  kampongs  and  environs  of  Mukim  Plentong,  Johor,  for  example, 
demonstrates  some  of  the  latent  hostility  to-wards  local  UMNO 
. cadres  despite  their 
provision  of  social  welfare.  20  At  the  same  time,  clear  patterns  of  rural-urban  migration 
from  the  1980s,  typified  by  the  large-scale  movement  of  young  single  Malay  women  into 
low-wage  employment  in  the  new  Free  Trade  Zones  (FTZs)  and  industrial  plants,  has 
continued  to  erode  the  fabric  of  kampong  life  and  its  multi-layered  system  of  village  co- 
operation  (gotong  royong).  These  new  social  problems  for  rural  migrants  in  the  major 
industrial  centres  have  caused  a  mood  of  displacement  which  one  long-term  demographic 
study  describes  as  a  state  of  "anomie.  7721 
Rapid  economic  development  in  the  1980s  had  also  given  rise  to  a  more 
fragmented  set  of  urban  middle-class  identities  as  individualism  and  consumer 
sovereignty  competed  with  the  values  of  NEP  collectivism.  An  expanding  middle-class 
had  experienced  both  the  fruits  of  upward  mobility  and  the  insecurities  of  the  mid-1980s 
recession,  with  competition  for  privatised  wealth  intensifying  social-class  identity.  It  is 
perhaps  instructive  that,  to  date,  market  researchers  appear  to  have  taken  a  keener 
interest  than  academics  in  the  emerging  patterns  of  middle-class  identity  in  Malaysia.  22 
But  what  both  perspectives  reveal  is  the  exponential  growth  of  the  `new  middle-classes' 
from  the  1980s,  increasingly  segmented  by  socio-economic  position,  lifestyle  and 
consumption  patterns.  It  is here,  in  the  new  urban  landscape  of  glossy  KL  and  Penang 
shopping  malls  and  other  designer-modish  outlets  that  `new  middle-classness',  based  on 
consumerism  rather  than  ethnicity,  has  been  forged.  Yet,  it  is  also  amongst  a 
professionalised  Malay  salariat  and  middle-class  that  the  renewal  of  Islamic 
consciousness  became  most  prominent  by  the  mid-1980s,  serving  to  re-politicise  Islam  as 
an  increasingly  potent  symbol  of  ethnic  identification.  By  the  mid-1980s,  this  `ethnic- 
class  paradox'  and  more  fluid  set  of  middle-class  identities  was  presenting  new  sectoral 
139 divisions  and  challenges  for  the  project.  Heightened  by  the  mid-1980s  recession, 
privatisation  and  public  sector  reform,  lingering  tensions  within  UMNO  now  came  to  the 
Internal  conflict  and  the  UMNO  split 
The  turmoil  and  eventual  split  within  UMNO  by  1988  represented  not  just  an  internecine 
power  struggle,  but  a  hegemonic  crisis.  It  signified  the  political  showdown  of  contending 
class  forces  and  sectoral  interests  thrown  up  by  the  1980s  deregulatory  agenda, 
revealing,  in  its  aftermath,  a  fundamental  shift  in  the  political  basis  of  the  bloc. 
In  broad  terms,  the  source  of  the  disaffection  stemmed  from  `traditional'  or 
`conservative'  forces  within  UMNO.  Its  most  decisive  feature  involved  the  failed 
challenge  at  the  April  1987  UMNO  Election  by  former  Finance  Minister  Tengku 
Razaleigh  Hamzah  for  the  post  of  UMNO  President,  and  Musa  Hitam  for  the  post  of 
Deputy;  positions  providing  effective  accession  to  the  Prime  Ministership  and  Deputy 
Prime  Ministership.  Although  Mahathir's  and  Razaleigh's  support  bases  within  the  party 
(respectively,  if  not  very  imaginatively,  dubbed  `Team  A'  and  `Team  B')  represented 
certain  factional  and  personality-based  cleavages,  the  more  substantial  source  of  the 
conflict  can  be  traced  to  the  broadly  different  set  of  policy  perspectives  held  by  each 
grouping  in  relation  to  economic  development. 
Invoking  UMNO's  `founding  values',  the  Razaleigh  team  had  campaigned  on  an 
anti-corruption  platform  within  the  context  of  UMNO  and  NEP  patronage.  However, 
the  source  of  its  grievance  lay  in  its  main  support  base  comprising  small-medium  business 
fractions  and  civil  servants  unhappy  at  Mahathir's  deregulatory  ideas.  It  is  worth  noting 
here  how  these  elements  had  come  to  constitute  the  decisive  proportion  of  UMNO 
delegates  -  notably  at  the  expense  of  teachers,  UMNO's  older  base.  Thus,  Team-B's 
campaign  lay  in  its  disquiet  over  the  re-distribution  of  privatisation  resources,  which, 
alongside  the  effects  of  the  1985-87  recession,  had  resulted  in  the  more  controlled  flow 
of  patronage  and  rewards  to  new  elites.  24  Thus,  the  economic  downturn  can  be  seen  as 
the  catalyst  for  a  split  waiting  to  happen: 
When  Malaysia's  economic  growth  began  to  falter  in  the  early  to  mid-1980s,  mainstream  Malay 
political  and  business  opinion  on  the  NEP's  impact  on  the  economy  and  its  impending  end  in  1990 
started  to  split  between  pro-'growth'  and  pro-'distribution'  positions...  [The  former]  shared  a  wider 
140 concern,  traditionally  held  by  non-Malay  and  foreign  capital,  that  excessive  state  regulation  had  led  or 
would  lead  to  a  contraction  in  investment  in  the  Malaysian  economy.  [The  latter]  were  committed  to  the 
retention  of  the  NEP's  restructuring  objective.  25 
Thus,  while  the  Razaleigh  camp's  approach  involved  a  more  assertive  defence  of  the 
NEP  state,  26  this  perspective  conflicted  with  Mahathir's  ambitions  to  shift  the  weight  of 
political  control  away  from  the  state  bureaucracy. 
Tensions  over  these  policy  perspectives  had  been  evident  since  1980  when,  as 
Deputy  Prime  Minister,  Mahathir  had  expressed  `disdain'  for  the  Industrial  Co- 
ordination  Act  and  the  Petroleum  Development  Act,  the  latter  having  been  initiated  by 
Razaleigh  in  1974.27  Under,  the  NEP,  a  whole  plethora  of  bureaucratic  interests  had 
become  entrenched  within  state  agencies  such  as  the  Treasury  Department,  the 
Economic  and  Planning  Unit  (EPU),  the  Ministry  of  Public  Enterprises  and  the  Bank 
Negara.  28  Mahathir's  moves  to  streamline  and  control  them  -  including  the  integration 
of  the  EPU  into  an  expanded  Prime  Minister's  Department29  -  now  brought  defenders 
of  those  interests,  like  Razaleigh,  into  direct  confrontation.  In  turn,  Mahathir's 
deregulatory  agenda,  a  reflection  of  new  state-class  priorities,  now  had  to  be  legitimised 
in  political  terms.  Thus,  policy  sensitivities  which  had  taken  the  form  of  discreet 
factional  positioning  within  UMNO  now  took  the  form  of  open  political  conflict. 
In  defeating  Razaleigh's  bid,  albeit  with  a  marginal  51%  of  delegate  votes, 
Mahathir  had  used  the  UMNO  contest  as  a  hegemonic  opportunity  to  re-model  the 
political  basis  of  the  party  and  the  power  bloc.  Again,  the  modernity  argument  had  been 
invoked  to  portray  Team  B  as  a  repository  of  anachronistic  values.  However,  Razaleigh, 
and  his  Team-B  Ministers  had  proceeded  to  challenge  the  legality  of  the  UMNO  Election 
in  the  courts,  a  lawsuit  being  filed  by  the  `UMNO-11'  in  June  1987  seeking  to  nullify  the 
Election.  In  an  atmosphere  of  growing  public  unease,  Mahathir  needed  to  pre-empt  any 
further  haemorrhaging  of  support  within  UMNO  and  loss  of  public  confidence  in  the  BN. 
The  party  crisis  had  also  coincided  with  a  series  of  brooding  communal  tensions  between 
Malay  and  Chinese  institutions  over  the  introduction  of  Malay-Islamic  educational 
reforms,  prompting  protests  from  Chinese  guild  associations,  the  MCA,  Gerakan  and  the 
DAP.  30  Thus,  on  27th  October  1987,  using  the  spectre  of  past  social  and  ethnic  unrest 
as  an  authoritarian  populist  rationale,  31  Mahathir  deployed  the  ISA  to  arrest  over  one 
hundred  opposition  figures  under  Operation  Lalang,  the  detention  of  academics  and 
141 intellectuals  such  as  (then)  Aliran  President  Chandra  Muzaffar,  K.  S.  Jomo,  Kua  Kia 
Soong  and  Dr.  Mohd  Nasir  Hashim  being  defended  as  a  necessary  measure  to  prevent 
sedition  and  civil  disorder.  32  Despite  warnings  from  Tunku  Abdul  Rahman,  Malaysia's 
elder  statesman,  that  the  country  was  becoming  a  `police  state'  Mahathir  used  the  media 
to  defend  the  suspension  of  civil  liberties  and  denounce  political  dissent  as  an  incentive  to 
social  chaos.  33 
The  High  Court's  ruling  in  February  1988  on  the  UMNO-11  suit  was  that  illegal 
UMNO  branches  had  been  evident  and  that  while  the  election  itself  could  not  be  nullified, 
UMNO  should  be  deregistered  as  a  party  under  the  Societies  Act.  34  With  the  schism 
formalised  and  UMNO  technically  `illegal',  the  Registrar  had,  thereafter,  allowed 
Mahathir  to  reclaim  the  party  title  as  UMNO  Baru  (new),  with  Razaleigh  proceeding  to 
found  Semangat  `46  (S46).  As  statements  of  Malay  identity,  both  assignations  were 
instructive.  Semangat  146  (the  Spirit  of  `46),  referring  to  the  year  of  UMNO's  founding, 
invoked  a  `back  to  basics'  traditionalism;  an  attempt  to  re-politicise  Malay  political 
culture  through  an  appeal  to  older  values.  The  concept  of  semangat  itself,  roughly 
meaning  `soul'  or  `vital  substance',  derives  from  the  Malays'  diverse  religious  and 
cultural  inheritance,  ranging  from  ancient  forms  of  animism  (still  prevalent  among  the 
Orang  Asli  aboriginals)  to  Islam  brought  by  Arab  traders.  The  Malay  understands 
semangat  as  a  universal  force  within  man  and  all  other  forms  of  nature.  35  Again,  one 
needs  to  recognise  the  significance  of  Malay  adat  in  shaping  political  consciousness. 
UMNO  Baru,  on  the  other  hand,  was  hailed  as  a  newly  `purified'  political  force  with  a 
revitalised  modern  vision.  36 
However,  the  legal  impasse  now  offered  an  expedient  moment  to  confront  the 
judiciary  itself.  This  followed-on  from  a  series  of  conflicts  between  the  courts  and  the 
executive,  including  the  High  Court's  decision  in  September  1987  to  allow  Aliran  the 
right  to  publish  a  monthly  magazine  in  the  Malay  language  -  overturning  an  earlier 
application  rejected  by  the  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs.  37  Fearing  judicial  arbitration  on 
the  allocation  of  privatised  contracts,  the  move  to  curb  the  judiciary's  powers  also  came 
in  response  to  Lim  Kit  Siang's  lawsuit  over  the  legality  of  the  UEM  North-South 
Highway  contract.  Following  protracted  legal  manoeuvres,  the  Supreme  Court  President 
Tun  Salleh  Abbas  was  suspended  in  May  1988  (technically,  on  the  instructions  of  the 
142 Yang  di-Pertuan  Agong)  with  effect  from  August  8th  1988.  The  following  day,  the 
Supreme  Court  heard  an  appeal  by  the  UMNO-11  and  dismissed  their  case.  38 
In  the  ensuing  1990  General  Election,  coinciding  with  an  economic  upturn, 
Semangat's  poor  performance  within  Malaysia's  first  ever  multi-racial  electoral  pact,  the 
Gagasan  Rakyat  Malaysia  (Malaysian  People's  Front)  showed  that,  while  the  Barisan 
had  lost  ground  (losing  Sabah  and  Kelantan),  UMNO's  political  hegemony  was  still 
intact.  This  was  evidenced  by  the  steady  stream  of  party  personnel  returning  to  the 
UMNO  fold,  isolated  by  the  lack  of  political  patronage  denied  to  political  bodies  outside 
the  Barisan.  39  By  late-  1996,  following  Semangat's  deteriorating  political  alliance  with 
PAS  in  Kelantan,  Razaleigh  himself  returned  to  UMNO.  4o 
By  the  early-1990s,  the  dynamics  of  the  split  had  created  a  more  centralised 
political  bloc.  While  articulating  various  concerns,  the  Razaleigh-Musa  camp  had 
comprised  a  `protectionist'  element,  while  Mahathir  had  sought  a  concerted  shift  in  state 
priorities.  But  the  1987  clampdown  had  also  revealed  the  limitations  of  ISA  repression 
as  a  political  strategy.  41  Thus,  Mahathir  required  a  return  to  consensus-building  to  help 
consolidate  the  BN's  electoral  base. 
Consolidating  the  bloc  after  1990 
This  section  considers  the  attempted  consolidation  of  the  political  bloc  from  the  period 
of  the  split,  culminating  in  the  political  fallout  of  the  1997  crisis.  Four  aspects  are 
addressed  here.  Firstly,  the  nature  of  the  political  coalition  vis-ä-vis  Chinese  politics  and 
the  other  BN  parties.  Secondly,  the  realpolitik  of  the  `Anwar  succession'.  Thirdly,  the 
continuing  issue  of  political  corruption  within  UMNO.  And,  fourthly,  Mahathir's  role  on 
the  international  political  stage. 
This  takes  us  towards  a  closer  analysis  of  how  these  elements  fed  into  the  crisis 
and  Mahathir's  emergency  attempts  to  re-establish  hegemonic  consent. 
Holding  the  coalition:  Chinese  politics  and  the  wider  party  alliance 
A  full  analysis  of  the  Barisan  parties  and  their  roles  within  the  coalition  is  beyond  the 
remit  of  this  work.  42  Let  us  consider,  however,  some  of  the  principal  factors  which  have 
143 continued  to  hold  the  coalition  together  and  how  Mahathir  has  sought  to  fashion  a  new 
political  base  through  the  Vision  project. 
Mahathir's  charismatic  appeal,  political  judgement  and  astute  handling  of  the 
reward  structure  has  been  fused  with  the  invocation  to  work  together  for  growth,  helping 
to  keep  the  MCA,  MIC  and  other  junior  Barisan  partners  contained  within  the  political 
bloc.  For  the  Chinese  in  particular,  the  quid  pro  quo  for  MCA  and  Gerakan  (an  offshoot 
of  the  MCA  from  the  early-1960s)  co-operation  has  been  the  consistent  promise  of 
material  rewards.  Indeed,  there  is  an  unstated  understanding  here  that  this  compliant 
role  will  enhance  the  prospects  for  growth  and  accumulation  for  Chinese  business. 
Thus,  the  extent  of  the  MCA's  own  political  voice  has  revolved  around  a  rational 
calculus  of  what  level  of  business  rewards  and  broader  social  goods  can  be  secured  from 
working  within  the  Barisan  system.  As  MCA  President  Ling  Liong  Sik  asserts,  the 
Chinese  community: 
...  want  a  society  where  the  rules  are  conducive  to  doing  business,  where  they  can  educate  their  children. 
And  they  have  it  here.  This  is  a  land  of  tremendous  opportunity.  43 
From  this  perspective,  one  can  see  the  connection  between  Ling's  avid  enthusiasm  for 
the  Vision  project  on  the  one  hand  and  the  compliant  nature  of  MCA  politics  on  the 
other.  44  At  the  same  time,  the  party  acts  as  a  controlling  mechanism  within  the  coalition, 
helping  to  filter  government  objectives  down  to  the  broader  Chinese  community. 
As  noted,  this  compliance  has  its  roots  in  the  politics  of  decolonisation,  the 
Emergency  and  Alliance  consociationalism.  Having  supported  British  attempts  to 
contain  the  MCP's  base  of  Chinese  workers,  left-wing  Malay  nationalists  and  other  rural 
elements,  45  conservative  Chinese  elites  had  formed  the  MCA  as  a  bulwark  to  class-based 
ethnic  demands  from  below.  In  the  immediate  post-Merdeka  period,  this  allowed  the 
MCA  a  relatively  strategic  position  within  the  Alliance.  Yet  despite  a  more  assertive  and 
intellectual  profile  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,  under  leaders  like  Tan  Siew  Sin,  party 
objectives  have  become  rather  parochial.  Translated  into  the  current  politics  of  Bangsa 
Malaysia,  the  MCA's  role  within  the  political  bloc  is  one  of  pragmatic  co-operation,  a 
trade-off  for  economic  rewards  which  has  diminished  its  status  for  many  Chinese  who 
see  it  as  a  passive  appendage  to  UMNO.  In  response,  the  party  has  made  some  efforts  to 
reassert  its  credibility  -  for  example,  through  its  promotion  of  the  Thought  Reform 
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However,  this  agenda,  coinciding  with  perceived  attempts  to  water-down  basic  Chinese 
nostrums  on  democracy,  culture  and  education  has  been  strongly-resisted  by  Dong  Jiao 
Zong  (DJZ),  the  esteemed  Chinese  educationalist  movement,  and  its  radical  director  Kua 
Kia  Soong.  46  Ling  has  also  sought  to  rebuild  the  party  by  promoting  its  women's  wing, 
Wanita  MCA.  47  Yet,  reflecting  the  difference  between  the  latter  and  its  Malay 
counterpart,  Wanita  UMNO,  the  MCA's  political  credentials  remain  all  but  subsidiary  to 
UMNO. 
Similarly,  Gerakan's  influence  has  been  mainly  confined  to  the  domestic  issues  of 
Penang  politics.  In  defeating  the  Penang  Alliance  at  the  1969  General  Election,  under 
the  charismatic  leadership  of  Lim  Chong  Eu  (Penang  Chief  Minister  1969-90),  the  party 
could  claim  a  significant  multi-ethnic  and  social  democratic  support  base.  But  by  the 
mid-1980s,  these  had  been  sacrificed  for  a  passive  role  within  the  BN.  48  As  Loh  Kok 
Wah  concludes,  Chinese  political  discourse  has  become,  in  essence,  "the  politics  of 
developmentalism...  [a  means  of]  ensuring  that  the  Chinese  get  a  fair  share  of  the  cake.  "49 
Conversely,  issues  such  as  corruption  and  repressive  acts  and  have  become  taboo 
subjects  for  political  discussion  among  the  Chinese  BN.  so 
Perhaps  more  worrying  for  the  MCA  and  Gerakan  is  the  apparent  long-term 
diffusion  of  its  support  base.  Neither  party  has  ever  been  able  to  nullify  the  appeal  of  the 
DAP  opposition  within  the  Chinese  community.  And  while  recording  their  best-ever 
results  in  the  1995  General  Election,  much  of  this  can  be  seen  as  an  endorsement  of 
Mahathirism  rather  than  specific  support  for  the  MCA  and  Gerakan.  Indeed,  the  BN's 
best  election  result  since  1974  is  a  reflection  of  the  increased  Chinese  support  for  the 
coalition  and  UMNO's  record  of  economic  liberalisation,  growth  and  financial 
prosperity.  "  In  addition,  Mahathir  has  sought  to  build  Chinese  consent  by  taking  a  more 
conciliatory  view  of  Chinese  education,  culture  and  Confucian-Islamic  dialogue.  52 
Internal  to  the  Barisan's  support  base  has  been  the  `political  voice'  of  Chinese 
business  agencies,  most  notably  the  Malaysian  Chinese  Chamber  of  Commerce  (MCCC). 
Although  the  principal  representative  of  small-medium  Chinese  business,  this  body  can  be 
seen  as  an  important  part  of  the  UMNO  network  through  its  close  connections  with  the 
MCA  and  in  its  efforts  to  maintain  stable  relations  with  local  political  elites.  A  good 
example  of  this  is  the  role  played  by  the  Penang  Chinese  Chamber  of  Commerce 
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business  community.  13  While  a  professed  independent  organisation,  it  acts  as  a  key 
intermediary  between  the  Penang  business  sector  and  the  Penang  State  Assembly.  The 
PCCC  has  also  worked  closely  with  Gerakan,  the  state's  governing  party,  and  its  Chief 
Minister  Dr  Koh  Tsu  Koon.  54  Likewise,  with  other  regional  branches,  it  engages  in 
more  in-depth  `consultation  exercises'  with  government  through  national  AGMs.  As 
intimated  in  the  PCCC's  own  profile  statement,  this  links  it  into  the  broader  business- 
political  network: 
The  Chamber  has  great  rapport  with  the  Government  at  regional  as  well  as  national  level  through  its 
direct  affiliation  to  the  Associated  Chinese  Chambers  of  Commerce  and  Industry  of  Malaysia  and 
indirect  connection  with  the  National  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry  of  Malaysia.  ss 
While  such  dialogue  is  not  in  itself  unusual,  it  does  signify  the  means  by  which  the 
Chinese  business  class  are  absorbed  into  the  political  network.  Another  key  factor  in  the 
PCCC's  support  for  Mahathir  had  been  the  business  benefits  derived  for  the  Penang 
business  class  through  Anwar's  political  association  with  the  state.  The  careful  attention 
paid  by  Anwar  to  developing  such  relations  could  be  seen  in  the  MCCC's  key  pre- 
election  endorsement  of  Mahathir  and  the  Vision  agenda  in  1995.56 
This  suggested  an  important  shift  in  UMNO's  electoral  base  by  the  mid-1990s. 
While  still  concerned  with  reversing  PAS  influence  over  the  rural  Malays,  UMNO 
seemed  prepared  to  risk  concessions  to  the  non-Malays  and  the  forfeiture  of  some  Malay 
support  in  order  to  build  a  broader  multi-racial  support  base  -a  strategy,  perhaps, 
consistent  with  the  demographic  realities  of  an  increasingly  urbanised,  consumer-driven 
electorate.  The  poor  response  to  the  DAP's  main  1995  electoral  theme  of  greater 
democratisation  also  helped  reinforce  the  suspicion  that  the  Chinese  electorate  attach 
relatively  greater  importance  to  economic  rather  than  political  rights.  57  This  does  not 
imply  any  simple  disregard  for  the  latter.  Rather,  the  distinction  is  more  nuanced,  with 
Chinese  `political  consciousness'  inclined  towards  a  more  rational  assessment  of  how 
political  rights  help  safeguard  economic  opportunities.  This  was  also  evident  in  Kelantan 
where,  despite  its  Islamic  agenda,  PAS  has  consciously  sought  to  protect  the  political 
and  economic  rights  of  the  Chinese  community.  But,  in  the  absence  of  any  more 
mainstream  political  alternative,  small-medium  Chinese  business  has  remained  tied  to  the 
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UMNO  itself.  The  Chinese  BN  has,  thus,  played  a  key  role  in  locking  these  elements 
into  the  prevailing  structure.  By  late-1998,  Chinese  business  unease  over  Mahathir's 
handling  of  the  crisis  had  made  that  support  base  more  precarious,  though  still  tempered 
by  rational  considerations. 
Very  similar  parallels  can  be  drawn  in  relation  to  the  MIC  under  the  leadership  of 
Samy  Vellu.  38  Indeed,  the  MIC's  compliant  role  "within  the  BN  structure  is  in  many 
ways  even  more  pronounced  than  that  of  the  Chinese  BN  parties.  Much  of  this, 
however,  can  be  traced  to  the  historical  vulnerability  and  marginalisation  of  the  Indian 
working  class,  particularly  its  rural  component,  and  its  need  to  find  a  secure  channel  of 
political  expression  within  the  system.  59  Again,  though,  the  relative  increase  of  middle- 
class  rewards  and  patronage,  dispensed  through  the  MIC,  has  served  to  neutralise 
potential  dissent  within  the  Indian  community. 
In  the  East  Malaysian  states  of  Sabah  and  Sarawak,  a  more  complex  set  of 
political  relationships  prevail.  In  Sarawak,  the  main  BN  Part  Besaka  Bumiputera 
Bersatu,  (United  Bumiputera  Party)  presiding  over  a  diverse  amalgam  of  ethnic  groups 
(Chinese,  Malays,  Melanaus  and  Dayaks  -  including  Christian  Iban,  Orang  Ulu  and 
Bidayuh  peoples),  pursues  a  more  autonomous  and  distinct  agenda  suited  to  its 
particular  configuration  of  ethnic  politics.  UMNO,  thus,  adopts  a  more  restrained  form 
of  influence  here.  Yet,  despite  Sarawak's  lower  level  of  economic  development  relative 
to  Peninsular  Malaysia,  the  managed  distribution  of  wealth  across  the  ethnic  strata,  and 
acceptance  of  Mahathir's  modernising  endeavours  at  the  national  level,  has  helped  the 
Barisan  maintain  control  in  the  state.  60 
In  Sabah,  relations  between  UMNO  and  the  Part  Bersatu  Sabah  (PBS,  United 
Sabah  Party)  have  been  more  strained.  Though  based  principally  around  the  indigene 
Kadazans,  the  PBS,  as  a  nominally  multi-communal  party,  also  draw  significant  support 
from  the  Chinese.  In  1990,  the  PBS  left  the  BN  (which  it  had  joined  in  1986)  to  contest 
the  1990  General  Election  alongside  the  Razaleigh  opposition  grouping.  However,  by 
1994,  following  the  co-optation  of  key  PBS  figures,  Mahathir  had  re-established  control 
within  Sabah  through  an  UMNO-led  state  coalition  government.  61  Nonetheless,  despite 
The  BN's  victory  in  Sabah  in  1995,  strong  anti-federal  sentiment  remains,  notably  over 
central  government  control  of  development  funds.  62  By  managing  the  flow  of  state 
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impose  what  Sabahans  term  `political  recessions'  in  order  to  delegitimise  internal 
opposition,  thus  paving  the  .  way  for  federal  intervention  and  UMNO  control.  63 
Consistently  fearful  of  demands  for  independence,  UMNO  have  used  other  various  back- 
door  strategies  to  keep  the  political  class  in  Sabah  and  Sarawak  divided  and  tied-into  the 
coalition,  such  as  the  regular  secondment  of  their  state  officials  to  federal  posts  and  the 
award  of  scholarships  to  students  for  study  in  other  states.  64  During  the  1999  state 
elections  in  Sabah,  the  BN  poured  money  in  to  fund  major  road  projects  and  other 
infrastructural  inducements.  But  while  giving  tacit  support  to  Mahathir's  economic 
agenda,  perceptions  of  centralised  interference  and  political  bribery  remain  a  source  of 
ongoing  resentment. 
Beyond  these  state-federal  conflicts,  Mahathir's  political  acumen  was  also  still 
needed  to  maintain  control  within  UMNO  and  temper  aspiring  factions  within  the  party 
hierarchy. 
Consolidation  and  the  succession  issue 
The  stability  of  the  power  bloc  by  the  mid-1990s  had  come  to  depend  very  largely  upon 
the  positioning  of  senior  figures  within  the  party,  most  notably  that  of  Anwar  Ibrahim. 
As  Mahathir's  `heir  apparent,  '  Anwar  had  made  a  long  journey  from  radical  Muslim 
activist  and  ABIM  leader  to  a  position  of  political  accommodation  within  UMNO.  In 
many  regards,  the  conservatism  and  prestige  of  high  office  seem  starkly  at  odds  with 
Anwar's  previous  activism  and  ideas  on  civil  reform.  In  Two  Faces,  a  personal  account 
of  the  PRM  leader  Syed  Husin  Ali's  detention  under  the  ISA  (1974-1980),  we  get  an 
insightful  view  of  the  young  radical  Anwar,  jailed  alongside  Syed  at  Kamunting  during 
Tun  Abdul  Razak's  clampdown  on  social  activists,  academics  and  other  `communist 
agents.  i6S  Here,  as  close  friends  and  inmates,  Syed  talks  admiringly  of  Anwar  the 
Muslim  and  social  idealist  with  a  vision  of  society  far  removed  from  the  oppression  of 
the  Barisan  state.  Yet,  by  1981,  Anwar  had  become  absorbed  into  that  very  system. 
In  an  illuminating  article,  Zafar  Bangash  tells  how  this  "marriage  of  convenience" 
was  set-up  by  Anwar's  former  teacher  and  mentor,  the  late  Ismail  Farugi.  66  Acting  as 
intermediary,  Faruqi  had  managed  to  persuade  Anwar  that  Mahathir  was  `well-disposed 
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goal'.  However,  Mahathir  had  insisted  on  three  main  preconditions  for  Anwar's  entry 
into  UMNO:  that  ABIM  revoke  all  associations  with  PAS,  including  standing  on  PAS 
tickets  at  elections;  that  it  discard  its  view  of  the  NEP  as  un-Islamic  and  support  the 
promotion  of  Bumiputera  rights;  and  that  it  should  not  condemn  the  Malay  Educational 
Policy.  In  presenting  these  terms  of  entry,  Faruqi  argued  that  the  Islamic  movement  in 
Malaysia  (and  elsewhere)  had  to  participate  in  the  prevailing  power  structure  in  order  to 
effect  `change  from  within,  '  a  view  subsequently  endorsed  by  Anwar,  paving  the  way  for 
his  and  ABIM's  co-optation.  Again,  both  Faruqi's  and  Anwar's  compliance  here  can  be 
viewed  as  the  practical  application  of  insiderism  and  intellectual  assimilation  by  the 
UMNO  network. 
Having,  effectively,  purged  serious  dissent  within  UMNO  by  the  late-1980s, 
Mahathir  appeared  to  be  laying  the  groundwork  for  a  smooth,  if  very  gradual, 
succession.  Despite  other  `contenders',  Anwar  remained  the  clear  favourite.  The 
question  was  not  if,  but  when.  Yet,  while  supporting  Anwar's  eventual  succession, 
Mahathir  had  refused  to  give  a  timetable  for  it,  claiming  that  to  do  so  would  make  him  a 
"lame  duck"  leader.  67  Despite  gathering  speculation  that  he  would  use  the  1999  UMNO 
presidential  election  as  an  uncontested  event  and  valedictory  for  `the  handover', 
Mahathir,  buoyed  by  an  unprecedented  level  of  popular  support,  had  remained 
circumspect  about  relinquishing  power.  Meanwhile  elements  within  the  Anwar  camp  had 
begun  to  express  open  impatience  at  the  process  -  though  not  Anwar  himself  who, 
recognising  the  dangers  of  an  outright  challenge,  proceeded  to  develop  his  political 
profile  as  a  trusted  minister  and  a  `liberal  intellectual'  with  evolving  ideas  on  Islamic 
modernity  and  civil  reform. 
However,  this  studious  persona  could  not  disguise  the  emerging  tensions  between 
Mahathir  and  Anwar's  camp.  In  a  prelude  to  Mahathir's  1998  purge,  Anwar  had 
received  a  stark  reminder  of  the  Prime  Minister's  guile  and  resilience  at  the  October 
1996  (triennial)  UMNO  party  elections,  with  Mahathir  allies  winning  80%  of  Supreme 
Council  seats  over  Anwar's  associates.  68  In  a  series  of  deft  pre-election  manoeuvres, 
Mahathir  had  also  brought  restless  party  elements  in  Sabah  into  line,  overcome  resistance 
from  UMNO  assemblymen  in  Kedah  in  his  bid  to  replace  Menteri  Besar  Osman  Aroff 
with  Mahathir  loyalist  Sanusi  Janid,  and,  in  a  personal  coup  de  grace,  had  secured  a 
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1999.69  In  effect,  Mahathir  was  blocking  any  possibility  of  UMNO  divisional  delegates 
nominating  Anwar  for  President,  the  post  traditionally  associated  with  that  of  Prime 
Minister.  Nonetheless,  Anwar  had  still  managed  to  maintain  the  support  of  a  select 
cohort  of  rising  party  figures,  notably  UMNO  Youth  leader  Zahid  Hamidi  and 
`darkhorse',  Education  Minister  Najib  Razak.  70 
But  despite  careful  endeavours  not  to  provoke  disunity,  deep  sensitivities 
remained  between  Anwar  and  key  Mahathir  loyalists  like  UMNO  Treasurer  Daim 
Zainuddin,  Kedah  Menteri  Besar  Sanusi  Junid,  and  Foreign  Minister  Abdullah  Badawi. 
Again,  much  of  this  has  to  be  seen  in  the  context  of  privatisation  and  the  strategic 
placement  of  business  elites  by  political  figures.  With  lucrative  resources  becoming  more 
scarce,  the  conflict  for  control  of  the  remaining  prime  assets  had  intensified.  In 
particular,  there  had  been  continuous  acrimony  between  Anwar  and  Daim  at  the  scale  of 
privatised  benefits  handed-out  by  Daim  to  privileged  business  figures,  including  the 
Bakun  Dam  project  in  Sarawak  (Malaysia's  biggest-ever  privatisation)  to  Ting  Pek 
Khiing  and  the  contract  for  the  second  Malaysia-Singapore  causeway  to  close  business 
associate  Halim  Saad,  head  of  Renong.  71  Against  this,  Anwar  had  secured  a 
considerable  power  base  through  his  controlling  interest  in  the  New  Straits  Times  Group 
and  editorial  influence  within  the  daily  Utusan  Malaysia.  72  Nonetheless,  having  shown 
consummate  skill  in  counterbalancing  these  elements,  Mahathir  was  still  firmly  in  charge, 
his  supporters  asserting  that  Anwar  would  assume  the  leadership  only  when  these 
tensions  were  resolved  and  he  was  seen  to  represent  UMNO  as  a  whole,  rather  than  a 
faction  within  it.  73  It  is  significant,  then,  that  as  the  1997  crisis  unfolded,  an  apparent 
rapprochement  between  Anwar  and  Daim  could  be  observed  (see  below),  with  both 
`working  closely'  to  restore  economic  confidence.  "'  At  the  same  time,  Mahathir, 
playing-down  media  speculation,  dismissed  serious  differences  between  himself  and 
Anwar,  casting  their  relationship  as  akin  to  father  and  son.  75 
Rather  than  the  serious  policy  differences  to  follow,  the  more  intriguing  aspect  to 
the  relationship  at  this  point  was  their  different  intellectual  qualities.  As  a  significant 
insight  for  the  crisis  to  follow,  Gomez  had  noted  the  particular  relevance  of  Anwar's 
leadership  abilities  with  regard  to  moral  politics  and  Islam: 
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if  the  Islamic  rhetoric  propagated  by  PAS  continues  to  gather  momentum,  UMNO  will  probably  have 
to  depend  more  on  Anwar,  rather  than  Mahathir  to  stem  the  tide.  Unlike  Mahathir,  Anwar  is  still 
respected  in  Islamic  circles  for  his  knowledge  of  Islam  and  his  attempts  to  inculcate  more  Islamic  values 
within  the  government.  Anwar's  moderate  stand  on  issues  and  his  promotion  of  modernist  Islamic 
views  may  also  help  him  retain  the  support  of  the  urban  electorate,  while  curbing  PAS's  influence  in  the 
rural  Malay  heartland.  If  the  need  arises  for  a  vision  of  politics  that  must  be  articulated  on  essentially 
moral  positions,  and  if  the  question  of  spiritual  values  increasingly  enters  the  public  sphere,  Anwar 
would  appear  to  be  one  of  the  very  few  leaders  in  UMNO  who  can  respond  persuasively...  "' 
But  alongside  fears  of  Anwar's  `moral  authority'  within  UMNO,  a  more 
malevolent  campaign  against  his  succession  was  emerging.  The  first  serious  indication  of 
the  crisis  to  come  was  the  circulation  of  a  surat  layang,  or  poison  pen  letter,  in  August 
1997  claiming  that  Anwar  had  been  engaged  in  homosexual  and  adulterous  liaisons.  77 
Although  subsequently  dismissed  by  Mahathir,  such  smears  signified  the  beginning  of  a 
concerted  campaign  to  discredit  him  in  the  run-up  to  the  1999  UMNO  elections. 
A  further  element  here  had  been  Anwar's  attempts  to  foster  a  more  qualitative 
dialogue  concerning  the  development  of  civil  society  in  Malaysia.  In  many  ways,  it  was 
Anwar's,  rather  than  Mahathir's,  engagement  of  `democratic  reform'  and  a  more 
expansive  conception  of  civil  society  which  had  informed  the  political  and  intellectual 
aspects  of  the  Vision.  Indeed,  in  the  wake  of  the  crisis,  Anwar  had  come  to  pose  this  as 
a  critical  issue  for  the  rehabilitation  of  the  region  as  a  whole.  Thus,  in  a  speech  in  June 
1998,  he  argued  that  the  crisis  had  "unleashed  a  gale  of  creative  destruction"  that  would 
"cleanse  society  of  collusion,  cronyism  and  nepotism",  78  a  theme  adopted  by  Anwar 
allies  to  prepare  a  coded  assault  on  Mahathir  during  the  1998  UMNO  gathering.  Anwar 
also  used  his  close  ties  with  Habibie  here  -  who  he  had  supported  openly  following 
Suharto's  fall  -  to  promote  a  redefinition  of  civil  society  `appropriate  to  the  region'. 
Alongside  a  tolerant  interpretation  of  Islam,  Anwar  and  Habibie  had  been  instrumental  in 
sponsoring  such  ideas  through  think  tanks  like  the  Institute  for  Policy  Research  in 
Malaysia  and  the  Centre  for  Information  and  Development  Studies  in  Indonesia.  79  In  the 
short  term,  this  did  not  presage  any  qualitative  reform  or  `opening-up'  of  civil  society. 
But  it  did  expose  more  seriously  the  underlying  tensions  between  Mahathir's  brand  of 
`restrained  liberal  development'  and  Anwar's  more  enthusiastic,  if  still-guarded,  shift 
towards  free-market  liberal  reforms.  Thus,  as  in  1987,  latent  tensions  within  UMNO, 
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policy  ideas  and  expressions  of  state-class  interests. 
Addressing  corruption 
While  Mahathir's  political  dexterity  had  helped  realise  a  sense  of  factional  detente  within 
UMNO,  the  integrity  of  the  Barisan  by  the  late-1990s  was  now  deeply  tainted  by  the 
association  of  corrupt  practices.  Despite  much  self-righteous  use  of  the  term  by  Western 
elites,  `crony  capitalism'  does  exhibit  certain  features  in  the  Malaysian  system  of  money 
politics.  In  contrast  to  the  familial  and  military-based  structure  under  Suharto,  UMNO 
patronage  operates  through  a  more  party-based  system  of  political-corporate  closure.  80 
Openly  critical  of  UMNO's  part  in  major  financial  scandals,  Chandra  Muzaffar  has,  for 
example,  long-argued  for  a  clearer  separation  between  business  and  politics,  claiming 
that  Mahathir's  consistent  calls  for  greater  `moral  values'  cannot  disguise  the  deeper 
malaise.  81 
Three  basic  factors  lie  at  the  heart  of  the  corruption  issue  in  Malaysia: 
institutionalisation,  centralisation  and  privatisation.  The  first  refers  to  the  ways  in  which 
business  and  politics  became  enmeshed  through  the  institutional  circumstances  of  the 
NEP  state,  drawing  not  only  Bumiputeras,  Malay  business  elites  and  UMNO,  but  also 
the  MCA,  MIC  and  their  political-corporate  functionaries,  into  the  network  of  state- 
based  money  politics.  The  second  concerns  the  greater  centralisation  of  executive  power 
under  Mahathir  from  the  early-1980s,  including  closer  control  of  the  judicial  process 
(through,  for  example,  the  1988  legislation  to  make  the  judiciary  subservient  to 
Parliament  and  controls  over  bodies  like  the  Electoral  Commission)  and  the  absence  of 
fully  independent  investigative  status  for  the  Anti  Corruption  Agency.  The  third  involves 
the  massive  opportunities  of  wealth  which  privatisation  and  the  sale  of  public  services 
(devoid  of  any  open-tender  system)  came  to  offer,  making  what  had  gone  before  seem 
like  a  drop  in  the  ocean.  By  the  mid-1990s,  this  conjuncture  of  forces  had  given  rise  to  a 
`corruption  epidemic.  '82 
The  legitimacy  of  the  power  bloc  depends  on  the  ability  of  its  state  managers  to 
maintain  political  cohesion.  Thus,  in  crisis  scenarios,  political-corporate  networks  will, 
/ 
ultimately,  `sacrifice'  their  senior  executives  (pace  Nixon,  Thatcher,  Suharto),  in  order  to 
152 protect  the  bloc  itself.  In  this  regard,  social  unease  was  forcing  Mahathir  to  `address'  the 
spectre  of  corruption  within  UMNO/BN. 
A  graphic,  if  somewhat  theatrical,  indication  of  such  came  during  the  1996  Party 
Assembly.  Here,  Mahathir  wept  openly  during  his  speech  on  the  dangers  of  money 
politics,  warning  how  it  could  "destroy"  UMNO.  83  In  April  1997,  following  a  highly 
emotional  Supreme  Council  meeting,  Mahathir  sent  a  definitive  signal  of  intent  by 
securing  the  resignation  of  Muhammad  Muhammad  Taib,  Chief  Minister  of  Selangor,  in 
connection  with  alleged  currency  irregularities  and  false  declarations  to  customs  officials 
at  Brisbane  airport.  84  As  in  the  case  of  Kedah,  the  subsequent  appointment  of  Abu 
Hassan  to  the  Selangor  post  was  instructive:  a  Mahathir  loyalist,  pledged  to  root-out 
corrupt  practices,  and  in  a  vital  location  to  administer  the  proposed  MSC  project  in 
Putrajaya.  85 
Alongside  a  more  assertive  role  for  the  government's  Anti-Corruption  Agency,  86 
the  image  portrayed  here  was  of  Anwar  and  Mahathir  working  closely  on  this  issue  - 
signifying  a  congenial  atmosphere  and  a  `united  resolve'  within  the  party.  In  May  1997, 
Mahathir  left  Anwar  in  charge  as  acting  Prime  Minister  before  departing  on  a  two  month 
vacation  to  Europe  -  his  longest  official  break  in  sixteen  years.  Within  days,  Anwar 
had  signalled  his  own  authority  by  calling  to  account  two  senior  government  officials 
over  the  questionable  disbursement  of  public  money.  87  By  December  1997,  Mahathir's 
appointee  Abu  Hassam  was  himself  under  suspicion,  breaking-down  as  he  tried  to 
explain  the  circumstances  of  a  RM5  million  renovation  plan  for  his  official  residence  to 
the  State  Assembly.  88  Meanwhile,  Abdul  Rahman,  a  top  official  in  the  Prime  Minister's 
Department  and  former  Malacca  state  secretary,  was  charged  over  a  RM260  million 
fraud  involving  false  documents  showing  plans  for  a  government  award  to  two 
construction  companies.  89 
Against  this  backdrop,  the  corruption  and  nepotism  issue  was  introduced  at  the 
1998  UMNO  Assembly  by  UMNO  Youth  chief  Zahid  Hamidi.  While  reflecting  broader 
concerns  within  UMNO  Youth,  this  suggested  a  concerted  attempt  by  Anwar  proxies  to 
raise  the  temperature  in  the  leadership  issue.  Again,  though,  Mahathir  had  shown 
political  prowess  in  silencing  his  critics,  firstly  in  an  open  rebuke  to  Zahid  for  raising  the 
issue  publicly,  rather  than  within  UMNO,  and  then,  in  an  `act  of  transparency',  by 
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Zahid  -  who  had  benefited  from  privatisation  and  government  awards.  9o 
While  such  acts  only  revealed  the  tip  of  the  political-corporate  iceberg,  it  now 
signified  the  political  dangers  of  the  corruption  problem  for  key  elements  within  UMNO, 
particularly  with  allegations  of  crisis  bail-outs  mounting. 
Playing  the  international  stage:  politics  and  diplomacy 
While  Mahathir's  attempts  to  build  political  consensus  had  been  conducted  against  a 
background  of  domestic  reforms,  recessionary  fears  and  party  splits,  the  project  also 
became  more  globally-focused  by  the  early-1990s.  Here,  Mahathir  has  crafted  a 
prestigious  persona  for  the  international  stage,  the  main  feature  being  his  role  as  `chief 
executive'  of  Malaysia  Inc.,  leading  business  delegations  around  the  world  in  pursuit  of 
inward  capital  and  new  investment  sites  -  Proton's  penetration  of  the  Western  car 
market  being  emblematic  of  the  new  hi-tech  confidence.  91  Mahathir's  key  achievement, 
in  this  regard,  has  been  his  ability  to  portray  Malaysia's  foreign  dependence  in 
nationalist-economic  terms.  Thus,  the  proclaimed  challenge  of  industrial  maturity 
expressed  in  the  Vision  offers  a  populist  raison  d'etre  for  growth  while  `camouflaging' 
its  fragile  base.  A  second,  interacting,  aspect  involves  his  role  as  `emissary'  for  the 
South,  offering  a  post-Bandung  discourse  of  Malaysian-style  `economic  nationalism'  for 
peripheral  states  to  follow.  Fashioned  around  themes  of  political  solidarity  with  poor 
and  developing  countries,  this  has  seen,  for  example,  emerging  ties  between  Malaysia 
and  South  Africa,  with  Mandela,  pre-crisis,  endorsing  Mahathir's  growth-led  strategy  as 
a  model  of  socio-economic  development.  92  Indeed,  even  as  the  Malaysian  economy  fell 
into  critical  recession  by  mid-1998,  Mahathir's  decision  to  `break-ranks'  and  enforce 
capital  controls  (see  following  chapters)  represented  an  alternative  to  Western  orthodoxy 
for  such  countries. 
A  further  measure  of  this  confidence  was  Malaysia's  determination  to  proceed 
with  Burma's  controversial  admission  to  ASEAN.  93  Mahathir  has  been  rigid  in  seeking 
to  present  sensitive  regional  issues  such  as  trade  with  Rangoon,  Indonesian  repression  in 
East  Timor,  or  the  various  claims  of  ownership  to  the  Spratley  Islands,  as  internal 
ASEAN  affairs,  beyond  the  interference  of  Western  diplomats.  On  top  of  other 
154 diplomatic  problems,  the  formal  decision  in  May  1997  to  grant  admission  to  Burma  had 
created  some  friction  between  ASEAN  and  the  West.  94  A  more  sensitive  factor  for 
Mahathir  here  was  that  many  Malaysian-based  NGOs  had  opposed  Burma's  membership, 
notably  ABIM  who  had  criticised  the  harsh  treatment  of  Muslims  by  the  State  Law  and 
Order  Restoration  Council  (SLORC).  However,  as  sixth  largest  foreign  investor  to  the 
regime,  the  Malaysian  government's  previous  opposition  had  been  scaled-down  as  it 
sought  to  promote  bilateral  and  intra-regional  trade.  95 
Mahathir  also  continued  to  Look  East  for  other  political  props.  Most  notable 
here  was  his  vocal  promotion  of  a  regional  East  Asian  Economic  Caucus  (EAEC)  over 
the  broader  Asia-Pacific  Economic  Co-operation  (APEC)  countries.  This  included 
persistent  attempts,  most  prominently  at  the  APEC  Jakarta  summit  in  November  1994, 
to  stall  moves  towards  a  more  open  trading  regime  with  the  US  and  other  Pacific 
countries  by  the  year  2020.  Besides  appropriating  Mahathir's  2020  slogan,  the  fear 
expressed  here  was  that  any  such  trading  order  would  allow  the  US  unequal  advantage  in 
the  region,  thus  compromising  Malaysia's  development  schedule.  Against  this,  Mahathir 
had  played-upon  the  troubled  US-Japan  trade  relationship  as  a  way  of  encouraging  a 
closer  Japanese  identification  with  the  EAEC.  Part  of  this  discourse  included  Mahathir's 
co-authorship  of  The  Asia  That  Can  Say  No  with  the  controversial  Japanese  politician 
Shintaro  Ishahara  (an  adaptation  of  the  latter's  now  infamous  The  Japan  That  Can  Say 
No),  a  strident  appeal  to  Japanese  sensitivities  proclaiming  "an  anti-American  front  on 
the  issue  of  values.  "96 
Behind  this  polemic,  Malaysia  has  always  maintained  a  practical  foreign  policy 
stance  towards  the  US,  both  in  bilateral  terms  and  through  ASEAN,  formed  in  1967 
partly  as  a  bulwark  to  communist  Vietnam.  While  ASEAN  member  states  have  not 
always  shared  a  common  outlook  vis-ä-vis  the  superpowers,  Malaysia's  pragmatic 
support  for  US  security  arrangements  in  the  region  have  been  evident  in,  for  example, 
the  ASEAN  Regional  Forum  (ARF),  set  up  in  1993  in  response  to  the  rising  power  of 
China.  97  This  essentially  pro-US  security  position  should  be  borne  in  mind  when 
considering  the  circumstances  of  Mahathir's  anti-Western  rhetoric,  particularly  at  the 
height  of  the  Anwar  crisis. 
155 For  some  time,  Western  diplomats  had  been  content  to  `note'  Mahathir's 
polemics.  But  as  the  1997  crisis  unfolded,  the  implications  of  his  attacks  on  Western 
capitalist  institutions  were  beginning  to  create  more  serious  disquiet  at  home  and  abroad. 
1997:  political  pressures  and  crisis  management 
The  ways  in  which  the  UMNO  network  deployed  its  resources  to  manage  public 
anxieties  during  the  economic  crisis  and  the  Anwar  situation  will  be  dealt  with  in  the 
following  chapters.  For  the  moment,  let  us  focus  here  on  the  more  immediate  political 
implications  of  the  crisis  leading  to  the  Anwar  purge  and  the  impact  of  this  within  the 
bloc.  98 
As  Mahathir's  attack  on  Soros  and  the  US  reached  its  critical  peak,  the  perennial 
question  of  its  content  was  once  again  posed  by  Malaysia  watchers:  populist  diatribe  or 
Asian  values?  Perhaps  in  Mahathir's  own  mind  it  was  a  mixture  of  both.  Although  one 
can  recognise  the  familiar  accoutrements  of  gesture  politics  played-out  for  the  domestic 
audience,  this  does  not  invalidate  the  sense  of  conviction  or  enigmatic  purpose  behind 
such  discourse.  Indeed,  an  intrinsic  part  of  Mahathir's  political  style  lies  in  this  '  very 
ability  to  present  himself  as  an  enigma. 
The  more  important  aspect  here,  however,  concerns  its  hegemonic  content. 
While  Anwar's  budgetary  interventions  were  being  used  to  ameliorate  market  fears,  the 
worry  for  BN  elites  was  that  the  economic  crisis  would  deteriorate  into  political  and 
ideological  crises  -  an  organic  crisis  of  hegemony.  Conversely,  the  dominant  group 
may  use  selective  hegemonic  strategies  -  economic,  political  or  ideological  -  at 
expedient  points  to  help  sustain  the  bloc.  In  other  words,  while  hegemony  is  always  a 
three-fronted  affair,  a  crisis  at  any  one  level  may  be  offset  through  mobilisation  of 
consent  at  another  level.  With  the  economic  crisis  deepening,  Mahathir  was,  thus, 
seeking  to  shore-up  the  political  bloc  and  use  the  ideological  network  (see  next  chapter) 
to  build  national-popular  support. 
At  the  centre  of  this  confidence-building  exercise  lay  two  particularly  sensitive 
issues.  The  first  involved  threats  from  within  the  US  State  Department  to  impose 
punitive  measures  on  Malaysia  over  the  activities  of  its  national  oil  company  Petronas. 
Following  its  Iran-Libya  sanctions  policy,  the  US  wanted  to  `investigate'  Petronas 
156 investments  in  Iran  to  evaluate  the  grounds  for  punitive  action.  '  The  second  issue 
involved  a  draft  resolution  by  34  US  Congressmen  led  by  Robert  Wexler  calling  on 
Mahathir  to  apologise,  or  else  resign,  for  alleged  anti-Semitic  remarks  directed  at  George 
Soros  over  his  role  in  the  financial  crisis.  100  The  resolution  called  upon  Mahathir  to 
repudiate  his  `claim'  that  Soros's  speculative  activities  formed  part  of  a  `Jewish 
conspiracy'  against  Malaysia  as  a  Muslim  state. 
Although  ostensibly  separate,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  how  both  issues  became 
entangled  in  the  political  hubris  of  emerging  events.  With  economic  tension  escalating, 
Mahathir  insisted  that  his  comments  had  been  taken  out  of  context  and  that  he  had 
merely  noted  the  "coincidence"  that  Soros,  a  Jew,  had  been  involved  in  speculative 
activity  detrimental  to  a  Muslim  country.  101  Despite  other  prejudices,  there  is  little  in 
Mahathir's  make-up  to  cast  him  as  a  racist.  Nonetheless,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that  he 
could  not  have  foreseen  the  political  impact  of  such  a  sensitive  remark.  If  there  was  an 
element  of  calculation  in  its  delivery,  it  may  have  involved  Mahathir's  willingness  to 
trade  the  wrath  of  the  US  `Jewish  political  establishment'  in  order  to  galvanise  political 
support  at  home.  Moreover,  with  Clinton  keeping  a  pragmatic  distance  from  the 
resolution,  Mahathir  may  have  thought  it  possible  to  defy  the  Congressional  grouping 
without  damaging  bilateral  relations  with  Washington.  Thus,  what  emerged  as  the  focal 
issue  was  not  the  alleged  anti-Semitic  element  but  the  heady  politics  of  US 
aggrandizement  and  claims  of  an  unwarranted  intrusion  in  a  sovereign  country's  affairs. 
With  the  media  reporting  a  nationwide  upsurge  in  anti-US  sentiment  and  the 
receipt  of  death  threats  to  the  US  Embassy,  Mahathir  was  compelled  to  reassure  US 
citizens  in  Malaysia  not  to  fear  for  their  safety.  102  Paricularly  evident  at  this  point  was 
the  `shocktroop'  activities  of  UMNO  Youth.  103  While  Mahathir  had  sought  to  raise  the 
political  stakes  by  encouraging  public  shows  of  nationalist  support,  there  was  also  the 
danger  of  too  much  anti-US  provocation  endangering  the  economic  recovery.  In  a 
further  attempt  to  calm  emotions,  the  American  Ambassador  to  Malaysia,  John  Mallot, 
intervened  to  describe  the  Wexler  resignation  demands  as  "inappropriate"  and  announce 
the  imminent  arrival  of  a  key  US  State  Department  official  to  help  "explain  the  law"  over 
the  sanctions  issue.  104  Nonetheless,  support  for  Mahathir  had  been  a  reminder  to  those 
within  the  BN,  quietly  anxious  about  the  impact  of  the  crisis,  not  to  go  against  the  grain 
of  `public  feeling'.  More  importantly,  it  served  to  concentrate  minds  within  UMNO  of 
157 the  dangers  of  factionalism.  Thus,  an  expression  of  solidarity  for  Mahathir  was 
confirmed  at  a  special  Supreme  Council  meeting  of  the  14-member  Barisan  called  in 
response  to  the  Wexler  resolution.  105 
Having  initiated  the  BN  vote  of  confidence,  Anwar  proceeded  to  table  a  more 
substantive  motion  of  support  in  the  Dewan  Rakyat.  Anwar's  enthusiasm  at  this  point 
also  suggested  a  pragmatic  attempt  to  demonstrate  loyalty  as  a  counterbalance  to  his 
own  rising  status.  The  vote  of  confidence  in  Mahathir  and,  ipso  facto,  his  handling  of  the 
economic  crisis  was  included  as  an  internal  part  of  the  motion  rejecting  the  Wexler 
resolution  and  the  US  Petronas  investigation.  Denouncing  foreign  interference,  the  DAP 
leader  had  supported  the  Government  on  the  Petronas  and  Wexler  points,  but  wanted  a 
separate  motion,  debate  and  vote  on  Mahathir's  specific  handling  of  the  crisis,  ""  a  call 
rejected  by  the  Speaker,  Ong  Tee  Keat.  Despite  DAP  and  PAS  opposition,  the  five- 
point  motion  of  confidence  in  Mahathir  was  passed  by  the  Speaker  as  a  unanimous 
vote.  107 
While  the  Barisan  were  never  likely  to  refuse  their  support,  Mahathir  had 
displayed  impressive  judgement  in  cultivating  political  capital  from  economic  adversity. 
Yet,  while  preventing  factional  splits,  underlying  tensions  remained.  An  indication  of  this 
was  the  outcomes  of  two  key  by-elections  at  Sungai  Bakap  and  Changkat  Jering,  held 
eleven  days  before  the  Dewan  Rakyat  motion  of  confidence.  Although  the  Barisan,  with 
the  considerable  support  of  the  media,  won  both,  it  did  so  with  substantially  reduced 
majorities.  Indeed,  at  Sungai  Bakap,  the  Gerakan-BN  candidate  Lai  Chew  Hock  could 
only  muster  47%  of  the  total  vote,  with  the  rest  going  to  the  DAP  and  the  Independent 
candidate.  108  More  significant,  though,  was  the  swing  of  Malay  votes  from  the  BN  to 
the  Independent  Malay  candidate  Abu  Harith,  a  shift  acknowledged  in  Dr.  Koh's 
admission  that  the  BN  needed  to  learn  lessons  from  the  result.  109  Allowing  for  by- 
election  dissent  in  the  midst  of  economic  crisis,  these  results  now  pointed  to  new 
electoral  fluidity  and  an  erosion  of  UMNO's  Malay  support  base. 
The  bloc  was  also  vulnerable  at  this  point  to  the  fallout  from  other  regional 
crises.  The  economic  contagion  had  caused  political  turmoil  and  undermined  the 
authority  of  powerful  regimes.  In  South  Korea,  the  damage  to  the  once-mighty  chaebol 
system,  the  IMF  bail-out  and  severe  retrenchment  had  sparked  student  and  civilian  riots. 
Amidst  rising  anger  at  the  corrupt  practices  of  Kim  Young  Sam's  government,  a 
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fashion  as  the  country  elected  Kim  Dae  Jung,  its  first  left-of-centre  leader  in  fifty 
years.  11'  Facing  harsher  retrenchment  and  poverty,  the  Thai  electorate  placed  their  faith 
in  the  more  humble  figure  of  Chuan  Leekpai  after  popular  protest  had  secured  the 
resignation  of  Chavalit  Yongchaiyudh.  In  Indonesia,  rampant  inflation,  including  a  400% 
increase  in  staple  food  prices,  had  given  rise  to  major  civil  unrest,  intensive  ethnic  purges 
against  small-scale  Chinese  traders,  an  emergency  military  crackdown  and  an 
unprecedented  crisis  for  the  Suharto  family.  Suharto  had  sought  to  link  the  collapsing 
rupiah  to  a  $US  currency-board  in  a  desperate  effort  to  stave-off  further  financial  crisis 
and  insulate  the  regime  from  political  attack,  a  strategy  which  had  jeopardised  the  terms 
and  conditions  of  the  IMF's  $US33  billion  bail-out,  thus  intensifying  the  crisis.  "  With 
the  rupiah's  downward  effect  on  the  ringgit,  the  returning  smog  crisis  over  Borneo  and 
the  spectre  of  mass  immigration  into  Malaysia  (and  Singapore)  threatening  to  hold-back 
economic  recovery  at  home,  Mahathir  had  offered  practical  assistance  to  Suharto, 
including  a  promise  not  to  repatriate  thousands  of  Indonesian  workers  -  even  though 
this  was  likely  to  intensify  labour  problems  and  social  tensions  at  home.  112 
This  reflected  a  continued  line  in  pragmatic  foreign  policy  since  the  Konfrontasi 
(1963-66).  113  In  this  regard,  the  Malaysian  authorities  have  viewed  internal  cohesion  in 
Indonesian  politics  and  good  bilateral  relations  with  Jakarta  as  strategic  to  political 
stability  in  Malaysia  itself.  One  aspect  of  this  for  Mahathir  was  the  need  to  control  the 
spread  of  Islamic-based  politics,  a  force  which,  despite  diverse  groupings  in  Indonesia, 
had  shown  its  ability  to  capitalise  on  the  crisis  and  find  counter-hegemonic 
accommodations  within  the  opposition  movement.  "4  More  ominously,  Suharto's  fall 
and  ongoing  pressure  on  Habibie  threatened  to  erode  at  least  the  idea  of  Barisan 
invulnerability  in  the  mind  of  Malaysians. 
Much  of  the  crisis  management  now  centred  around  the  National  Economic 
Action  Council  (NEAC).  In  its  conception,  it  looked  little  more  than  token  neo- 
corporatism  drawing  together  political,  business  and  public  support.  But  as  the  scale  of 
collapse  and  indebtedness,  particularly  within  the  banking  sector,  became  more  apparent, 
the  NEAC  looked  set  to  undertake  a  more  far-reaching  appraisal  of  financial  institutions. 
It  was  exquisitely  fitting  that  Mahathir  should  appoint  the  architect  of  Malaysia 
Inc.  and  privatisation  Daim  Zainuddin  as  an  Executive  Director.  While  Anwar,  as 
159 Finance  Minister  would  `oversee'  the  NEAC  process,  it  was  Daim  and  Mahathir,  as 
Chairman,  who  came  to  make  the  key  proposals.  As  Mahathir's  closest  confidant, 
suspicions  were,  not  unreasonably,  expressed  that  having  overseen  and  benefited  from, 
the  new  privatised  wealth  flows,  "'  Daim  was  precisely  the  wrong  person  for  the  job. 
Yet,  while  the  immediate  task  for  Daim  was  the  bailing-out  of  favoured  corporate  figures 
and  former  proteges,  the  NEAC  was  also  being  used,  as  in  the  1980s  crisis,  as  a  medium 
of  hegemonic  readjustment. 
One  of  the  most  politically  sensitive,  issues  to  be  addressed,  in  this  regard,  was 
that  of  Bumiputera  equity  rights.  Here,  the  crisis  had  brought  into  focus  the  problem  of 
financially  unviable  industries  hitherto  controlled  through  Bumiputera  share  trusts.  The 
`solution'  was  to  allow  Chinese  capital  greater  access  to  struggling  Malay  businesses  in 
order  to  save  and  rebuild  them.  By  waiving  certain  equity  rights  and  encouraging 
takeovers,  firms  within  the  major  sectors  such  as  banking,  transport  and 
telecommunications  would  emerge  leaner  and  more  competitive.  All  standard  capitalist 
principles.  Yet,  even  in  the  harsh  landscape  of  economic  crisis,  the  political  dangers  of 
such  a  strategy  were  considerable.  Thus,  as  merger  plans  for  the  country's  biggest 
finance  companies  and  the  splitting-up  of  government-backed  conglomerates  such  as 
Renong  began  to  emerge,  so  too  did  political  tensions  over  the  threat  to  Bumiputera 
business  privileges.  "'  Symptomatic  of  this  tension  was  the  contrasting  press  responses 
of  the  UMNO  Youth  leader  Zahid  Hamidi  ('Give  priority  to  bumi  firms')  and  MCA 
leader  Ling  Liong  Sik  (`Ling  lauds  move  on  bumi  equity').  117  Once  again,  it  was 
Mahathir  who  had  played  the  role  of  allaying  Malay  fears  and  arbitrating  political 
tensions.  In  seeking  to  balance  these  interpretations,  Mahathir  argued  that  while  such 
steps  were  necessary  for  the  survival  of  many  Bumiputera  companies,  this  did  not  signify 
any  specific  threat  since  many  Bumiputeras  had  themselves  already  bought-into  non- 
Bumiputera  firms,  many  of  which  were  also  facing  problems:  "So  on  an  aggregate,  the 
amount  of  Bumiputera  [ownership  in  the  economy]  will  not  change.  "118 
Even  beyond  this  issue,  the  Chinese  element  of  the  bloc  had  been  strengthened. 
For  while  the  crisis  had  led  to  bankruptcy  and  losses  for  domestic  Chinese  capital,  it  had 
also  given  impetus  to  new  policy  ideas  based-upon  a  further  negation  of  Bumiputeraism. 
In  its  place  lay  the  potential  for  a  more  level  playing-field  for  Chinese  business  and  its 
160 political  class,  policy  objectives  linked  more  specifically  to  the  framework  of  Bangsa 
Malaysia. 
While  Daim,  as  veteran  fixer,  appeared  to  have  formed  a  `new  partnership'  with 
Anwar,  119  the  tensions  between  them  were  becoming  more  apparent  by  mid-1998. 
Having  dispensed  with  veiled  political  attacks  on  his  leadership  at  the  UMNO  1998 
Assembly,  Mahathir  was  now  manoeuvring  to  focus  attention  on  the  economic  recovery 
process.  It  was  also  evident  that  Mahathir  had  no  intention  of  relinquishing  overall 
control  here.  With  some  justification,  Mahathir  was  by  now  arguing  strongly  that  the 
domestic  crisis  (by  this  point  registering  a  6.8%  contraction  in  GDP  for  the  second 
quarter  of  1998)120  was  part  of  a  protracted  global  problem,  as  evidenced  by  the  collapse 
of  the  rouble  and  political  crisis  in  Russia  by  late  August  -  an  episode  again,  as  in  the 
Far  East,  featuring  the  predatory  activities  of  Soros's  Quantum  Fund.  Having  followed 
tight  monetary  policy  and  IMF  prescriptions,  the  country  was  no  nearer  recovery. 
Indeed,  with  the  ringgit  still  falling  and  the  country  now  in  recession,  this  had  intensified 
the  problem.  Mahathir's  decision  to  `break-ranks'  and  consequent  turn  to  monetary 
expansion  now  saw  Anwar's  free-market  position  marginalised  as  a  recovery  strategy,  a 
message  confirmed  by  Daim's  promotion  to  the  Cabinet  as  Special  Functions  Minister 
and  his  launching  of  the  National  Economic  Recovery  Plan  (NERP).  121  With  Mahathir 
reverting  once  more  to  the  `old  partnership',  Anwar's  response  was  to  adopt  a  more 
vocal  line  on  currency  speculators,  122  though,  this  cannot  simply  be  read  as  cynical 
manoeuvring  on  Anwar's  part. 
Nonetheless,  despite  Anwar's  protestations  of  loyalty,  the  crisis  had  revealed 
essential  policy  differences  with  Mahathir,  differences  which  under  less  critical 
circumstances  may  not  have  led  Mahathir  to  the  conclusion  that  Anwar  was  attempting 
to  undermine  him.  Part  of  Mahathir's  fears  here  can  also  be  traced  to  Anwar's  apparent 
reluctance  to  support  some  of  the  major  corporate  bail-outs,  including  that  of  Mahathir's 
son  Mirzan.  Yet,  Mahathir  was  not  clinging  to  power  for  reasons  of  mere  nepotism. 
There  was  simply  no  parallel  here  between  Mahathir  and  Suharto  in  terms  of  the  latter's 
massive  family  stake  in  the  economy.  Nonetheless,  with  Mahathir's  position  under 
threat,  there  was  the  concern  that  an  Anwar  ascendancy  might  not  provide  the  requisite 
guarantees  of  protection  Mahathir  was  seeking. 
161 But  there  may  have  been  a  much  more  fundamental  issue  at  play  here.  Mahathir 
had  given  seventeen  years  of  sustained  effort  to  building  economic  prosperity,  Vision 
modernity  and  UMNO  hegemony,  none  of  which  he  intended  to  see  sacrificed 
ignominiously  in  a  moment  of  domestic  uncertainty,  albeit  a  critical  one.  Not  only  was 
Anwar  taking  the  economy  in  a  direction  which,  for  Mahathir,  threatened  to  undo  those 
achievements,  his  relationship  with  the  IMF  nexus  suggested  a  wider  strategy  to  replace 
him.  As  noted,  while  not  a  `Trojan  horse',  it  was  apparent  that  Anwar  was  being 
groomed  by  Western  interests  as  the  most  favoured  free-market  reformer  within  the 
government.  Neither  before  nor  after  Anwar's  dismissal  was  the  significance  of  these 
liaisons  adequately  addressed  in  mainstream  analyses.  For  Mahathir,  the  threat  had 
become  all  too  apparent. 
The  purge 
The  purge  was,  thus,  underway.  In  a  pre-emptive  curb  on  Anwar's  media  base, 
Mahathir,  already  unhappy  over  `negative'  reporting  of  the  crisis,  had  secured  the 
resignations  of  key  Anwar  allies  Johan  Jaafar  and  Nazri  Abdullah,  respective  editors  of 
Utusan  Malaysia  and  Berita  Harlan.  The  character  attacks  on  Anwar  had  also  gained 
momentum  at  the  June  1998  Assembly  with  the  circulation  of  a  surat  layang-type  book 
entitled  50  Reasons  Why  Anwar  Can't  Become  Prime  Minister.  Mahathir's  initial 
response  to  the  book  had,  like  the  previous  defamatory  material,  been  dismissive. 
Nonetheless,  despite  the  arrest  of  its  author  Khalid  Jafri  and  a  court  injunction  banning 
it,  123  the  book's  contents,  including  allegations  of  corruption,  adultery,  unnatural  sex, 
complicity  to  murder  and  acting  on  behalf  of  foreign  powers,  had  now  become 
widespread.  124  With  the  Inspector  General  of  Police  (IGP)  Rahim  Noor  investigating 
Anwar  and  others  `implicated'  in  the  text,  notably,  Anwar's  friend  S.  Nallakaruppin 
(Nalla),  12'  a  smear  campaign  at  the  higher  level  of  the  network  was  now  apparent.  At 
this  point,  it  was  unclear  to  what  extent  anti-Anwar  elements  had  convinced  Mahathir  of 
the  possible  veracity  of  the  allegations.  Either  way,  Mahathir  was  now  using  it  as  a 
ready  instrument  for  ruining  Anwar. 
With  calculated  timing,  Mahathir  made  his  critical  move,  beginning  with  Anwar's 
allies  at  the  Bank  Negara.  On  August  28th  1998,  the  Bank's  Governor  and  Deputy 
162 Ahmad  Mohamed  Don  and  Fong  Weng  Phak  resigned  their  posts,  citing  `policy 
differences'  over  the  impending  currency  measures.  On  September  2nd,  the  Bank 
announced  the  immediate  imposition  of  exchange  controls,  the  adoption  of  a  fixed 
exchange  system  for  the  ringgit  (to  be  pegged  at  RM3.80  to  the  US  dollar)  and 
restrictions  in  Malaysian  stock  dealings  on  the  KLSE.  Later  that  day,  Anwar  was 
dismissed  from  his  duties  as  Deputy  Prime  Minister,  Finance  Minister  and  Executive 
Director  of  the  NEAC.  On  September  3rd,  he  was  formally  expelled  from  the  party  at  a 
showdown  meeting  of  the  UMNO  Supreme  Council. 
By  initiating  both  Anwar's  removal  and  the  emergency  currency  measures, 
Mahathir  had  staked  the  political  legitimacy  of  the  bloc  on  saving  the  economy.  While 
the  IMF,  foreign  capital  and  other  Western  capitalist  agencies  moved  swiftly  to  condemn 
the  abandonment  of  free-market  reforms,  Mahathir's  case  was  that  the  country,  by  now 
already  devastated,  mainly  by  external  forces,  had  nothing  to  lose  -a  claim  given  some 
credence  by  the  immediate  strengthening  of  the  ringgit  and  welcoming  signs  from 
domestic  business.  126  Meanwhile,  the  UMNO  and  BN  hierarchy  closed  ranks,  defending 
Anwar's  removal  as  a  prerogative  power  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  a  necessary  part  of 
the  recovery  process.  127 
As  protesters  took  to  the  streets,  Anwar,  calling  for  calm,  went  public, 
reaffirming  his  loyalty  to  Mahathir,  his  patriotism  and  his  readiness  to  tackle  the 
economic,  political  and  social  turmoil  now  facing  the  country: 
The  time  to  launch  a  reformation  has  arrived...  The  reformation  is  demanded  from  within,  not  due  to 
external  pressure...  Therefore  let  there  not  be  groups  who  are  accusing  it  of  being  an  external 
conspiracy...  Don't  be  fooled  and  deceived  by  those  who  are  afraid  of  the  wave  of  reformation.  They  are 
void  of  ideas,  repeatedly  playing  old  songs.  They  are  afraid  of  the  new  generation...  I  trust  in  the  wisdom 
of  the  UMNO  members...  They  want  stability  and  unity  within  the  party.  They  want  the  party  to  always 
be  strengthened  and  be  given  new  strength  through  the  replacement  of  old  leaders  with  new  ones.  '  28 
Even  at  this  point,  Anwar's  criticism  of  Mahathir  remained  relatively  `tempered.  ' 
Warning  that  the  conspiracy  to  topple  him  would  lead  not  only  to  his  own  arrest,  but 
hundreds  of  others,  Anwar  claimed  that  Mahathir  had  become  "paranoid"  and  fearful  of 
suspected  challengers,  increasingly  so,  he  had  noted,  since  the  fall  of  Suharto.  '29  But 
163 with  the  full  extent  of  the  purge  and  trial  now  confronting  him,  this  language  now  gave 
way  to  a  more  detailed  and  ferocious  denunciation  of  Mahathir  and  his  acolytes. 
As  the  trial  got  underway,  Anwar's  prison  letter  `From  the  Halls  of  Power  to  the 
Labyrinths  of  Incarceration'  130  set  out  for  the  first  time  the  `inside  story'  of  corruption, 
nepotism  and  abuse  of  power  within  the  UMNO  system.  Mahathir,  Anwar  alleged,  was 
now  a  "despised  dictator.  "  He,  his  family  and  his  cronies  had  "siphoned  off  billions.  "  He 
had  turned  politics  into  a  "sordid  occupation  and  politicians  into  a  bunch  of  immoral 
sycophants.  "  Struggling  to  conceal  his  "revulsion"  at  the  level  of  corruption  and  abuse 
(a  restraint  advised  by  friends  seeking  to  protect  his  political  career),  Anwar  had 
attempted  to  strengthen  the  ACA  and  pursue  key  players  in  the  Perwaja  scandal,  (such  as 
corporate  elites  Eric  Chia  and  V.  K.  Lingam),  much  to  the  discomfort  of  the  Attorney 
General  Mohtar  Abdullah.  More  critically,  Anwar  had  informed  Mahathir  of  reports  that 
Daim  had  taken  between  RM700  million  and  RM1  billion  out  of  the  country  and  had 
attempted  "to  abscond  with  RM800  million  worth  of  UMNO  shares.  "  Mahathir,  Anwar 
alleged,  had  concealed  his  alarm  at  this  news,  as  he  did  his  annoyance  over  Anwar's 
attempts  to  limit  Ting  Pek  Khing's  compensation  for  the  stalled  Bakun  project.  Less 
hidden  was  his  displeasure  at  the  RM1.7  billion  (rather  than  RM2.2  billion)  eventually 
paid  by  Petronas  for  his  son  Mirzan's  Konsortium  -  Anwar  (and  Petronas)  having 
argued  for  settlement  through  an  international  shipping  valuer.  While  Anwar  "promoted 
civil  society"  through  The  Asian  Renaissance  and  other  forums,  Mahathir  "disparaged 
it,  "  showing  "contempt  for  my  relatively  liberal  ideas.  "  Anwar  also  defends  his  position 
within  the  IMF  as  part  of  an  attempt  to  introduce  transparency.  In  "furious"  response  to 
Zahid  Hamidi's  corruption  speech  at  the  1998  Assembly,  Mahathir  had  used  the 
privatisation  list  as  a  "cheap  trick"  to  discredit  Anwar  and  his  family,  none  of  whom, 
Anwar  insists,  had  been  issued  "one  share  or  awarded  a  single  contract"  in  his  six  years 
as  Finance  Minister.  Anwar  also  notes  at  this  point  the  frequent  visits  of  the  IGP  Rahim 
Noor  to  Mahathir's  office,  the  targeting  of  Nalla  and  Anwar's  adopted  brother  Sukma 
Darmawan  and  the  close  involvement  of  Daim  in  the  whole  affair.  According  to  Anwar, 
the  eventual  showdown  in  Mahathir's  office  was  deeply  acrimonious.  Anwar  would  not 
"resign  or  be  sacked  with  grave  consequences.  "  Rejecting  Mahathir's  "perverted 
understanding  of  Asian  values,  "  where  a  subordinate  goes  quietly  in  deference  to  his 
leader,  Anwar  vowed  to  follow  "the  dictates  of  my  conscience"  and  seek  to  expose  the 
164 conspiracy,  even  though  the  unfolding  events  would  be  "beyond  my  worst  expectations.  " 
Anwar  goes  on  to  talk  about  the  manoeuvrings  of  Daim,  his  sycophants,  such  as  "side- 
kick"  Ahmad  Sebi  (a  businessman  and  former  journalist),  the  latter's  power  over  New 
Straits  Times  editor  Kadir  Jasin  and  the  corruptibility  of  many  High  Court  judges  - 
though  he  tells  the  many  morally  upright  judges  to  "be  patient".  He  berates  those  in 
UMNO  who  betrayed  him,  such  as  the  Deputy  Information  Minister  Tajol  Rosli,  who,  at 
the  UMNO  Council  meeting  to  dismiss  Anwar,  had  remarked:  "  `My  philosophy  in 
politics  is,  the  boss  is  always  right'.  "  Finally,  invoking  the  reformasi  (see  following 
chapters),  Anwar  thanks  his  loyal  friends  in  UMNO  and  acknowledges  the  support  of 
NGOs,  Muslim  scholars,  low-income  groups  and  others.  The  last  word,  though,  is for 
Mahathir:  "Are  the  people  expected  to  continue  indefinitely  to  endure  the  ranting  and 
raving  of  a  senile,  power-drunk  tyrant?  " 
The  Anwar  affair  is  expanded  in  subsequent  chapters.  The  main  question  here 
concerns  Anwar's  own  role  within  UMNO  and  how  his  ouster  had  affected  party  unity. 
Firstly,  we  have  to  ask  precisely  why  Anwar  had  chosen  to  stay  silent  on  the  above 
during  all  his  time  in  office?  Even  if  he  had  decided  to  play  the  long-term  game  to  secure 
eventual  control,  could  this  excuse  him  from  complicity  in  the  inner  affairs  of  the  UMNO 
hierarchy?  For  years  Anwar's  refrain  had  been:  `there  is  no  policy  difference  between 
myself  and  Mahathir';  `I  support  the  PM';  `he  is  like  a  father'.  Now  the  `true  picture' 
had  been  revealed,  was  it  not  pertinent  to  ask  why  Anwar  had,  effectively,  misled  the 
Malaysian  public?  For  example,  in  relation  to  Mahathir's  conflict  with  the  Malay  Rulers, 
Anwar  notes: 
Of  course  we  supported  him  in  the  constitutional  amendment  issue,  thinking  rather  naively  that  the 
powers  taken  from  the  Rulers  would  revert  to  the  people  and  not  go  to  him  alone.  How  blind  we  were 
131  then  not  to  see  through  his  vile  plan... 
But  was  such  support  for  Mahathir's  centralisation  of  power  mere  naivety  as 
Anwar  claims?  Again,  this  brings  us  back  to  the  culture  of  insiderism  within  UMNO. 
Certainly,  Anwar  had  understood  the  necessity  of  playing  by  Mahathir's  rules,  even  if,  as 
noted,  `Anwar's  boys'  had  shown  an  ultimate  failure  of  judgement  in  these  matters. 
During  his  tenure,  Anwar  had  taken  a  relatively  strong  stance  on  social  policy,  for 
example  in  his  promotion  of  low-cost  housing,  and  there  were  genuine  indications  that  he 
165 had  been  attempting  to  push  a  reform  agenda  from  within.  But  this  had  made  him 
neither  an  innocent  bystander  nor  a  champion  of  the  poor.  While  Anwar  did  not  enjoy 
the  wealth  and  power  of  Daim  and  his  corporate  circle,  neither  did  he  lack  cronies  or 
seem  averse  to  UMNO  operating  as  a  corporate  entity. 
On  the  other  hand,  Anwar  had  never  been  accepted  into  the  political 
establishment.  His  previous  radical  Muslim/ABIM  connections  had  not  endeared  him  to 
many  in  the  party.  His  imprisonment  in  support  of  such  had  placed  him  at  a  different 
`moral  level'  from  other  party  apparatchiks.  For  this  and  other  reasons,  Anwar's 
relations  with  Abdullah  had  never  been  easy,  while  Razaleigh  saw  Anwar  as  having 
usurped  his  position  within  UMNO.  Najib,  on  the  other  hand,  had  been  `closer'  to 
Anwar  on  policy  matters  and  outlook.  However,  there  was  to  be  no  show  of  sympathy 
as  he  too  closed  ranks  behind  Mahathir.  Most  of  all,  Anwar  was  feared  by  Daim. 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  Anwar  purge,  Mahathir  had  to  decide  on  a  Deputy  and,  in 
effect,  successor  from  among  these  main  contenders.  His  initial  tactic  had  been  to  leave 
the  position  open,  declaring  that  the  post  would  be  determined  by  UMNO  members  at 
the  June  1999  Assembly.  Part  of  the  reason  for  this  was  to  allow  Mahathir  free-reign  in 
dealing  with  the  crisis.  Another  was  a  reluctance  to  be  seen  endorsing  a  favoured 
candidate  (probably  at  this  point,  Najib)  for  fear  of  `tainting'  him  with  the  crisis.  Yet 
another  was  a  more  basic  uncertainty  over  who  to  trust.  In  particular,  Mahathir  feared 
giving  it  to  someone  who  would  strike  a  deal  with  Anwar  or  Anwarites  within  UMNO, 
thus  endangering  both  his  policy  view  and  private  interests.  It  is  not  without  significance 
that  Najib  had  himself  started  to  appropriate  some  of  the  reformist  themes  in  an  attempt 
to  court  Anwar  people  within  and  beyond  the  party.  In  lieu  of  the  `Assembly  poll',  a 
special  meeting  of  UMNO  was  convened  in  December  1998  to  amend  parts  of  the 
party's  constitution  in  order  to  limit  the  pro-Anwar  faction.  132  Following  this,  Mahathir 
was  quoted  as  saying  that  he  wanted  his  next  deputy  to  be  an  "exact  replica  of  myself' 
(spawning  a  plethora  of  `cloning'  jokes  among  the  opposition)  with  regard  to  policy 
direction:  "The  main  thing  is  that  the  policies  are  followed.. 
.  not  so  much  the 
personalities.  "  133  Again,  this  emphasis  was  indicative  of  the  policy  issues,  rather  than 
personal  nature,  of  Mahathir's  dismissal  of  Anwar.  However,  alongside  growing 
concerns  over  Mahathir's  health,  there  were  gathering  fears  that  such  prevarication 
would  be  read  as  signs  of  fumbling  and  disunity  within  UMNO.  Mahathir  had  managed 
166 to  avoid  an  outright  split.  But  deep  down,  the  party  had  been  riven  by  serious,  if  still 
contained,  factionalism,  particularly  at  the  divisional  levels. 
In  January  1999,  Mahathir  moved  to  ameliorate  this  situation  by  appointing 
Äbdullah  Badawi  as  his  Deputy.  However,  while  this  helped  ease  short-term  speculation 
about  a  `timetable'  for  the  `handover',  it  was,  in  reality,  a  cosmetic  move;  part  of  an 
unfolding  PR  initiative  by  the  UMNO  network.  (See  Chapter  6.  )  Thus,  there  was  no 
certainty  that  `Mr.  Clean',  as  he  would  come  to  be  packaged  by  the  media  (inadvertently 
casting  a  stain  over  the  rest),  would  ever  succeed  Mahathir.  In  seeking  to  stem  dissent, 
around  400  known  Anwar  sympathisers  had  been  expelled  from  UMNO  by  mid-1999.134 
However,  this  could  not  disguise  the  growing  gulf  among  UMNO's  2.7  million  members. 
Another  worrying  indicator  for  UMNO  at  this  point  was  the  by-election  loss  of  the  BN 
stronghold  Arau  seat  (Perlis)  to  PAS.  135 
In  response,  clampdowns  on  DAP  and  PAS  ceramahs  and  police  harassment  of 
civil  gatherings  were  now  increasing.  The  police  had  also  disrupted  a  civil  rights 
convention  of  concerned  Malaysian  lawyers,  the  `Gathering  of  Legal  Eagles',  in  May 
1998.136  Another  such  dinner  gathering  in  Negri  Sembilan  was  permitted  to  take  place 
on  condition  that  no  speeches  were  made,  prompting  a  Media  Statement  from  Lim  Kit 
Siang  entitled:  "Is  Mahathir's  Vision  2020  nothing  more  than  Vision  `Animal Farm' 
where  the  people  can  eat  but  cannot  talk"?  137 
In  a  sharper  reminder  of  the  network's  coercive  capacities,  the  Court  of  Appeal 
increased  DAP  MP  Lim  Kit  Siang's  RM15,000  fine  to  a  three  year  jail  sentence  for 
`criticising  the  judiciary'  and  `spreading  false  news'.  Lim,  the  DAP  leader's  son,  had 
been  found  guilty  in  April  1997  of  offences  under  8A(1)  of  the  Printing  Presses  and 
Publications  Act  (1984)  and  Section  4(1)(b)  of  the  Sedition  Act  (1948)  following  his 
criticism  of  the  decision  not  to  prosecute  UMNO  politician  and  former  Malacca  Chief 
Minister  Rahim  Tamby  Chik  on  under-age  sex  and  statutory  rape  charges.  Lim,  who  had 
supported  the  girl  in  question,  had  been  fined  for  publishing  a  critical  pamphlet  (True 
Story  Talk)  and  for  making  a  critical  speech  on  the  issue  at  a  Malacca  hotel  in  1995. 
Under  Article  48  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  Lim  was  also  disqualified  from  office  as  an 
138 
While  public  concern  was  growing  over  these  abuses  of  power,  open  dissent  had 
been  limited.  However,  the  Anwar  purge  now  provided  a  catalyst  for  the  fuller 
167 emergence  of  a  new  `moral  politics'.  In  particular,  a  mood  was  forming  that  Mahathir 
had  now  transgressed  Malay  cultural  sensitivities  by  seeking  to  shame  and  humiliate 
Anwar,  rather  than  just  indict  him  on  legal  grounds.  As  one  key  Aliran  piece  put  it  by 
early-1999: 
When  Anwar  Ibrahim  was  dismissed  on  moral  grounds,  the  party  president  (being  too  much  of  a 
moderniser)  was  out  of  touch  with  the  existence  of  an  ancient  Malay  social  covenant:  a  ruler  should 
never  resort  to  the  ploy  of  shaming  a  subject  (memberi  äib)...  Not  once  in  the  history  of  UMNO  has  any 
prominent  dissident  been  so  publicly  humiliated-and  removed  on  moral  grounds...  The  removal  of 
Anwar  Ibrahim  is  the  one  single  political  event  that  has  been  responsible  for  unleashing  the  many  facets 
of  Malay  resentment.  139 
Here,  in  effect,  was  one  `Asian  value'  that  Mahathir  could  not  invoke  to  legitimise  his 
actions.  In  this  sense,  the  crisis  had  created  new  political  uncertainties.  For  Mahathir,  an 
ISA-style  clampdown  now  appeared  a  less  viable  option  given  the  severity  of  the  crisis 
and  the  futility  of  that  strategy  in  Indonesia.  Thus,  while  still  managing  to  hold  the 
political  bloc  together  through  coercive  and  consensual  controls,  the  more  critical 
question  was  whether  national  popular  support  could  be  maintained. 
Thus,  the  political  configuration  of  the  power  bloc  had  been  re-shaped  in  significant  ways 
by  the  time  of  the  1997  crisis.  The  shift  from  NEP  priorities  to  the  NDP,  privatisation 
and  the  Vision  had  altered  the  basis  of  state-class  relations.  The  1987  split  can  be  seen 
as  the  political  expression  of  policy  conflicts  within  this  process.  Anwar's  ascendancy 
also  saw  a  new  power  faction  within  UMNO  and  competition  for  control  of  key  political 
offices  and  corporate  sites.  Despite  this,  a  more  effective  consolidation  of  the  political 
bloc  was  evident  by  the  mid-1990s.  Four  main  elements  were  evident  here:  firstly, 
Daim's  re-distribution  of  rewards,  allowing  not  only  Malay,  but  big  Chinese,  capital  a 
closer  relationship  to  UMNO;  secondly,  Mahathir's  efforts  in  checking  Bumiputeraism 
by  offering  the  Chinese  community  continued  economic  rewards  -  thus,  securing  an 
unprecedented  level  of  non-Malay  support  at  the  1995  Election;  thirdly,  Mahathir's 
political  dexterity  in  fending-off  internal  challenges  and  managing  the  `Anwar 
succession';  and  fourthly,  Mahathir's  persona  as  moderniser  and  global  statesman,  a 
charismatic  profile  which  had  helped  galvanise  support  across  the  ethnic  spectrum.  In  all 
168 of  these  regards,  relations  within  the  political  bloc  had  assumed  a  new  coherence  by  the 
mid-1990s. 
Yet,  behind  the  scenes,  the  political  bloc  had  been  severely  tested  by  the  crisis. 
Here,  Mahathir  had  shown  consummate  skill  in  containing  internal  dissent,  protecting  his 
own  position  and  holding  the  bloc  together.  While  using  the  political  process  to  divert 
attention  from  the  economy  in  the  early  phase  of  the  crisis,  he  had  skilfully  re-focused 
attention  towards  it  during  the  emergency  phase  in  order  to  rationalise  the  Anwar  purge 
and  rebuild  consent.  But  while  support  within  the  political  bloc  had  been  consolidated, 
the  appeal  for  populist  support  was  now  a  more  contingent  affair.  With  a  cross-ethnic 
middle-class  badly  hurt  and  a  `moral  concern'  emerging  within  the  wider  Malay 
community,  UMNO  was  now  seriously  detached  from  its  populist  moorings.  This  takes 
us,  more  specifically,  to  the  ideological  dimension  of  the  Vision  project  and  the 
intellectual  enterprise  used  to  manage  the  crisis  and  the  Anwar  affair. 
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Organic  intellectuals:  ideological 
production  and  the  UMNO  network 
We  are  living  through  a  revolutionary  period  in  the  history  of  mass-communications, 
with  profound  implications  for  the  organisation  of  states  and  societies.  As  political  and 
social  identities  become  less  uniform,  the  medium  of  communications  becomes  more 
crucial.  The  more  fluid  the  reward  system,  the  more  vigilant  the  state  must  be  in 
managing  the  evolving  social  outcomes.  Social  control  and  ideological  persuasion  are, 
thus,  being  fashioned  through  a  new  complex  of  information  sites  and  emerging 
technologies.  Combining  these  developments  with  the  view  that  hegemony  is  an  ongoing 
enterprise,  the  production  and  dissemination  of  intellectual  discourse,  information, 
entertainment  and  populist  iconography  has  come  to  represent  an  increasingly  vital 
element  of  class  control  and  political  legitimation. 
This  invites  consideration  of  the  ways  in  which  ideological  production  has  helped 
sustain  UMNO  control  and  the  sense  in  which  a  more  nuanced  form  of  persuasion  was 
emerging  through  the  language  of  Vision  2020  by  the  mid-1990s.  Malaysia's  `passage  to 
modernity'  has  created  new  social  expectations,  economic  divisions  and  cultural 
uncertainties.  The  conflicting  claims  of  Islam  and  consumer  culture  have  further 
complicated  popular  consciousness.  In  response,  Mahathir  has  sought  to  fashion  hybrid 
forms  of  capitalist  modernity,  Islamic  morality  and  ethnic  collectivism  as  a  basis  for 
national-popular  support.  Let  us  now  consider  the  nature  of  UMNO  enterprise  within 
this  changing  civil  space  and  the  particular  projection  of  Vision  discourse  through  the 
mass-media.  This  takes  us,  in  the  following  chapter,  to  a  more  specific  analysis  of  the 
media  during  the  Anwar  affair. 
Civil  society,  organicity  and  the  UMNO  network 
One  of  Gramsci's  most  prescient  insights  was  his  attempt  to  show  the  importance  of 
cultural  production  as  an  evolving  feature  of  capitalist  society.  Here,  organic  intellectuals 
175 play  a  central  role  in  the  construction  of  ideas;  the  very  organisation  of  hegemony. 
Gramsci's  view  of  intellectual  enterprise  provides,  in  this  regard,  an  advanced  reading  of 
`base-superstructure'  relations  within  marxist  theory,  '  allowing  a  more  qualitative  shift 
from  economistic  conceptions  of  state-civil  relations. 
As  a  party  apparatus,  UMNO  embodies  this  idea  of  organic  integration  between 
these  spheres.  The  principal  axis  of  the  network  is  the  UMNO/BN  political  alliance.  But 
it  extends  outwards  and  beyond  conventional  party  arrangements.  These  chains  of 
influence  range  from  corporate  elites  and  party  affiliates,  such  as  Wanita  UMNO,  2  to  the 
BN  controlled  media,  from  Islamic  forums  and  JKKKs  to  voluntary  bodies  and  a  panoply 
of  small  organisations.  A  small  example  of  such  would  include  institutions  such  as  the 
Malaysian  Women's  Advancement  Institute,  whose  activities  include  the  publication  of 
the  1995  biography  Mahathir:  Epitome  of  a  Statesman?  Reverential  discourse  such  as 
this,  launched  by  prominent  political  figures,  endorsed  through  business  patronage  and 
covered  in  celebratory  form  by  the  popular  media,  captures  the  integrated  sense  in  which 
`party  intellectuals'  of  all  types  come  to  articulate  positive,  populist  images  of  the  BN 
system. 
This  is  not  to  suggest  uniformity  of  thought  or  absence  of  discrete  agendas. 
Rather,  `hegemonic  networking'  denotes  fluidity,  interaction  and  accommodation, 
wherein  particular  actors  and  institutions  may  have  particular  sectoral  interests  to  protect 
or  advance,  but  also  hold  to  a  `shared  perspective'  on  the  maintenance  of  the  broader 
power  structure.  Thus,  such  bodies  perform  a  commonly-focused  support-role,  helping 
to  reproduce  dominant  interests  and  ideas  through  diverse  processes  of  political, 
corporate  and  ideological  exchange.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  always  room  for  the 
incorporation  of  new  interest  groups  and  alliances,  a  complex  internalisation  of  interests 
allowing  participation  across  the  state-civil  spectrum. 
It  is  not  difficult  to  see  liberal  objections  to  such  a  view.  Here,  the  state  is 
viewed,  a  priori,  as  distinct  from  civil  society,  a  potentially  pluralist  realm.  State 
authoritarianism  is  the  generic  model  of  explanation  here,  with  civil  freedoms  and 
democratic  expression  stunted  by  an  all-encompassing  central  power.  Understandably, 
liberal  and  left-leaning  reformers  in  Malaysia  are  reluctant  to  move  beyond  this  paradigm 
as  they  witness  the  continual  deployment  of  the  ISA  and  other  repressive  instruments. 
Yet,  while  recognising  the  specificity  of  this  apparatus,  it  is  also  worth  noting  how  state 
176 instruments  are  wielded  in  Western  societies  as  strategies  of  class  control.  4  The  more 
particular  point,  though,  is  the  sense  in  which  social  control  in  Malaysia,  by  the  mid- 
1990s,  was  becoming  organised  around  a  more  nuanced  mix  of  state  coercion  and  civil 
persuasion. 
The  importance  of  civil  society  as  a  contested  political  space  is  evident  in  the 
growing  sense  of  civil  awareness  amongst  Malaysians.  Recent  findings  on  rising  levels  of 
`civil  consciousness'  in  Malaysia  would  appear  to  corroborate  this  view.  For  example, 
the  major  national  study  Caring  Civil  Society,  carried  out  by  social  researchers  at 
Universiti  Sains  Malaysia,  5  found  high  rates  of  civil  awareness  across  a  wide  range  of 
social,  political  and  cultural  issues.  Noticeable  here  was  the  absence  of  any  significant 
variation  across  the  three  sample  states  studied,  Penang,  Kedah  and  Kelantan.  Measured 
against  sampled  questions  to  5000  respondents,  a  Civil  Consciousness  Index  (CCI) 
showed  high  levels  of  civil  awareness  on  four  out  of  five  main  indices: 
"  Ethnic  Tolerance  (Attitudinal  orientation  toward  other  ethnic  groups  including  affinity  to  accept 
differences  and  interaction  with  other  ethnic  groups)  69.7% 
"  Political  Efficacy  (Willingness  to  use  formal-institutional  as  well  as  non-formal  processes  to 
affect  political  outcomes)  76.5% 
"  Civil  Right  Awareness  (Concern  for  basic  human  rights  as  well  as  awareness  of  these  rights) 
45% 
"  Public  Spiritedness  (Willingness  to  contribute  to  the  public  good  through  various  responsible 
public  acts)  78.3% 
"  Ecological  Awareness  (Concern  for  the  preservation  of  the  natural  environment  and  willingness 
to  act  to  preserve  or  not  to  destroy  the  natural  environment)  79.9% 
The  main  exception  here,  the  low-level  of  civil-rights  awareness,  would  seem  to 
indicate  the  still  rather  conservative  nature  of  the  Malaysian  electorate  and  a  certain 
ambivalence  over  the  exercising  of  political  rights.  For  example,  while  58%  supported 
the  decentralisation  of  local  authorities,  only  44%  think  these  bodies  should  be  elected 
rather  than  appointed.  6  Other  questions  within  these  main  indices  also  reveal  concerns 
over  the  erosion  of  social  institutions  and  ethical  values.  For  example,  48%  viewed 
`overconsumption'  as  the  reason  for  `society  [being]  very  materialistic'  (around  24% 
seeing  `corruption'  as  the  cause).  52%  upheld  `the  family'  as  `the  agent  most 
177 responsible  for  cultivating  moral  and  ethical  values'  (followed  by  16.5%  citing  `the 
individual').  57%  thought  `a  caring  society  in  Malaysia  can  be  achieved'  if  people 
become  more  `co-operative  and  less  demanding'  (followed  by  29%  who  said  `if  we 
become  more  religious').  The  overwhelming  majority  (83%  to  95%)  believed  that  the 
state  should  maintain  a  central  role  in  ensuring  public  welfare,  law  and  order  and  other 
basic  services.  At  the  same  time,  there  was  strong  support  (around  85%),  for  the 
participation  of  non-state  actors  in  these  areas,  such  as  NGOs,  employers,  individuals 
and  the  family.  However,  despite  marginal  support  (between  53%  and  59%)  for 
privatised  services  (such  as  utilities  and  elderly  care),  this  did  not  translate  into  support 
for  business  corporations  taking  a  leading  role  in  the  provision  of  education  or  the  main 
health  services.  With  regard  to  the  Vision,  80%  expressed  a  `need  to  participate  in 
decisions  about  national  development',  with  60%  having  `benefited  from  the 
development  that  has  taken  place  over  the  years'.  Yet,  only  22%  agreed  that  `limiting 
individual  rights  in  Malaysia  was  important  in  attaining  our  level  of  development.  ' 
Alongside  the  impact  of  the  crisis,  such  indices  help  illustrate  the  increasingly 
fluid  nature  of  Malaysian  civil  society  and  shift  in  social  identities.  But  they  also  suggest, 
for  the  UMNO  network,  the  importance  of  controlling  the  civil  space,  a  key  feature  of 
that  process  being  the  articulation  of  its  ideas  through  the  mass-media. 
Networks  of  influence:  the  media  in  Malaysia 
The  main  aim  here  is  to  identify  the  ways  in  which  news,  information  and  cultural  output 
in  Malaysia  is  structured  and  presented,  not  only  as  overt  state  propaganda,  but  as  a 
more  subtle  vector  of  civil  values.  Again,  this  invites  consideration  of  how  civil 
persuasion  and  coercive  interventions  are  being  used  as  variable  tools  to  maintain  the 
ideas  and  interests  of  the  leading  group.  In  this  regard,  Loh  Kok  Wah  and  Mustafa  K. 
Anuar  have  noted  three  main  instruments  of  press  control  in  Malaysia  (each  broadly 
applicable  to  the  electronic  media):  "coercive  legislations";  "ownership  and  control  of  the 
major  publications";  and  the  practice  of  "responsible  development  journalism".  7  Here, 
we  are  mainly  concerned  with  the  latter,  as  a  conceptual  indicator  of  Vision  discourse. 
However,  let  us,  firstly,  note  the  significance  of  the  other  two  elements  as 
complementary  to  this  process. 
178 The  foremost  state  mechanism  of  press  control  is  the  Printing  Presses  and 
Publications  Act  (1984).  The  main  corresponding  legislation  for  the  electronic  media  is 
the  Broadcasting  Act  (1988).  With  regard  to  the  press,  all  publications  are  required  to 
apply  for  an  annual  publishing  permit,  which  can  be  revoked  where  the  applicant  has 
been  deemed  to  have  negated  certain  state-interpreted  `national  interests'.  This  was  the 
Star's  fate  in  1987  during  Operation  Lalang.  Since  the  return  of  its  permit  in  March 
1988,  the  Star  has  never  regained  its  previous  `liberal  flavour'.  With  similar  intent,  the 
Home  Affairs  Ministry  has  also  imposed  various  restrictions  on  the  Rocket  and  Harakah, 
respective  papers  of  the  DAP  and  PAS.  ' 
At  the  same  time,  the  proliferation  of  new  media  forms  had  created  more 
sensitive  problems  over  the  control  of  public  information  and  entertainment.  Much  of 
this  stems  from  the  deregulatory  process  and  gathering  corporatisation  of  the  press  and 
electronic  media  from  the  1980s.  Thus,  while  the  Ministry  of  Information  sought  to 
promote  competition  by  issuing  more  publishing  permits  for  new  daily  newspapers  such 
as  The  Edge  (a  business-based  title  "reflecting  the  higher  demographic  profile  of  the 
`new  Malay',  who  is  increasingly  urban,  middle-class  and  professional"9)  it  also 
continued  issuing  cautious  reminders.  For  example,  the  three  Chinese  language  papers 
China  Press,  Sin  Chew  Jit  Poh  and  Nanyang  Siang  Pau  all  received  warnings  that  their 
licences  would  be  revoked  if  they  published  articles  undermining  `the  government's 
efforts  in  creating  a  multiracial  society'.  10 
Under  the  Broadcasting  Act,  similar  stringent  conditions  and  powers  apply.  The 
1988  Act,  notes  Zaharom  Nain,  was  introduced: 
in  anticipation  of  the  further  commercialisation  of  broadcasting,  especially  television.  Indeed,  in  the 
midst  of  the  supposed  `deregulation'  of  broadcasting  [it]  now  gives  the  Minister  of  Information  virtually 
total  powers  to  determine  who  will,  and  who  will  not  broadcast,  and  to  determine  the  nature  of  the 
broadcast  material...  On  paper,  this  means  one  individual  has  the  power  to  decide.  " 
Control  of  media  output  has  also  been  used  to  contain  the  social  consequences  of 
economic  development  -  robbery,  domestic  violence,  drug  abuse,  divorce,  the  `moral 
threat'  of  `youth  delinquency'  and  lepak  culture  (loafing).  In  1995,  the  Information 
Minister,  Mohamed  Rahmat,  directed  the  Film  censorship  board  to  enforce  a  clampdown 
on  sex,  violence  and  consumer  imagery  on  TV,  afraid  that,  among  other  things,  it  would 
179 leave  the  government  open  to  charges  of  moral  relativism  from  PAS.  12  Further  reactions 
such  as  an  anti-vice  crackdown  on  the  entertainment  industry  and  early-closing  of 
fashionable  Kuala  Lumpur  nightspots  reflect  the  added  concern  that  the  disproportionate 
share  of  such  activity  involves  Malays  rather  than  other  ethnic  groups.  13  The  emergent 
crisis  had  intensified  these  concerns.  In  the  first  three  months  of  1998,  overall  crime 
figures,  most  notably  armed  robbery  and  property  related  crime,  in  Malaysia.  rose  by 
53%,  14  indicating  a  direct  correlation  between  economic  instability  and  social 
dislocation.  In  this  regard,  coercive  media  control  has  been  used  as  a  reactive  strategy  to 
avert  social  breakdown,  allowing  the  state,  in  turn,  an  expanded  rationale  for  further 
censorship. 
The  second  form  of  consolidation  has  been  through  media  ownership.  The 
central  point  to  be  noted  here  is  the  tight  concentration  of  media  control  in  Malaysia, 
whether  through  state  ownership,  political  patronage  or  trustee  proxies.  Although 
comprising  a  complex  web  of  interlocking  companies,  the  bulk  of  media  equity  in 
Malaysia  is,  in  essence,  controlled  by  a  minority  circle  of  UMNO,  MCA  and  MIC 
investment  and  holding  companies  alongside  other  business  elites  closely  aligned  to  the 
Barisan.  For  example,  through  trustee  companies  tied  to  the  UMNO  investment  arm 
Fleet  Holdings  and  Renong  Bhd,  UMNO  has  been  able  to  secure  control  over  the  two 
main  publishing  groups,  New  Straits  Times  Press  (NSTP)  and  Utusan  Melayu.  ls  In  the 
field  of  electronic  media,  the  state  retains  direct  control  over  the  two  Radio  Televisyen 
Malaysia  (RTM)  channels  TV  I  and  TV2.  However,  with  the  shift  towards  privatised 
delivery  of  public  services  from  the  1980s,  new  commercial  media  franchises  signalled  a 
corporate  bonanza  for  well-placed  business  clients.  Beginning  with  the  launch  of  TV3  in 
1984,  Sistem  Televisyen  Malaysia  Bhd  (STMB),  another  holding  company  closely 
associated  with  UMNO,  was  awarded  the  first  commercial  contract  by  the  government. 
In  1994,  the  Utusan  Group  became  part  of  a  four  company  consortium  awarded  the 
tender  to  operate  the  second  new  commercial  TV  station  Metro  Vision.  Sistem 
Television  also  attained  a  majority  40%  share  of  Mega  TV,  the  country's  first 
subscription  channel  launched  in  1995,  the  other  major  shareholder  being  the  Ministry  of 
Finance  with  30%.  16  In  March  1998,  another  commercial  station  Natseven  (NTV7) 
began  broadcasting.  Owned  by  Effendi  Norwawi,  Vice  President  of  the  PBBB,  part  of 
180 the  BN  coalition  in  Sarawak,  it  has  sought  to  position  itself  as  a  main  challenger  to  TV3, 
offering  a  more  `feelgood'  and  `risk-taking'  output.  (See  below.  ) 
The  Utusan  Group,  one  of  the  two  major  national  newspaper  publishers,  also 
produces  one  of  the  leading  Malay  dailies,  Utusan  Malaysia.  Its  main  competitor,  the 
New  Straits  Times  Group,  latterly  controlled  by  business  executives  linked  to  Anwar, 
publishes  the  country's  two  main  English  and  Malay  titles,  the  New  Straits  Times  and 
Berita  Harian.  '7  The  major  controlling  stake  in  Star  Publications  Sdn  Bhd,  publisher  of 
the  English  daily  Star  is  held  by  Huaren  Holdings,  an  investment  arm  of  the  MCA. 
Table  S:  1  Selected  Peninsular  Malaysia  (daily)  newspaper  circulation  figures18 
July  96-  July  97-  July  98-  Jan  99- 
June  97  June  98  Dec  98  June  99 
Bahasa  newspapers 
Utusan  Malaysia  253,680  267,765  265,515  229,133 
Berita  Harlan  272,615  249,756  245,445  208,559 
Harlan  Metro  85,540  77,036  65,111  62,404 
English  newspapers 
New  Straits  Times  163,287  155,977  143,110  134,812 
The  Star  206,832  220,493  231,573  239,789 
The  Sun  77,328  82,247  82,705 
The  Malay  Mail  54,234  48,569  44,406  38,376 
The  Edge  11,862  12,092  12,280 
Chinese  newspapers 
Sin  Chew  Jit  Poh  237,604  264,283 
Nanyang  Siang  Pau  184,279  175,339 
Guan  Ming  Daily  91,602  100,475 
China  Press  171,636 
The  newest  major  English-speaking  daily,  the  Sun,  owned  by  Vincent  Tan  Chee 
Yioun,  multi-millionaire  head  of  the  lucrative  Berjaya  Group,  has  positioned  itself  as  a 
fresh  contender,  notably  to  the  Star.  19  Tan's  70%  acquisition  of  Sports  Toto  in  1985,  a 
key  privatisation  facilitated  by  Daim,  was  the  main  impetus  for  the  rapid  expansion  of  the 
Berjaya  empire,  Tan's  wealth  reflecting  close  relations  with  prominent  UMNO  elites.  20 
However,  `quiet  warnings'  over  content  had  been  issued  on  occasion  to  the  Sun  by  the 
Ministry  of  Information.  In  part,  this  reflected  attempts  to  market  the  paper  as  a  more 
innovative  and  `critical'  alternative  to  the  other  dailies.  (See  below.  ) 
At  a  more  general  level,  media  ownership  and  editorial  influence  had  become  a 
vital  part  of  the  political  manoeuvring  for  control  within  UMNO  -  as  key  Anwar  people 
181 within  the  Utusan  Group  and  TV3  would  soon  discover  to  their  cost.  However,  while 
these  power  games  continued  behind  the  scenes,  mainstream  press  output  continued,  for 
the  most  part,  to  reflect  the  overall  Barisan  view  rather  than  particular  elements  within 
UMNO.  And  yet,  despite  this  entrenched  compliance  and  failure  to  cover  key  issues,  2'  a 
nominally  more  `liberal'  press  had  emerged  by  the  mid-1990s.  This  was  because 
proprietors  and  journalists  now  understood,  more  fully,  the  boundaries  of  critical  output. 
The  third  feature  of  media  control,  `responsible  development  journalism',  offers  a 
helpful  gateway  here.  The  promotion  of  such,  through  a  populist  ideology  of  growth, 
has  helped  cast  UMNO  as  beneficent  provider,  while  concealing  the  contradictions  and 
weaknesses  of  the  development  process  itself.  Thus,  the  Malaysian  media  is  constantly 
awash  with  photo  opportunities,  messages,  slogans,  soundbites,  nationalist  songs  and 
jingles,  editorials  and  corporate  advertising  all  extolling  the  common  challenge  of  onward 
industrial  development.  The  messages  are  both  overt  and  subliminal,  whether  it  be 
Mahathir's  almost-daily  appearances  on  the  front  page  of  the  New  Straits  Times,  Star  or 
Utusan  Malaysia  opening  another  industrial  plant,  or  the  Telefakta  information  adverts 
(TV2)  displaying  (over  catchy  music)  simplified  statistics  of  improved  industrial  output. 
As  we  shall  see,  responsible  development  journalism  is  also  implicit  in  the  content  of  TV 
news  and  current  affairs  output.  Thus,  both  mediums  seek  to  limit  critical  analysis  and 
adversarial  commentary  by  utilising  developmentalism  as  a  routine  context  for  the 
filtering  of  news  and  stories.  22 
This  agenda  is  particularly  evident  during  general  elections.  Here,  the  media  play 
a  pivotal  role  in  framing  ideas  and  issues,  camouflaging  news,  creating  punchy  political 
adverts,  humanising  coalition  candidates,  demonising  others,  and  promoting  a  sense  of 
`naturalised'  affinity  between  the  Barisan  and  the  electorate  through  the  populist 
imagery  of  nation-building,  ethnic  harmony  and  Vision  emotionalism?  During  the  1995 
General  Election,  the  media  frequently  misrepresented  opposition  messages,  lampooned 
opposition  leaders  and  alleged  underhand  dealings  between  the  DAP  and  PAS.  For  the 
first  time,  morning  TV  was  used  to  provide  a  favourable  platform  for  BN  messages.  24 
The  effectiveness  of  the  UMNO  media  was  also  evident  during  Mahathir's  bid  to 
replace  Kedah  Chief  Minister  Osman  Aroff  with  Sanusi  Junid.  Here,  without  openly 
supporting  the  PM,  the  media  ran  detrimental  stories  about  Osman,  criticised  his 
leadership  and  speculated  consistently  on  whether  he  would  resign.  25 
182 A  further  variation  of  responsible  journalism  could  be  seen  in  the  media's  self- 
imposed  news  blackout  during  the  Kampung  Rawa  mosque-temple  disturbances  in 
March  1998.26  This  was  followed  by  praising  reports  of  Anwar's  public  arbitration 
between  the  contending  parties,  in  contrast  to  the  `malevolent'  reporting  of  the  foreign 
media.  27  Despite  the  understandable  vigilance  over  alarmist  coverage,  the  incident 
characterised  the  way  in  which  UMNO/BN  seek  to  monopolise  the  moral  high  ground  on 
ethnic  relations.  Here,  for  instance,  Mahathir  had  `appealed'  to  DAP  and  PAS  not  to 
make  political  capital  from  the  incident,  a  statement  carrying  an  overtone  of  moral 
authority  and  an  undertone  of  suggested  distrust,  provoking  Lim  Kit  Siang,  in  defence- 
like  manner,  to  restate  his  own  commitment  to  ethnic  harmony.  21 
This  message  is  also  evident  in  the  coverage  of  the  annual  Merdeka  Day.  Here, 
the  Barisan  become  synonymous  with  the  `hegemonic  triangle'  of  moral  harmony, 
economic  achievement  and  political  benevolence,  a  blended  imagery  captured  at  the 
height  of  `Late  Mahathirism'  in  the  New  Straits  Times  1994  National  Day  Special.  Here, 
the  thematic  headline  `Towards  a  Caring  Society'  is  proclaimed  along  the  page  top. 
Below  this  is  an  attractively  designed  feature  on  the  Malaysian  car  industry,  with  the 
upbeat  heading:  `Proton  car  best  symbol  of  growth'.  Completing  the  page  is  the 
ebullient  figure  of  Anwar  pictured  at  the  levers  of  a  tractor  and  a  detailed  article 
announcing  his  plans  for  a  major  low-cost  housing  package.  Other  pages  contain  a 
similar  array  of  pictures,  graphics  and  features  projecting  messages  of  social  cohesion, 
technological  advancement  and  caring  government.  Such  ideals  are  also  reflected  in  the 
full-page  corporate  adverts,  such  as  Telekom  Malaysia's  Merdeka  Day  message:  `As  We 
Race  To  The  Vision,  Let's  Not  Leave  Our  Values  Behind'.  29  Thus,  both  here  and 
beyond  the  coverage  of  popular  events,  the  `national'  becomes  merged  into  the  political. 
As  Kua  Kia  Soong  notes: 
...  the  most  serious  aspect  of  the  press  is  its  failure  to  point  out  the  clear  line  between  the  `interests  of  the 
nation'  and  the  interests  of  the  government.  30 
The  anodyne  nature  of  mainstream  media  content  can  also  be  seen  in  the  process 
of  film  and  television  production.  Here,  Nain  notes  how  "the  media  as  a  whole  in 
Malaysia  dulls  the  senses  of  the  audience,  virtually  never  inviting  us  to  question  the 
status  quo.  "  Noting  the  profusion  of  locally-produced  films  and  TV  series  which 
183 "...  unashamedly  aim  at  legitimating  the  existence  of  the  state  apparatus",  and  the 
reluctance  to  offer  critical  reviews  of  such  output,  the  source  of  the  malaise,  he  argues, 
lies  in  a  passive  acceptance  of  the  social  order.  The  problem  expresses  itself  at  the  levels 
of  cultural  production  and  intellectual  enquiry,  creating  an  insularity  of  thought  and  a 
lack  of  stimuli  to  think  the  unconventional: 
...  the  activity  of  film  making...  cannot  divorce  [itself]  from  the  prevailing  political,  economic  and  cultural 
circumstances.  Ours  is  an  extraordinarily  `sensitive'  society  -  or  at  least  has  been  made  to  become  that 
way  by  powerful  social  and  political  forces.  It  is  a  society  where  even  a  tender  kissing  scene  between 
two  consenting  adults  in  a  movie  is  deemed  sufficient  to  corrupt  us...  Indeed...  where  it  is  an  everyday 
occurrence  for  courting  couples  to  be  apprehended  by  the  authorities  for  being  together,  with  their 
clothes  on...  What  we  need  to  understand  is  that  religion  -  in  its  narrowest  sense  -  has  become  firmly 
entangled  with  our  political  and  cultural  circumstances.  31 
In  the  words  of  another  critic,  he  notes  how: 
...  we  risk  creating...  'a  society  emotionally  lobotomised  by  the  loss  of  its  freedom  to  dream  and  fantasise 
on  the  dark,  as  well  as  the  light,  side  of  the  imagination.  '  32 
But  the  Malaysian  media  was  also  being  conditioned  by  the  `Murdoch  effect'  in  the 
1990s,  33  with  the  corporatisation  and  privatisation  of  the  press  and  TV  denoting  new 
accommodations  to  transnational  interests: 
Since  its  inception  until  today,  Malaysian  television  has  forged  links  with  the  international  media 
market.  However,  what  may  indeed  initially  have  been  a  convenient  and,  perhaps,  necessary 
compromise  in  terms  of  programming  is  becoming  an  unholy  alliance  between  transnational  media 
companies  and  the  local  media  elites.  In  their  seemingly  relentless  quest  to  get  as  much  revenue  as 
possible  from  television,  the  policy  makers,  consciously  or  otherwise,  have  aligned  themselves  with  the 
transnational  actors,  leading  Malaysian  television  even  further  into  the  international  marketplace,  not  so 
much  as  a  producer  but  as  an  insatiable  consumer.  34 
Despite  Mahathir's  own  warning  that  the  profit  motive  was  undermining  the 
responsibility  of  local  television  stations  to  produce  varied  programmes,  Malaysian 
television  has  continued  to  offer  a  diet  of  cheap  imported  soaps,  movies  and  sport,  with 
184 locally-produced  sit-corns,  drama  and  current  affairs  formats  appearing  as  essentially 
"sub-standard  copies  of  mainly  western  genres.  "35 
Of  course,  it  would  be  facile  to  suggest  that  all  such  media  representations  are 
accepted  universally  or  uncritically  within  Malaysian  society.  Indeed,  beneath  the  veneer 
of  conformity  and  `respect  for  authority'  there  is  also  an  underlying  capacity  for  critical 
reflection,  iconoclastic  humour  and  political  repartee.  36  Yet,  this  is  still  confined  mainly 
to  alternative  publishing  forms  and  quietly  tolerated  middle-class  satire.  For  example, 
favoured  within  the  convivial  circle  of  Kuala  Lumpur's  smart  set,  the  comedy  group 
Instant  Cafe  Theatre  have  engaged  in  a  somewhat  risque  routine  of  underhand  social 
commentary  and  political  parody.  Though  tame  by  Western  standards,  their  sharp  jabs  at 
UMNO  authority  and  the  party  elite  often  touch  sensitive  political  nerves.  Yet,  like 
other  media  forms,  it  has  been  a  contained  middle-class  outlet,  rarely  subversive  or 
capable  of  mainstream  dissent.  Indeed,  having  amused  Mahathir  and  Anwar,  the  group 
became  de  rigeur  at  the  big  fashionable  dinner  parties  of  top  corporate  elites  like  Ananda 
Krishnan.  37  Thus,  while  offering  a  certain  space  for  urbane  dissent,  it  is  in  a  managed 
form,  rarely  allowed  to  move  beyond  the  parameters  of  `responsible'  political  expression. 
Middle-class  perceptions  of  `press  freedom'  and  political  dissent  have,  likewise, 
been  qualified  by  this  internalised  view  of  authority,  a  view  acknowledged  and 
rationalised  by  the  writer  Rehman  Rashid: 
It's  not  done  in  Malaysia,  it's  not  your  fundamental  right  to  stand  up  [as  in]  Hyde  Park  corner  or 
London  [sic]  and  say  your  piece.  We  don't  have  that  here.  So...  dissent  is  not  encouraged  in  this 
country  ... 
it's  neither  encouraged  or  discouraged.  If  you've  got  something  to  say,  you  can  say  it,  but  you 
have  to  think  it  through  and  you  have  to  be  prepared  to  be  argued  down  very  sternly,  even  maybe  not 
argued  down,  maybe  taken  away  and  told  to  shut  up.  You  know.  But  that's  the  price.  And,  God  bless 
us,  Malaysians  have  not  been  cowed  to  the  point  of  total  silence.  38 
This  careful  middle-class  consciousness  permeates  Malaysian  society.  In  turn,  it 
has  allowed  the  political  elite,  notably  in  times  of  economic  boom,  to  adopt  a  relatively 
relaxed  attitude  towards  `middle-class  expression',  even  the  occasional  lampooning  of 
government  policy.  As  such,  one  of  the  more  significant  features  of  changing  press 
styles  in  Malaysia  has  been  a  growing  propensity  towards  would-be  middle-class  issues, 
consumer  concerns,  identity  and  lifestyle.  The  New  Straits  Times  can  be  seen  as 
185 something  of  a  forerunner  in  this  respect  with  its  major  revamp  and  introduction  of  a  new 
Lifestyle  -  now  Life  and  Times  -  section  in  1991.  This  was  followed  by  similar 
stylistic  changes  at  The  Star,  Utusan  Malaysia,  Berita  Harian  (sister  paper  to  the  New 
Straits  Times)  and  the  main  Chinese  dailies  Sin  Chew  and  Nanyang.  What  energised  all 
the  mainstream  press  here  was  the  realisation  of  how  economic  expansion  had  created 
vibrant  new  middle  and  service-class  sectors,  offering,  in  turn,  new  stimuli  for  consumer- 
style  features,  `middle-class  social  formats'  and,  of  course  increased  advertising  revenue. 
Few  of  these  `bourgeois  concerns'  have  any  immediate  resonance  in  the  poor 
rural  kampongs  or  the  impoverished  working-class  housing  sprawls  of  Kuala  Lumpur, 
Penang  and  Johor.  Yet,  `middle-classness'  in  Malaysia  has  become  not  only  a  social 
identifier  of  the  middle-classes,  but  a  cultural  reference  point  for  an  aspirational  working- 
class.  Here,  a  new  blend  of  middle-class  media  discourse  has  emerged,  acting, 
simultaneously,  as  a  cultural  filter  and  as  an  arbiter  of  social  values. 
At  the  first  of  these  levels,  stylised  representations  of  upward  mobility  and 
consumer  gratification  are  being  projected  as  new  forms  of  `cross-class'  consumer 
culture.  Among  the  profusion  of  new  retail  sites  in  Malaysia,  the  fast-expanding  Looking 
Good  chain  of  grand  shopping  malls  illustrates  this  semiotic  synthesis  of  `new 
individualism'  and  `Vision  prosperity'  -  though,  with  some  concession  to  postmodern 
irony,  things  were  looking  not  so  good  for  Looking  Good,  the  consumer  or  the  Vision  as 
the  economic  crisis  unfolded.  Nonetheless,  the  `crisis  of  consumption'  has  not  seriously 
weakened  middle-classness  as  an  influence  over  the  wider  cultural  milieu. 
At  the  second  level,  this  new  media  discourse  has  also  come  to  reflect  a  more 
specific  middle-class  social  agenda.  Indeed,  middle-class  response  to  the  economic  crisis 
has  involved  a  relatively  serious  `re-examination'  of  middle-class  consumerist  values. 
Life  and  Times-type  features,  in  this  sense,  have  encouraged  a  certain  form  of 
`responsible'  civil  dialogue.  Criticism  is  permitted.  But  only  in  the  sense  that  it  forms 
part  of  a  collective,  problem-solving  agenda,  akin  to  the  received  values  of  `responsible 
journalism'.  Moral  panic  and  economic  fears  prevail  as  `classic'  symptoms  of  middle- 
class  insecurity.  But  the  crisis  has  also  given  rise  to  a  relatively  more  informed  type  of 
middle-class  sociological  debate  within  the  mainstream  press  and  other  media,  39 
encouraging  intellectual  analysis  and  observation  to  be  expressed  from  the  inside.  Led 
186 by  selected  academics  and  policy  intellectuals,  Malaysian  editors,  proprietors  and 
political  elites  appear  increasingly  receptive  to  this  type  of  internalised  media  debate. 
Here,  a  certain  synchronicity  can  be  discerned  between  social  and  `political' 
concerns.  Take,  for  example,  a  New  Sunday  Times  feature  on  affluence-related 
alcoholism  ('Alcoholism,  a  hidden  problem  in  Malaysiai40)  and  a  New  Straits  Times 
Letter  of  the  Day  from  the  President  of  CAP  about  the  currency  crisis  ('Let's  join  forces 
to  reform  monetary  system  i41).  In  both  articles,  the  message  is  underwritten  by  common 
themes  of  `social  responsibility'  and  `collective  problem  solving'.  While  the  former 
argues  the  need  for  unified  social  responses  to  the  growing  problem  of  alcohol  abuse,  the 
latter  urges  similar  collective  resistance  to  the  international  currency  system  and  its 
permissive  impact  on  Malaysian  society.  Although  expressing  laudable  concerns,  in 
neither  instance  is  the  government's  role  seriously  questioned.  Rather,  both  problems 
are  addressed  as  general  `development  issues'.  In  this  way,  `social  problems'  and 
government  `political  problems'  become  generalised  `us'  problems. 
Another  example  of  such  discourse  can  be  seen  in  a  letter  by  the  opposition  critic 
Chandra  Muzaffar  ('Global  currency  coalition  can  curb  manipulation  i42  ),  calling  for  a 
"global  coalition"  of  governments  to  "remind  the  IMF  of  its  responsibility"  in  creating  "a 
just  and  equitable  international  financial  system.  "  Urging  it  to  be  led  by  ASEAN,  Japan 
and  Northeast  Asia,  Chandra  argued  that  such  a  coalition  might  even  accelerate 
Mahathir's  case  for  an  enhanced  East  Asia  Economic  Caucus.  Leaving  aside  the  part 
already  being  played  by  such  states  in  the  prevailing  financial  system,  it  is  notable  how 
such  `critical'  contributions  were  being  built  around  a  tacit  endorsement  of  Mahathir  at 
this  point  in  the  crisis,  thus  serving  to  legitimate  his  position. 
A  more  challenging  example  of  the  discourse  can  be  seen  in  the  New  Straits 
Times  Perforated  Sheets  article,  `The  return  of  the  Vision  Squad',  by  Amir  Muhammad. 
Here,  in  whimsical  fashion,  Mahathir  is  taken-to-task  for  the  questionable  reality  of  his 
much-vaunted  Vision  adjectives:  "psychologically  liberated,  secure,  self  confident, 
mature,  democratic,  scientific,  liberal  and  tolerant.  "43  In  this  instance,  the  author  feigns 
his  right  to  critical  comment  by  citing  Mahathir's  apparent  defence  of  social  critics  (as 
necessary  to  national  progress)  made  in  the  foreword  to  a  book  by  his  daughter  Marina. 
Prompted  by  the  gagging  order  restricting  Malaysian  academics  from  talking  to  the 
media  about  the  prevailing  haze  crisis,  the  piece  goes  on,  in  mildly  subversive  tones,  to 
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and  the  government's  commitments  to  civil  freedom.  The  Perforated  Sheets  column  was, 
ultimately,  thought  too  underhand,  with  Amir  moving  to  online  journalism. 
The  tenor  of  middle-class  media  discourse  is,  thus,  guided  by  a  `permitted' 
subtext  of  `reasoned  liberalism',  `shared  dialogue'  and  the  need  to  solve  social  anomalies 
together  on  our  way  to  the  Vision.  Here,  Marina  Mahathir  has  been  projected  as  a  more 
appropriate  role-model  of  liberal  Vision-speak,  combining  `reasoned'  criticism  with  a 
public-media  profile  on  social  issues  such  as  AIDS.  44  The  Anwar  crisis  would,  of 
course,  be  the  real  test  of  Marina's  liberalism.  However,  in  her  fortnightly  Star  column 
and  elsewhere,  the  seriousness  of  the  reform  movement  is  played-down,  while  her 
criticism  of  the  foreign  media'  becomes  an  extension  of  Mahathir's  own  `us-them' 
dichotomy.  45  At  the  heart  of  this,  she  argues,  is  a  Western  disdain  for  Asian  culture,  a 
patronising  view  of  Malaysia's  development  efforts  and  an  attempt  by  the  foreign  media 
to  manipulate  the  reform  process.  Thus,  what  appears  to  be  a  legitimate  statement  of 
Malaysian  sensitivities  and  defence  of  the  South  soon  becomes  an  encoded  apology  for 
the  prevailing  system.  As  such,  its  purpose  is  to  reinforce  the  very  illusions  more  critical 
analysis  might  serve  to  reveal. 
Of  course,  this  is  not  to  claim  that  there  is  always  outright  endorsement  of  such 
media  messages  at  the  popular  level.  As  one  past  content  analysis  of  the  Star  notes,  the 
press  have  come  to  convey  a  particular  view  of  social  reality  where: 
...  the  Barisan  is  moderate  while  the  opposition  is  extremist;  the  Barisan  can  guarantee  harmony  between 
ethnic  groups  while  an  opposition  government  would  unleash  the  forces  of  ethnic  conflict...  Implicit 
[here]  is  the  power  of  the  Barisan  as  natural  and  wise  as  the  power  of  a  parent.  This  vision  is  rendered 
so  often  in  the  mainstream  papers  that  its  very  redundancy  seems  to  lessen  its  persuasiveness.  Indeed,  it 
is  my  impression  that  Malaysians  react  to  press  accounts  less  with  conviction  than  cynicism.  This 
response  is  hardly  of  concern  to  the  government,  however,  since  cynicism  can  be  entirely  as 
disempowering  as  mystification.  46 
Yet,  neither  should  the  potency  of  national-popular  media  discourse  be 
underestimated,  particularly  where  it  involves  prolonged  articulations  of  `the  other'. 
This  is  one  of  the  main  insights  captured  by  Kershaw  in  analysing  the  Malaysian  media's 
coverage  of  the  Pergau  Dam  affair.  Not  only  are  the  media  themselves  already  primed 
188 for  anti-Western  propaganda,  so  too  is  there  a  certain  `readiness'  amongst  intellectuals, 
part  of  which  becomes  distilled  through  the  media  at  the  populist  level: 
The  opportunity  to  take  advantage  of  a  certain  'them/us'  perception  of  the  structure  or  the  modem  world 
is inherent  not  only  in  the  presence  of  a  media  equal  to  the  task,  but  also  in  the  evolving  cognitions  of  a 
Malaysian  minor  elite  and  the  people  generally.  Eye-catching  theorising  of  the  Huntington  kind  quickly 
finds  its  way,  in  summary,  to  the  more  literate  groups  through  international  news  agency  features 
printed  in  the  Malaysian  press.  This  creates  a  certain  expectancy  of  international  conflict,  especially 
among  Muslim  intelligentsia.  Moreover,  it  is  possible  to  assert  after  prolonged  acquaintance  with 
`ordinary  Malaysians'  that  when  an  anti-Western  media  campaign  does  take  place,  it  fosters  a  popular 
receptiveness  towards  such  actions  -  indeed  an  expectation  of  more  of  them  as  confirmation  of 
Malaysia's  `international  credibility'  on  the  very  terms  defined  by  Mahathir  himself 
. 
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Thus,  in  Kershaw's  view,  Malaysians  do  absorb,  through  the  filter  of  `them/us' 
media  projections,  a  certain  sense  of  `national  identification'  with  the  Barisan.  Indeed, 
this  latter  view  is  much  closer  to  the  present  writer's  own  evaluation  of  how  `ordinary 
Malaysians'  had  come  to  interpret  the  message  of  `Vision  development'.  These  and 
other  perceptions  of  the  social  order  may  also  be  informed  by  resignation,  apathy  or 
cynicism.  Yet  similar  feelings  prevail  in  the  West.  However,  with  the  crisis  now 
prompting  a  more  serious  examination  of  the  media's  role,  this  was  creating  new 
pressure  for  change  within  the  media  itself  and  the  need  for  intellectual  management  of 
that  process. 
Thus,  while  key  elites  within  the  UMNO  network  have  secured  the  power  and 
resources  to  control  the  media  and  influence  media  output,  it  is  still  important  to  view 
this,  following  Kellner,  as  a  contested  space.  That  is,  one  in  which  political-corporate 
power  is  concentrated,  but  where  intellectual  enterprise  is  always  required  to  confront 
economic  crises,  political  pressure  and  social  dislocation. 
Hegemony  is,  thus,  a  managed  affair.  Legitimacy  does  not  depend  upon 
consistent  adherence  to  a  particular  ruling  party  or  open  endorsement  of  partisan  media 
representations.  Rather  it  is  about  persuading  people,  more  generally,  of  the  `moral 
authority'  of  the  prevailing  system  -a  more  flexible  mode  of  control  which  allows,  and, 
indeed,  encourages,  the  view  that  dissatisfaction  can  be  expressed,  so  long  as  it  can  be 
contained  within  acceptable  boundaries  of  `democratic  participation'.  In  the  context  of 
the  media,  the  key  point  is  to  keep  critical  journalism  within  a  peripheral,  manageable 
189 space.  What  matters,  in  particular,  is  effective  control  over  mainstream  media  content. 
Here,  intellectuals  help  fill  designated  spaces  for  problem-solving,  social  observation  and 
`soft  dissent'  through  agenda-setting  discourse.  This  does  not  mean  uniformity  of 
thought.  Rather,  it  is  part  of  a  more  subtle  appeal  to  `insider  reason';  a  more  refined 
process  of  co-optive  persuasion  where  intellectuals,  policy  planners  and  media  critics  are 
encouraged  to  internalise  the  terms  of  debate  and  argue  within  acceptable  parameters. 
This  suggests  a  more  expansive  form  of  social,  political  and  cultural  assimilation,  wherein 
people  come  to  regard  the  existing  order  as  somehow  `natural'.  Thus,  while  salient,  the 
Boulanger  view  is  too-narrowly  focused  on  the  `media-as-messenger'  rather  than  the 
ways  in  which  the  media,  alongside  other  system-reinforcing  agencies,  help  mould 
perceptions  of  social  reality  in  the  longer-term.  At  the  same  time,  it  understates  the  more 
nuanced  forms  of  popular  ideology  emerging  within  the  Malaysian  mass-media,  in 
particular,  that  of  `role-model'  middle-class  discourse  and  Vision-type  problem-solving. 
The  Malaysian  media  is,  indeed,  biased  towards  the  Barisan.  But  it  is important  to  see 
the  more  complex  forms  of  consensus-building  within  that  process. 
Vision  discourse  and  national  culture 
To  contextualise  this  shift,  it  is  helpful  to  note  the  gradual  re-emphasis  in  `cultural  policy' 
by  the  late-1990s.  Under  the  NEP,  the  control  of  social  debate  through  the  media  had 
encouraged  not  only  political  quiescence,  but  a  more  profound  sense  of  intellectual 
conformity.  This  frustration  of  critical  expression  can  be  identified  with  the  National 
Cultural  Policy  (NCP)  (1971).  Framed  by  a  select  group  of  Malay  policy  intellectuals,  it 
went  beyond  the  ideals  of  the  Rukunegara  to  embrace  an  assimilationist  view  of  culture, 
education  and  vernacular  language.  Resisted  in  particular  by  the  Chinese  community,  the 
NCP  held  to  three  main  principles: 
1.  The  National  Culture  must  be  based  on  the  indigenous  culture  of  the  region. 
2.  Suitable  elements  from  other  cultures  can  be  accepted  as  part  of  the  NCP. 
3.  Islam  is  an  important  component  of  the  National  Culture.  48 
In  seeking  to  `fix'  culture  to  nascent  Bumiputeraism  and  the  NEP,  the  NCP  was 
at  odds  with  the  diverse  aesthetics  of  custom,  religion  and  belief  in  Malaysia.  These  rich 
190 cultural  forms  are  resonant,  for  example,  in  the  festival  ambience  of  Hari  Raya, 
Deepavali  and  Chinese  New  Year,  the  ceremonial  mystique  of  Mak  Yong  dance, 
Thaipusam  and  the  datuk  kong  spirits  of  Hungry  Ghost,  the  rituals  of  bomohs,  kavadi 
devotees  and  feng  shui  geomancy  and  the  daily  social  significance  of  mosque  and  temple 
activity.  While  still  recognising  the  right  to  ethnic  expression,  the  NCP  represented  a 
politically  motivated  attempt  to  legislate  what  the  culture  should  be  -  an.  artificial 
attempt  to  synchronise  and  incorporate  their  disparate  cultural  energies,  rather  than 
acknowledge  their  diversity,  interaction  and  creative  potential. 
Mahathir  had  also  been  a  key  exponent  of  such  cultural  ordering.  As  part  of  his 
attack  on  archaic  institutions,  he  sought  to  define  the  symbols  of  the  present  by  invoking 
constructed  images  of  the  past.  Following  themes  in  The  Invention  of  Tradition,  49 
Kessler  shows  how  this  mystification  of  convention  helps  reinforce  legitimacy,  noting  the 
significance  of  traditional  political  culture  in  the  Malaysian  case: 
Legitimation  is  inevitably  a  cultural  process  since  it  is  concerned  with  the  moral  grounds  upon  which 
people  consider  rule  in  general  or  some  particular  command  as  binding  and  valid.  If  power  and  its 
transmutation  through  a  process  of  legitimation  into  authority  is  intrinsically  a  cultural  phenomenon, 
then  culture  itself,  and  all  particular  cultures  are  inherently  political.  In  most  societies  that  political 
culture  is  explicit,  recognised,  conscious,  and  often  `ideologised'  as  both  legitimate  and  legitimating,  on 
grounds  of  'tradition'...  [and  the]  authenticity  of  its  `pastness'.  Most  societies,  and  certainly 
contemporary  Malay  society  within  Malaysia...  have  in  this  sense  a  distinctive  political  culture.  so 
Symptomatic  of  this  `need  of  a  serviceable  past'  was  Mahathir's  commissioning  of  the 
party  anthem  Lagua  Setia  ('The  Loyalty  Song')  in  an  attempt  to  turn  Bumiputera  loyalty 
from  one  of  archaic  deference  for  the  traditional  order  to  one  of  modern  loyalty  for 
UMNO.  The  song: 
re-imagined  and  reinvented  loyalty  as  something  modem,  subtle,  low  key...  [Capturing  the]  quintessence 
of  traditional  Malay  legitimacy...  [it]  modernised  the  traditional  and  archaised  the  modern.  51 
But  cultural  meaning  is  complex  here.  The  cachet  of  Malay  tradition,  from 
consumer  products  to  theme  park  culture,  remains  a  general  feature  of  middle-class 
lifestyle.  52  Yet,  as  Tan  Sooi  Beng  points  out,  government  endeavours  to  influence  this 
cultural  field  by  the  late-1980s  -  notably  its  attempts  "to  centralise  and  control  the 
191 performing  arts"  -  were  being  met  with  increasing  `resistance'  from  a  more 
independently-minded  middle-class.  53  Thus,  for  Loh  and  Kahn,  middle-class  `cultural 
visions'  were  becoming  both  "particularistic"  and  "fragmented",  S4  suggesting  a  more 
equivocal  view  of  culture  and  the  modernity  process: 
If  one  wishes  to  maintain,  as  we  certainly  do,  that  Malaysia  is  in  the  throes  of  a  modernising  process, 
then  we  shall  have  to  re-think  earlier  attempts  to  characterise  cultural  modernisation  as  an  inexorable 
dissolution  of  so-called  primordial  loyalties  and  the  emergence  of  universalistic  values.  55 
Nonetheless,  the  NCP  had  allowed  given  `cultural  priorities'  to  become  `defined' 
and  naturalised  within  the  society  through  civil  organisations,  educational  bodies  and  the 
prism  of  the  mass-media.  Throughout  the  1970s,  the  Malaysian  state  sponsored  an 
ethno-cultural  ideology  which  viewed  any  criticism  of  the  NEP,  Bumiputeraism  and 
`cultural  assimilation'  as  somehow  deviant;  a  form  of  false  consciousness.  State  controls 
and  censorship  were  invoked  to  protect  the  special  status  of  Malay  rights  and  cultural 
expression.  Mahathir  had  also  `inherited'  and  used  this  agenda  to  cultivate  Malay 
support.  In  formal  terms,  the  policy  acknowledged  the  rights  of  other  ethnic  identities 
and  cultural  practices.  Yet,  it  did  not  signify,  in  any  meaningful  sense,  a  climate  of  open 
cultural  development.  Thus,  alongside  the  NEP,  the  idea  of  cultural  uniformity  remained 
inimical  to  a  non-Malay  community  denied  the  same  social  and  economic  opportunities 
as  Malays.  Not  only  was  this  a  source  of  ongoing  ethnic  resentment,  it  was  also  a 
growing  obstruction  to  Mahathir's  hegemonic  project.  By  the  period  of  the  NEP-NDP 
transition  in  1991,  the  validity  of  Bumiputeraism  and  its  cultural  accoutrements  were 
becoming  increasingly  tested.  Thus,  Mahathir  needed  a  more  consensual  ideology  to 
complement  the  post-NEP  agenda. 
Vision  2020:  the  new  context  of  communication 
From  the  early-1980s,  the  ideals  of  Malay  economic  development  had  become  statements 
of  political-nationalism,  with  Mahathir's  own  charismatic  leadership  and  unifying  image 
providing  the  focal  point  for  a  rising  mood  of  national  euphoria.  56  However,  the 
traditions,  customs  and  conventions  of  `the  nation'  -  or  "imagined  communitiess57  - 
do  not  evolve  in  isolation  from  other  cultural  influences.  By  the  early-1990s,  Mahathir 
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NEP.  In  contrast  to  the  Malay  Dilemma  and  its  attempt  to  re-assert  an  imagined  Malay 
community,  the  Vision  invoked  a  more  inclusive  concept  of  community,  allowing  greater 
cultural  diversity  in  the  process. 
But  this  more  expansive  view  of  community  was  also  consistent  with  the  new 
realities  of  `globalisation'.  Bumiputeraism  was  becoming  an  anachronism  in  a.  country 
experiencing  not  only  major  social  adjustment,  but  exposure  to  the  dynamic  forces  of 
global  capital  and  information  technology.  In  turn,  these  forces  required  new  intellectual 
responses  from  within.  For  Mahathir,  the  Vision  offered  a  new-millennial  context  within 
which  to  address  and  manage  these  changes:  a  new  type  of  nationalist  project  for  a  new 
international  age. 
The  crystallisation  of  Vision  ideology  was  coincident  with  the  gathering 
deregulation  of  the  media  and  the  arrival  of  satellite  technology  by  the  early-1990s. 
Their  emergence  promised  not  only  enhanced  growth,  but  a  vast  source  of  wealth  for 
corporate  elites  close  to  UMNO.  In  appealing  for  sensible  censorship  and  controls, 
Mahathir  saw  that  advanced  technology  was  outpacing  policies  and  laws  to  control 
global  communications.  But  rather  than  resist  these  new  technologies,  Mahathir, 
recognising  their  inevitable  momentum,  has  embraced  the  media  revolution,  seeking  to 
promote  it  as  an  intrinsic  part  of  the  Vision  project.  Reflecting  the  pre-crisis  prosperity, 
there  were  also  indications  of  a  more  relaxed  approach  towards  media  output.  But 
`more-open'  media  still  came  with  a  reminder  that  broadcasters  had  to  `act  responsibly.  ' 
State  sanctions  remained.  Yet,  Mahathir  was  also  seeking  to  present  these  changes  as 
part  of  a  new  consensual  process,  a  maturing  form  of  `balanced'  democratic  expression 
and  co-operation  within  the  context  of  Vision  collectivism. 
As  the  government  considered  the  potentialities  of  the  new  privatised  channels 
and  subscription  networks,  "  there  was  a  growing  realisation  of  the  need  to  control  the 
allocation  of  licences.  Mahathir  was  also  anxious  at  this  point  to  resist  the  encroaching 
influence  of  the  Murdoch  network,  by  now  establishing  itself  in  the  region  through 
pragmatic  overtures  to  Singapore  and  Beijing.  59  In  response,  Mahathir  had  overseen  the 
launching  of  the  Malaysia  East  Asian  Satellite  (MEASAT),  Malaysia's  first  satellite 
system,  which,  by  1996,  was  offering  multi-channel  TV  and  radio  services  to  Malaysia 
and  other  countries  in  the  region.  60  With  the  additional  private  stations  (TV3  and 
193 Metrovision)  competing  with  TV1  and  TV2,  the  government  had  also  come  to  realise  the 
massive  market  in  airtime  advertising  space.  61 
Vision  2020  had  also  become  identified,  symbiotically,  with  the  opportunities  and 
ideologies  of  multimedia  technology.  By  the  late-1990s,  the  new  media  technologies 
were  being  closely  linked  to  the  integrative  possibilities  of  `cyber-vision'  services  such  as 
tele-conferencing.  62  However,  in  seeking  to  take  advantage  of  these  sites  as  generators 
of  growth,  Mahathir  needed  new  media-populist  ideology  to  give  it  meaning. 
`...  Oh  IT...  Guna  IT...  ' 
On  the  evening  of  Saturday  11th  October  1997,  the  Prime  Minister  informed  the  nation 
that  the  integration  and  use  of  information  technology  (IT)  was  the  single-most  urgent 
task  facing  all  Malaysians.  For  two-and-a-half  hours,  all  the  main  TV  stations  in 
Malaysia  were  given-over  to  Mahathir's  Live  Telecast  speech  and  forum  on  the  challenge 
of  IT  for  the  Malaysian  economy  and  society  at  large.  Although  a  platform  for  the 
Barisan,  the  tone  of  the  broadcast  was  seminarial  and  `consultative',  the  technical 
content  wide-ranging  for  mass-audience  television.  In  essence,  argued  Mahathir,  the 
widespread  expansion  of  IT  would  be  critical  to  the  realisation  of  future  economic 
development,  national  integration  and  enhanced  prosperity  for  all  sections  of  Malaysian 
society. 
Launched  by  Mahathir  during  the  Infotech  Malaysia  `96  Conference  (December 
19th)  the  National  IT  Agenda  (NITA)  calls  on  all  sectors  of  the  economy  to  work  in  an 
integrated  effort  towards  technological  innovation  and  ideas  which  will  transform 
Malaysia  into  a  global  IT  hub  and  information-rich  society.  Under  the  aegis  of  the 
National  Information  Technology  Council  (NITC),  set  up  in  1993,  it  envisions  the 
development  of  a  National  Information  Infrastructure  (NII).  Broadly  speaking,  this 
would  include  rapid  advancements  in  the  fields  of  national  telecommunications,  computer 
networks,  hardware  systems,  software  services  and  database  holdings,  alongside  new 
human  resource  training,  educational  packages  and  management  applications  -  all 
helping  to  generate  the  technical  skills  and  labour  pool  needed  for  such  infrastructure. 
At  the  centre  of  this  Vision-based  construct  lies  Mahathir's  most  grandiose 
development,  the  Multimedia  Super  Corridor  (MSC).  Despite  the  crisis  and  cancellation 
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would  lift  Malaysia  beyond  the  conventional  stage  of  industrial  development  into  a  new 
landscape  of  `intelligent  administration',  electronic  government  and  global  production 
webs.  63  Stretching  south  from  the  existing  business  heartland  of  Kuala  Lumpur  City 
Centre  through  a  50  by  15  kilometre  corridor  to  the  new  KL  International  Airport,  the 
project  involves  the  ongoing  construction  of  Putrajaya,  the  new  seat  of  electronic 
government,  and  Cyberjaya,  an  adjoining  Smart  City  comprising  multimedia  industries, 
R&D  facilities  and  other  advanced  infrastructure.  64  As  the  first  part  of  a  three-phased 
plan  set-out  by  the  Multimedia  Development  Corporation  (MDC)  over  20  years,  the  aim 
of  the  MSC  is  to  offer  multinationals  a  suitable  cyber  locale  within  which  to  expand  their 
technological  capacities,  investment  potential  and  broader  global  interests.  By  1997, 
Mahathir  had  assembled,  under  his  chairmanship,  an  MSC  International  Advisory  Panel 
comprising  forty-four  of  the  world's  multimedia  corporate  luminaries,  most  notably  Bill 
Gates  of  Microsoft.  65  By  late-1998,  the  Anwar  affair  and  Mahathir's  restrictions  on 
foreign  capital  had  created  major  uncertainties  over  the  project's  viability.  Yet,  with  the 
formal  opening  of  Cyberjaya  by  July  1999,  the  first  phase  of  the  MSC  would  be  an 
enduring  testament  to  Mahathir.  In  marking  its  completion  and  relocation  of  the  Prime 
Minister's  Office  to  Putrajaya,  Mahathir  was  still  extolling  IT-led  growth  as  the  motor  of 
middle-class  prosperity.  66 
Beyond  its  `testimonial'  status,  the  MSC  suggests  an  ambitious  attempt  to 
circumvent  conventional  industrial  development  through  the  'spin-off  benefits  of 
information-led  investment,  as  proclaimed  in  the  new  `Vision-speak': 
As  a  strategy  to  achieve  the  Vision,  Malaysia  has  embarked  on  an  ambitious  plan  to  leapfrog  into  the 
Information  Age  by  providing  intellectual  and  strategic  leadership...  Malaysia  upholds  the  virtues  of  the 
new  world  order,  believing  that  the  globe  is  collectively  moving  towards  a  "century  of  the 
world"...  Malaysia  has  chosen  to  be  open  and  pragmatic  in  dealing  with  change,  and  is  committed 
to...  creativity,  innovation  and  entrepreneurship...  As  a  first  step,  Malaysia  has  created  the  Multimedia 
Super  Corridor  -a  world-first,  world-class  act  -  to  help  companies  of  the  world  test  the  limits  of 
technology  and  prepare  themselves  for  the  future.  The  MSC  will  also  accelerate  Malaysia's  entry  into 
the  Information  Age,  and  through  it,  help  actualise  Vision  2020.  67 
Through  its  delivery  of  special  business  and  lifestyle  features,  the  MSC  will  be: 
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A  Multimedia  Utopia  offering  a  productive,  intelligent  environment  within  which  a  multimedia  value 
chain  of  goods  and  services  will  be  produced  and  delivered  across  the  globe. 
An  island  of  excellence  with  multimedia-specific  capabilities,  technologies,  infrastructure,  legislation, 
policies  and  systems  for  competitive  advantage. 
A  test  bed  for  invention,  research  and  other  groundbreaking  multimedia  developments  spearheaded  by 
seven  multimedia  applications. 
A  global  community  living  on  the  leading-edge  of  the  Information  Society. 
A  world  of  Smart  Homes,  Smart  Cities,  Smart  Schools,  Smart  Cards  and  Smart  Partnerships.  68 
`Smart  Partnerships'  can  be  seen  as  a  key  term  in  the  lexicon  of  Vision-speak, 
informing  middle-class  media  discourse  and  MSC  marketing  language  alike.  In  a 
message  applicable  to  both,  Mahathir's  basic  claim  is  that  "...  in  enriching  the  other,  you 
enrich  yourself.  i69  The  term  had  also  been  adapted  as  an  axiom  of  economic 
development  for  the  South.  Thus,  as  argued  by  Mahathir  at  the  First  Southern  Africa 
International  Dialogue  in  May  1997,  Smart  Partnership  -  between  the  civil  service, 
private  sector,  political  leaders  and  trade  unionists  -  had  helped  Malaysia  realise 
consistent  growth  rates  and  an  alternative  development  strategy  to  the  countries  of  the 
North.  70  Later  that  month,  at  a  London  gathering  of  European  IT  business  figures, 
Mahathir  offered  similar  partnership  promises  in  the  Ten  Point  Multimedia  Bill  of 
Guarantees  to  prospective  MSC  companies,  including  free  capital  movement,  full 
company  ownership,  tax  incentives,  intellectual  property  rights,  no  internet  censorship, 
competitive  telecom  tariffs,  prioritised  MSC  contracts  and  a  `high-powered'  agency  to 
coordinate  these  needs.  71 
This,  of  course,  suggests  a  number  of  critical  questions.  For  example,  why  would 
cutting-edge  IT  corporations  like  Microsoft  centre  their  key  operations  and  R&D 
installations  in  Malaysia?  Certainly,  transnationals,  by  their  very  nature,  are  no  longer 
confined  to  a  `home-base'.  Indeed,  Bill  Gates  has  been  a  keen  advocate  of  global  IT 
networks,  exemplified  by  Microsoft's  rapid  expansion  into  India  with  its  abundant 
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trained  IT  personnel.  72  Thus,  why  should  IT  transnationals  see  Malaysia  as  anything 
more  than  an  information  version  of  branch-assembly  production  -a  low-labour-cost 
`cyber-service-sector'?  In  these  regards,  Mahathir's  special  MSC  provisions  may  be 
regarded  as  an  upgraded  attempt  to  secure  a  niche  role  within  an  increasingly  crowded 
sector  of  the  global  economy. 
In  pushing  the  DAP's  IT  for  All  agenda,  Lim  Kit  Siang  has  criticised  the 
government's  specific  promotion  of  the  MSC  as  the  jewel  of  its  National  IT  Plan;  a 
`project-centred',  rather  than  `people-centred'  strategy.  73  However,  it  is  not  only  the 
`value'  of  technological  innovation,  or  its  economic  potential,  which  is  significant  here 
but  the  way  in  which  IT  has  come  to  be  used  as  a  new  dimensional  means  of  production 
and  ideological  resource.  Thus,  missing  from  Lim's  analysis  is  any  critique  of  who 
controls  such  capabilities,  how  its  diffusion  empowers  capital,  and  to  what  extent  this 
constrains,  rather  than  enhances,  social  development.  Here,  `IT  discourse',  serving 
private-sector  ideas,  has  been  reproduced  for  agenda-setting  purposes,  providing  the 
MSC  and  National  IT  Agenda  with  a  synonymous  identity.  In  this  regard,  the  NITA 
offers  an  ideological  rationale  for  the  MSC,  allowing  the  government  to  promote  its 
populist  elements  while  the  private-sector  and  UMNO  proxies  derive  the  key  benefits. 
Nonetheless,  the  DAP's  alternative  IT  For  All  has  demonstrated  an  impressive 
grasp  of  potential  IT  applications,  their  extended  use  within  education,  commerce  and 
government,  problems  of  computer-illiteracy  within  the  Dewan  Rakyat  and  the  technical 
issues  underlying  the  new  `cyberbills',  such  as  the  Computer  Crimes  Bill  and  the  Digital 
Signature  Bill.  Reflecting  criticism  that  none  of  the  country's  first  cyberbills  by  1997 
were  allowed  proper  legislative  debate  or  public  scrutiny,  the  DAP  posted  all  four  on 
their  homepage.  74  Thus,  while  the  government  has  idealised  information  technology,  it 
remains  highly  circumspect  about  its  actual  use  as  an  instrument  for  debating  information 
technology  itself. 
In  effect,  awareness  of  IT  has  been  promoted  more  vigorously  than  IT 
awareness.  At  the  heart  of  this  agenda  has  been  a  massive  media  campaign  to  `inform' 
the  public  about  IT  and  its  imperative  place  within  Vision  development.  The  Ministry  of 
Information's  IT  Awareness  Campaign  has  mass-produced  leaflets  and  other  literature 
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social  development,  it  also  proclaims: 
The  objective  of  NITA  is  to  build  a  continuous  learning  culture  on  IT  to  enhance  the  quality  of  work  of 
individuals,  performance  of  organisations  and  quality  of  life  towards  the  creation  of  a  Civil  Society.  " 
The  campaign  has  also  seen  the  proliferation  of  stylish  TV  adverts  extolling  IT 
and  the  MSC.  The  frequent  airing  and  close  juxtaposition  of  these  adverts  is  intended  to 
distil  their  commonality  in  the  public  mind.  Thus,  invoking  themes  of  cross-ethnic 
harmony  and  Bangsa  Malaysia,  a  group  of  smiling  Malaysians  give  happy-voice  to  the 
nation's  catchy  singalong:  "...  Kenal  IT...  Suka  IT 
... 
Pelajari  setiam  hari..  IT  terkini...  Oh 
IT...  Guna  IT...  Tingkafkan  ilmu  IT...  Malaysia  bistari...  Terima  IT...  Belejar  IT...  Sayang 
IT...  Guna  IT...  IT.  "76  In  more  dynamic  mood,  another  fast-moving  collage  of  high-tech 
graphics  and  multimedia  images  conveys  the  IT  message  and  its  part  in  Malaysia's  master 
development  plan,  with  key  features  of  the  MSC  flashing  across  interchanging  images  of 
computer  technologies,  KL  tower  blocs,  and  young  `on-line'  Malaysians: 
... 
With  the  realisation  of  Vision  2020,  the  Multimedia  Super  Corridor  was  born 
... 
In  the  era  of  the 
information  age,  multimedia  will  be  used  in  every  aspect  of  our  everyday  lives.  With  IT  comes 
development  to  take  us  into  the  next  millennium.  Now  we  can  stand  tall  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 
Tomorrow's  Technology  for  Today's  Living. 
A  further  version  of  this  shows  Dr.  Mahathir  at  the  computer-face,  with  the  message: 
"Unlocking  the  Full  Potential  of  the  Information  Age",  imagery  used  in  another  variation 
of  the  `singalong  IT'.  In  a  closely  followed  advert,  a  beautifully  crafted  landscape  of 
swirling  colours  and  alluring  music  draws  the  viewer  into  the  exotic  world  of  Putrajaya, 
the  residential  hub  of  the  MSC,  a  new  experiment  in  living  and  `virtual'  home  for  the 
new  generation  of  environmentally-friendly,  IT-aware  middle-classes. 
Like  most  clever  adverts,  the  impact  is  subliminal,  intended  to  naturalise  an 
image,  an  impression,  an  association,  a  sense  of  what  Malaysia  and  Malaysians  might 
aspire  to.  Complemented  by  a  plethora  of  other  upbeat  glossy  ads  enticing  Malaysians 
into  a  consumerist  dreamworld  of  smart  homes,  Mastercards,  mobile  phones,  Sega  City 
virtual  reality  theme  parks  and  `happy  banking',  the  overall  message  is  one  of  onward 
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vision  of  `social  mobility'.  Yet  with  real  economic  prospects  declining  by  the  day,  the 
relevance  of  this  and  all  other  mass-media  output  was  becoming  increasingly  tested. 
Managing  the  crisis:  the  UMNO  network  and  media  coverage 
At  the  onset  of  the  crisis,  it  was  apparent  that  the  language  and  terms  employed  by  the 
press  and  electronic  media  to  describe  the  unfolding  events  was  being  carefully 
controlled.  Initially,  the  term  `crisis'  itself  had  been  routinely  avoided,  subsumed, 
instead,  to  `the  situation'.  However,  the  selective  use  of  language  was  not  the  only 
means  of  managing  popular  consciousness.  People  still  recognised  the  situation  as  a 
crisis.  More  important  was  the  attempt  to  contextualise  it;  that  is,  to  make  the  crisis  a 
`collective  problem';  a  shared  situation  of  national  adversity.  Yet,  while  the  broad  media 
adopted  this  agenda  on  behalf  of  the  Barisan,  there  was  also  some  significant  variations 
in  tone  within  mainstream  newspaper  output.  Thus,  while  the  following  analysis  is 
concerned  to  show  the  compliant  role  played  by  the  media,  it  also  seeks  to  highlight 
some  of  the  more  nuanced  interpretations,  meanings  and  undercurrent  tensions  within 
that  reportage.  " 
TV  News  and  Current  Affairs 
Of  all  the  main  news  media  outlets  in  Malaysia,  mainstream  TV  news  can  be  seen  as  the 
most  heavily  sanitised.  Its  general  purpose  during  the  crisis  appears  to  have  been  one  of 
`normalising'  the  situation  by  providing  a  `calm  exterior'  in  a  situation  of  gathering 
economic  and  social  uncertainty.  Four  main  elements  of  TV  news  output  were 
discernible  here: 
"  To  project  positive  headline  images  of  Dr  Mahathir  and  other  Barisan  figures 
"  To  condense,  simplify  and  talk-up  government  measures  for  dealing  with  the  crisis 
"  To  provide  a  rationale  for  the  falling  value  of  the  ringgit  and  the  KLSE  -  mainly  by  citing  regional 
or  global  factors  affecting  the  Malaysian  markets 
"  To  provide  populist  report  slots  and  upbeat  features  on  the  crisis 
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already  well-established  format.  Neither  are  there  any  substantive  difference  in  content 
or  style  between  the  main  English  news  (TV3  News  Hour,  News  on  2  and  TV2  News 
Scan)  and  vernacular  news  (Berita  Perdana,  on  TV1  and  Metrovision,  TV3's  Buletin 
Utama  and  Berita  Mandarin  on  TV2),  each  projecting  positive  impressions  of  the 
Barisan.  The  key  subtext  of  TV  news  generally,  though,  masking  any  overt  propagandist 
purpose,  lay  in  the  careful  pronunciation  of  news  as  `public-service  information',  thus 
providing  a  means  of  `receiving'  the  crisis  and  rationalising  the  emerging  social  situation. 
This  was  integral  to  the  way  in  which  news  items  were  prioritised,  structured  and 
delivered,  as  the  following  selections  illustrate: 
"  TV3  News  Hour  (Ilpm)  (28/11/97)  Main  item:  expansive  selection  of  Datuk  Sri  Dr.  Mahathir's 
(hereafter  Dr.  M)  deliberations  on  the  crisis.  *Dr.  M  making  the  case  for  an  `Asian  Fund'  as  opposed  to 
the  more  restrictive  terms  and  conditions  of  IMF  assistance.  *Dr.  M  on  the  dangers  of  any  IMF  package 
leading  to  local  bank  closures.  *Dr.  M  warning  against  the  detrimental  effects  of  higher  interest  rates 
and  income  tax  resulting  from  IMF-type  package.  *Dr.  M  on  the  need  for  tighter  banking  regulations  in 
order  to  curb  speculators.  *Dr.  M  criticising  the  WTO's  apathy  over  speculators'  attacks  on  poor 
nations.  *Dr.  M  on  reports  of  falling  foreign  investment,  explaining  that  many  of  his  statements  have 
been  "misunderstood  or  misinterpreted,  in  some  cases,  quite  deliberately.  "  *Anwar:  interest  rates  need 
to  be  kept  "firm",  but  not  excessively  high.  *Upbeat  film  report  on  national  publishers  (DBP)  decision 
not  to  increase  price  of  school  textbooks,  despite  feared  paper  shortages.  *Similar  report  on  Kentucky 
Fried  Chicken  (Malaysia  Bhd)  decision  to  hold  prices,  the  announcement  coming  at  a  KFC  scholarship 
award  ceremony  officiated  by  Education  Minister  Najib  Abdul  Razak.  *Interview  with  chief  medical 
official  on  the  need  for  random  health  checks  on  foreign  workers.  *Feature  on  Malaysian  designers' 
efforts  to  develop  a  cosmetics  industry.  *On  the  markets:  the  KLSE,  "finished  slightly  mixed  today 
when  profit-taking  erased  much  of  the  earlier  gains.  "  *Various  stock  indexes  shown  (to  catchy  music). 
*Upbeat  report  on  the  KLSE,  citing  Daim  Zainuddin:  "There's  never  been  a  better  time  to  buy  local 
stocks  at  bargain  basement  prices.  "  *On  the  FOREX  markets:  "The  ringgit  closed  lower  against  the  US 
dollar  today.  This  is  due  to  jitters  over  the  regional  currency  turmoil  that  continues  to  depress  sentiment 
on  the  local  currency.  "  *Report  on  TV3's  20%  increased  turnover  for  the  year:  TV3  will  "continue  to 
emphasise  news-based  and  informative  programming,  particularly  in-house  productions.  "  *Positive 
financial  statements  on  other  major  corporations  (played-over  high-tech  film  sequences  and 
developmentalist  imagery).  *Brief  foreign  news. 
"  TV3  News  Hour  (29/11/97)  Main  item:  Dr.  M  announces  policy  allowing  companies  to  use  foreign 
workers  provided  they  export  their  goods  and  services.  *Dr.  M  on  the  problem  of  `shady'  foreign 
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price  of  essential  goods  will  not  rise  despite  the  ringgit's  fall.  *Dr.  M:  NEAC  will  be  transparent. 
*Deputy  Home  Minister  Tajol  Rosli  on  new  plans  to  curb  illegal  immigrant  workers.  *Health  Minister 
Chua  Jui  Ching  on  the  decline  of  cholera  cases  in  the  Klang  Valley.  *Education  Minister  Najib  Razak 
announcing  that  school  textbooks  will  be  cheaper  next  year.  *Abdul  Hamid  Othman  of  the  Prime 
Minister's  Department  on  new  assistance  for  haji  pilgrims,  sponsored  by  Telekom  Malaysia.  *Defence 
Minister  Syed  Hamid  Albar  discounting  rumours  of  food  cutbacks  for  military  personnel.  *On  the 
markets:  regional  "jitters"  over  Japanese  bank  failures;  Renong-UEM  deal  helps  Malaysian  market 
"rebound.  "  *Feature  on  a  one-day  seminar  by  Dr.  Deepak  Chopra,  the  mind,  body  and  soul  healer. 
"Organisers...  say...  his  inspirational  words  will  help  Malaysians  regain  confidence  in  these  troubled 
times.  " 
"  News  Scan  (12pm,  15  minutes)  (TV2)  (29/11/97)  Main  item:  Dr.  M  dismissing  foreign  news  report 
about  an  alleged  approach  to  Taiwan  for  trade-based  assistance.  *(Similar  account  of  Dr.  M's 
statements  above.  )  *Pictures  of  Anwar,  other  Cabinet  ministers  and  corporate  leaders  meeting  Dr.  M  on 
his  arrival  back  from  Tokyo.  78  *Foreign  news:  implications  of  Opec  plans  to  increase  oil  output. 
*Feature  on  bargain  shopping  in  Hong  Kong 
"  News  on  2  (8pm,  30  minutes)  (TV2)  (30/11/97)  Main  item:  Dr  M  speaking  about  traders  (notably, 
cooking  oil  manufacturers)  raising  the  price  of  goods,  comparing  them  to  unpatriotic  saboteurs,  no  better 
than  the  currency  speculators.  *Dr  M  filmed  during  his  launching  of  Family  Day.  *Report  on  agenda 
for  next  day's  ASEAN  meeting  of  Finance  Ministers.  Anwar  speaking  on  the  nature  of  a  standby-fund 
and  the  need  io  work  "in  close  collaboration"  with  the  IMF.  *Foreign  Minister  Abdullah  Badawi  on  the 
need  for  Malaysians  to  become  more  knowledgeable  about  international  politics  in  order  to  "overcome 
issues  which  are  negative  to  the  country.  "  (Pictures  of  Badawi  addressing  a  Teachers  Institute 
conference.  )  *More  punitive  measures  announced  by  the  government  against  errant  employers  defying 
labour  court  orders  under  the  Employment  Act.  The  purpose  was  to  help  improve  labour  productivity 
and  flexi-labour  recruitment.  *Education  Minister  Najib  (at  a  `meet  the  people'  session)  reminding 
school  authorities  to  avoid  unnecessary  expenditure.  School-leavers,  he  said,  should  "not  to  be  choosy 
about  jobs"  or  over-dependent  on  parents,  but  "should  enter  the  workforce  to  help  reduce  the  country's 
dependence  on  foreign  workers.  "  *Deputy  Minister  of  Education  Fong  Chan  Onn  (opening  a 
kindergarten)  on  the  government's  efforts  to  bring  textbook  prices  down,  while  urging  the  private  sector 
to  help  provide  more  pre-school  centres.  *Information  Minister  Mohamed  Rahman  (speaking  at  an 
Islamic  forum)  calling  on  all  Muslim  countries  to  co-operate  on  IT  in  order  to  portray  "the  true  form  of 
Islam.  "  He  suggested  the  use  of  Malaysia's  MEASAT  satellite  system  to  transmit  an  `Islam  Vision' 
service  to  the  world.  *  11  more  cholera  cases  confirmed.  *Business  news:  KLSE  Securities  Commission 
assurances  that  trading  restrictions  on  five  stockbroking  houses  do  not  signify  default.  *Stock  indexes 
and  Forex  (to  catchy  music)  *Foreign  News  (Australian  bush  fires;  oil  spill  in  Alaska;  peace-keeping 
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item  on  the  longevity  of  the  B52  bomber).  *Weather  and  sport. 
"  TV3  News  Hour  (2/12/97)  Main  item:  Extensive  report  on  Dr.  M's  address  at  the  Langkawi 
Airshow  (Lima  `97).  *  Dr.  M  on  the  bright  prospects  for  Malaysian  aviation  industry.  *Dr  M.:  "We 
have  no  ambitions  to  make  the  21st  century  the  Asian  Century.  Malaysia  has  never  subscribed  to  this 
fanciful  dream.  But  we  do  believe  the  21st  century  will  be  the  global  century...  "  *Presenter  noting  Dr. 
M's  comment  that  there  had  never  been  a  better  time  for  aviation  investors  to  make  lucrative  deals 
within  the  ASEAN  market.  *Glossy  film  report  of  the  military  hardware  on  display.  *Report  on  joint 
ASEAN  statement  delivered  by  Anwar  urging  the  "rapid  implementation  of  the  Manila  Framework"  and 
better  delivery  of  IMF  assistance  to  ASEAN  countries  in  receipt  of  IMF  aid.  *Pledge  here  to  support 
measures  to  strengthen  the  resources  and  capabilities  of  the  IMF,  World  Bank  and  Asian  Development 
Bank.  *Anwar's  call  here  (reflecting  Dr.  M's  view)  that  currency  trading  be  placed  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  WTO.  *Press  conference  statements  by  Michel  Camdessus  on  the  need  for  internal 
"regional  surveillance"  rather  than  IMF  bail-outs.  *Primary  Industries  Minister  Dr.  Lim  Keng  Yaik  on 
government  plans  to  fix  price  of  cooking  oil.  *Federation  of  Malaysian  Consumers  Association 
(FOMCA)  President,  Prof.  Hamdan  Adrian,  welcomes  the  government's  new  stabilisation  scheme  and 
ceiling  price  for  cooking  oil.  *Filmed  report  on  positive  public  reaction  to  the  announcement. 
*President  of  Palm  Oil  Millers'  Association,  Low  Mong  Hua,  explains  the  industry's  problems  in 
relation  to  the  international  currency  situation,  but  gives  notice  that  cooking  oil  manufacturers  are  co- 
operating  with  the  Minister  of  Trade.  *M.  Mahalingam,  Ministry  Parliamentary  Secretary,  on  the 
government's  efforts  to  inspect  food  outlets  following  the  cholera  outbreak  in  Kuala  Lumpur  -  (42 
cases,  to  date,  in  the  Klang  Valley).  *On  the  markets:  the  KLSE  "rebounded  to  close  higher  on  late- 
buying  support  and  bargain-hunting  activity.  "  "The  three-month  Klibor  futures  on  the  Malaysian 
Monetary  Exchange  [MMEI  closed  lower  in  quiet  trading  today  due  to  uncertainties  in  the  direction  of 
the  market.  "  "And  at  the  currency  market,  the  ringgit  closed-off  it's  low  against  the  US  dollar  tracking 
the  fluctuation  of  the  yen  to  the  greenback.  "  *Business  News  section:  "The  Malaysian  Institute  of 
Economic  Research  (MIER)  expects  Malaysia's  economy  to  snap-back  to  its  robust  growth  rates  within 
two  years  time.  MIER  Executive  Director  Dr.  Director  Mohammed  Ariff  said  by  the  year  2000, 
Malaysia's...  GDP  will  once  again  expand  by  7%  to  8%.  "  Report  on  revised  MIER  forecasts:  (growth  for 
1998  down  from  expected  6.8%  to  5.8%;  6.1%  for  1999;  the  ringgit  to  revert  back  to  2.80  against  US 
dollar  by  1999;  inflation  rate  for  1998  revised  upwards  from  4.8%  to  5.3%,  stabilising  at  4%  in  1999). 
"Dr.  Ariff  said  the  current  economic  problems  are  really  blessings  in  disguise...  The  cheaper  ringgit  has 
also  accelerated  the  recovery  of  the  electronics  and  electrical  export  industry.  Dr.  Mohamed  Ariff  said 
although  the  worst  is  over,  recovery  depends  on  the  return  of  confidence.  He  also  called  for  greater 
transparency  in  the  financial  sector  to  nip  rumours  at  their  source.  "  *Brief  foreign  news  and  sport. 
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assures  investors  that  occasional  reports  of  piracy  on  the  high  seas  does  not  threaten  regional  security. 
*Dr.  M  commending  the  navy  for  its  "smart  ship"  concept,  noting  that  the  private  sector  should 
incorporate  more  IT  based  automation  into  the  maritime  industry,  in  line  with  the  MSC  project.  *Dr  M. 
reaffirming  the  government's  commitment  to  a  land-bridge  project  linking  the  Malaysian  peninsula  at 
Langkawi  island  to  southern  Thailand  and  Kota  Bharu.  *Dr  M.  also  cautioning  the  business  community 
here  against  over-  profiteering  while  the  country  suffers  hardship.  *Other  pronouncements  on.  maritime 
plans.  (Film  of  Dr.  M  inspecting  naval  base).  *Dr.  Ling  on  government  plans  to  privatise  air  traffic 
services.  *Selangor  Menteri  Besar  Abu  Hassan  Omar  to  give  a  full  account  of  expenditure  for 
refurbishment  of  his  official  residence  to  Dr.  M  and  Finance  Minister  Anwar  Ibrahim.  A  spokesman 
said:  "the  state  government  welcomes  the  request  by  certain  quarters  to  have  the  matter  investigated  by 
the  Anti  Corruption  Agency  [in  the  interests  of]  transparency  and  accountable  government.  " 
*Government  `hotline'  number  given  for  consumers  to  report  retailers  who  increase  the  price  of  cooking 
oil.  *Human  Resource  Minister  announcing  tax  exemptions  for  employers  who  set  up  saving  incentive 
schemes  for  their  employees.  *Education  Minister  Najib  announcing  plans  to  promote  over  11,000 
teachers  in  order  to  improve  the  teaching  profession.  *Science,  Technology  and  Environment  Minister 
Law  Hieng  Ding  announcing  plans  to  sign  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MoU)  between  Malaysia 
and  Mexico.  *Business  news:  "Bargain  hunting  saw  share  prices  surging  across  the  board  to  close  the 
day  earlier  on  the  [KLSE]....  The  ringgit  recovered  to  close  at  3.7050  against  the  dollar  after  an  earlier 
low  in  the  day.  "  *A  US-based  investment  consultant  reported  as  saying  that  the  bond  market  will 
emerge  as  the  major  driving  force  to  push  the  East  Asia  economy  ahead.  The  claim  was  made  at  a 
conference  on  asset  securitisation  organised  by  the  KLSE  Securities  Commission.  *Foreign  News 
(Multilateral  signing  in  Quebec  to  abolish  landmines;  CNN  film  on  a  US  teacher's  success  in 
popularising  technology  in  class).  Weather  and  sport. 
"  TV3  News  (5/12/97)  Headline  item:  Dr.  M  launches  a  blueprint  for  the  development  of  the 
Malaysian  aerospace  industry.  Film  report  and  pronouncements.  Main  item:  Anwar's  announcement  of 
new  strategic  measures  to  strengthen  the  country's  economic  and  financial  system.  At  the  press 
conference,  Anwar  (avoiding  the  word  `crisis')  talked  of  an  "unprecedented  development"  which 
required  "tough",  "pre-emptive"  measures  to  improve  confidence,  "painful"  adjustments  which  would  be 
"unpopular"  but  necessary.  (IMF-type  cutbacks  on  federal  expenditure,  tighter  credit  and  other  banking 
sector  controls  were  detailed  by  the  presenter.  )  Other  specific  steps  to  improve  the  banking  system 
included:  "No  bail-outs  or  life  support  loans  to  companies  or  individuals  when  no  longer  prudent  to  do 
so.  "  (This  can  be  seen  as  a  significant  statement  in  the  light  of  Anwar's  dismissal  and  the  issue  of  the 
Renong  bailout.  )  To  improve  the  corporate  sector,  there  was  a  need  for  greater  "transparency"  and  an 
"austerity  drive  to  increase  cash-flow  [and]  cut  expenditure.  "  *Daim  commenting  that  the  proposed 
land-bridge  project  would  require  private-sector  input  from  its  sponsoring  countries  under  the  Indonesia, 
Malaysia,  Thailand  Growth  Triangle  (IMTGT)  project.  *ACA  still  considering  possibility  of  corruption 
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received  a  boost  from  [Anwar's  measures].  "  *Filmed  report  on  stock  market's  favourable  reaction  to 
Anwar's  measures.  Phu  Lee  Kerk,  of  Jupiter  Research,  said  it  would  restore  confidence  of  both  local 
and  foreign  investors.  "Meanwhile,  Third  World  Network  [a  Malaysian-based  NGO]  Director  Martin 
Khor  said  the  announcement  showed  the  government  was  serious  about  greater  austerity  and  a  more 
mature  financial  system,  "  Khor:  "...  on  the  whole,  I  think  [Anwar's]  statement  has  been  very  timely  and 
we  hope  this  will  be  very  well  received  by  the  market.  "  On  the  FOREX:  "the  ringgit  also  climbed 
sharply  following  [Anwar's]  announcement  of  belt-tightening  measures...  "  *Business  news:  Anwar  not 
ruling-out  the  possibility  of  aborting  the  proposed  Renong-UEM  buy-out  plan.  Malaysia  Airlines 
(MAS):  no  plans  for  fare  increases  despite  the  country's  problems.  *Weather  and  sport. 
Malaysian  TV  has  a  number  of  social,  business  and  consumer  affairs-based 
programmes,  such  as  TV3's  Face  to  Face  and  What's  Right.  Alongside  other  business 
discussion  formats,  these  constitute  the  basis  of  `current  affairs'.  Overall,  the  content 
and  tone  here  was  more  expansive,  though  still  ordered  around  `positive'  interpretations 
of  the  crisis,  and  opportunities  arising  from  it,  rather  than  any  critical  analysis  of 
government  policy.  Here  again,  academics  and  other  commentators  were  encouraged  to 
partake  in  `policy-planner'-type  discussion  on  how  to  arrest  the  decline.  The  following 
synopsis  of  TV3's  `flagship'  business  affairs  programme  Money  Matters  is  representative 
of  such  output: 
"  Money  Matters  (TV3)  (28/11/97)  Introducing  the  main  item,  `Road  ahead  for  local  manufacturing 
industry',  presenter  Melissa  Goh's  film  considered  ways  of  adapting  to  the  crisis.  With  the  weaker 
ringgit,  she  noted,  export  oriented  industries  (EOIs)  such  as  the  semiconductor  and  textile  sectors  had 
the  opportunity  to  enhance  their  market  share  despite  intense  global  competition.  Domestic  oriented 
industries  such  as  construction  would  also  be  hit,  but  could  also  grow  moderately.  Fears  about  high 
interest  rates  within  the  manufacturing  sector  were  noted. 
During  the  subsequent  panel  discussion  with  Paul  Low,  President  of  the  Federation  of  Malaysian 
Manufacturers,  and  P.  Arunasalam,  Deputy  Secretary-General  of  the  Malaysian  Trade  Union  Congress 
(MTUC),  Goh  asked  the  latter:  "How  do  you  think  the  trade  unions  will  help  [ensure]  that  these 
opportunities  are  tapped  to  the  fullest?  "  Noting  the  MTUC's  role  in  assisting  development  through  good 
industrial  relations,  he  replied,  echoing  Mr  Low,  that  they  would  continue  to  work  towards  "increasing 
productivity  in  order  to  sustain  competitiveness.  "  This  led-into  a  `more  partisan'  discussion  concerning 
the  issue  of  non  unionisation  of  the  electronics  sector.  However,  Mr.  Arunasalam's  observations  on  the 
government's  preference  for  non-union  labour  were  not  allowed  to  move  beyond  the  main  issue  of 
productivity  and  union-management  co-operation.  Goh  went  on  at  this  point  to  consider  the 
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Professor  Letchmanan  Naidu. 
In  the  `phone-in'  component,  it  was  obvious  that  `constructive  questions'  were  being  encouraged,  such 
as  that  addressed  to  Mr  Low  asking  how  domestic  manufacturers  could  help  develop  the  MSC,  "the 
brainchild"  of  Dr.  Mahathir.  "  Mr.  Low  responded  with  an  endorsement  of  the  MSC  and  the  need  to 
develop  IT  and  R&D  clusters.  Noting  the  low  level  of  strikes,  Mr.  Arunasalam  also  commended  the 
government's  role  in  human  resource  development,  while  calling  for  more  education  in  the  workplace  as 
a  stimulus  to  `responsible'  industrial  relations.  Mr  Low  also  noted  the  need  for  a  further  breakdown  of 
"labour  rigidity"  and  the  inculcation  of  better  "work  values.  " 
Preceded  by  an  upbeat  feature  on  a  young  pizza-chain  entrepreneur,  Goh  moved  to  a  discussion  with  R. 
V.  Ravaratnam,  Advisor  to  the  Sungei  Way  Group.  Asked  for  his  comments  on  the  points  raised  by  the 
earlier  speakers,  he  noted  the  need  for  unions  and  employers  to  "have  the  same  objectives"  based  around 
Dr.  Mahathir's  "concept  of  smart  partnership.  "  Stressing  the  need  for  "confidence-building",  he 
welcomed  the  NEAC,  but  warned  that  it  must  address  macro-issues,  be  transparent  and  (acknowledging 
Chandra  Muzaffar)  help  "eradicate"  the  "denial  factor.  "  While  prudent  management  of  currency 
markets  was  needed,  a  "shake-out"  of  weaker  businesses  was  also  necessary  in  order  to  enhance 
competitiveness.  At  this  point,  Goh  asked:  "What  is  your  comment  with  regard  to  the  so-called  political 
bail-out  that  has  been  much  talked  about...?  "  Ravaratnam  (smiling):  "How  do  you  mean  political  bail- 
out?  "  Goh:  "For  example...  the  issue  of  UEM...  "  Ravaratnam:  "I  think  there  were  some  mistakes 
made...  however  well  intentioned 
... 
So  I  think  the  lesson  to  be  learned  from  that  episode  is,  well, 
recognise  that  the  market  is  so  sensitive  that  a  little  touch  can  cause  a  problem.  "  He  also  noted  the  need 
"...  to  cultivate  the  foreign  investors.  Even  if  we  disagree  with  them,  we  can  disagree  pleasantly.  We  can 
agree  to  disagree...  [We  need  to]  exclude  the  negative  elements  and...  warmly  welcome  the  positive 
elements.  And  then  we  can  have  a  good  smart  partnership  with  foreign  investors  too.  "  The  programme 
ended  on  an  upbeat  story  about  the  Malaysian  music  industry's  efforts  to  promote  itself  on  the  export 
market. 
"  Money  Matters  (5/12/97)  Another  edition  of  the  programme  looks  at  measures  Malaysians  can  take 
to  adopt  a  prudent  lifestyle  in  response  to  the  economic  situation.  An  important  theme  here  was  the 
promotion  of  family  life  and  the  practical,  as  well  as  moral,  benefits  to  be  derived  from  simpler  home 
experiences.  Although  concern  was  expressed  over  creeping  food  price  increases,  the  central  message 
was  `opportunity  in  adversity'.  Again,  the  middle-class  families  shown  discussing  their  own  ways  of 
adjusting  to  the  crisis  neatly  complemented  the  ideal  of  shared  national  responsiveness.  The  "fortitude" 
of  consumers  is  also  reflected  in  the  subsequent  comments  of  Chow  Chee  Ming,  Chairman  of  the 
Malaysian  Retailers  Association,  while  the  other  main  item  on  economic  measures  has  Mohammed  Ariff 
of  the  MIER  restating  the  need  for  national  sacrifices  (such  as  pay-cuts)  in  order  to  keep  inflation  in 
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International  Studies  (Malaysia)  (ISIS)  and  Third  World  Network's  Martin  Khor  both  commend 
Anwar's  economic  package  announced  that  day.  However,  like  Ariff,  reservations  are  expressed  here 
over  the  wider  issue  of  IMF-type  intervention  (reflecting  an  emerging  ambivalence  amongst  many  policy 
intellectuals  by  this  point  and  an  omen  of  the  showdown  to  come  between  Mahathir  and  Anwar). 
With  growth-driven  development  curtailed,  the  crisis  had  also  brought 
`sustainable  development'  to  `closer  attention'  as  a  media  issue.  In  Penang,  for  example, 
rapid  growth,  unchecked  planning,  hill-reclamation,  road  construction,  high-rise 
development,  a  booming  population  (1.28  million)  and  increased  pollution  have  all 
combined  to  threaten  the  quality  of  daily  life  and  Penang's  fragile  eco-system.  As  one 
advertising  hoarding  next  to  a  lone  kampong  at  the  now  booming  south  of  the  island 
proclaimed:  `Watch  this  space  and  see  how  things  develop'.  The  crisis  had  given  added 
impetus  to  projects  such  as  The  Sustainable  Penang  Initiative,  under  the  aegis  of  the 
Socio-Economic  &  Environmental  Research  Institute  (SERI).  79  But  while  government 
and  state  officials  appeared  to  be  supportive  of  such  projects,  and  sustainable  planning 
generally,  this  could  not  disguise  the  deeper  political-corporate  interests  underwriting  the 
physical  development  process  in  Malaysia.  This  can  be  gleaned  in  the  subtext  of  media 
output  such  as  Property  Watch,  a  relatively  questioning  format  of  concerned,  but  safe, 
middle-class  discourse. 
"  Property  Watch  (TV3)  (30/11/97)  The  feature  reports,  introduced  by  Karen  Ho,  combined 
consumer-based  concerns  with  broader  issues  of  social  development.  For  example,  the  main  report 
centred  on  the  need  for  a  `total  planning  doctrine'  to  tackle  the  gathering  problems  of  Western-style 
urban  development  in  Malaysian  cities.  The  perennial  problem  of  traffic  jams,  air  quality  and  lack  of 
houses  for  the  poor  were  among  a  number  of  policy  issues  raised.  Professor  of  Environmental  Design, 
Ismawi  Zen  noted  that  policy  planners  have  been  too-focused  on  building  beautiful  mega-cities  rather 
than  trying  to  understand  "the  complexity  of  the  social  problem.  "  (Pictures  of  police  questioning  `lepak' 
youths  at  amusement  arcade.  )  However,  this  promising  line  of  enquiry  gives  way  to  the  case  for 
Putrajaya  as  the  model  solution,  the  presenter  noting  that  "the  67,000  homes  in  Putrajaya  will  cater  to  all 
income  groups.  "  She  also  commends  the  new  guidelines  on  balanced  development  noted  by  the  Director 
General  of  Town  and  Country  Planning.  On  a  less  sanguine  note,  questions  are  raised  about  the  private- 
sector's  willingness  to  follow  this  model,  given  that  "landscaping,  open-spaces  and  low  cost  housing 
mean  a  loss  of  revenue.  "  However,  private-sector  `acknowledgement'  of  the  total  planning  concept  is  re- 
affirmed  by  Zaiton  Md  Noh,  a  Senior  Development  Manager  who  agrees  that  "we  cannot  think  of  profit 
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property  prices  fall. 
Overall,  the  purpose  of  TV  and  current  affairs  output  was  to  normalise, 
rationalise  and,  ultimately,  depoliticise  the  crisis.  Such  coverage  did  not,  indeed,  could 
not,  disguise  the  actual  impact  the  crisis  was  beginning  to  have  on  ordinary  Malaysians' 
lives.  Rather,  its  function  was  to  provide  an  appropriate  context  and  filter  for  receiving 
the  crisis  and  measures  to  contain  it.  In  this,  the  slavish  regularity  of  pro-government 
TV  news  was  slightly  mitigated  by  the  more  `discursive'  approach  of  current  affairs 
output.  But  while  the  former  was  a  sanitised  version  of  events  offering  no  alternative 
viewpoint  whatsoever,  the  latter  was  built  more  subtly  around  a  `problem  solving' 
axiom,  whether  in  its  `policy  planner'  play  to  academics,  business  figures  and  trade 
unionists  or  in  its  populist  appeal  to  `the  Malaysian  as  consumer.  '  It  is  not  coincidental 
here  that  two  of  the  biggest  NGOs  in  Malaysia  are  the  consumer  bodies  FOMCA  and 
CAP. 
Turning  more  specifically  to  the  domestic  press,  we  find  a  variation  of  these 
approaches.  That  is,  the  `Dr.  Mahathir  says'  variety  and  the  `encouraged  dialogue' 
version.  Essentially,  the  objective  is  the  same  as  that  assumed  by  the  electronic  media: 
the  normalisation  of  news  and  information  and  the  neutralisation  of  dissent.  However, 
the  print  media,  generally,  can  still  be  regarded  as  a  relatively  more  `expansive'  format  in 
terms  of  critical  commentary,  popular  polemic  and  nuanced  reportage.  At  least, 
potentially  so.  As  noted  above,  gathering  competition,  feature  re-vamps,  the  play  for 
middle-class  readership  and  a  certain  liberalisation  by  the  mid-1990s  had  increased  the 
scope  for  a  more  expanded  press  product.  To  what  extent,  then,  were  any  of  the 
mainstream  dailies  attempting  to  move  beyond  the  `standard  text'  of  responsible 
development  journalism  as  the  crisis  unfolded?  As  an  emerging  daily  with  a  `claim'  to 
this  mantle,  let  us  consider  the  particular  output  of  the  Sun  at  this  point.  An  analysis  of 
other  Malaysian  press  output  in  relation  to  the  Anwar  issue  follows  below. 
The  Sun:  pushing  the  boundaries? 
From  its  launch  in  1994,  the  Sun  had  sought  to  fill  a  significant  niche  market  occupied  by 
the  Star.  Part  of  the  impetus  for  this  had  arisen  from  a  certain  disenchantment  amongst 
207 some  Star  journalists  and  others  over  the  paper's  passivity  after  1987.  More  particularly, 
the  Sun's  Berjaya  group  owners  appeared  to  have  identified  a  promising  new  market  for 
a  younger,  `more  discerning'  readership  seeking  less  `staid'  news,  more  foreign  features 
and  a  better  produced  magazine  section.  The  nature  of  the  Sun's  content  and  approach  at 
this  point  may  be  measured  against  five  main  indicators  relevant  to  the  crisis  and  the 
issue  of  civil  expression: 
1.  Headline  coverage  of  Mahathir  and  the  Barisan 
2.  Wexler  and  the  anti-American  issue 
3.  The  November  1997  by-elections 
4.  Reporting  opposition  opinion  and  ISA  detentions 
5.  Critical  features  on  civil  issues 
Headline  coverage  of  Mahathir  and  the  Barisan 
In  general,  the  Sun's  reporting  of  Mahathir's  pronouncements  and  the  Barisan  message 
was  consistent  with  the  responsible  journalism  found  elsewhere  in  the  Malaysian  press. 
What  differentiated  it,  marginally,  from  other  dailies  was  the  relatively  less  slavish  tone  of 
its  reporting.  This  corresponds,  to  some  extent,  with  a  view  within  the  Sun  that  the 
paper  was  attempting  to  express  its  `adversarial'  voice  in  a  more  `alternative'  manner  by 
not  engaging  in  the  type  of  hyped-up  exposure  so  apparent  at  that  point  in  the  Star,  New 
Straits  Times  and  Utusan  Malaysia.  However,  this  supposed  `subtle  criticism'  can  be 
seen  more  as  a  difference  of  style  rather  than  substance.  While  the  reports  were 
somewhat  less  `proclamatory'  than,  for  example,  the  New  Straits  Times'  'BN  pledges 
support  for  PM'  (19/11/97),  the  opening  `Mahathir  said'  format  was  still  employed  in  most 
lead  stories,  one  distinction  being  the  Sun's  use  of  the  less  reverential  `Mahathir',  rather 
than  `Dr.  Mahathir'  in  its  text  -  though  still  preceded  by  the  convention  of  `Datuk  Seri' 
in  the  headline  sentence.  Similarly,  while  front-page  headlines  in  the  New  Straits  Times 
appeared  as  overt  Barisan  announcements,  as  in  `A  confidence  boosting  national  Budget 
for  1998'  (18/10/97),  the  Sun  used  relatively  more  abbreviated  headline  forms,  as  in: 
`Taking  control'  -  noting  the  need  for  Malaysians  to  counter  the  speculators  (12/11/97); 
`All-round  aye'  -  on  the  Dewan  Rakyat's  motion  of  confidence  in  Mahathir  (20/11/97); 
and,  `Trust  us:  PM'  -  on  Mahathir's  resistance  to  an  IMF  package  (2/12/97).  On  the 
208 whole,  though,  this  more  restrained  format  did  not  detract  from  the  essential  content  of 
the  reports,  which,  alongside  other  Home  coverage,  was  generally  favourable  to  the 
Barisan. 
Wexler  and  the  anti-American  issue 
Throughout  this  `confrontation',  the  press  in  general  adopted  a  safely  pro-Mahathir 
position.  In  essence:  no  foreign  interference  in  Malaysian  affairs.  However,  in  its 
headline  treatment  of  the  issue,  the  Sun's  output  was  generally  more  moderate  in  tone,  as 
in  `Envoy:  Enough'  -  US  Ambassador  Mallot  calling  for  an  end  to  the  bickering 
(18/11/97);  and  `Right  to  speak'  -  Mahathir's  appeal  for  conciliation  (19/11/97).  Though 
serious  criticism  of  the  Dewan  Rakyat's  single  motion  of  confidence  was  generally  absent 
in  the  press,  the  Sun  did  offer  nominal  space  for  Lim  Kit  Siang's  amendment  proposal  for 
the  motion  to  be  split  (20/11/98).  Its  coverage  of  anti-American  protests,  such  as  'BN 
Youth  demonstrates  at  Embassy'  (14/11/97),  can  also  be  contrasted  with  Utusan 
Malaysia's  more  chauvinistic  colour  picture  and  caption  `Isyarat  tegas'  (strong  warning) 
(14/11/97).  Other  reports,  such  as  the  New  Straits  Times'  piece  `Pos  Malaysia  employees 
pledge  support  for  PM'  and  the  Sun's  `Pos  Malaysia  supports  PM'  (15/11/97),  were 
similar  in  content.  However,  the  Sun's  coverage  of  the  proposed  investigation  into 
Petronas,  `Sanctions,  if  imposed,  will  apply  within  US  only'  (18/11/97)  and  `Ramsay:  I'm 
here  to  explain,  not  investigate'  (21/11/97),  was  generally  more  informative  than  the  New 
Straits  Times  output.  Again,  though,  much  of  the  Sun's  information  fitted  the  PM's  own 
agenda  by  this  point,  as  in  `Mahathir  reassures  American  citizens'  (14/11/97),  and  was 
being  reproduced  by  the  Sun  and  other  press  as  government  information  via  the  Bernama 
news  agency.  Nonetheless,  it  can  be  suggested  that  the  Sun's  slightly  more  `equivocal' 
view  of  Mahathir's  anti-US  posture  and  its  implications  for  recovery  reflected,  perhaps,  a 
deeper  undercurrent  of  concern,  particularly  amongst  the  Chinese  business  class. 
The  November  1997  by-elections 
Some  of  this  ambivalence  could  be  denoted  in  the  coverage  of  the  Sungai  Bakup  and 
Changkat  Jering  by-elections  (November  8th  1997.  )  In  the  run-up  to  the  polls, 
209 mainstream  press  output  had  been  broadly  similar,  the  Sun's  coverage  of  other  party 
views  deviating  only  slightly  from  the  pro-Barisan  imbalance.  Despite  substantial 
reductions  in  the  BN  vote  (see  Chapter  3),  the  New  Sunday  Times  ran  with:  `Barisan 
sweeps  to  double  victory',  the  Star  on  Sunday  with  the  more  restrained  'BN  wins  in  Sg 
Bakup  and  Changkat  Jering',  while  the  Sunday  had  'BN  wins  by-elections  with  ease' 
(9/11/97).  Where  the  New  Straits  Times  sought  to  disguise  the  reduced  majorities  by 
talking-up  the  BN  `promise  to  work  harder  for  the  people',  the  Star  assumed  a  safe 
reportage  of  statistics  and  BN  comments,  as  did  the  Sunday  piece,  though  the  latter  two 
noted  the  PAS  candidate's  complaint  in  Changkat  Jering  that  he  had  not  been  given  fair 
coverage  by  the  media.  In  its  subsequent  post-poll  piece,  `Independent's  good  showing 
is  food  for  thought'  (10/11/97),  the  Sun  looked  more  closely  at  the  damage  done  to  the 
BN  and  the  changing  voting  pattern  of  Malays. 
Reporting  opposition  opinion  and  ISA  detentions 
Opposition  views  are  rarely  aired  as  main  stories  in  the  press,  except  where  they  reflect 
support  for  the  Barisan,  a  convention  practiced  also  by  the  Sun,  as  in:  `Set  aside 
differences,  be  united:  Nik  Aziz'  (17/11/97).  More  obvious  differences  can  be  found 
between  the  Sun  and  the  New  Straits  Times  in  their  respective  `At  the  Dewan  Rakyat 
yesterday'  features.  In  general,  the  former  offered  more  space  for  DAP  opinion,  as  in 
`Opposition  men  walk  out  to  protest  cut  in  debate  time'  (5/11/97)  and  `People  have  right 
to  foreign  news:  Lim'  (27/11/97),  in  contrast  to  the  latter's  more  typical,  `  "PM  has  proven 
to  the  world  he  was  right  all  along"  '  (30/10/97). 
More  revealing,  though,  was  the  Sun's  coverage  of  restrictions  on  academics  and 
ISA  detentions  at  this  point.  In  another  civil  curb,  the  government  had  slapped  a  gag 
order  on  academics  discussing  the  haze  problem.  In  response,  the  Sun's  front-page 
headline  piece  `Dumbstruck'  (7/11/97)  led  on  the  strong  criticism  of  NGOs,  the  Bar 
Council's  Cecil  Rajendra  and  Universiti  Malaya  academics  Chandra  Muzaffar  and 
Professor  Adnan  Nawang.  The  paper's  Home  page  also  had:  `Gag  order  adds  insult  to 
injury,  says  EPSMi80  and  `Public  have  a  right  to  know,  says  lawyer'.  With  regard  to  the 
ISA,  the  Sun  report  `Eight  held  under  ISA  for  deviationist  activities'  (7/11/97)  carried  the 
standard  government  line  on  the  threat  to  national  security  from  `deviationist  religious 
210 groups'.  But  it  also  noted  PRM  president  Syed  Husin  Ali's  concerns  that  their  actions 
be  met  with  dialogue  rather  than  ISA  detention.  Surprisingly,  there  were  also  a  number 
of  statement  pieces,  albeit  small,  from  Aliran  on  this  and  other  issues:  `Aliran:  charge  the 
10  detained  under  ISA'  (10/11/97);  and  `Clean  up  own  backyard  before  advertising: 
Aliran'  (19/11/97)  -  in  response  to  the  Information  Minister's  moves  to  obtain 
advertising  space  on  CNN  and  other  foreign  media.  Further  to  the  ISA  issue, 
. the  Sun 
had  also  expressed  tacit  support  for  the  government's  purge  on  'Shi'ite  activism'  and 
`deviationist  teaching'  in  the  universities,  as  indicated  in  its  main  headline:  `Student 
targets  -  Deviant  groups  zero  in  on  undergraduates'  (Sunday,  9/11/97).  In  this  regard, 
`public  fear'  of  `deviant  Islam'  has  been  part  of  a  long-standing  media  agenda  aimed  at 
both  Chinese  and  Malay  sensitivities.  However,  there  appeared  to  be  something  of  a  line 
being  drawn  here  between  the  Islamic  issue  and  the  wider  issue  of  civil  restrictions.  In 
another  (letter)  article,  `Encourage  students  to  be  more  conscious  politically'  (24/11/97), 
Aliran  Exco  member  Dr.  Mustafa  Anuar  was  given  space,  albeit  nominal,  to  rebut  calls 
for  government  scholarships  to  be  withdrawn  from  students  supporting  PAS.  81  This 
complemented  other  small  pieces,  such  as  the  paper's  noting  of  a  HAKAM  civil  forum, 
The  Role  of  NGOs  in  a  Democracy:  `Human  rights  talks'  (30/11/97).  82 
Critical  features  on  civil  issues 
The  main  issue  here  was  whether  such  space  for  alternative  opinion  could  be  translated 
into  more  expanded  forms  of  critical  commentary.  We  might  note,  in  this  regard,  the 
propensity  for  `wider'  media  expression  in  English,  rather  than  Malay  -  even  if  still 
balanced  somewhat  by  the  more  elliptical,  less  direct,  style  of  critical  address  common  to 
literary  and  media  forms  in  Malaysia.  Yet,  whether  in  English  or  vernacular,  the  general 
dearth  of  critical  features  within  the  Malaysian  press  cannot  be  disguised.  It  was 
somewhat  refreshing,  thus,  to  observe  the  Sun's  output  here.  For  while  much  of  it  was 
similar  to  the  sort  of  middle-class  `lifestyle  genre'  noted  above,  one  could  also  discern  a 
more  qualitative  vein  of  critical  features  on  a  range  of  civil  and  intellectual  concerns,  as 
noted  in  the  following  sample:  ß3 
211 *  Rusdi  Mustapha  (Megazine  Retrospect)  `Beware  the  propaganda  campaign'  (12/10/97) 
This  informed  article  makes  legitimate  criticisms  about  the  covert  roles  of  M16,  the  CIA 
and  other  intelligence  agencies'  manipulation  of  the  media  for  propagandist  purposes.  Is 
it  too  fanciful,  he  asks,  to  see  a  connection  between  current  US  interests  in  the  region 
and  foreign  media  attacks  on  Mahathir?  The  author  also  notes  that  Malaysians  must  be 
mature  and  harmonious  in  their  responses  if  they  want  to  be  treated  as  a  serious  world 
player  -  sentiments  which  might  have  carried  more  weight  had  he  also  discussed 
domestic  propaganda  and  media  manipulation  by  the  Barisan. 
*  Akbar  Ali  (Focus)  `Newsgroup  delivers  it  piping  hot'  (22/10/97) 
This  full-page  piece  discusses  in  more  depth  the  need  for  greater  media  freedom  and  civil 
awareness.  While  placing  the  need  for  Mahathir's  IT  vision  in  a  wider  social  context,  it 
leads  on  expressions  of  admiration  for  journalists  like  Bala  Pillai,  founder  of  Sangkancil, 
Malaysia's  most  "vibrant"  and  "dynamic"  newsgroup.  In  contrast  to  the  above  piece, 
there  is  recognition  of  the  malaise  within  the  domestic  press.  In  one  prophetic  passage, 
the  author  notes: 
The  newspapers  in  this  country  should  pay  close  attention  to  Sangkancil  newsgroup  because  the  news 
and  the  news  analysis  plus  the  gossip  that  goes  on  in  Sangkancil  is  light  years  ahead  of  what  the 
newspapers  print  in  the  morning.  With  Sangkancil  leading  the  way  it  is  a  matter  of  time  before  more 
newsgroups  or  Malaysian  discussion  groups  appear  on  the  Internet.  And  where  will  that  place  the  bland 
reporting  or  lacklustre  news  analysis  that  goes  on  in  most  of  our  printed  media? 
*  Nooraini  Mydin  (Focus)  `A  long,  long  way  from  utopia'  (27/10/97) 
This  (full-page)  piece  on  civil  society  in  Malaysia  took  as  its  departure  point  a  recent 
seminar  on  the  `Media  and  Civil  Society'  organised  by  the  faculty  of  Mass 
Communications  at  Institut  Teknologi  Mara.  As  the  title  suggests,  the  author,  reflecting 
many  of  the  academic  contributions,  felt  that  Malaysia  had  some  distance  to  travel. 
Having  gone  some  way  to  identifying  what  a  civil  society  might  look  like,  there  was 
general  consensus  on  the  promotion  of  NGOs  as  a  check  on  government  and  the  private 
sector,  greater  freedom  of  speech  within  the  media  and  an  understanding  of  how 
uncontrolled  capitalism  was  giving  rise  to  corruption,  greed  and  a  loss  of  social  values, 
212 as  well  as  the  destruction  of  the  natural  environment  -  the  haze  issue  being  a  graphic 
example.  As  the  author  noted: 
A  civil  society  includes  the  government,  the  people  in  their  different  roles  as  well  as  the  public  and 
corporate  sectors,  which  in  turn  shape  the  environment  we  live  in.  It  ties  in  very  closely  with  the  issue 
of  civil  liberties  without  which  there  can  be  no  possibility  of  a  civil  society. 
A  further  issue  here  was  how  any  such  civil  development  might  encompass  both  an 
Islamic  set  of  values  and  secular  human  rights.  Responding  to  one  Islamic  interpretation 
from  Awang  Had  that  "[a]  civil  society  is  made  up  of  people  who  believe  in  God,  "  - 
"atheists  [having]  a  tendency  towards  anarchy"  -  the  author  argues  the  need  for  total 
involvement  and  a  basic  set  of  human  rights,  otherwise  "civil  society  will  only  be  another 
cliche.  " 
*  W.  G.  Mansor  (Megazine  Special  Issue)  `A  well-aimed  shot  at  poverty'  (27/11/97) 
This  feature  was  fairly  typical  of  the  Sun's  coverage  of  acute  social  issues.  Here,  the 
ongoing  problem  of  rural  poverty  is  addressed,  taking  as  its  cue  the  work  of  the 
kampong-based  `credit  bank'  Amanah  Ikhtiar  Malaysia  (AIM).  84  Run  by  villagers 
themselves,  the  scheme  has  been  widely  successful  (covering  2659  villages)  in  providing 
manageable  loans  to  poor  rural  people  with  no  access  to  conventional  banks,  while 
helping  to  generate  a  sense  of  solidarity  and  something  of  an  independent  voice  for 
women,  the  main  recipients  of  AIM  loans.  Tracing  the  origins  of  the  scheme  (from 
Bangladesh)  and  the  pioneering  work  of  two  policy  academics  in  the  field,  the  author 
notes  how  this  type  of  NGO  programme  complements  the  government's  wider  poverty- 
reducing  efforts  and  provision  of  social  infrastructure.  A  linked  piece,  `In  business  with 
the  poor',  looks  more  closely  at  the  problems  of  capacity  faced  by  the  organisation  as  it 
attempts  to  expand  its  operations.  Together,  the  articles  offered  an  informative  set  of 
insights  and  social  commentary,  though  no  serious  critique  of  the  government's  own  role 
in  poverty  reduction  policy  was  included. 
*  Samuel  Jeyaraj  (Megazine  Special  Issue)  `Modern  sickness'  (30/11/97) 
In  similar  vein,  this  article  takes  up  the  more  perennial  issue  of  urbanisation,  discussing 
the  "flip  side"  to  rapid  growth  and  development.  Much  of  the  content  here  is  similar  to 
213 the  above-noted  Property  Watch  (TV3)  report,  including  the  need  for  developers  to 
adhere  to  new  town  planning  standards  (the  Total  Planning  and  Development  Doctrine 
being  noted)  and  the  references  to  Putrajaya  and  Cyberjaya. 
In  more  enquiring  mood,  three  extensive  features  on  the  intellectual  and  the  want  of 
intellectual  discourse  in  Malaysia  denote  a  more  basic  set  of  concerns  lurking  as  critical 
commentary  within  this  populist  space. 
*  Akbar  All  (Focus)  `Filling  the  intellectual  vacuum'  (3/10/97) 
In  this  thought-provoking  piece,  the  author  laments  the  lack  of  any  meaningful 
intellectual  community  as  the  country  moves,  tentatively,  towards  the  Vision: 
We  are  23  years  away  from  Vision  2020.  But  it  is  yet  to  be  seen  if  we  are  successfully  developing  an 
intellectual  society  or  even  an  intellectual  tradition  in  our  society.  Looking  at  the  lack  of  intellectual 
discourse  in  our  country,  one  wonders  if  we  will  at  all  remember  Vision  2020  when  we  finally  get 
there...  Whether  it  is  academia,  religion,  social  activism  or  writing  books  and  articles,  there  is  a  dearth  of 
intellectual  discussion.  Even  the  level  of  discourse  on  our  TV  talk  shows  is  mild.  There  are  rarely  any 
probing  questions  about  anything  and  the  discussions  are  rarely  to  the  point. 
To  criticise,  he  notes,  is  not,  necessarily,  to  be  intellectual.  And  yet: 
...  the  lack  of  intellectual  discussion  has  led  us  to  establish  a  norm  that  to  say  anything  intelligent  or 
controversial  means  that  one  is  anti-establishment...  For  example...  some  of  the  ulamak  types  have  even 
said  that  to  understand  and  interpret  the  Quran  is  a  sin.  The  religious  "authorities"  or  ulamak  are 
therefore  among  the  worst  culprits. 
This,  essentially,  liberal  argument,  echoed  in  the  final  remarks  on  the  West's  ability  to 
tolerate  diverse  opinion,  is  a  revealing  indictment,  even  though  it  never  makes  the 
connection  between  the  prevailing  intellectual  discourse  and  Vision  ideology  itself, 
notably  via  the  media.  However,  the  link  is  made  more  apparent  in  the  following  five 
page  Special  on  intellectuals. 
214 *  W.  G.  Mansor  (Megazine  Special  Issue)  `I  think,  therefore  I  am'  (9/11/97) 
In  the  first  three-page  section,  Mansor  reviews  the  thoughts  and  standing  of  some  key 
intellectuals  of  the  modem  age,  such  as  Bertrand  Russell,  Julien  Benda  and  Noam 
Chomsky,  before  elaborating  the  crisis  of  the  intellectual  in  Malaysia  through  critical 
voices  like  Jomo  and  Syed  Hussein  Alatas.  In  the  first  instance,  though,  he  notes  the 
formative  contribution  of  Gramsci  and  the  connection  between  media  production  and  the 
intellectual: 
Gramsci's  own  career  exemplifies  the  role  he  ascribed  to  the  intellectual.  He  was  also  a  linguist  who 
organised  the  Italian  working  class  movement;  as  a  journalist  he  was  a  consciously  reflective  social 
analyst  whose  purpose  was  to  build  an  entire  cultural  formation  associated  with  a  social  movement.  [In 
contrast  to  Benda's  notion  of  intellectuals  as  a  select  band  of  moral  philosophers,  ]  Gramsci's 
representation  of  the  intellectual  as  a  person  who  fulfils  a  particular  set  of  functions  in  society  is 
probably  closer  to  present-day  reality  than  Benda's  narrow  definition.  Today,  everyone  who  works  in 
any  field  connected  with  the  production  or  distribution  of  knowledge  is  an  intellectual  in  the  Gramscian 
sense. 
The  article  goes  on  to  explore  some  of  the  anti-establishment  positions  adopted  by  pre- 
Merdeka  Malay  intellectuals,  the  stance  taken  by  Ungku  Aziz  on  land  reform,  before 
helping  to  draft  the  NEP,  and  the  determination  of  writers  and  poets  such  as  Keris  Mas, 
Usman  Awang  and  Samad  Ismail  to  reveal  the  plight  of  the  lower  classes  through  their 
work.  However,  this  confrontation  by  artists  and  intellectuals  against  early  capitalist 
materialism  has  much  deeper  roots  in  the  Western  tradition,  notes  Mansor.  Invoking 
Alatas,  Malay  intellectuals  had  also  been  pacified  by  the  smooth  transfer  of  colonial 
power  and  the  lack  of  an  Indonesian-type  struggle  for  independence.  Today,  he  notes, 
the  West  has  adversarial  intellectuals  like  Chomsky,  an  "articulator  of  dissent"  who 
"argues  that  the  major  newspapers  and  TV  networks  connive  with  the  elites  of 
government  and  big  business  to  restrict  the  range  of  information  and  opinion  available  to 
ordinary  citizens.  "  In  contrast,  Malaysian  intellectuals  generally  hold  to  a  culture  of 
passive  pragmatism: 
In  fact,  it  would  appear  that  only  a  handful  of  Malaysian  intellectuals  conceive  their  role  to  be  that  of  the 
classical  intelligentsia,  critical  of  excesses  and  errors  of  whatever  regime  is  in  power...  One  can  say  that, 
with  notable  exceptions,  the  political  ideas  of  Malaysian  intellectuals  are  marked  by  run-of-the-millness 
215 rather  than  extraordinariness.  In  the  sense  that  their  views  mirror  all  the  ambiguities  of  society  at  large, 
they  are  more  Malaysian  than  `intellectual'.  On  the  whole,  they  do  not  constitute  a  vanguard 
community  with  a  radically  different  image  of  the  political  future.  Part  romantic  nationalist,  part 
pragmatic  realist,  these  are  the  intellectuals  who  say  "democracy  works  very  well  here  but  it  is  a 
Malaysian  version.  " 
The  result  of  this,  notes  Mansor,  is  a  pervasive  anti-intellectualism  from  above.  This,  he 
argues,  citing  Chandra  and  Jomo,  has  reified  a  culture  of  silence  and  an  absence  of 
intellectual  enquiry: 
We  can  judge  this  by  the  paucity  of  published  materials,  and  the  absence  of  a  sustained  collective 
discussion  on  vital  issues.  The  intellectual  output  from  our  universities,  the  institutes  and  the  press  has 
not  been  that  impressive.  There  has  been  little  contribution  towards  a  critical  discussion  of  the  real 
issues. 
Completing  the  circle  is  a  lack  of  public  engagement.  Without  a  market  for  in-depth 
books,  few  are  published  in  Bahasa,  critical  discourse  thus  remaining  the  preserve  of  an 
Anglophone  world.  As  the  author  concludes: 
A  government  practising  a  policy  of  accommodation,  it  seems,  can  tolerate  apathy  but  not  ideology  from 
its  intellectuals.  Thus,  the  government  stands  to  gain  most  from  a  depoliticised  intellectual  stratum 
without  binding  ideological  commitments.  Observers  who  hope  for  a  revolutionary  transformation  led 
by  vanguard  intellectuals  will  be  disappointed. 
*  YusoffAhmad  (Megazine  Special  Issue)  `Who's  a  clever  boy  now?  '  (9/11/97) 
These  themes  are  developed  in  a  further  two-page  feature.  Here,  the  author  takes-up 
Syed  Husin  Ali's  view  that:  "In  order  to  think,  write  and  be  critical  of  society,  the 
intellectual  must  be  close  to  society.  "  In  effect,  real  intellectual  engagement  does  not 
come  from  books  alone,  but  from  direct  observation  and  involvement  with  people.  Abdul 
Razak  Abdullah  Baginda  of  the  Malaysian  Strategic  Research  Centre  (MSRC) 
acknowledges  that  intellectuals  do  operate  outwith  the  university,  but  must  also  be 
respected  in  this  domain.  He  also  sees  a  more  particular  need  for  harnessing  local 
intellectuals.  More  directly,  Syed  Husin  Ali  specifies  a  number  of  reasons  for  intellectual 
passivity  in  Malaysia,  such  as  the  lack  of  democratic  space  within  the  media,  the  inability 
216 of  intellectuals  to  escape  their  ethnic  trap  and  the  economic  lifestyle  enjoyed  by 
Malaysian  intellectuals  in  contrast  to  some  of  their  regional  counterparts. 
It  is  not  only  what  is  being  stated  here  that  is  important,  but  the  fact  that  it  is  being 
expressed  through  the  popular  press.  While  idealising,  somewhat,  the  `Western 
intellectual',  these  articles  suggest  a  wider  potential  for  critical  reflection  and  the  need 
for  greater  intellectual  engagement.  However,  discussion  of  the  intellectual  also  needs  to 
recognise  the  ideological  context  within  which  these  things  are  being  said.  For  the  top- 
down  `anti-intellectualism'  which  does  indeed  pervade  Malaysian  society  constitutes 
intellectual  enterprise  in  itself.  Thus,  in  the  Gramscian  sense  noted,  but  not  wholly 
applied,  by  Mansor,  the  political  elite  are  not  anti-intellectual,  given  the  central  role  of 
intellectuals  as  producers  and  presenters  of  ideas.  In  this  regard,  intellectuals  linked  to 
the  state  and  civil  institutions  like  the  media  continue  to  draw  other  policy  intellectuals, 
academics  and  influential  individuals  into  the  elite  network. 
In  summary,  the  Sun  had  pushed  the  boundaries  a  little,  partly  because  of  a  more-relaxed 
press  by  the  mid-1990s,  partly  because  of  a  market  strategy  to  displace  the  Star  and 
partly  as  an  (apparently  genuine)  acknowledgement  of  a  more  discerning  readership.  But 
this  in  itself  was  only  allowed  because  proprietors,  editors  and  journalists  had  come  to 
understand  the  rules  of  the  game  and  the  lessons  of  the  1980s.  In  the  main,  the  Sun's 
editorial  approach  appeared  to  be  one  of  pragmatic  support  for  the  status  quo  and  the 
Barisan.  At  no  time  did  its  editorials  or  lead  articles  question  the  wider  power  structure. 
Nonetheless,  the  paper's  output  at  this  point  could  be  regarded  as  more  `enquiring'  than 
the  other  dailies,  certainly  the  New  Straits  Times  and  Utusan  Malaysia,  even  allowing  for 
the  impression  of  impartiality  cultivated,  a  reportage  presented  as  `critical  journalism' 
through  selective  coverage  of  opposition  opinion.  Again,  much  of  the  lifestyle  features, 
letters  and  `critical  commentaries'  played-up  the  same  basic  appeal  to  middle-class 
insiderism.  Yet,  in  its  cursory  examination  of  the  intellectual  face  of  Malaysia,  it  also 
appeared  cognisant  of  a  deeper  seam  of  civil  concern,  something  which  it  felt  able  to 
excavate  without  undermining  the  elite  structure  above  it.  If  this  has  been  done  in 
recognition  of  a  more  critically  engaged  public,  it  may  indicate,  at  least,  the  nucleus  of  a 
more  assertive  press,  something  which  might  surface  should  Malaysians  come  to  reject, 
217 wholesale,  routine  media  adherence  to  the  Barisan.  As  the  Anwar  crisis  unravelled, 
there  were  signs  of  such  disenchantment.  But  it  was  also  apparent  that  the  Sun,  like  the 
rest  of  the  press,  had  not  diverged  in  any  meaningful  way  from  the  practice  of 
responsible  development  journalism. 
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220 administrative  databases  and  repositories  can  be  accessed,  using  computerised  key-encryption 
technology,  to  view,  send  and  sign  legally-binding  documents. 
73  From  the  IT  Awareness  Campaign  leaflet  produced  by  the  Information  Department,  Ministry  of 
Information,  October  1997. 
76  Broadly  translated:  Know/recognise  IT.  Enjoy  IT.  Students  every  day...  use/take  advantage  of  IT...  the 
science  of  IT.  Malaysia  skilled/accomplished.  Embrace  IT.  Learn  IT.  Love/have  affection  for  IT. 
Uselbenefit  from  IT. 
77  The  following  is  a  selected  content  analysis  of  media  output  during  the  crisis  period  early-October  to 
mid-December  1997.  The  main  elements  discussed  here  are  the  New  Straits  Times,  Star  and  Sun 
newspapers  and  selections  from  RTM  and  TV3  news.  Reference  is  also  made  to  some  TV  current  affairs 
programmes  and  other  miscellaneous  output.  The  observations  and  notes  within  this  section  also  derive 
from  interviews  with  the  Sun  Regional  Editor  (Penang)  Jackson  Ng  Kee  Seng,  Mr  Chiew,  Assistant 
Editor  for  the  Star  in  Penang,  and  other  informal  discussions  with  working  journalists  from  the  New 
Straits  Times  and  Malay  Mail.  Analysis  of  these  and  other  related  issues  here  is  also  drawn  from  a 
lengthy  discussion  with  Zaharom  Nain  at  the  School  of  Communications,  Universiti  Sains  Malaysia. 
78  This  practice  of  seeing  the  PM  off  at  the  airport  and  greeting  him  on  return  is  seen  as  an  important 
expression  of  loyalty  and  a  way  for  aspiring  business  figures  to  get  closer  to  Mahathir. 
79  The  SPI  is funded  by  the  Institute  on  Governance  (Canada),  with  other  input  from  UN-based  bodies. 
SERI,  based  in  Penang,  has  also  worked  with  the  Penang  state  government  on  this  issue,  with  Dr.  Koh 
Tsu  Koon,  the  Chief  Minister,  closely  associated  the  SPI  project.  See  SERI  Homepage: 
<http:  //www.  geocities.  com/RainForest/Vines/7288/index.  htm>. 
80  The  article  refers  to  statements  by  R.  Senthirajah  of  the  Environmental  Protection  Society  of 
Malaysia  (EPSM)  condemning  the  government's  intervention  and  appealing  for  greater  transparency. 
81  This  was  in  response  to  veiled  threats  made  to  opposition  student  activists  by  Backbenchers  Club 
president  Ruhanie  Ahmad. 
82  This  gathering  of  NGOs  took  place  in  Kuala  Lumpur  on  7th  December  1997. 
83  Feature  titles  here  are  in  brackets;  `Special  Issue'  features  are  taken  from  the  Sun  and  Sunday 
Megazine  (magazine)  sections. 
84  AIM  is  based  on  the  ideas  of  the  Grameen  Bank  scheme  in  Bangladesh  founded  by  Professor 
Mohamad  Yunus.  Its  only  main  difference  is  the  use  of  an  administrative  fee  rather  than  credit,  in 
accordance  with  Islamic  law.  The  scheme  was  developed  by  Professor  David  Gibbons  and  Sukor  Kasim 
of  Universiti  Sains  Malaysia's  Centre  for  Policy  Research. 
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The  Anwar  crisis 
and  the  media 
Anwar's  removal  from  high  office,  the  clampdown  of  pro-Anwar  forces  and  the 
subsequent  arrest,  charging  and  character  assassination  of  Mahathir's  one-time  heir 
apparent  provides  a  graphic  picture  of  the  interacting  powers  of  the  UMNO  network. 
Such  enterprise  had  already  been  evident  in  the  run-up  to  Anwar's  dismissal. 
This  included,  most  notably,  the  initiation,  funding,  publishing  and  distribution  of  the  50 
Reasons  book,  the  culmination  of  an  orchestrated  smear  campaign  directed  at  the  highest 
level.  Anwar  was  later  to  claim  that  the  book  "was  funded  by  very  senior  people  in  the 
government  and  corporate  sector.  Tens  of  millions  of  dollars  were  spent  on  several  print 
runs  and  it  was  distributed  widely.  I  have  a  tape  to  substantiate  that.  "'  Another  example 
of  the  network's  response  was  the  way  in  which  affidavits  issued  against  Nalla  on  the 
morning  of  Anwar's  dismissal  were  allowed  into  the  public  domain  without  a  full  court 
hearing,  their  contents  being  made  public  on  TV3  and  in  a  Special  Edition  of  the  Malay 
Mail  rushed-out  that  afternoon.  2 
With  the  order  for  his  arrest  forestalled  by  the  Commonwealth  Games,  the 
`Anwar  roadshow'  was  building  support  across  the  country.  Anwar's  home  had  become 
the  focal-point  for  mass  protest  gatherings  and  the  launching  of  the  reformasi.  With 
Queen  Elizabeth  in  Kuala  Lumpur  to  close  the  Games,  the  international  media  were 
serving  to  highlight  the  crisis  and  the  movement's  ideals.  Thirty-thousand  demonstrators 
had  marched  from  the  National  Mosque  to  Merdeka  Square  to  hear  Anwar's  call  for 
reform  and  Mahathir's  resignation.  Rioting,  disturbances  at  UMNO  HQ  and  pitched 
battles  with  the  Federal  Reserve  Unit  (FRU)  outside  Mahathir's  home  had  followed.  3 
With  tension  increasing,  the  Inspector  General  of  Police  (IGP),  Rahim  Noor  took  the 
decision  to  send-in  an  elite  snatch-squad  to  arrest  Anwar  (under  the  ISA)  as  he 
addressed  a  press  conference,  an  open  declaration  that  the  authorities  would  not  be 
cowed  by  the  presence  of  the  foreign  media.  Large-scale  street  protests  continued,  met 
forcefully  by  riot-police.  Various  pro-Anwar  associates  were  arrested,  including  Siddiq 
222 Baba  and  Kamaruddin  Jaffar  (of  the  Institute  of  Policy  Research),  Zahid  Hamidi  and  the 
top  four  officials  of  ABIM,  4  indicating  an  attempt  to  stifle  intellectuals  linked  to  the 
reformasi  -  an  extension  of  the  purge  on  Anwar  people  within  the  media. 
While  the  reformasi  lacked  clear  objectives  at  this  point,  Anwar's  Permatang 
Pauh  Declaration  had  received  broad  support,  5  helping  to  bring  about  two  new  coalition 
forums:  the  Coalition  for  People's  Democracy  (GAGASAN),  headed  by  Fadzil  Noor  of 
PAS,  and  the  Malaysian  People's  Movement  for  Justice  (GERAK),  led  by  Tian  Chua  of 
SUARAM.  6  While  both  bodies,  comprising  DAP,  PAS,  PRM  and  most  reformist 
NGOs,  remained  distanced  from  the  reformasi  as  a  proto-party  at  this  point,  the 
movement  had  helped  foster  a  new  form  of  co-operation  between  the  major  opposition 
parties  and  a  working  relationship  with  Anwar's  followers,  symbolised  by  Anwar's  now- 
open  declaration  of  support  for  Lim  Guan  Eng.  Meanwhile,  Anwar's  wife  Wan  Azizah 
Wan  Ismail  had  taken-up  Anwar's  place  as  a  rallying  figure.  '  By  December  1998,  she 
had  formed  the  Pergerakan  Keadilan  Sosial  (Movement  for  Social  Justice),  to  be  known 
as  ADIL  (with  Chandra  Muzaffar  acting  as  Vice  President)  in  an  effort  to  give  the 
reformasi  a  clearer  organisational  structure.  "  In  effect,  ADIL  and  Wan  Azizah,  now 
acting  in  Anwar's  name,  was  working  alongside  GERAK  and  GAGASAN  in  an  effort  to 
build  a  broad  political  alignment.  '0 
Alongside  the  `roadshow  effect',  fears  were  now  growing  over  the  sensitive 
information  Anwar  had  become  privy  to  through  his  party  positions  and  corporate  links. 
The  release  of  two  letters  from  Anwar  to  Mahathir,  one  preceding  and  one  following  his 
dismissal,  suggested  a  more  serious  catalogue  of  corruption  and  nepotism  than  that 
alleged  even  by  outside  observers.  "  Anwar  had  also  claimed  not  to  have  been 
instrumental  in  ordering  `unwarranted  investigations'  into  key  government  departments, 
including  the  offices  of  the  IGP.  Anwar  had  also  claimed  not  to  have  been  instrumental 
in  ordering  `unwarranted  investigations'  into  key  government  departments,  including  the 
offices  of  the  IGP.  Appealing  for  recognition  of  his  unease,  he  had  noted  to  Mahathir: 
Lately,  some  people  have  become  uncomfortable  with  me  because  it  seems  I  was  the  one  who  directed 
the  Anti-Corruption  Agency  to  investigate  the  Director-General  of  the  Economic  Planning  Unit.  '2 
It  is difficult  to  accept  Anwar's  role  here  as  that  of  `innocent  bystander.  i13  Yet, 
whether  one  accepts  his  version  of  events  or  not,  the  more  crucial  issue  was  whether 
223 Mahathir  believed  him  at  this  stage.  It  is  also  possible  that  Daim  would  have  been  the 
first  major  `casualty'  of  any  such  revelations  had  Anwar  come  to  power.  Again,  what 
may  have  precipitated  Anwar's  removal  was  his  apparent  reluctance  to  participate  in  the 
plan  to  bail-out  the  corporate  giant  Renong,  understood  to  be  the  main  conduit  for 
UMNO  funding.  14  In  a  statement  circulated  prior  to  his  arrest,  Anwar,  (fearing  the 
possibility  of  being  injected  with  drugs  while  in  jail  -  even  the  AIDS  virus  to  `prove'  his 
`illicit  affairs')  specified  the  main  reason  for  the  campaign  against  him: 
The  reason  they  are  so  afraid  of  me  is  that  I  know  too  many  of  their  secrets.  I  know  how  many  billions 
of  ringgit  of  UMNO  money  they  have  stolen  to  benefit  a  few  people.  I  know  how  much  money  -  one 
billion  in  October  (1997?  )  [sic]  -  they  took  out  of  the  country  to  deposit  in  bank  [sic]  in  the  vicinity  of 
Zurich.  I  reported  this  to  Dr.  Mahathir,  thinking  I  could  trust  him  as  leader.  As  it  turns  out  he  kept  the 
information  to  himself,  and  I  cannot  but  come  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  secret  pact  between  him 
and  a  few  well-known  people.  I  know  how  many  projects  were  used  to  benefit  a  few  friends  and  his 
relatives.  They  are  terrified  because  I  have  this  information.  's 
Thus,  while  Mahathir  had  begun  to  `address  corruption'  as  a  legitimation 
problem,  he  appears  to  have  become  more  concerned  about  the  particular  charges  of 
nepotism  at  this  point.  As  Jomo  notes,  in  relation  to  the  `anti-KKN'  challenge  in 
Indonesia,  it  may  have  been  the  `Suharto  factor'  in  particular  which  proved  the  "last 
straw"  for  Mahathir:  "I  don't  think  Dr.  Mahathir  minded  attacking  korupse  and 
kronisme,  but  nepotisme  came  too  close  to  the  bone.  "  16 
Yet  despite  concerns  about  the  political  fallout  of  nepotism  and  fears  that  an 
Anwar  succession  might  not  guarantee  his  private  family  interests,  Mahathir  also  appears 
to  have  been  motivated  by  a  more  fundamental  belief  in  his  sole  ability  to  lead  the 
country  out  of  crisis.  Allowing  for  the  usual  delusions  of  many  long-serving  leaders,  this 
view  was  not  without  reasonable  support  amongst  the  Malaysian  public,  given 
Mahathir's  past  successes  in  the  face  of  adversity.  For  this  and  other  reasons,  notes 
Jomo,  Mahathir,  unlike  Suharto,  was  more  likely  to  "go  with  his  boots  on.  i17 
One  of  the  most  critical  factors  therefore  was  how  this  strategy  would  be  played- 
out  through  the  media.  To  what  extent  could  Mahathir  sell  the  Anwar  purge  and  civil 
crackdown  as  a  popular  rationale  for  political  order  and  economic  recovery?  At  the 
outset,  Mahathir  had  been  under  extreme  pressure,  even  within  UMNO,  to  provide  a 
224 convincing  explanation  for  Anwar's  removal,  arrest  and  persecution.  For  not  only  did 
the  case  allege  abuse  of  political  office,  but  of  sodomy,  a  gross  violation  of  Islamic  law. 
As  the  pressure  increased,  Rahim's  own  `generalissimo'  tone  towards  `impertinent' 
members  of  the  foreign  media  (see  below)  had  only  exacerbated  the  situation.  "  On  top 
of  this,  both  Anwar's  adopted  brother  Sukma  Darmawan  Sasmitaat  and  his  former 
speech-writer  Munawar  Ahmad  Anees  had  now  withdrawn  their  (apparently  forced) 
statements  confessing  to  have  been  sodomised  by  Anwar.  Both  had  received  six  month 
jail  sentences  after  pleading  guilty  to  charges  of  gross  indecency.  The  problem  became 
more  acute  when,  after  nine  days  incommunicado,  Anwar  finally  appeared  in  court, 
showing  a  swollen  eye  and  other  injuries,  to  hear  the  corruption  and  sodomy  charges 
againsthim.  19  As  the  pictures  and  account  of  his  alleged  mistreatment  in  custody  flashed 
around  the  world,  Mahathir  was  now  dealing  with  Anwar  the  martyr  as  well  as  Anwar 
the  reformer. 
Precisely  how  or  why  all  this  was  allowed  to  happen,  given  the  adverse  reaction  it 
was  bound  to  evoke,  domestically  and  internationally,  remains  unclear.  20  Mahathir, 
reported  to  have  been  "angry"  about  Anwar's  treatment'21  had  sought  to  ameliorate  the 
situation  by  suggesting  that  the  injuries  may  have  been  self-inflicted,  a  calculated  play  for 
public  sympathy.  However,  a  subsequent  doctor's  report,  obtained  and  distributed  by 
Reuters,  concluded  that  Anwar  had,  indeed,  been  beaten  and  left  unconscious  - 
allegedly,  claimed  Anwar's  Political  Secretary  (in  a  letter  published  on  the  Internet),  by 
Rahim  Noor  himself.  22  The  IGP  had  also  tried  to  suppress  the  medical  report  through 
the  Malaysian  news  agency  Bernama,  which  had  sent  out  the  immediate  message: 
URGENT  NOTE  TO  EDITORS:  The  Bukit  Aman  federal  police  request  the  media  not  to  use/publish 
the  medical  examination  report  dated  Sept  30th  1998,  on  former  Deputy  Prime  Minister  Datuk  Seri 
Anwar  Ibrahim  by  Datuk  Dr  Haji  Ahmad  Shukir  Mohamed  of  Shukri  Hardeev  eye  specialists.  A  police 
spokesman  said  the  medical  report  is  only  meant  for  the  prosecution  and  defence  in  the  Anwar  case.  23 
On  the  same  day,  Mahathir  had  called  a  `consultative'  meeting  with  Malaysian  media 
editors  after  the  local  press  had  splashed  the  Anwar  black-eye  picture  on  their  front 
pages.  As  a  result,  the  medical  report  was  duly  suppressed,  the  injuries  reported  as  a 
series  of  unsubstantiated  allegations  and  the  emphasis  now  placed  more  specifically  on 
Mahathir's  investigation  into  the  complaint  -  as  directed  through  the  Attorney-General, 
225 rather  than  the  Special  Branch,  to  ensure  its  'independence.  24  Despite  assurances  that 
the  rule  of  law  would  be  upheld,  calls  for  the  IGP's  suspension  for  the  duration  of  the 
inquiry  went  unheeded. 
Meanwhile,  messages  of  concern  from  notable  international  figures  such  as  James 
Wolfensohn  and  Kofi  Annan  began  to  mount.  Anwar's  close  relationships  with  Habibie 
and  Estrada  had  also  put  a  strain  on  regional  relations,  threatening.  the.  ASEAN 
convention  of  non-interference  in  each  others  affairs.  25  Paradoxically,  while  much  of  the 
Malaysian  media  had  helped  imply  Anwar's  guilt,  it  was  Justice  Augustine  Paul's  order 
prohibiting  media  discussion  of  the  case,  after  fixing  Anwar's  trial  date,  which  allowed 
Mahathir  some  respite  from  its  adverse  publicity  at  this  point.  26 
However,  US  and  Western  pressure  on  Mahathir  here  also  reflected  growing 
tensions  at  the  global  level.  With  the  domestic  economy  already  battered  by  free-market 
adjustments  -a  painful  experiment  now  being  attributed  to  Anwar  -  Mahathir  was 
seeking  to  keep  public  attention  focused  on  the  new  measures  for  domestic-led  recovery 
-  exchange  controls,  interest  rate  cuts,  expanded  credit  and  looser  fiscal  policy.  But, 
like  Mahathir,  capitalist  institutions  were  also  engaged  in  their  own  version  of  the  `denial 
syndrome.  '  With  key  financial  figures  led  by  Alan  Greenspan  at  the  US  Federal  Reserve 
engaged  in  emergency  measures  to  contain  the  Asian  fallout  and  its  contagion  effect  on 
Russia  and  South  America,  this  had  seen  a  crisis  of  neo-liberalism  itself.  Plans  for  reform 
of  the  global  financial  architecture  ('historical  innovations'  likened  to  a  new  Bretton 
Woods,  though  greeted  with  little  enthusiasm  by  the  markets)  included  new  regulatory 
codes  to  promote  monetary  transparency  and  allow  a  clearer  surveillance  role  for  the 
IMF,  27  a  belated  `acknowledgement'  of  the  Fund's  failure  to  foresee  the  crisis.  What 
could  not  be  encouraged  was  the  protectionist  strategies  now  being  adopted  by  Mahathir 
-  domestic  controls  now  finding  favour  in  crisis-torn  Russia.  In  effect,  Mahathir  and 
other  countries  now  threatened  to  expose  the  fallacies  of  free-market  capitalist 
development.  As  John  Gray  was  to  note  at  this  point: 
The  global  free-market  is  falling  apart.  In  a  move  that  is  certain  to  be  emulated  by  other  developing 
countries,  Malaysia  has  introduced  old  fashioned  exchange  controls.  Hong  Kong  has  torn-up  the  free- 
market  rule-book  and  provided  government  support  for  the  stock  market.  Above  all,  Russia  has  rejected 
the  policies  imposed  on  it  by  the  western  economic  consensus.  Russia's  crisis  is  no  longer  primarily 
226 economic.  By  now  it  is  a  crisis  of  the  state  [and]  neoliberal  economic  policies  demanded  by  the 
West...  28 
Thus,  perversely,  Mahathir's  decision  to  remove  the  ringgit's  convertibility,  given 
credibility  by  Russia's  action  over  the  rouble,  had  given  him  `new  standing'  as  a 
supposed  champion  of  financial  reform. 
As  the  immediate  furore  of  the  Anwar  issue  subsided,  Mahathir  was  using  capital 
controls  as  a  breathing-space  to  rebuild  economic  confidence29  a  legitimate  `window 
of  opportunity',  as  the  US  economic  `guru'  Paul  Krugman  had  put  it  in  an  open  address 
to  Mahathir,  provided  it  was  used  for  systematic  financial  reform  rather  than  the  bailing- 
out  of  more  cronies.  30  It  should  be  noted  that  Krugman  was  not  speaking  here  as  a 
Mahathir  apologist  or  `born-again  Keynesian',  but  as  a  critic  of  the  IMF's  monitoring 
capacities.  31  Nonetheless,  Mahathir  was  now  using  Krugman's  `validation',  the  growing 
consensus  against  IMF  intervention  amongst  Malaysian  policy  analysts  and  the 
permissive  dangers  of  hedge-funds  to  re-launch  himself  as  a  leading  crusader  against  IMF 
orthodoxy. 
Behind  the  new  ideology  of  protectionism,  Mahathir  was  seeking  to  prop-up 
domestic  business  and  middle-class  support.  Unlike  the  1985  recession,  the  crisis  had 
struck  the  middle-class  quicker  than  lower-income  groups  temporarily  `cushioned'  by 
prevailing  labour  shortages.  Thus,  a  middle-class  generation,  gilded  by  prosperity,  had 
seen  their  assets  and  spending  power  badly  disrupted  by  the  stock  market  crash,  currency 
crisis  and  collapse  of  property  prices. 
On  October  23rd  1998,  in  his  role  as  Finance  Minister  (thereafter  given  to  Daim), 
Mahathir  unveiled  an  expansionary  budget  of  wide-ranging  tax  and  spend  measures, 
signalling  a  clear  break  with  IMF  remedies  and  raising  the  ante  with  foreign  capital. 
Besides  a  raft  of  fiscal  measures  to  assist  domestic  business,  notably  the  service  sector,  a 
number  of  more  populist  incentives  were  included,  such  as  the  waiving  of  income  tax  on 
earnings  for  the  forthcoming  year32  and  attempts  to  stimulate  local  demand  through  new 
forms  of  assistance  to  SMIs.  By  early-  1999,  the  provision  and  administration  of  funds  to 
SMIs  via  Bank  Negara  was  being  pushed  by  the  bank  itself  and  various  business 
organisations.  33  However,  it  is  important  to  note  here  that  Anwar  had  also  instituted  a 
number  of  such  stimulus  policies  before  being  sacked,  interventions  not  noted  in  the 
White  Paper  on  the  crisis  presented  to  Parliament  in  April  1999.34  Moreover,  the 
227 government  `debt  resolution'  agencies  Danaharta,  Danamodal  and  the  Corporate  Debt 
Restructuring  Committee  (CDRC),  charged  with  recapitalising  ailing  banks/financial 
institutions  and  absorbing  bad  debt,  were  actually  set  up  under  Anwar's  direction  in 
1998.35  While  using  these  agencies,  in  effect,  as  a  discreet  means  of  organising  bailouts, 
Daim  was  also  trying  to  reassure  concerned  foreign  fund  managers  that  corporate 
transparency  was  being  taken  seriously  and  that  the  exit  tax  now  levied  on  investments 
would  not  adversely  affect  their  holdings.  36  Mahathir  also  used  the  Budget  speech  to 
connect  Anwar  with  the  damaging  effect  of  IMF-type  policies  on  the  economy.  37 
One  year  on  from  Anwar's  austerity  package,  Mahathir's  Budget,  capital  controls 
and  case  for  a  new  trading  order  had  helped  placate  domestic  capital  and  a  wavering 
middle-class.  Mahathir's  anti-IMF  doctrine  had  also  found  `support'  in  Japanese  Finance 
Minister  Eisuke  Sakakibara's  denunciation  of  the  Fund  as  the  "Washington  consensus 
[of]  free  markets  and  sound  money...  [a]  blind  application  of  the  universal  model  of 
emerging  economies"  -  allowing  the  Sun  headline:  `IMF  is  US  dominated  says  Mr 
Yen' 
. 
38  By  January  1999,  Mahathir's  bravura  calls  for  exchange  controls  were  finding 
resonance  at  the  World  Economic  Forum  in  Switzerland'39  helping  to  restore  some  of  his 
global  prestige.  Thus,  for  all  its  rhetorical  content,  Mahathir's  attacks  on  the  IMF  may 
be  seen  as  an  important  point  in  the  `renewal'  of  neo-Keynesian  ideas. 
Yet,  while  Mahathir  cultivated  populist  `recovery  discourse',  there  was  still  the 
populist  backlash  of  the  reformasi  to  contend  with.  Mahathir's  authoritarian  crackdown 
had  given  rise  to  serious  civil  unrest,  pressure  which  had  been  met  head-on  by  the  whole 
state  apparatus.  Brutality  had  been  shown  by  riot  police,  though,  in  contrast  to 
Indonesia,  no  one  had  been  shot  or  killed.  During  the  protests,  Special  Branch  (SB) 
officers  and  agent  provocateurs  had  been  deployed  to  `isolate'  the  organisers  and  `direct' 
the  more  gullible  protesters.  More  academics  and  activists  associated  with  Anwar, 
ABIM,  GERAK  and  other  pro-reformasi  agencies  had  been  detained.  40  Some  made 
formal  complaints  of  being  beaten  in  jail,  including  the  GERAK  leader  Tian  Chua,  now 
twice  arrested.  Mass  weekly  gatherings  continued,  notably  around  the  Jalan  Tunku 
Abdul  Rahman  (Jalan  TAR)  area  of  Kuala  Lumpur,  with  exuberant  crowds  (varying 
between  10,000  to  30,000)  chanting  `RE-FOR-MASI'  and  waving  pro-Anwar  banners.  41 
While  seeking  to  present  a  more  restrained,  even,  by  some  accounts,  friendly,  profile 
during  the  early  gatherings,  it  was  evident  that  the  FRU  had  adopted  specialised  chase 
228 and  dispersal  tactics,  using  ratans  and  water  cannons  laced  with  chemicals.  Many 
reformasi  supporters  had  also  been  attacked  and  detained  during  the  17th  October  rally 
when  a  section  of  the  crowd  moved  towards  the  Istana  Negara  to  hand  in  a 
memorandum  to  the  Yang  di-Pertuan  Agong.  42  Similar  treatment  had  been  meted  out 
around  the  Parliament  building  following  the  Budget  speech.  The  following  evening, 
over  250  arrests  were  made  in  and  around  the  Malay  Kampung  Baru  district  of  KL,  the 
FRU's  excessive  force  being  condemned  by  Amnesty.  43  (Ironically,  these  concerns 
coincided  with  the  release  of  a  major  Amnesty  International  report  detailing  the 
systematic  abuse  of  prisoners  in  US  jails.  44)  Scene  of  the  1969  riots,  Kampung  Baru  was 
to  become  a  focal  point  for  many  such  protests  during  the  trial. 
However,  unlike  the  Indonesian  crisis,  these  and  other  demonstrations  never 
looked  like  bringing  Mahathir  down.  Permits  for  opposition  ceramahs  were  still  being 
blocked,  but  so  too  were  proposed  UMNO  gatherings  in  the  interests  of  `public  order', 
giving  some  semblance  to  claims  of  `even-handedness'.  Meanwhile,  having  been  quietly 
eased-out  by  the  UMNO  Youth  leadership,  Zahid  was  now  planning  to  tour  the  country 
to  `help  allay  public  fears'  (UMNO-speak  for  co-optation).  While  street  protests 
continued,  much  of  daily  life  went  on  as  normal. 
The  Malaysian  press:  `let's  work  together' 
Part  of  the  reason  for  this  lies  in  the  nature  of  legitimacy  which  had  come  to  prevail  in 
Malaysia,  in  contrast  to  Indonesia.  This  reflected  middle-class  sensitivities  and  a  general 
aversion  to  violence.  But  it  can  also  be  linked  to  the  encouragement  of  `insiderist' 
dialogue  within  the  media.  -  This  is  an  important  point  missed  by  many  external  observers 
of  the  Anwar  situation.  Despite  the  irregularities  of  the  electoral  process,  Mahathir  was 
still  an  elected  leader  with  a  mandate  to  secure.  The  threat  of  state  coercion  remained  - 
as  it  does  in  Western  states,  only  in  more  attenuated  forms.  But  social  control  was  also 
being  mediated  through  processes  of  popular  persuasion.  In  this  regard,  one  may  note 
the  particularised  nature  of  press  content: 
There's  a  dichotomy  in  press  coverage  in  Malaysia...  On  political  issues,  there  is  no  critical  reporting  or 
open  discussion  of  different  sides.  But  in  the  non-political  areas  -  such  as  society  and  the  environment 
-  there  is  very  open  debate.  45 
229 This,  notes  Syed  Husin  Ali,  was  particularly  so  in  the  post-1995  election  euphoria: 
There  was  not  much  to  worry  about  and  the  economy  was  doing  well.  With  allegations  that  the  press 
had  been  controlled  and  not  fair,  they  wanted  to  show  it  was  democratic.  46 
Hence,  while  many  Malaysians  were  now  reacting  to  overt  propaganda  by  boycotting 
Utusan  Malaysia  (the  paper's  `reformist'  ideas  on  the  crisis  having  been  stifled  by  Johan 
Jaaffar's  removal),  middle-class  `social  debate'  was  still  helping  to  distil  a  palliative 
language  of  middle-class  moderation  and  support  for  national  recovery,  even  where  that 
included  deep  unease  over  the  Anwar  issue. 
The  role  of  the  domestic  press  in  the  Anwar  affair,  thus,  comprised  two  discrete, 
yet  complementary,  elements.  47  The  first  involved  use  of  Barisan  press  statements  as 
`breaking  news.  '  In  effect,  the  Barisan's  version  of  unfolding  events,  unaccompanied  by 
critical  commentary,  became  the  news  in  itself.  This  did  not  preclude  statements  from 
Anwar,  opposition  opinions  or  coverage  of  reformasi  ceramahs  across  the  country, 
giving  the  semblance  of  objective  news  gathering.  But  this  was  always  treated  as 
marginal  in  relation  to  the  `more  authoritative'  pronouncements  of  leading  Barisan 
figures.  The  following  headlines  and  (captioned)  quotes  are  indicative  of  this  biased 
form  of  `they  said'  reportage:  48 
MBs  backMahathir's  action  (Perak  Mentri  Besar  Tan  Sri  Ramli  Ngah  Talib  said  he  was  confident  that 
Dr  Mahathir  had  "weighed  and  studied  at  length"  [sic]  before  taking  action  against  Anwar...  His 
sentiments  were  shared  by  several  mentris  besar.  ) 
Yusof  Nor:  UMNO  Supreme  council  acted  to  safeguard  party  ("...  the  prime  Minister  was  faced  with 
statements  and  disclosures  which  he  found  difficult  to  ignore  and  to  safeguard  the  image  of  the  party, 
race  and  country,  he  had  to  act  with  great  reluctance  against  his  deputy  whom  he  had  trusted,  "  he  said.  ) 
Anwar  tried  to  interfere  in  police  investigations  (Asked  about  this,  Anwar,  who  has  described  all  the 
allegations  against  him  as  fabrications,  said:  "I  wouldn't  be  surprised  if  they  add  20  more...  ") 
Anwar  hopes  capital  control  measures  will  work  ("As  a  Malaysian  and  a  former  member  of  the  cabinet,  I 
really  wish  that  the  move  announced  on  Sept  1  will  work  in  the  interests  of  our  people,  "  Anwar  said.  ) 
230 PM  to  give  explanation  on  Anwar's  expulsion  soon  (UMNO  Secretary-General  Datuk  Sabbaruddin  Chik 
said  the  explanation  is  necessary  in  order  to  remove  the  existing  confusion  among  those  who  are  directly 
affected  by  the  decision  taken.  ) 
PM.  Anwar  'arrested'  by  followers  (...  Dr  Mahathir  Mohamad  said...  Anwar  is  "being  put  under  house 
arrest"  by  his  own  followers  who  are  out  to  create  problems.  ) 
PM:  Ceramahs  show  we  are  democratic  (The  nightly  ceramahs  at  [Anwar's  house]  in  Bukit  Damansara 
will  be  allowed  to  go  on  because  Malaysia  is  a  democratic  country  ... 
Dr  Mahathir  Mohamad  said  if  the 
public  speeches  and  gatherings  were  stopped,  then  the  media,  especially  the  foreign  media,  would  brand 
the  country  as  repressive..  "It's  something  one  has  to  submit  to  if  one  believes  in  democracy"  [he]  said 
yesterday.  ) 
Anwar  encouraged  by  show  of  support  at  talks  [with  opposition  leaders]  (...  Anwar  said  a  multiracial 
effort  was  needed  to  ensure  the  success  of  reformasi  (reform)  for  the  country.  "It  must  be  a  multiracial 
effort.  If  not,  we  will  not  win,  "  he  said  at  a  public  gathering  in  conjunction  with  the  Free  Guan  Eng 
Marathon  fast  at  Sungai  Chua.  ) 
Greater  sin  if  Mahathir  had  not  exposed  Anwar's  sin  -  Mohamed  (...  Sept  27  -  [BN  Secretary-General] 
Datuk  Seri  Mohamed  Rahmat  today  said  the  Prime  Minister  could  not  bear  to  harbour  the  greater  sin  of 
not  exposing  the  sinful  activities  of...  Anwar.  ) 
UMNO  Divisions  used  to  topple  Dr  Mahathir  -  Mohamed  Rahmat  (Leaders  at  divisional  levels  had  been 
paid  monthly  allowances...  and  some  divisions  had  been  allocated  with  RMl  million  to  RIM  million  to 
carry  out  subversive  activities  in  UMNO,  he  said.  "We  can  identify  the  divisions  involved.  ") 
Anwar  plotted  to  oust  Dr  M'  (...  Aziz  Shamsudin,  political-secretary  to  Dr  Mahathir,  claimed  it  was 
Anwar's  plan  to  topple  the  [PM]  by  "killing  off  people  surrounding  Dr  Mahathir  first.  "  "Anwar  is  the 
biggest  conspirator.  That  is  why  he  wanted  to  implicate  me  as  a  conspirator,  "  he  said...  ) 
Malaysia  on  road  to  recovery.  says  ISIS  Chief  (...  as  the  capital  control  measures  are  showing  great 
success,  the  chairman  of  the  Institute  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies  (ISIS),  Tan  Sri  Dr  Noordin 
Sopiee,  said  today...  "I  think  the  recession  of  1998  will  end  in  1998  and  that  we  will  have  positive  growth 
for  1999,  "  he  said  at  a  press  conference  to  announce  the  National  Congress  on  Economic  Recovery 
entitled,  "The  Way  Forward",  which  will  be  organised  by  ISIS  and  the  ASEAN  Strategic  and  Leadership 
Institute  (ASLI)...  ) 
231 Anwar  attempted  to  initiate  a  revolution,  not  a  reformation,  says  Najib  ("...  He  has  rejected 
everything...  whether  it  be  Umno,  the  government,  the  police  force,  the  judiciary...  everything,  "  he  said...  ) 
Court  Fixes  Nov  2-14  for  Anwar's  trial  (...  and  ordered  a  gag  on  public  discussion  of  the  case.  Justice 
[Augustine  Paul]...  said:  "Justice  must  not  only  be  done  but  seen  to  be  done...  ") 
Of  course,  the  pro-government  bias  did  not  cease  with  the  Judge's  prohibition. 
Indeed,  as  noted,  the  gag  may  even  have  been  a  welcome  diversion  for  Mahathir  and 
editors  under  daily  pressure  from  the  foreign  media.  This  allowed  attention  to  be  turned 
again  to  more  familiar  forms  of  `they  said'  reportage  on  the  opposition,  including,  by 
now,  GERAK  -  for  example,  in  the  Star's  `PAS  out  to  exploit,  says  Ghafar'.  49  In  an 
attempt  to  play  the  UMNO  network  at  its  own  game,  Anwar  issued  a  RM100  million 
writ  against  the  Sun  for  publishing  statements  by  Mahathir  in  which  he  described 
Anwar's  `sexual  conduct'  as  "despicable".  so  However,  as  with  the  trial  itself,  there  was 
little  prospect  of  a  fair  hearing  over  the  action. 
The  second  element  of  press  output  here  involved  the  amelioration  of  middle- 
class  concerns.  Encompassing  the  lifestyle  genre  noted  above,  this  was  more 
`consultative'  and  `open-ended'  in  tone  and  content.  Very  noticeable  here  was  the 
extensive  space  given  to  `educating'  and  `fostering  understanding'  of  the  Anwar  affair 
and  the  economic  situation.  An  example  of  how  such,  agenda-setting  discourse 
permeates  key  civil  and  cultural  institutions  can  be  seen  in  a  piece  carried  by  Utusan 
Malaysia  entitled  `Najib  urges  teachers  to  attend  briefings  on  Anwar's  sacking': 
Education  Minister  [Najib]  said  today  it  is  important  for  teachers  to  attend  information  sessions  on  the 
sacking  of  [Anwar]  to  erase  confusion  among  them...  The  Education  Ministry  is briefing  the  teachers  at 
every  meeting,  but  then  all  200,000  teachers  nationwide  cannot  attend  such  meetings  at  the  same  time, 
he  said.  "Groups  organising  such  information  at  state  and  district  levels  are  asked  to  invite  teachers  to 
attend  such  sessions  in  view  of  their  important  function  in  society,  "  he  told  reporters  after  opening  the 
inaugural  meeting  of  the  Congregation  of  National  Language  and  Cultural  Activists  Malaysia 
... 
51 
The  significance  of  such  `reports'  lay  not  so  much  in  their  `they  said'  value,  but  in 
their  attempt  to  set  the  Anwar  issue  within  a  prescribed  context  of  national  recovery 
through  an  appeal  for  reasoned  middle-class  debate.  The  `restrained  polemic'  apparent  in 
the  talkback  features,  letters  and  columns  at  this  point  was  also  being  `guided'  by 
232 editorials  and  comment  pieces  appealing  for  balanced  discussion.  The  New  Straits  Times 
editor  Kadir  Jasin's  `Other  Thots'  article,  `Treat  Anwar's  trial  like  any  other',  is  a  case  in 
point,  taking-to-task  those  "deliberately  trying  to  politicise  the  matter": 
Even  if  the  [medical]  report  is  true,  the  fact  that  Dr  Mahathir  had  no  prior  knowledge  of  Anwar's  injury 
shows  that  he  does  not  interfere  with  the  work  of  the  police.  Of  course,  it  is  not  to  the  advantage  of  the 
critics  to  acknowledge  that  under  section  73  of  the  [ISA]  which  is  being  used  against  Anwar,  the  police 
do  not  have  to  inform  the  Home  Minister  of  every  stage  of  the  investigation  nor  of  actions  against 
detainees.  52 
As  noted,  whether  Mahathir  was  being  informed  about  Anwar's  treatment  or  not  remains 
a  matter  of  conjecture.  Certainly,  his  public  appearance  in  this  condition  served  no 
purpose  for  Mahathir,  as  he  himself  had  pointed  out.  Yet,  allowing  for  this  confusion,  it 
is  equally  illogical  to  extrapolate  from  this  Mahathir's  non-involvement  in  the  broader 
Anwar  affair,  as  implied  in  Kadir's  article. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  such  output  lacked  genuine  concern  for  Anwar's  own 
predicament.  Some  seditious  tones  were  even  being  adopted  to  get  the  message  across. 
Reflecting  upon  Joseph  K,  for  example,  Amir  Muhammad's  Perforated  Sheets  essay, 
`The  beginning  of  The  Trial',  used  Kafakaesque  allegory  to  suggest  nightmarish 
processes  of  state  victimisation  and  political  mendacity  against  Anwar.  "  But  while 
stimulating  a  certain  reaction,  most  other  `political  commentary'  here  had  helped  keep 
middle-class  dissent  ambivalent,  contained  and,  for  the  most  part,  off  the  streets.  Indeed, 
with  the  reformasi  movement  now  gaining  momentum  through  GERAK  and  other 
civil/political  alignments,  these  media  appeals  for  calm  reflection  pointed-up  the  real 
dilemma  for  the  middle-class:  whether  to  sit-tight  in  the  hope  of  an  economic  upturn  - 
and,  perhaps,  even  some  internal-led  reform  by  an  anguished  elite  -  or  risk  further 
instability  by  embracing  wholesale  reform.  Although  still  incensed  by  Anwar's  treatment, 
the  repeated  TV  scenes  and  press  coverage  of  Anwar  supporters  clashing  with  riot  police 
had  only  intensified  middle-class  fears,  amplifying  a  conservative  aversion  to  mob 
violence  amongst  the  Malaysian  public  at  large.  However,  hostility  towards  the  domestic 
media  was  also  growing,  with  the  reformasi  message  finding  new  expression  through  a 
range  of  alternative  organs,  including  the  Malay-language  publications  Eksklusif,  Detik, 
Wasilah,  Tamadun  and,  more  notably,  Harakah.  (See  Chapter  8.  ) 
233 While  not,  as  yet,  critical,  the  domestic  press  were  now  experiencing  circulation 
problems,  as  well  as  increased  publishing  costs  and  a  decline  in  advertising  revenue. 
According  to  Azizi  Meor  Ngah,  Executive  Director  of  the  Utusan  group  and  Chairman 
of  the  Malaysian  Newspaper  Publishers  Association  (MNPA),  circulation  of  Malaysia's 
39  daily  newspapers  fell  11%  in  1997  and  a  further  6%  in  the  first  half  of  1998  (from  a 
peak  of  3.9  million  in  1996).  The  bulk  of  this  decline,  he  noted,  had  been  recorded  in  the 
younger  generation  now  accessing  the  net  more  frequently.  54  While  he  and  others  were 
still  talking-up  the  prospects  for  the  industry,  this  development  was  indicative  of  a  slow, 
but  worrying,  trend  for  the  authorities.  In  a  subsequent  re-launch,  the  Sun,  for  example, 
appeared  to  be  adapting  to  this  new  public  mood.  55  However,  while  recognising  slanted 
editorial  lines  as  a  key  reason  for  the  decline,  many  editors  remained  unhappy  at  the 
accuracy  of  foreign  reports.  56 
Reporting  the  media:  foreign  coverage  and  competing  ideologies 
This  brings  us,  more  specifically,  to  the  relationship  between  the  domestic  press  and 
foreign  media.  Inevitably,  much  of  the  Anwar  affair  was  being  presented  in  the 
mainstream  Western  media  as  the  final  call  for  yet  another  autocratic  Asian  leader:  the 
`genie  was  out  of  the  bottle',  as  Anwar,  the  adopted  symbol  of  civil  freedoms  and 
democratic  reform,  lay  beaten  and  bruised  on  `Mahathir's  prison  floor.  '57  The  foreign 
media  hadplayed  a  key  role  in  highlighting  Anwar's  persecution,  the  use  of  the  ISA  and 
local  media  bias  -  all  welcome  publicity  for  the  reformasi.  Yet,  there  had  also  been 
sensationalist  language  and  much  simplification  of  the  issues.  As  one  commentator  was 
to  note  at  this  point  in  an  article  posted  on  the  reformasi  site,  Saksi: 
A  trawl  through  their  offerings  to  the  world  illustrates  not  just  bad  journalism  but  distortion,  caricature 
and  a  trivialisation  of  Malaysia's  political  crisis.  58 
Examples  of  narrow  reporting  and  common  stereotypes  noted  were:  the  depiction  of 
peaceful  protests  as  riots  and  anarchic  situations  (BBC,  New  York  Times,  Guardian, 
Bangkok  Post);  the  trivialisation  of  opposition  gatherings  (South  China  Morning  Post, 
Far  Eastern  Economic  Review);  personalisation  of  the  crisis,  `lionising  of  Anwar'  and 
free  use  of  caricatures  -  "Anwar  the  freedom  lover  and  Dr  M  as  the  James  Bond 
234 villain"  (Telegraph,  New  York  Times);  the  lack  of  reports  outside  KL;  the  play  on  `PAS 
fundamentalism'  and  implied  `gulf  between  middle-class  liberals  and  Muslims  -  as  if  a 
Muslim  cannot  be  a  liberal  (Reuters,  Newsweek,  Christian  Science  Monitor);  the 
intonation  of  Malaysia  as  a  `backward'  country  having  failed  its  `coming-of-age'  -  `we 
are  modern,  you  are  not'  (Newsweek,  Matt  Frei  for  the  BBC  and  Telegraph);  and  the 
`fearless  liberal  hack'  performance  -  the  `ego  prize'  here  going  to  the  Observer's  John 
Sweeney  for  hamming-up  his  `threatening  encounter'  with  Rahim  Noor. 
Meanwhile,  trivialised  `reports',  more  akin  to  `travel  journalism'  than  political 
analysis,  continued  to  be  churned  out,  as  in  Matt  Frei's  BBC  piece  `Political  benefits  of 
sin'  on  the  spectre  of  `PAS  fundamentalism'  in  Kelantan.  Here,  rather  than  the  vital 
significance  of  the  Anwar  affair  on  PAS  politics  and  the  Kelantanese  electorate,  we  find  a 
series  of  hackneyed  phrases  and  images  of  the  'Islamic  threat'.  For  example,  in 
Kelantan: 
The  genders  have  to  stand  in  separate  queues  at  the  supermarket  -  just  in  case  they  should  be  overcome 
by  passion  while  waiting  to  pay  for  their  frozen  peas.  s9 
More  significant,  though,  was  the  lack  of  scrutiny  given  by  the  foreign  media  to 
Anwar's  own  UMNO  record,  his  close  relationship  with  Camdessus  et  al  or  his  adoption 
of  IMF  austerity  measures,  a  high  interest  rate  policy  which  had  failed  to  halt  the  decline 
and  may  have  tipped  the  country  into  recession.  By  October  1998,  the  inadequacy  of 
these  deflationary  measures  in  Malaysia  and  elsewhere  had  given  rise  to  G7  emergency 
talks  on  1F/World  Bank  restructuring.  60  Yet,  there  was  little  discussion  of  these 
structural  connections  in  mainstream  foreign  analysis  of  the  Anwar  affair.  This  was 
symptomatic  of  the  way  in  which  `standard  liberal  journalism'  works  within  accepted 
parameters  of  critical  enquiry,  and  its  hegemonic  function  in  contextualising  power 
relationships.  Thus,  while  many  of  the  political  and  social  aspects  of  the  crisis  were 
being  highlighted,  it  was  being  done  through  this  liberal  filter.  " 
Nonetheless,  for  many  Malaysians,  deeply  angered  by  Anwar's  treatment  and  the 
casual  disregard  for  legal  processes,  the  unfolding  situation,  and  foreign  media  coverage 
of  it,  offered  new  possibilities  for  serious  political  reform.  Yet,  the  Anwar  conflict  also 
threatened  further  social,  political  and  economic  upheaval,  a  set  of  disruptions  which  still 
weighed  heavily  on  the  minds  of  the  middle-classes,  particularly  within  the  Chinese 
235 community.  Reflecting  these  concerns,  the  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review  piece  `Prime 
Moveri62  noted  how  Malaysians  were  now  confused  and  polarised  in  their  attitude 
towards  Mahathir.  Citing  surveys  carried  out  for  UMNO  (there  being  no  major 
independent  opinion-poll  agencies  in  Malaysia)  and  other  `anecdotal'  evidence,  it  showed 
that  while  most  Malays  saw  him  as  a  nation-builder,  a  majority  were  now  unhappy  with 
Mahathir  (seven  out  of  ten  according  to  an  earlier  Review  article.  )63  `Taking  the  pulse' 
in  Kedah  and  Penang  as  well  as  KL,  it  also  noted  the  higher  level  of  support  for  Mahathir 
amongst  the  Chinese  community,  particularly  business  people  alarmed  at  the  impact  of 
Anwar's  high-interest  rate  policy.  One  Chinese  journalist  noted  in  the  piece  pointed  to 
Anwar's  own  cronies  and  lack  of  reform  while  in  office.  With  the  Indian  community  also 
split,  the  key  point  drawn  out  by  the  article  was  that  all  Malaysians,  rather  than  Malays, 
were  now  part  of  the  debate,  the  key  to  that  shift  being  Mahathir  himself. 
Ironically,  it's  Mahathir  who  is  most  responsible  for  this  change.  Over  his  17  years  at  the  helm,  the 
prime  minister  has  pushed,  cajoled  and  browbeaten  Malaysia's  ethnic  communities  to  think  of 
themselves  as  Malaysians  first...  With  that  has  come  a  feeling  that  they  have  a  stake,  and  a  say,  in  the 
political  life  of  the  country. 
One  indication  of  such  was  that  80%  of  letters  to  local  newspapers  supporting  Mahathir 
at  this  point  were  from  Chinese  Malaysians.  64 
However,  it  is  also  important  to  see  the  class  basis  of  Chinese  support  here. 
Primarily,  it  reflected  the  concerns  of  established  business  and  upper  middle-class 
Chinese.  Generally  older  and  more  conservative,  this  element  saw  Mahathir  as  the  only 
means  of  averting  instability  and  financial  loss.  The  related  question  was  whether  the 
privatisation  `towkays',  the  MCA,  Gerakan  and  Chinese  business  institutions  could  keep 
the  other  Chinese  classes  tied-into  this  support  base  for  Mahathir  and  the  prevailing 
structure. 
Here,  many  foreign  reports  tended  towards  stereotypical  reportage  of  the  Chinese 
factor.  For  example,  Michael  Sheridan's  piece  `Anwar  in  `coward'  gibe'  (reproduced  in 
Harakah  from  a  Sunday  Times  article)  had  this  simplified  summation: 
236 Anwar's  cause  has  also  attracted  support  from  opposition  politicians  in  the  commercially  powerful 
Chinese  community.  That  is  unusual  in  a  country  where  tensions  between  the  27%  of  the  population 
who  are  Chinese  and  the  majority  Muslim  Malays  have  spilt  over  into  race  riots  in  the  past.  65 
One  problem  here  is  the  reference  to  the  Malay-Chinese  `conflict',  as  though  it 
had  happened  recently  rather  than  thirty  years  prior,  giving  the  generalised  and  false 
impression  that  the  situation  was  akin  to  Indonesia.  Another  problem  is  the  author's 
blanket  allusion  to  opposition  Chinese  politicians  and  Chinese  business.  Despite  DAP 
support  for  the  reformasi  and  Chinese  business  concern  over  Mahathir's  early  handling 
of  the  crisis,  there  had  been  no  significant  support  for  Anwar  from  within  the  Chinese 
business  sector  at  this  point.  66  There  were  two  main  reasons  for  this.  The  first,  quite 
simply,  was  that  Anwar  was  now  unable  to  convey  their  concerns  to  the  political 
hierarchy.  Thus,  in  Penang,  for  example,  many  Chinese  had  abandoned  Anwar,  his 
replacement  with  Abdullah,  another  Penang-based  figure,  being,  perhaps,  significant. 
The  second  factor  was  the  adverse  impact  of  Anwar's  IMF-type  policies  on  domestic 
business.  Here,  mainstream  coverage  of  the  crisis  had  failed  to  capture  domestic  Chinese 
fears  over  this  agenda. 
On  the  other  hand,  lower-middle  and  working-class  Chinese  with  less  to  lose  had 
been  more  disposed  towards  the  reformasi.  Although  still  cautious  of  a  `PAS  dividend', 
a  scenario  being  talked-up  by  the  BN,  many  ordinary  Chinese  now  saw  Anwarism  as  a 
way  of  shaking-off  the  last  vestiges  of  the  NEP  system.  Concern  within  the  BN  over  this 
shift  can  be  seen  in  Gerakan's  attempts  (notably  in  Penang)  to  incorporate  elements  of 
the  reform  agenda.  But  it  had  also  been  Mahathir's  own  `Malaysian  Malaysia'  which 
had,  inadvertently,  galvanised  the  reformasi  (see  Chapter  9),  leaving  the  ruling  elite  less 
able,  though  still  attempting,  to  play  the  `race  card'  as  a  control  strategy.  For  the  first 
time  since  Merdeka,  cross-ethnic  alignments  and  serious  `class  politics'  were  now 
threatening  traditional  ethnic-class  power  arrangements  within  the  Barisan. 
In  response,  the  government  intensified  their  attack  on  the  foreign  media  as 
purveyors  of  distorted  news.  For  example,  Utusan  Malaysia  carried  the  following 
message  in  the  week  after  Anwar's  arrest: 
The  local  media  should  give  a  more  accurate  picture  of  the  situation  within  and  outside  the  country 
because  the  foreign  media  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  do  so,  Information  Minister  Datuk  Mohamed 
237 Rahmat  said  today...  `I  call  on  the  local  media  to  play  their  role  in  explaining  the  true  situation...  "...  he 
told  reporters  after  attending  a  mass  circumcision  in  Kampung  Paya...  Mohamed  said  the  ministry  will 
67  extend  the  Information  Action  Plan  nationwide  to  explain  the  situation  to  the  people... 
While  propagandist  news  reports  were  being  used  here  to  depict  external  news 
reports  as  propaganda,  not  all  press  coverage  of  the  situation  was  couched  in  slavish 
monotones.  Following  the  media's  `postmodern  trend'  of  reporting  itself,  the  press  even 
found  itself  covering  both  its  own  and  the  foreign  media's  coverage  of  the  encampment 
outside  Anwar's  home.  In  `No  let-up  to  political  drama  at  Bt  Damansara',  the  Star's 
Wong  Chun  Wai  offers  this  rather  acerbic  view  of  the  scene: 
The  garden  at  [Anwar's]  residence  has  become  a  field  of  mud  as  a  result  of  heavy  rain  and  the  big  crowd 
over  the  past  few  days-..  Inside,  Anwar's  privacy  is  now  confined  to  the  kitchen  and  the  bedroom 
upstairs...  A  few  enterprising  young  men,  selling  mineral  water  and  burgers,  have  defied  City  Hall's 
order  to  leave.  One  has  proclaimed  his  product  as  air  reformasi,  while  cassettes  of  Anwar's  speeches  are 
being  sold  at  RM5  each  ... 
A  university  student,  sporting  gold-rimmed  glasses  and  a  goatee  -  trademarks 
of  Anwarites  -  complained:  "It's  all  fabricated,  where  is  the  evidence?  "  His  friends  nod  in  agreement, 
telling  the  foreign  reporters  that  "it  is  a  big  conspiracy  ........ 
After  more  than  a  week,  the  strain  [on 
Anwar]  has  begun  to  show...  Fatigue  has  also  set  in  among  the  local  and  foreign  reporters...  Still,  no 
reporter  is  willing  to  miss  Anwar's  arrest,  should  it  happen.  The  job  is  particularly  tough  for  the 
reporters  of  a  private  TV  station.  They  have  been  heckled  and  criticised  for  purported  biased  coverage. 
Ironically,  this  same  station  was  also  attacked  by  Anwar's  political  foes  in  Umno  just  a  few  months 
back.  The  station  was  then  said  to  be  controlled  by  Anwar's  allies  and  had  supposedly  blacked  out  his 
68  Umno  rivals. 
To  some  extent,  what  was  already  being  projected  by  the  media  as  a  `shared  national 
experience'  was  also  now  being  filtered  as  a  `shared  media  experience.  '  Having  turned 
the  Anwar  affair  into  a  media  event,  the  media  itself  were  now  subject  to,  and  subjecting 
themselves  to,  almost  as  much  attention  as  Anwar  himself. 
All  of  this  might  be  viewed  as  just  more  postmodern  irony  were  it  not  for  the 
ideological  power-play  underlying  it.  Malaysian  editors  had  played  a  central  role  in 
helping  to  fabricate  populist  conceptions  of  a  `foreign  agenda.  '  Yet,  it  was  not 
unreasonable  to  make  the  link  between  certain  unfavourable  reporting  of  Mahathir's  new 
policy  measures  and  the  free-market  concerns  of  the  IMF  and  other  Western  agencies. 
To  a  significant  extent,  what  was  being  portrayed  in  Time,  Asiaweek,  The  Economist, 
238 CNN  and  other  such  outlets  was  a  business  media  version  of  the  intellectual  `policy 
view'  within  these  bodies,  even  where  that  involved  `critical'  debate  about  the  shifting 
nature  of  multilateral  responses  to  the  crisis  and  the  need  for  a  more  `social- 
developmentalist'  approach.  69 
For  example,  much  of  the  `crisis  analysis'  by  now  appearing  in  World 
Bank/International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC)  literature  pointed  specifically  to  internally- 
created  problems  within  Asian  countries,  such  as  "lack  of  international  standards  in 
regulation",  "directed  credit  and  administered  interest  rates"  and  "poor  and  non- 
transparent  supervision",  70  an  agenda-setting  perspective  offered  by  the  business  media 
on  Mahathir's  policy  measures.  As  one  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review  article  itself  put 
it: 
[Mahathir's]  decision  to  adopt  currency  controls  to  tackle  Malaysia's  economic  crisis  has  left  him  in  the 
cold  with  many  Western  financial  institutions.  Privately,  American  diplomats  around  the  region  can 
barely  contain  their  anger  at  the  man  they  see  as  undermining  adherence  to  the  International  Monetary 
Fund's  orthodoxy  of  high  interest  rates  and  open  markets.  " 
In  response,  the  domestic  press  had  begun  to  target  specific  news  agencies.  On 
the  day  of  Anwar's  trial-fixing  court  appearance,  the  New  Straits  Times  carried  an 
editorial  calling  for  `errant'  foreign  reporters  to  be  detained  under  the  ISA  if  found  to  be 
sensationalising  the  situation.  In  particular,  it  singled-out  the  Singapore-based  CNBC 
network  and  the  Hong  Kong-based  Asian  Wall  Street  Journal,  both  part  of  the  Dow 
Jones  corporation  in  the  US  (which  also  owns  the  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review).  The 
editorial,  carried  as  a  `breaking  news'  story  by  many  of  the  foreign  media  services,  urged 
them  to  "stop  being  prejudiced  and  be  fair  to  Dr  Mahathir": 
What  Malaysians  are  basically  saying  to  foreign  media  companies  is  this  -  be  fair  and  truthful  in  your 
reporting...  Why  prejudge  [Mahathir's  dismissal  of  Anwar]?  As  a  matter  of  fact,  you  will  discover  that 
many  Malaysians,  who  know  more  of  the  facts  than  the  western  media,  think  otherwise.  They  believe 
Dr.  Mahathir  has  acted  responsibly  as  a  gentleman  and  a  statesman  ... 
Local  media  of  Asian  countries  do 
not  have  the  circulation  and  audience  to  influence  global  opinion.  Even  so,  the  media  in  this  country  are 
generally  careful  and  responsible  in  their  commentaries  on  the  affairs  of  our  neighbours  and  their 
leaders...  This  is  very  much  part  of  the  Asian  culture  where  we  are  sensitive,  tolerant  and  respectful  of 
the  interests  of  others.  72 
239 As  the  staunchest  voice  of  government,  the  New  Straits  Times  editorial  may  not 
have  been  representative  of  the  domestic  press,  particularly  the  Chinese  press  which  had 
been  relatively  more  graphic  in  its  portrayal  of  the  reformasi,  inviting  possible  curbs  on 
their  publishing  permits.  The  editorial  had  also  been  attacked  by  other  regional 
newspapers.  73  But  the  pronouncement  was  now  symptomatic  of  the  discredited  status 
of  journalism  as  a  `profession'  in  Malaysia.  For  Nain,  structural  controls  and 
conservative  socialisation  within  the  media  had  now  brought  journalists  into  critical 
disrepute  -  unable  and  unwilling  to  confront  the  unfolding  issues  with  any  degree  of 
integrity: 
Journalism  in  Malaysia  is  no  longer  -  if  it  ever  was  -a  profession  in  its  true  sense,  imbued  with  a 
mission  to  seek  out  truths  and  to  convey  them  to  the  public.  Instead,  journalism,  like  any  other  job,  is 
about  cari  makan  [seeking  a  living].  Many  journalists  evidently  believe  that,  like  the  roti  canal 
[Malaysian  `street  food']  maker  who  sells  roti  canal  for  a  profit,  theirs  is  a  job  of  producing  (and 
reproducing)  news  to  be  sold  on  the  market,  like  any  economic  commodity.  " 
Reflecting  this  passivity,  it  was  fitting  that  the  unease  of  even  senior  Gerakan  and 
MCA  figures  at  this  point  was  being  aired  in  the  regional,  rather  than  the  local,  press  - 
as  in  a  South  China  Morning  Post  report  of  Penang  CM  Koh  Tsu  Koon  urging  the 
government  to  consider  the  Bar  Council's  concerns  over  the  justice  system.  75 
Although  conspicuously  few  in  number,  some  within  the  local  press  were, 
nonetheless,  still  trying  to  push  the  boundaries  of  `critical  reporting'.  In  an  incisive 
piece,  written  on  the  Saksi  site  and  reproduced  in  Harakah,  a  `Local  Journalist'  offers 
some  insight  into  the  difficulties  of  their  task.  Deeply  disillusioned  by  the  emergency 
media  clampdown  in  1987,  yet  still  part  of  the  prevailing  system,  the  writer  chides  those 
who,  in  blanket  form,  denounce  all  local  journalists  as  `prostitutes.  '  Noting  the  large 
number  of  `critical'  stories  that  have  been  aired  over  the  years  (such  as  the  plight  of  the 
urban  poor,  the  Bakun  Dam  issue  and  illegal  land  deals),  the  writer  believes  that: 
The  democratic  space  is  always  in  a  state  of  flux  as  far  as  the  local  media  is  concerned.  Journalists  with 
a  conscience  do  not  always  take  democracy  for  granted.  The  space  to  express  dissent  has  to  be 
constantly  negotiated...  Still  there  are  those  who  are  determined  to  believe  that  the  foreign  media  is  fair 
and  the  local  media  is  biased.  Can  people  accept  the  fact  that  both  are  equally  biased  in  that  they  have 
their  own  agenda?..  . 
All  said  and  done,  there  are  editors  and  journalists  who  are  constantly  testing  and 
240 pushing  the  boundaries.  We  may  be  small  in  number  but  there  is  hope  yet.  And  remember  this:  news 
and  feature  contents  within  the  same  paper  may  not  necessarily  have  the  same  stand.  76 
Acknowledging  the  discomfort  of  many  journalists  within  the  profession,  the 
prominent  local  journalist  and  academic  Rustam  Sani  points  more  specifically  to  the 
institutional  bias  within  the  domestic  media.  In  one  of  many  critical  articles  by  now 
appearing  in  Harakah  (see  next  chapter),  he  notes  that  while  during  elections  and  the 
Anwar  crisis,  "the  conspiratorial  nature  of  the  local  media  could  hardly  be  concealed", 
media  manipulation  during  periods  of  political  calm  is  hardly  discernible: 
I  have  never  accused  the  Malaysian  government  of  exercising  stark  media  censorship.  But  through  a 
complex  network  of  corporate  control  of  media  companies  by  political  parties  and  through  manipulate 
selection  of  editorial  executives,  the  media  has  been  subjected  not  so  much  to  direct  control  but  more  to 
self  and  subtle  censorship.  77 
Sani  had  stopped  writing  for  Utusan  at  election  times,  finding  "being  a  participant  in 
such  an  unacceptable  form  of  journalism  too  revolting  personally.  08  Yet,  despite  this 
bias  and  his  campaign  for  an  extensive  public  boycott  of  the  local  media,  the  object  of  his 
criticism  is  the  media  as  institution  rather  than  the  journalists  inside  it: 
Indeed,  I  believe  that  a  majority  of  journalists  in  the  country  are  unhappy  with  the  situation  that  their 
profession  has  to  endure  and  consider  themselves  the  victim  rather  than  the  promoter  of  the  kind  of 
media  that  has  developed  in  this  country.  79 
Sani  also  sees  a  distinction  here  between  foreign  and  local  reporting  of  the  crisis. 
Inaccuracies  in  foreign  coverage  were,  he  believes: 
...  not  caused  by  a  conscious  effort  to  mislead  or  to  conspire  against  anyone,  but  merely  by  the  ignorance 
of  the  reporters  [who  were]  totally  unfamiliar  with  Malaysia  and  its  political  terrain...  [In  contrast,  ]  the 
fault  of  the  local  media  lies  in  their  conscious  participation  in  a  conspiracy...  [As  part  of  this  process,  a] 
number  of  political  has-beens,  totally  unsuitable  for  the  task,  were  given  exposure  in  the  media  to  talk 
about  subjects  such  as  morality  of  leaders,  the  new  global  economic  order  and  neo-colonialism. 
Suddenly  there  was  an  unexplained  and  unprecedented  editorial  interest  in  certain  subjects  such  as 
homosexual  behaviour.  80 
241 While  Sani  rather  glosses-over  the  `understandable  incompetence'  aspect  of  the 
foreign  media  here,  and  apparent  absence  of  any  agenda,  it  is  worth  noting  his  view,  as 
with  the  previous  writer,  that  media  production  in  Malaysia  is  of  a  more  subtle  nature 
than  that  generally  allowed  for.  Such  representations  of  a  `straightforwardly  controlled' 
Malaysian  media  are,  in  this  sense,  part  of  an  external  media  discourse  in  itself,  as  is  the 
view  of  an  openly-biased  foreign  media  a  domestic  media  construct.  Again,  this  is  not  to 
negate  the  particular  institutional  controls  within  the  Malaysian  media,  but  to 
acknowledge  the  hegemonic  interactions  and  conflicts  at  both  these  levels. 
Dateline  Malaysia:  `seizing  the  moment' 
A  good  example  of  this  interplay  during  the  Anwar  crisis  could  be  seen  in  the  NTV7 
Dateline  Malaysia  programme.  Launched  in  November  1998  by  the  newly-formed 
Asian  News  Broadcasting  company,  this  new  `hard-hitting'  current-affairs  format  had 
shown  commercial  initiative  by  producing  shows  about  the  crisis,  using  a  new  `bolder' 
reporting  style  to  allow  opposition  figures  more  than  the  usual  space  for  `dissent.  ' 
Another  intention  of  the  show,  claimed  one  of  its  producers,  was  to  "heal  some  divisions 
through  open  debate.  i81  As  noted  by  Jomo  and  other  participants,  the  taping,  editing 
and  rapid-style  presentation  of  the  show  tended  to  limit,  rather  than  allow,  meaningful 
argument.  82  However,  its  more  immediate  function  was  to  satisfy  the  need  for  an 
apparent  expansion  of  media  discussion,  civil  participation  and  objective  reporting. 
In  one  notable  edition  on  the  domestic  and  foreign  media,  83  Dateline  presenter 
Khairy  Jamaludin  (a  bright,  precocious  Oxford  `PPE')  brought  together  the  Star  editor 
Wong  Chun  Wai  and  Ahmed  Rejad  Arbeel,  Group  Editor  of  Berita  Harian,  to  voice 
allegations  of  foreign  media  bias  against  Associated  Press  (AP)  correspondent  Ranjan 
Roy,  the  BBC's  David  Willis  and  Chris  Blackwell  of  CNBC.  Here,  it  was  apparent  that 
while  a  frank  exchange  of  views  was  taking  place,  giving  the  programme  an  air  of 
`controversial  credibility',  the  theme  promoted  by  Khairy  was  `concerned  Malaysians 
confront  distorted  foreign  reporting  of  our  country',  as  the  following  extracts  indicate: 
Asked  by  Khairy  whether  the  Star  ever  took  copy  from  AP,  Ahmed  admitted  "Yes"  it  did,  mainly 
because  of  the  paper's  limited  global  reach.  Ranjan  Roy  insisted  that  AP  always  cross-check  their 
sources.  Following  Ahmed's  complaint  that  the  foreign  media  saw  themselves  as  "self-appointed 
242 guardians  of  fair  play",  Khairy  asked  David  Willis  whether  their  coverage  had  been  too  sensationalist. 
In  a  rather  apologetic  manner,  Willis  noted  that  he  did  "have  some  sympathy"  for  Dr.  Mahathir.  How, 
then,  asked  Khairy,  could  he  defend  the  BBC's  website  story,  `Mahathir:  strongman  under  siege'  and 
the  stereotypical  view  of  Malaysians  as  "uncivilised  pygmies"?  Willis,  rather  disingenuously,  deferred 
comment  here,  noting  that  he  had  not  seen  the  website  item  but  would  draw  the  BBC's  attention  to  it  if 
it  was  offensive.  Asked  by  Khairy  if  CNBC  was  guilty  of  "hit-and-run  journalism",  Chris  Blackwell 
replied  "no",  denying  also  that  CNBC  were  overly-influenced  by  their  owners  Dow  Jones.  However,  he 
thought  they  had  to  be  careful  about  over-use  of  library  re-run  pictures.  Wong  noted  here  that  CNBC 
had  been  very  "judgmental"  and  "speculative"  in  their  coverage  of  the  Anwar  affair.  Rejecting  this, 
Blackwell  insisted  that  they  only  wanted  to  get  the  other  side  of  the  story  -  there  was  "no  agenda.  " 
Ahmad  countered  that  the  foreign  media  only  show  an  interest  when  things  are  bad.  Blackwell  accepted 
this  as  "valid"  criticism,  that  the  foreign  media  constantly  had  to  police  itself.  Khairy  asked  Blackwell  if 
he  thought  Malaysians  were  "too  sensitive?  "  "No",  he  thought,  "Malaysians  love  their  country".  In  a 
further  response  to  Ahmed's  claim  that  the  domestic  media  were  not  speaking  for  the  government, 
Blackwell  asked,  "are  there  not  some  stories  you  would  not  touch?  "  Both  Wong  and  Ahmed  noted  that 
they  would  not  cover  stories  deemed  too  sensitive  with  regard  to  race  and  religion.  Khairy  followed  this 
up  with  the  suggestion  to  Blackwell  that  the  foreign  media  did  not  carry  the  responsibilities  of  the  local 
press.  Rejecting  this,  Blackwell  noted  that,  "as  a  Black  man"  in  America,  he  was  well  aware  of  the  need 
to  be  careful  about  reporting  racial  issues. 
Allan  Friedman  of  the  International  Herald  Tribune  appeared  at  this  point  and  was  asked  by  Khairy  if 
the  foreign  press  "have  a  cultural  agenda?  "  Noting  that  it  was  "hard  to  generalise  these  things",  he 
conceded  that  some  of  the  right-wing  press  may  have.  In  essence,  there  were  three  types  of  reporters,  he 
thought:  "local,  old  timers",  "global  economic"  (like  himself)  and  "hit-and-run"  types.  Wong  insisted 
here  that  "we  are  more  straightforward",  placing  "emphasis  on  the  facts.. 
. 
We  are  not  so  judgmental.  " 
Didn't  Wong  take  this  line,  asked  Khairy,  because  "you  are  not  allowed  to  say  certain  things?  "  Noting 
also  that  the  most  critical  output  at  present  is  "Life  and  Times",  Khairy  also  asked  him  if  this  augured 
well  for  the  press  in  Malaysia?  Wong  responded  that  it  was  "a  tested  formula  that  works  well".  Ahmad 
followed  this  up  by  insisting  that  "the  press  is  not  the  fourth  estate.  Why  should  it  be  so?  "  What,  then, 
was  the  role  of  the  press,  and  what  of  hit-and-run  journalism,  asked  Khairy?  Ranjan  Roy  concluded 
that,  while  avoiding  hit-and-run  journalism,  the  press  should  act  as  a  watchdog.  The  main  purpose  was 
to  give  the  news  as  accurately  as  possible. 
While  debate  of  this  kind  suggested  a  certain  expansion  of  critical  opinion,  it  also  served 
a  hegemonic  purpose  by  stretching  the  boundaries  at  this  point  to  help  manage  public 
sentiment.  It  offered  open  exchange,  while  keeping  the  `discussible'  issues  within 
acceptable  limits.  Thus,  the  subtext  here  was  to  keep  the  issues  focused  on  themes  of 
243 `national  concern'  and  `false  depictions'  of  the  country.  As  the  Anwar  trial  progressed, 
Dateline  Malaysia  stopped  producing.  Although  coinciding  with  re-launch  plans  at 
NTV7,  there  were  suggestions  that  it  had  been  `advised'  to  take  a  lower  profile.  84 
Certainly,  this  was  consistent  with  the  return  to  a  more  anodyne  media  output  by  early- 
1999. 
The  media  and  the  Net 
For  many  Malaysians,  notably  the  politically  concerned  middle-class,  it  was  the  Internet 
which  helped  fill  this  journalistic  vacuum.  The  importance  of  the  Net  lay  not  in  its 
immediate  availability  for  möst  Malaysians  (despite  the  professed  IT  policy),  but  in  its 
use  as  a  networked  medium  for  accessing,  exchanging  and  spreading  information  on  the 
crisis.  Prior  to  the  crisis,  the  DAP  had  been  the  only  major  online  opposition  party  - 
Lim  Kit  Siang's  page,  in  particular,  being  an  effective  focal  point  for  media  statements 
and  speeches.  By  late-1997,  a  connecting  network  of  sites  and  homepages  had  been 
created  (notably  around  the  Aliran  homepage),  linking  all  the  major  opposition  parties, 
most  reformist  NGOs,  opposition  publications  such  as  the  PAS  newspaper  Harakah  and 
cyber  forums  like  Sangkancil.  With  the  onset  of  the  Anwar  situation,  a  whole  raft  of 
reformasi  sites  (around  sixty  by  the  beginning  of  the  trial)  had  become  part  of  this 
`cybercommunity'  -  including  the  newly-formed  GERAK  homepage.  85  Homepages  for 
ADIL  and  its  proto-party  (see  Chapter  9),  were  also  under  construction  by  early-1999. 
A  new  group  of  Internet  journalists  like  Sabri  Zain  were  sending  first-hand  reports  of  the 
protests  across  the  net,  providing  news  of  further  gatherings,  information  to  remote 
kampongs  and  immediate  updates  for  foreign  observers.  86  Anwar  Online  was  now  the 
focal  point  for  the  main  flow  of  information,  allowing  news  and  pictures  to  be 
downloaded,  photocopied  and  distributed  at  large.  It  was  here  that  Anwar's  letters  to 
Mahathir  and  speeches  detailing  his  refutation  of  the  charges  were  published,  including 
statements  smuggled  from  jail.  In  addition,  a  range  of  videotapes,  video  compact  discs 
and  CD-ROMS  with  culled  foreign  and  private  footage  of  the  street  protests,  Anwar's 
speeches  and  arrest  were  being  sold  at  street  markets  and  other  informal  outlets,  with  a 
message  to  reproduce  and  pass  on.  87  In  turn,  use  of  the  net  as  an  alternative  news  and 
information  source  for  disenchanted  Malaysians  became  a  major  story  in  itself  for  the 
244 major  news  agencies  and  journals.  88  With  cyber-cafes  and  net  access  in  Malaysia 
spreading,  the  news  government  wanted  withheld  was  now  in  the  public  domain. 
Reacting  to  this  expansion,  the  authorities  had  begun  monitoring  e-mail  messages 
and  tracking  downloaded  material.  The  main  Malaysian  Internet  service  provider 
MIMOS  had  intercepted  `suspect'  messages,  culminating  in  the  arrest  of  four  people 
under  the  ISA  for  spreading  false  rumours  about  impending  race-riots 
, 
in  Kuala 
Lumpur.  89  Although  condemned  as  a  malicious  practice  by  opposition  groups,  these 
security  concerns  were  given  extensive  coverage  by  the  domestic  media,  thus  providing  a 
pretext  for  the  continued  monitoring  of  Internet  exchanges.  Ironically,  Kadir  Jasin  had 
raised  fears  here  that  the  use  of  "a  Cold  War-era  security  law  [the  ISA]  to  punish  a 
cyberspace  perpetrator  may  not  jell  well  with  our  quest  to  become  a  wired  and  kinder 
nation.  "90  Nonetheless,  as  the  Anwar  affair  intensified,  Kadir  and  other  editors 
continued  to  offer  a  ready  platform  for  government  threats.  As  Deputy  Home  Minister 
Tajol  Rosli  (commenting  on  downloaded  pamphlets  alleging  unease  amongst  senior 
police  officers  and  UMNO  members)  warned  in  the  Star:  "The  police  will  check  every  bit 
of  information  and  leaflet.  "91 
One  such  net  article  in  early-1999  offered  insights  from  a  Special  Branch 
operative  into  the  practices  of  the  `UMNO  dirty  tricks  department'  itself.  Proudly 
claiming  inheritance  of  British  colonial  expertise  in  this  field  and  detailing  a  wide  range  of 
underhand  strategies  from  organised  buying  of  votes  to  stage-managed  `PAS 
demonstrations'  and  other  black  propaganda,  the  article  notes  how: 
In  every  organisation  we  have  our  SB  boys.  We  have  them  among  the  university  students,  in  every 
government  department,  and  in  many  of  the  private  offices  as  well.  Some  are  operators  but  many  are 
informers.  Informers  are  paid  a  monthly  retainer  and  they  get  paid  extra  if  they  bring  back  any 
information.  In  fact,  your  neighbour  or  one  of  your  family  members  could  be  a  Special  Branch  informer 
and  you  would  not  know  it...  We  trust  no  one,  whether  they  are  opposition  members  or  UMNO  members, 
or  even  Ministers  for  that  matter.  In  fact,  in  light  of  the  present  Anwar  crisis,  we  trust  the  UMNO 
members  even  less.  92 
Intelligence  and  Internet  surveillance  were  also  creating  doubts  about  the  MSC 
and  Mahathir's  claim  to  be  leading  Malaysia  towards  a  new  age  of  open,  information-led 
development.  In  his  `From  the  Halls  of  Power...  '  letter,  Anwar  had  criticised  Mahathir's 
245 "delusions  of  grandeur"  and  obsession  with  mega-projects  as  a  symptom  of  his  gathering 
megalomania.  93  Now  the  multimedia  guru  Alvin  Toffler,  an  admirer  of  the  MSC  and 
Mahathir's  "information  age  vision  of  the  future",  denounced  Anwar's  arrest,  warning 
that  companies  like  Netscape,  Hewlett  Packard  and  Compaq  might  now,  along  with 
other  potential  investors,  withdraw  their  interest.  94 
The  crisis  of  containment 
Prior  to  Anwar's  dismissal,  it  had  been  middle-class  rationalisation  of  the  crisis  through 
the  agenda-setting  filters  of  the  media  which  had  helped  maintain  some  form  of 
consensus.  However,  with  many  Malaysians  now  abandoning  the  mainstream  press 
altogether  in  search  of  alternative  news  sources,  the  ability  to  stem  political  dissent 
through  conventional  media  controls  and  persuasion  had  been  severely  tested.  The 
decision  to  take  Anwar  to  court  had  also  allowed  the  public  new  insights  into  Special 
Branch  practices  and  crony-type  relationships.  Thus,  as  the  trial  got  underway,  a 
damage  limitation  exercise  had  begun  in  an  attempt  to  restore  Mahathir's  public  image.  9S 
Alongside  the  appointment  of  Abdullah  and  other  political  moves,  Mahathir  began 
writing  his  own  monthly  opinion  column  in  the  Japanese  newspaper  Mainichi  Daily 
News,  this  being  reproduced  in  the  New  Straits  Times.  96  In  early-1999,  the  government 
announced  that  a  new  TV  station  was  to  be  set-up  to  counter  foreign  media  bias.  To  a 
similar  end,  the  UMNO  Information  Chief  Yusof  Nor  revealed  plans  to  update  the 
party's  website  more  often.  97 
However,  these  PR  efforts  could  not  conceal  the  problems  for  the  UMNO 
network.  As  receptors  and  mediators  of  the  `public  mood',  middle-class  influence 
through  the  net,  the  press  and  the  electronic  media  had  been  significant  in  shaping 
popular  dissent.  To  some  extent,  the  expression  of  such  through  these  mediums  may 
have  helped  keep  middle-class  protest  off  the  streets,  creating  a  surrogate  form  of  dissent 
safely  confined  to  the  lifestyle  columns  and  the  ether.  What  was  being  played-out  here, 
though,  was  not  only  a  debate  over  civil  freedoms;  but  a  hegemonic  confrontation  of 
ideas.  In  essence,  this  was  not  only  a  media  issue  about  liberal  rights,  but  a  class  issue 
over  competing  policy  agendas,  a  set  of  tensions  which,  having  come  to  political  crisis 
246 with  Anwar's  dismissal,  was  now  being  reproduced  as  ideological  discourse  through  the 
competing  filters  of  the  domestic  and  foreign  medias. 
Thus,  while  Mahathir  was  still  in  control,  the  Vision  looked  decidedly  frayed  as  a 
project,  while  the  public  mood  had  been  hardened  by  the  Anwar  purge  and  attack  on  civil 
freedoms.  As  the  reformasi  looked  to  form  new  coalitions,  the  gathering  question  was 
whether  this  signalled  a  meaningful  challenge  to  the  BN  bloc. 
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Traditional  intellectuals:  PAS,  Islam 
and  the  countervision 
We  now  turn  more  specifically  to  the  issue  of  counter-hegemony  and  assess  the  Vision 
project  in  relation  to  alternative  political  forces,  class  relations  and  ideas.  The  first  main 
area  concerns  the  Islamic  model  of  development  proposed  by  PAS.  This  requires  us  to 
consider  not  only  the  immediate  political  tensions  between  UMNO  and  PAS,  but,  more 
specifically,  the  intellectual  bases  of  their  respective  projects,  an  approach  consistent 
with  Gramsci's  understanding  of  the  organic  and  traditional  intellectual.  The  aim  is  to 
show  how  the  Vision  has  been  used  to  harness  Islamic  consciousness  through  idealised 
forms  of  `modern'  Islamic  identity,  and  to  set  this  against  the  model  of  Islamic  social 
collectivism  being  advanced  by  PAS.  These  issues  are  developed  in  relation  to  the 
Anwar  affair  in  the  next  chapter. 
In  seeking  to  build  its  own  project,  PAS  has  faced  two  key  tasks:  how  to  construct  a 
working  relationship  with  other  parties  and  civil  institutions  as  the  basis  of  an  alternative 
bloc;  and  how  to  cultivate  national-popular  support  for  PAS-Islam,  particularly  amongst 
the  Chinese.  To  help  contextualise  the  PAS  project,  let  us  consider  some  of  the 
historical  tensions  underlying  its  contestation  of  Vision-Islam. 
Vision  Islam  and  the  management  of  traditional  consciousness 
Illumination  of  the  present,  requires  appreciation  of  the  past.  In  seeking  to  locate  these 
contending  projects,  it  is  helpful  to  recognise  their  evolving  nature.  One  of  Gramsci's 
main  contributions  in  this  respect  involves  the  recovery  within  Marxism  of  a  `voluntarist' 
dimension  which  acknowledges  the  role  of  subjective  consciousness  in  the  historical 
process.  In  the  Prison  Notebooks,  Gramsci's  historicism,  situated  around  a  critique  (and 
some  retention)  of  Crocean  philosophy,  helps  redefine  `superstructural  relations'  and  the 
252 significance  of  the  historical  dialectic.  '  Intrinsic  to  this  process  is  the  sense  in  which 
human  activity  is  shaped  simultaneously  by  social  structures  and  is  itself  a  creative  force 
for  instrumental  change.  This  allows  for  a  more  acute  awareness  of  historical  forms  and 
traditions  -a  genealogical  conception  of  power  complementary  to  Foucault's.  Thus, 
Gramsci  offers  an  expansive  view  of  historical  development  as  a  contest  and  mediation  of 
ideas.  As  one  Gramscian  contributor  notes: 
Marxists  who  seek  to  establish  universally  valid  systems  of  thought,  who  spend  their  time  building  neat, 
logically  consistent  formal  models,  ultimately  mystify  rather  than  illuminate  history  by  ignoring  the 
unique  configurations  that  emerge  through  the  variations  in  socio-political  development.  They  also 
overlook  the  crucial  fact  that  intellectual  processes  themselves  -  of  whatever  kind  -  are  part  of  a 
complex  and  unique  history  that  is  shaped  by  particular  cultural  and  political  traditions... 
The  intellectual  conflict  between  Vision-Islam  and  PAS-Islam  is  a  contemporary 
manifestation  of  this  evolving  process.  Implicit  in  the  colonial  mindset  was  a  view  of 
Islam  as  a  monolithic  obstruction  to  modernism.  But,  in  its  search  for  a  modern  Malay 
identity,  the  anti-colonial  movement  also  came  to  challenge  the  traditionalist  impulses  of 
Islam  as  a  dogmatic  impediment  to  nationalist  development. 
Diverging  perceptions  of  Malay-Islamic  consciousness  crystallised  around  the 
Kaum  Tua  -  Kaum  Muda  (Old  Order  -  New  Order)  debate  in  late-nineteenth  century 
Malaya.  The  former  adhered  to  a  traditionalist  interpretation  of  Islamic  shariah  law 
(God's  law),  a  conservative  adat  consistent  with  feudal  hierarchy  and  a  spiritual 
universalism  of  pan-Islamic  salvation.  The  latter,  reflecting  progressive  streams  of 
Middle  East/Ottoman  intellectual  thought,  embraced  a  nationalist  modernism  based  upon 
the  ideals  of  rational  secular  knowledge,  technology  and  education.  3 
This  progressive  stream  was  by  no  means  a  negation  of  Islam.  In  challenging  the 
reactionary  inclinations  of  the  ulama  (spiritual  leaders)  and  their  fatalistic  worldview,  the 
Kaum  Muda  sought  to  restore  the  humanitarian  and  socially  progressive  values  of  Islam 
and  fuse  them  with  a  new  Malay  nationalism.  By  1906,  these  modernist  Islamic 
messages  were  finding  populist  resonance  through  the  Malay  periodical  Al-Imam  (The 
Leader).  Al-Imam  offered  an  intellectual  context  for  the  issue  of  Malay  identity  by 
linking  it  to  the  broader  problem  of  orthodox  Islamic  doctrine.  It  called  upon  Malays  to 
recognise  the  centrality  of  knowledge  and  the  gift  of  intelligence  as  a  source  of  spiritual 
253 fulfilment;  a  realisation  of  the  true  teachings  of  the  Prophet  Muhammad.  Inspired  by 
modernist  Islamic  groups  and  publications  in  Cairo,  4  Al-Imam  argued  for  a  new  form  of 
Islamic  education  and  religious  instruction  which  encouraged  open  thought,  the  teaching 
of  Western  subjects  and  the  critical,  independent  study  of  Islamic  ideas.  Embracing  the 
spirit  of  the  Kaum  Muda: 
AI-Imam  was  a  radical  departure  in  the  field  of  Malay  publications,  distinguished  by  its  predecessors 
both  in  intellectual  stature  and  intensity  of  purpose  and  in  its  attempts  to  formulate  a  coherent 
philosophy  of  action  for  a  society  faced  with  the  need  for  rapid  social  and  economic  changes 
In  contrast,  the  reproduction  of  traditional  ulama  scholarship  by  religious  elites 
had  helped  sustain  both  a  hierarchical  social  order  and  an  effective  system  of  colonial 
control.  As  divide  and  rule  innovators,  par  excellence,  the  British  had  also  used  the 
racist  stereotype  of  Malay  indolence  to  reinforce  this  subservience.  6  A  more  routine 
feature  of  the  system,  notably  in  Kelantan  and  Terengganu,  was  the  integration  of  the 
local  kadi  (civil  functionaries),  appointed  by  the  Sultans,  and  the  juridical  edicts  of  the 
mufti  or  ulama.  7  Through  its  predominant  influence  within  the  pondok  (schools)  and 
village  communities,  this  closely-linked  network  of  religious-civil  officials  represented  a 
vital  medium  of  socialisation  and  social  control.  By  endorsing  ideas  of  fatalism  and  a 
conservative  adat  as  integral  parts  of  the  socio-religious  system,  Malay  elites,  under  the 
colonial  order,  helped  propagate  Malay-Islamic  passivity  and  a  disdain  for  rational 
enquiry: 
...  there  are  many  Malay  values  and  attributes  which  impeded  the  modernisation  of  the  Malays  in 
Southeast  Asia,  [including]  the  acceptance  of  arbitrary  notions  of  power,...  the  downgrading 
of...  rationalism  and  the  encouragement  of  myths  which  serve  the  interests  of  those  in  power...  As 
producers  of  ideas  and  those  who  condition  the  thinking  of  their  society,  it  is  the  Malay  elite  who  are 
responsible  for  the  prevalence  of  these  negative  values  in  society.  " 
However,  it  is  the  ongoing  contestation  of  these  values  within  the  Malay-Islam 
relationship  which  helps  contextualise  the  way  in  which  many  social  issues  are  addressed 
by  intellectual  communities  in  Malaysia.  In  this  regard,  questions  of  Malay-Islamic 
identity  represent  not  only  a  socio-historical  `subject',  but  a  form  of  intellectual 
perspectivism.  Intellectuals  have  not  only  influenced  the  subject  through  discourse  and 
254 interpretation,  the  subject  has  conditioned  the  mode  of  intellectual  enquiry  itself. 
Representations  of  modernity,  development  and  political  culture  are  examined 
quintessentially  against  this  background  consciousness.  In  this  sense,  the  `Malay-Islam 
problem'  is  invoked,  deconstructed  and,  ultimately,  exploited  as  a  key  narrative  in  the 
projection  of  hegemony. 
Recourse  to  the  Malay-Islam  identity  problem  has,  thus,  been  central  to  the 
marginalisation  of  traditional  Islamic  forces,  as  in  Mahathir's  own  intellectual  reflections 
in  The  Challenge,  a  development  of  the  claims  expressed  in  the  influential  text  Revolusi 
Mental  which,  in  similar  mode,  sought  to  link  perceived  flaws  in  the  Malay  character 
with  the  need  for  a  transcendent  modernism.  ' 
A  further  variation  was  Mahathir's  attempt  to  associate  the  Malays'  socio- 
historical  predicament  with  the  socio-psychological  notion  of  Amok.  The  precise 
meaning  and  causes  of  amok  are  widely  disputed.  In  essence,  though,  it  refers  to  a 
culturally  derived  psychological  condition  amongst  Malays  in  which  emotions  of  inner 
repression  give  (apparent)  rise  to  sudden  outward  expressions  of  uncontrolled  violence. 
Deep-seated  feelings  of  stress  and  angst  arising  from  the  internalisation  of  the  Malays' 
cultural  burdens  -  obedience,  fatalism  and  adherence  to  form  -  are  said  to  invoke 
potential  inner  crises,  thus  activating  latent  violent  impulses  as  a  form  of  cathartic 
release.  10  For  Mahathir,  amok  was  a  symptom  of  the  Malay  identity  problem: 
Amok  represents  the  external  physical  expression  of  the  conflict  within  the  Malay  which  his  perpetual 
observation  of  the  rules  and  regulations  of  his  life  causes  in  him.  It  is  a  spilling  over,  an  overflowing  of 
his  inner  bitterness.  '' 
Yet,  as  Alatas  argues,  neither  amok  nor  any  other  form  of  `social  pathology' 
attributed  to  the  Malays  was,  or  is,  unique  to  the  Malay  community.  Just  as  the  colonial 
administrator  Clifford  had  contrived  to  link  the  psycho-pathological  state  of  latah  to  the 
Malays,  so  was  amok  a  crafted  distortion  of  the  Malay  character.  12  Against  the 
backdrop  of  the  May  13th  riots,  it  was  used  to  suggest  a  cultural  malady,  an  emotive 
symptom  of  the  `Malay  dilemma',  out  of  which  a  `new  Malayness'  could  emerge  as  a 
complement  to  the  NEP  system.  But  the  `modern'  Malay  nationalism  being  spawned 
here  had  also  come  to  reveal  new  political  and  intellectual  tensions  within  the  Malay- 
Islam  relationship. 
255 Islam  and  nationalism 
While  never,  in  practice,  hostile  to  the  aspirations  of  Malayan  nationalism,  `traditional 
Islam'  in  Malaya/Malaysia  has  harboured  a  certain  historical  ambivalence  towards  the 
ideals  of  nationalist  ideology.  In  the  colonial  context,  this  was  not  unconnected  with  the 
political  conservatism  of  the  Malayan  mullahs.  Of  wider  importance  was  the  disjunction 
between  Western  conceptions  of  the  nation-state,  based  on  liberal,  secular  and  positivist 
ideals,  and  that  of  the  `Islamic  state',  the  umma,  based  on  the  ideal  of  a  universal  Islamic 
community. 
Within  traditional  Islamic  scholarship,  sovereignty  has  a  solely  cosmological 
significance,  wherein  God  is  omnipotent  and  the  Muslim's  singular  form  of  identity  is 
that  of  Islam.  A  traditional  Muslim  has  no  sense  of  national  or  communal  identification 
higher  than  this  authority.  The  ideals  of  nationalism  and  nation-state  are  cosmetic 
artifices  impeding  the  Muslim's  true  spiritual  membership  of  the  Islamic  community,  the 
umma.  13  Under  the  tenets  of  shariah  (literally  `path')  Islamic  law,  the  world  is 
understood  as  a  division  between  dar  al  Islam  (the  `abode  of  peace';  Islamic  territory), 
and  dar  al-harb  (the  `abode  of  warfare';  non-Islamic  territory.  )  While  the  faithful  are 
enjoined  to  extend  the  former,  the  latter  is  synonymous  with  conflagration  and  the  false 
ideologies  of  nationalism. 
Historically,  Islam's  rejection  of  nationalism  has  been  neither  unequivocal,  nor 
the  only  principle  underlying  Islamic  `anti-modernism'.  Rather,  Islamic  perceptions  of 
the  nation-state  formed  part  of  a  broader  set  of  concerns  within  Islamic  scholarship  over 
the  role  of  rational  knowledge  in  Islamic  thought.  In  antiquity,  the  flowering  of  a 
progressive  Islamic  consciousness,  based-upon  the  sanctity  of  knowledge  and  learning, 
long  preceded  the  age  of  European  Renaissance,  Enlightenment  and  reason.  Evoking  the 
teachings  of  the  Quran  and  other  hadith  (sayings  of  the  Prophet),  it  gave  expression  to  a 
civilisation  of  scientific,  philosophical  and  cultural  enquiry.  In  no  sense  was  this 
intellectual  energy  inconsistent  with  the  ideal  of  an  Islamic  umma. 
However,  with  the  exigencies  of  war  precipitating  a  conservative  shift  among  the 
ulama,  the  suppression  of  rational  scholarship  saw  the  long-term  decline  of  Islam  as  a 
progressive,  dynamic  religion.  Symbolising  this  hiatus  by  the  tenth  century,  the  ulama 
`closed  the  Gate  of  Ijtihad'(Gate  of  Knowledge),  declaring  the  key  tenets  of  Islam 
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establishment  tied  itself  into  political  alliances  with  feudal  rulers  and  promoted  ideals  of 
theological  conformity.  14  Thus,  the  ulama  had,  effectively,  downgraded  the  values  of 
the  Islamic  polity  consecrated  at  Medina  (following  the  Prophet's  hyra  (migration)  from 
Mecca  in  622  AD);  a  religious  community  founded  upon  the  dual  concepts  of  political 
citizenship  and  Islamic  faith.  '5  Under  the  various  caliphs,  sultans  and  other  direct  rulers, 
the  ulama: 
...  contented  themselves  with  the  privileged  position  offered  them  by  the  ruler  or  dynasty  as  guardians  of 
the  word  of  God,  as  teachers,  scholars  and  judges.  Soon  they  accepted  the  separation  between  sanctity 
and  power.  Having  produced  their  massive  legal  compendia  according  to  their  interpretation  of  the 
Koran,  sunna  (life,  conduct)  and  hadith  (sayings)  of  the  Prophet,  they  formulated  the  proposition  that 
obedience  to  the  ruler,  good  or  bad,  was  better  than  fitna  (anarchy,  disorder).  In  other  words,  they 
legitimised  the  status  quo.  This  was  tantamount  to  the  formal  consecration  of  quietism  in  Islam.  16 
The  subsequent  orthodoxy  of  received  faith,  taglid,  seen  as  the  sole  criterion  of 
knowledge,  had  epochal  implications  for  Islam  as  an  intellectual  force: 
Closing  the  gates  of  rational  knowledge  and  independent  reasoning  has  had  a  disastrous  effect  on 
Islamic  science  and  education.  Secular  science  was  replaced  by  theology  and  dogma,  and  public 
education,  which  had  flourished  in  the  first  two  centuries  of  the  Abbasid  dynasty,  lost  its  dynamism  and 
creativity.  It  became  institutionalised  around  the  dysfunctional  taqlid  system  of  learning  by  memorising 
and  blind  imitation.  Gradually,  the  reactionary  mullahs  and  ulama  assumed  a  monopoly  control  of 
education,  morality  and  opinion,  and,  in  the  process,  advanced  the  cause  of  jahiliyya  (mass  ignorance), 
fatalism  and  underdevelopment  as  effectively  as  imperialism  and  colonial  exploitation.  " 
Not  until  the  nineteenth  century  did  modernist  Islamic  figures  such  as  Jamil  al-Din-al 
Afghani,  Muhammad  Iqbil  and  Muhammad  Abduh  (of  Persian,  Egyptian  and  Pakistani 
origin,  respectively)  challenge  this  traditional  conformity  through  the  call  for  a  greater 
understanding  of  Western  rationalism  and  scientific  knowledge,  '8  with  later  like-minded 
reformists  such  as  Sayyid  Shaykh  Al-hadi  in  the  1930s  arguing  for  a  re-integration  of 
Western  secular  and  Islamic  education.  19 
Such  forces  represented  a  gathering  progressive  challenge  to  an  entrenched 
ulama  in  Malaya.  The  modernist  movement  here  was  at  once  politically  hostile  to 
Western  ideals  of  colonial  `development'  and  intellectually  responsive  to  Western  ideals 
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lateral  thought  with  the  egalitarian  impulses  of  Islamic  social  justice  as  a  model  for  Malay 
modernisation.  And  it  is  within  this  context  that  a  Malay-Islamic  nationalism  became  co- 
defined  amongst  progressive  Islamic  forces.  Nationalism,  in  this  sense,  was  understood 
as  part  of  an  integral  intellectual  problem,  linking  modernity,  political  independence  and 
an  Islamic  social  consciousness:  in  effect,  nationalism  was  not  only  a  reactive  process, 
but  also  a  proactive  statement  of  the  need  to  reawaken  and  advance  the  progressive 
ideals  of  the  Islamic  community,  the  umma  itself 
PAS,  nationalism  and  the  Islamic  resurgence 
In  the  struggle  for  independence,  this  moral  view  of  nationalist  development,  although 
not  a  specific  guiding  force,  was  implicit  in  the  political  ideology  of  PAS.  As  Malaysia's 
`definitive'  Islamic  party,  formed  in  1951  in  Penang,  PAS  has  never  deviated  from  its 
desire  to  create  an  Islamic  state.  However,  in  contrast  to  its  "unequivocal  rejection  of 
nationalism"  today,  20  PAS's  identification  with  Malay  nationalism  from  the  1950s  to  the 
1970s  was  both  explicit  and  partly  motivated  by  this  higher  progressive  idealism.  As  its 
President  in  the  1950s-1960s,  Burhammudin  Al-helmy  (previously  leader  of  the  Malay 
Nationalist  Party  PKMM,  and  other  leftist  coalitions)  asserted:  "PAS  and  I  are  in 
content,  character  and  orientation  `Malay  nationalists'  with  `Islamic  aspirations'  . 
))21 
However,  by  1977-78,  PAS  was  undergoing  a  radical  change  in  its  view  of 
nationalism.  Following  the  move  by  former  ABIM  leaders  Fadzil  Noor,  Nakhaie  Ahmad 
and  Abdul  Hadi  Awang  into  PAS  and  the  crisis  departure  of  PAS  leader  Mohammad 
Asri  Muda  after  the  PAS  Muktamar  (party  Assembly)  in  1982,22  the  party's  new  guard, 
in  alliance  with  the  older  ulama  figures  (notably  Nik  Aziz  and  Yusof  Rawa),  proceeded 
to  abandon  its  Malay-nationalist  position  in  pursuit  of  a  more  pure  and  pristine 
interpretation  of  Islam.  Driven,  in  large  part,  by  the  charismatic  religious  teacher  Hadi 
Awang  in  Terengganu,  and  in  reaction  to  Anwar's  co-optation  in  1982,  PAS  had  begun 
to  rebuild  its  Islamic  agenda  in  opposition  to  UMNO.  By  the  mid-1980s,  PAS  had 
established  new  support  bases  in  Kedah  and  Perlis  while  extending  into  the  urban  centres 
and  universities  by  the  mid-1980s.  23 
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the  Islamic  revolution  in  Iran.  But  it  was  also,  more  specifically,  a  rejection  of  `narrow 
nationalism',  or,  as  PAS  had  come  to  define  it,  assabiyah,  loosely  translated  as  ethnic 
chauvinism.  Synonymous  with  false  or  contrived  sectarian  loyalty,  the  term  was 
extended,  notably  by  Hadi  Awang,  to  include  a  rejection  of  the  NEP  and  Bumiputeraism. 
Indeed,  Hadi  Awang's  assertion  that  a  Chinese  could,  in  principle,  become  Prime 
Minister  if  he  was  a  pious  Muslim,  had  helped  foster  new  dialogue  with  the  Chinese 
Consultative  Committee  (CCC)  and  other  such  groups  in  1985  and  1986,  PAS's  first 
direct  overture  to  explain  Islam  in  depth  to  the  Chinese  community.  24 
At  the  same  time,  PAS  has  sought  to  impose  limits,  where  possible,  on  the 
expression  of  culture  it  considers  inimical  to  an  Islamic  worldview.  For  example,  in 
Kelantan  and  Kedah  this  has  involved  opposition  to  the  performance  of  Western  styles  of 
music  by  Malaysian  groups.  In  Kelantan  it  has  also  seen  the  (attempted)  banning  of  the 
traditional  Malay  dance  drama  mak  yong  as  it  involves  men  and  women  performing 
together  and  is  too  focused  upon  Malay,  rather  than  Islamic,  elements.  25 
Thus,  from  the  early-1980s,  the  intricacies  of  domestic  politics  and  the  Islamic 
resurgence  had  sharpened  the  Malay-Islamic  identity  problem.  But  it  also  sponsored  a 
more  contemplative  reaction  within  the  wider  intellectual  community.  The  Islamic 
indictment  of  Western  values  has  helped  shape  intellectual  discourse  more  generally 
towards  critical  reflections  on  capitalism,  the  free-market  and  its  social  consequences  - 
acquisitiveness,  wealth  disparities  and  social  injustice.  This,  in  turn,  has  created  new 
tensions  between  UMNO  and  PAS  as  capitalist  development  in  Malaysia  proceeds. 
Likewise,  PAS  intellectuals  have  resisted  Mahathir's  attempts  to  entrench  modern- 
nationalist  ideas  about  Islamic  development  through  state  and  civil  institutions. 
Emerging  contradictions  could,  thus,  be  seen  within  the  project  by  the  early- 
1980s.  The  first  was  that,  through  the  promotion  of  NEP  nationalism,  a  more  mobile 
and  educated  Malay  middle-class  had  come  to  express  an  intensified  Islamic  awareness 
and  reaction  against  assabiyah.  Herein  lay  the  dialectic  of  the  NEP  generation:  in 
facilitating  the  socio-economic  advancement  of  Malays  through  enhanced  educational 
opportunities,  NEP  policies  were  creating  a  more  politicised  middle-class,  much  of  it 
sympathetic  to,  and  involved  in,  the  spread  of  Islamic  revivalism.  This  could  be  traced  to 
the  changes  in  tertiary  education  from  the  early-1970s  and  the  exponential  growth  of 
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within  this  new  environment  of  Malay  assertiveness  that  many  students  came  to 
understand  the  meaning  of  their  `nationalist  identity'  in  Islamic  terms  and  to  study  and 
engage  Islam  more  seriously  as  a  form  of  religious-political  commitment.  The  campus 
experience  thus  formed  the  key  source  of  recruitment  for  the  dakwah  movement  - 
notably  ABIM  and  the  National  Association  of  Muslim  Students  Malaysia,  PKPIM.  This 
was  strengthened  from  the  mid-to-late-1970s  by  the  gradual  return  of  Malay  students 
from  abroad,  notably  England,  many  of  whom  had  been  influenced  by  fundamentalist 
streams  of  Islamic  thought  and/or  had  found  cultural  security  in  Islam  as  a  way  of 
channelling  their  alienating  exposure  to  Western  values.  Indeed,  it  was  from  English 
campuses  that  Malay  students  began  to  denounce  government  policies  and  to  indict 
UMNO  itself  as  "a  secular,  Malay  nationalist  party,  thus  unIslamic".  26 
In  response,  UMNO  had  moved  decisively  to  neutralise  these  forces.  In  1979, 
under  Tun  Hussein  Onn,  AlArqam  had  been  forced,  in  the  `public  interest',  to  relinquish 
many  of  its  `deviationist'  views  -a  precedent  for  its  charismatic  leader  Ashaari's  public 
recantation  in  1994.27  As  noted,  ABIM  was  also  brought  under  control  by  1982  with 
Anwar's  co-optation,  leaving  the  group  badly  divided.  At  the  same  time,  potential 
dissent  among  ABIM  and  other  middle-class  revivalists  was  being  tempered  by  their 
material  dependence  on  the  public-sector  and  surveillance  within  the  state  bureaucracy.  28 
However,  this  could  not  diminish  the  extreme  rivalry  which  was  growing  between 
UMNO  and  PAS  by  this  point.  Indeed,  the  tension  became  a  cause  for  many  PAS 
followers  after  the  deaths  and  violence  resulting  from  the  Memali  incident  in  September 
1985  when  police  tried  to  arrest  the  local  cleric  Ibrahim  bin  Mahmood  in  Kampung 
Memali,  Kedah.  29 
This  suggests  a  second  contradictory  element  of  the  project:  that  of  the  ulama's 
own  intellectual  leanings.  Mahathir  has  sought  to  consecrate  the  idea  that  UMNO 
speaks  not  only  for  Malays,  but  for  Islam.  Thus,  the  enunciations  of  the  ulama  have  an 
important  bearing  upon  that  process.  Yet,  the  problem  of  winning  and  maintaining  this 
support  is  complicated  by  the  nature  of  ulama  power.  On  the  one  hand,  it  remains  an 
integral  part  of  the  political  establishment.  On  the  other,  it  derives  its  prestige  and  social 
influence  as  a  traditional  intellectual  community  (or  `status  group',  to  borrow  from 
Weber)  according  it  a  form  of  civil  authority  not  immediately  tied  to  party  politics. 
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remained  intellectually  sympathetic  to  PAS's  pan-Islamic  project  and  a  de  facto  part  of 
the  intellectual  opposition.  3o 
This  affinity  has  seen  political  resistance  to  UMNO  conveyed  through  PAS. 
Notable  here  was  the  party's  consistent  denunciation  of  the  NEP  as  a  wealth  charter  for 
middle-class  privilege,  rather  than  a  solution  to  poverty,  indicating  a  growing  intellectual 
argument  over  Islam,  nationalism  and  modernity  by  the  early-1990s.  In  this  context, 
notes  Mehmet: 
Islam  may  reinforce  the  Malay's  sense  of  ethnicity,  but  it  does  not  resolve  their  identity  crisis.  In  fact  it 
gives  rise  to  a  new  set  of  challenges  of  reconciling  Islam  with  nationalism  and  modernity,  [one  they 
have]  yet  to  confront.  31 
Thus,  with  new  forms  of  Malay-Islamic  consciousness  and  an  ambivalent  nationalism 
now  constraining  the  modernist  project,  Mahathir  was  not  only  signalling  the  Vision  as 
an  economic  challenge,  but  as  a  new  context  for  civil-Islamic  development  -  hegemony 
being  not  just  the  reproduction  of  elite  interests,  but  of  elite  ideas  through  moral 
leadersh  32  ip. 
Contesting  the  Vision 
One  of  the  more  intriguing  features  of  hegemony  in  Malaysia  has  been  the  consistency 
with  which  traditional  intellectuals  have  been  pacified  by  the  state.  As  organisers  of 
hegemony,  the  UMNO  network  have  sought  to  arbitrate  and  manage  religio-cultural 
sensitivities  by  framing  policy  ideas  and  civil  messages  within  a  basic  idiom  of  moderate 
Islam.  Therefore,  it  is  not,  simply,  for  political  expediency  that  the  values  of  community 
are  projected  by  UMNO.  The  attempt  to  forge  consensus  is  also  conditioned  by  more 
internalised  moral  and  cultural  imperatives,  expressing  alternative  forms  of  social  order 
from  those  of  liberal  individualism.  That  an  `ethics  of  community'  informs  intellectual 
questions  in  this  way  suggests  the  promotion  of  a  particular  type  of  national-popular 
ideology. 
Within  this  discourse,  coercion  is  presented  as  having  a  `moral'  rationale.  Thus, 
when  the  state  sanctions  Islamic  sects  or  courts  the  consent  of  dissident  figures,  this 
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assimilation'  was  evident  in  the  purging  of  Al  Arqam  in  October  1994,  the  `voluntary' 
recanting  of  its  leader  Ashaari  Muhammad  on  TV  being  rationalised  in  terms  of  this  need 
to  uphold  an  idealised  social  collectivism.  33  Here,  and  in  other  such  cases,  Mahathir  has 
attempted  to  promote  a  civil-religious  polity  attuned  to  the  ideals  of  nationalist 
modernity  and  the  values  of  traditional  Islamic  community. 
Mahathir's  concern  to  manage  Islamic  elements  is  also  connected  with  the  rise  of 
Islamic  parties  more  generally.  The  emergence  of  Islamic  parties  in  Indonesia  during  the 
Suharto  crisis  illustrated  the  dangers  for  long-standing  dominant  parties  within  Islamic 
countries  where  the  elite  are  seen  to  be  monopolising  wealth  and  engaging  in 
ostentatious  displays  of  privilege  -  as  in  Tommy  Suharto's  wedding.  One  of  Mahathir's 
(and  the  West's)  main  fears  during  the  Indonesian  crisis  was  that  it  would  precipitate  a 
wider  surge  of  support  for  Islamic  political  forces.  This  heady  cocktail  of  underclass 
resentment  and  Islamic  party  `welfarism'  has  provided  the  social  and  political  context  for 
the  rise'  of  Islamic  fundamentalism  in  Turkey,  Algeria,  Egypt  and  Sudan. 
Thus,  for  Mahathir,  the  aim  has  been  to  control  such  tendencies  by  projecting 
UMNO's  Islamic  credentials.  For  example,  in  seeking  to  build  an  `educational  discourse' 
for  Vision-Islam,  the  government  announced  in  July  1997  that  `Islamic  civilisation'  was 
to  be  taught  as  a  compulsory  course  in  all  Malaysian  universities.  Although  coming 
during  Anwar's  two-month  stint  as  acting  Prime  Minister,  the  decision,  made  through  the 
Islamic  Affairs  Development  Committee  and  the  Islamic  Consultative  Body,  both  chaired 
by  Anwar,  was  consistent  with  Mahathir's  promotion  of  Islamic  institutions.  " 
At  the  same  time,  UMNO's  Islamic  agenda  should  be  seen  not  only  as  a  response 
to  growing  Islamic  consciousness,  but  as  part  of  a  more  complex,  and  often  ambivalent, 
set  of  political  and  ideological  positions.  As  Hussin  Mutalib  has  noted: 
...  the  UMNO  government's  attitude  towards  the  Faith  can  perhaps  be  described  as  `cautious 
support'...  [UMNO's  vigilance  in]  regulating...  Islamic  activities  considered  potentially  dangerous  to  the 
country's  political  stability  ... 
[is]  indicative  of  the  stresses  and  strains  that  characterise  the  Malay-Islam 
dialectic...  35 
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Terengganu  provides  a  good  example  of  how  material  and  Islamic  elements  have  been 
blended  into  a  model  of  development  complementary  to  Mahathir's  Vision  agenda and 
used  as  an  expedient  bulwark  to  PAS-type  Islamic  development  in  Kelantan. 
The  BN  model  in  Terengganu  has  assumed  the  title  of  Wawasan  Sihat  -literally, 
`healthy  vision'.  However,  there  is  also  a  deeper  significance  to  the  term: 
... 
in  its  real  meaning,  letters  in  SIHAT  embody  the  very  philosophical  underpinning  of  the  Terengganu 
Islamic  development  vision.  S  stands  for  shat  (healthy  physical  and  mental),  IH  for  ilmu  yang  dihayati 
(practised  knowledge)  and  T  for  taqwa  (piety).  In  short,  Wawasan  Sihat  carries  a  value-loaded  model  of 
development  that  aims  at  establishing  the  first  mujtama'  madani  (madani  society)  in  Malaysia,  and,  in 
fact,  it  claims,  the  first  in  the  world.  By  mujtama'  madani  the  state  government  of  Terengganu  means  a 
society  that  possesses  an  Islamic  lifestyle  and  cultural  pattern,  either  at  the  level  of  the  individual, 
family,  organisations  and  administration.  Individuals  of  mujtama'  madani,  according  to  the  vision, 
would  be  Islamically  religious,  knowledgeable,  educated,  sharp,  creative,  independent,  with  integrity, 
convinced  of  his  [sic]  ability,  respect  others'  view,  dare  to  take  responsibilities,  and  uphold  their 
36  relationship  with  Allah  (hablum-minallah)  and  with  other  human  beings  (hablum-minannas). 
While  the  sihat  element  is  based  avowedly  on  the  Quran  and  Hadith,  the  link  to  the 
Wawasan  component  is  made  by  infusing  it  with  the  values  of  mujtama'  madani,  Thus: 
On  material  and  physical  development,  the  state  of  mujtama'  madani,  according  to  the  vision,  would  be 
characterised  by  a  rapid  industrial  development,  sustainable  economy,  low  rate  of  poverty,  emergence  of 
local  entrepreneurs  and  high  productivity.  It  goes  in  line  with  the  Balanced  Development  Policy  of  the 
state's  Second  Development  Phase  (1995-2010)  that  consists  of  three  aspects:  a  balance  between  human 
and  physical  development,  a  balance  between  sectors  and  a  balance  of  infrastructural  development 
between  areas.  37 
In  essence,  launched  in  conjunction,  Wawasan  Sihat  in  Terengganu  has  been 
intrinsic  to  Wawasan  2020,  operating  within  the  `mould'  of  Malay-Islamic  tradition  while 
remaining  committed  to  2020  development  ideals.  As  BN  Chief  Minister  and  Islamic 
scholar,  Wan  Mokhtar  Wan  Ahmad  has  been  a  consistent  advocate  of  this  fusion  of 
Islamic  values  and  Vision-type  development.  It  is  also  notable  that  mujtama'  madani 
notions  of  civil  society,  linking  ideas  of  Islamic  family  development  with  the  application 
263 of  technology,  was  given  impetus  by  Anwar's  promotion  of  the  concept  from  around 
38  1996. 
Leaving  aside  the  ideology  at  play  here,  it  is  instructive  to  note  how  the  Vision 
model  in  Terengganu  has  assumed  a  gradualist  evolution  towards  an  Islamic  civil  society 
rather  than  an  Islamic  state.  Thus,  Wawasan  Sihat  has  been  articulated  as  a  practical 
model  of  civil  Islamic  development  BN-style.  Here,  UMNO  have  sought  to  absorb 
traditional  civil  and  cultural  elements  (Malay  and  Islamic)  and  graft  them  onto  Bangsa 
Malaysia.  From  the  BN's  point  of  view,  this  has  kept  Terengganu  from  declaring  any 
intention  towards  an  Islamic  state,  even  though  the  state  leadership  there  have  appeared 
more  disposed  towards  something  along  those  lines  than  Mahathir.  In  this  sense,  the  BN 
state  government  have  attempted  to  push  particular  Islamic  policies  in  a  top-down 
manner.  Yet,  as  in  Kelantan,  this  has  been  largely  confined  to  incorporating  things 
thought  to  be  Islamic  into  the  existing  structure.  So  long  as  Islamic  institutions  and 
practices  (such  as  Islamic  Trust  Fund  Units  and  pawnshops)  were  being  created  as  part 
of  this  civil  process,  39  it  allowed  the  state  government  to  play  a  directive  role  in  Islamic 
affairs,  but  one  which  was  facilitative,  helped  contain  pressures  for  `formal'  Islamic 
government  and,  above  all,  was  in  tune  with  Vision  ideas  at  the  Federal  level.  Here,  the 
UMNO  network  have  sought  to  manage  the  intellectual  agenda  in  Terengganu  by 
holding  it  up,  contra  Kelantan,  as  a  model  of  Islamic  development.  40 
Against  this,  one  might  suggest  a  more  intensive  application  of  state-determined 
Islamic  practices  in  the  case  of  Kelantan.  Yet,  this  too  is  questionable.  Despite  PAS 
ambitions,  there  has  been  a  similar  process  of  incremental  civil  Islamic  development  also 
unfolding  in  Kelantan.  In  this  case,  much  of  what  passes  for  state-led  Islamic 
development  is  in  reality  an  attempt  to  introduce  Islamic  modifications  to  localised 
practice  and  culture.  For  example,  revenue  derived  from  haram  sources,  such  as  dog 
licences  and  pig-rearing,  are  separated  from  the  halal  ones  and  used  for  non-Muslims 
only.  Gambling  is  banned,  as  it  is  elsewhere  for  Muslims.  Though  generally  not 
available  for  non-Muslims,  alcohol  is  not  banned  by  the  State  government.  Mak  yong 
dance  is  actively  discouraged,  yet  still  practiced  in  the  rural  areas.  Moreover,  the 
attempted  segregation  of  the  sexes,  for  example  in  cinemas  and  hairdressers  has  proved 
difficult  to  enforce,  and  is  routinely  ignored  in  the  case  of  separate  supermarket  queues. 
Concerned  at  the  apparent  disruption  to  family  life  now  being  caused  by  working 
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However,  this  type  of  intervention  is  being  rationalised  as  part  of  a  more  generalised 
concern  over  industrialisation  and  its  negative  impact  on  the  family.  Here,  Nik  Aziz  has 
argued  that  capitalist  development  and  cheap  factory  labour  is  giving  rise  to  greater 
exploitation  of  young  female  workers  and  social  dislocation  within  the  family  and  wider 
community.  But  his  appeal  for  the  preservation  of  women's  dignity  outwith  the  home 
has  to  be  defended  against  liberal  groups  like  Sisters  in  Islam  who  seek  a  more  expansive 
role  for  Muslim  women.  41  In  effect,  the  construction  of  Islamic  practices  in  Kelantan,  as 
in  Terengganu,  has  been  contested,  negotiated  and  fashioned  through  variegated  forms 
of  civil  exchange  and  adaptation  rather  than  top-down  state  intervention. 
Ironically,  this  gradualist  evolution  of  Islamic  practices  at  the  civil  level  may  be 
seen  as  having  a  more  permeating  effect.  Here,  as  elsewhere  in  Malaysia,  Islamic 
conventions,  such  as  Muslim  women  wearing  the  tudung  (headscarf),  are  becoming 
slowly  absorbed  as  mainstream  cultural  habits.  Again,  though,  even  this  is  still  being 
offset  by  deep-rooted  Malay,  rather  than  Islamic,  customs  and  tradition.  In  this  regard, 
Islamic  ideas  are  being  constantly  prioritised  and  reasserted  by  PAS.  Small  examples  of 
this  would  include  Nik  Aziz's  reminders  to  observe  separate  shopping  queues,  42  and  his 
instruction  to  prohibit  the  use  of  firecrackers  during  Hari  Raya  given  its  `un-Islamic' 
connotations.  43  Other  cultural  practices  for  Malays  are  allowed  so  long  as  they  are  in 
accordance  with  Islamic  principles.  Yet,  like  Terengganu,  Kelantan  appears  to  be  a  place 
where,  in  practice,  Islamic  and  non-Islamic  cultures  co-exist  amicably.  Again,  though,  it 
is  the  very  fluidity  of  cultural  expression  here  which  makes  its  contestation  so  vital. 
Contesting  Kelantan:  UMNO  enterprise  at  work 
For  Mahathir  and  the  UMNO  network,  Kelantan  constitutes  a  key  impediment  to  the 
Vision  project.  At  the  1990  Elections,  UMNO  lost  all  38  state  seats,  PAS  winning  24 
(the  other  14  going  to  S46)  and  6  of  the  14  Parliamentary  seats.  Led  by  Nik  Aziz,  the 
party  was  now  taking  a  new  political  and  moral  direction,  quite  distinct  from  the  chaotic 
circumstances  which  had  ended  its  only  other  period  in  office  (1959-78).  44  Under  the 
Angkatan  Perpaduan  Ummah  -  United  Islamic  Movement  (APU)  coalition  in  1995, 
PAS  and  S46  took  36  of  the  43  state  seats  (24  and  12  respectively)  and  12  at  the  Federal 
level  (6  each).  45 
265 This  strengthening  mandate  has  seen  ongoing  attempts  to  delegitimise  PAS,  as  in 
Mahathir's  failed  bid  to  have  the  party  drop  the  word  `Islam'  from  its  title,  46  and  his 
accusation  that  "PAS  does  not  struggle  for  Islam,  but  strives  for  political  gain.  "47  The 
problem  for  Mahathir  here  is  that  PAS  populism  in  Kelantan  derives  not  only  from 
traditional  Islamic  values,  but  from  the  party's  social-welfarist  position,  a  set  of  ideas 
contained  within  its  1995  election  manifesto,  Progress  with  Islam,  a  counterpoint  to  the 
BN's  Vision,  Justice,  Efficiency.  Another  problem  for  Mahathir  was  that  APU's 
retention  of  power  in  Kelantan  in  1995  was  due  less  to  the  Malay-nationalism  of 
Semangat  -  much  of  this  linked  to  its  leader  Tengku  Razaleigh's  royal  background  - 
than  to  PAS's  populist  presentation  of  Islam.  Razaleigh's  status  as  a  Kelantan  prince,  a 
legacy  of  the  above-noted  historical  accommodation  between  the  conservative  Malay 
aristocracy  and  rural  Islamic  elites,  had,  to  some  extent,  helped  draw  Malay  and  Islamic 
components  together.  Yet,  it  was  the  growing  respect  for  PAS's  welfare  politics  and  the 
charisma  of  Nik  Aziz  which  could  be  seen  as  the  more  important  factors  here.  48 
It  is  instructive  to  recognise  the  three-fronted  means  by  which  the  UMNO 
network  has  engaged  this  challenge.  At  the  immediate  political  level,  UMNO  had 
worked  diligently  to  exploit  the  post-1995  election  rift  between  PAS  and  Semangat  in 
Kelantan.  Here,  co-optive  pre-election  overtures  had  been  made  through  the  BN  press 
to  undermine  Razaleigh's  participation  in  the  PAS-led  APU  coalition.  49  By  late-1996 
this  cleavage  had  become  critically  apparent  with  the  expulsion  of  Razaleigh 
assemblymen  from  the  state  executive  by  the  PAS  leadership,  much  to  the  displeasure  of 
the  state's  Sultan,  a  nephew  of  Razaleigh.  50  By  using  his  political  dexterity  to  encourage 
the  rift  and  open  the  way  for  Razaleigh's  return  to  the  UMNO  family,  Mahathir  was 
seeking  to  establish  the  basis  of  a  new  political  coalition  to  challenge  PAS  in  Kelantan. 
In  the  recrimination  over  the  PAS-Semangat  split,  the  BN  media  were  now  playing 
consciously  on  PAS's  political  problems.  Although  unable  to  question  Nik  Aziz's 
probity  or  apply  the  term  `corruption',  one  New  Straits  Times  feature  had,  for  example, 
used  PAS's  exclusion  of  S46  members  from  municipal  and  religious  posts  to  claim  that: 
"for  all  its  outward  trappings  of  piety,  something  is  rotten  in  the  state  of  Kelantan.  "51 
Meanwhile,  Mahathir  was  also  capitalising  on  the  APU  split  by  floating  the  idea  of  a 
possible  coalition  between  UMNO  and  PAS,  something  which  might  have  ameliorated 
PAS  difficulties  in  the  short-term,  but  would  have  undermined  their  political  credibility  in 
266 the  eyes  of  the  Kelantanese  electorate.  However,  given  the  ideological  gulf  between  the 
parties,  notably  over  Islamic  matters,  any  such  coalition  was  extremely  unlikely.  52 
Disappointingly  for  UMNO,  the  first  test  of  the  post-APU  alliance  resulted  in  a  PAS  by- 
election  victory  (January  1997),  indicating  that  it  could  still  maintain  power  without 
Razaleigh.  Nonetheless,  at  this  point,  Mahathir  could  take  heart  from  the  very  narrow 
margin  of  the  win.  53 
The  UMNO  network  has  also  deployed  strategies  of  economic  co-optation  in 
Kelantan.  A  notable  example  could  be  seen  in  relation  to  Mahathir's  visit  to  Kota  Bharu 
in  August  1997.  Accompanied  by  thirty  of  Malaysia's  main  corporate  figures, 
Mahathir's  first-ever  official  meeting  with  Nik  Aziz  was  calculated  to  foster  a  co- 
operative  climate  for  UMNO-led  investment  projects.  The  principal  initiative, 
subsequently  announced  by  Mahathir,  comprised  plans  for  Kelantan's  largest-ever 
industrial  project,  a  petrochemical  complex  financed  by  the  KUB  conglomerate  -a 
major  holding  controlled  by  UMNO  -  with  a  limited  partnership  role  for  the  Kelantan- 
owned  Keloil.  Similarly,  Mahathir  had  offered  assistance  to  other  potential  investors, 
including  Kelantanese  companies  with  interests  in  Kuala  Lumpur,  provided  they  were 
seen  to  align  themselves  with  UMNO  rather  than  PAS.  54 
With  per  capita  income  in  Kelantan  only  a  quarter  that  of  the  national  average 
and  foreign  investment  one  tenth  the  size  of  ädjoining  Perlis,  55  economic  co-optation  in 
the  state  has  also  been  directed  through  the  selective  allocation  of  development  funds  to 
Barisan  assemblymen.  The  main  vehicle  for  this  disbursement  in  Kelantan  is  the  Jabatan 
Pembangunan  Persekutuan  (JPP),  or  Federal  Development  Department.  With 
substantial  funds  available  from  Kuala  Lumpur,  the  JPP,  in  effect,  operates  as  an 
oppositional  development  agency  to  the  PAS  state  government's  own  development  arm. 
JPP  offices  in  Kelantan  total  99  as  opposed  to  49  under  the  State  Secretary's  Office. 
Given  their  conflicting  ideologies,  a  key  purposes  of  the  JPP  is  to  check  PAS-based 
forms  of  Islamic  development.  56  While  providing  some  all-round  benefit,  in  practice 
most  of  its  funds  are  targeted  towards  UMNO/BN  groups,  thus  alienating  others  still 
dependent  on  the  PAS  state  development  agencies.  One  illustration  of  this  was  the 
provision  of  RM8  million  to  BN  and  S46  members  (post  APU  split)  by  Rural 
Development  Minister  Annuar  Musa  for  the  implementation  of  rural  projects  in  their 
respective  constituencies.  57  Clearly,  such  initiatives  have  been  devised  to  exclude  PAS 
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promoting  the  select  interests  of  the  UMNO/BN  business  class. 
On  a  third  front,  UMNO  has  continued  to  wage  an  ideological  war  of  position  in 
Kelantan  with  PAS-based  Islamic  clerics.  Some  analysts  have  noted  that  within  UMNO, 
and  perhaps  amongst  other  Islamic  countries,  only  Mahathir  has  had  the  charismatic 
standing  and  self-confidence  to  question  the  ulama  and  conservative  Islamic  filth 
(jurisprudence).  58  While  a  valid  observation,  it  is  also  important  to  recognise  the  role  of 
`UMNO-friendly'  institutions  such  as  IKIM  in  helping  to  construct,  present  and 
reproduce  these  messages.  59  In  another  instance  of  the  network's  co-optive  enterprise, 
ABIM  had  offered  to  `mediate'  between  UMNO  and  PAS  in  order  to  `bring  them  closer' 
on  Islamic  matters,  an  offer  astutely  rejected  by  Nik  Aziz.  60  It  may  also  be  noted  here 
that  in  seeking  to  build  its  own  Islamic  project,  the  PAS  leadership  had  come  to  distance 
itself  from  Arqam  by  1991.  While  Arqam  was  appearing  to  assist  PAS  by  engaging  in 
Islamic  business  enterprises  and  spreading  Islamic  practices  at  the  kampong  level, 
Ashaari  had  been  critical  of  PAS's  mode  of  struggle.  Echoing  PAS  President  Fadzil 
Noor's  suspicions,  Subky  Latif,  the  party's  Information  chief,  argued  that  Arqam  had 
ulterior  motives  to  compete  with,  undermine  and  `confuse'  PAS.  Thus,  its  banning  in 
1994  was  actively  supported  by  Nik  Aziz  in  Kelantan.  For  similar  reasons,  PAS  has 
consciously  resisted  help  from  the  Islamic  group  Jemmah  Islah  Malaysia  (JIM),  seeing  it 
as  an  attempt  to  infiltrate  the  party.  61 
Confronting  hudud 
Mahathir  has,  thus,  been  seeking  to  re-centre  Islam  as  a  modern  economic  and  political 
entity  by  contesting  the  integrity  of  traditional  Islamic  doctrine.  The  most  symbolic 
aspect  of  the  UMNO-PAS  contest  has  been  attempts  by  the  political  class  and  traditional 
elements  in  Kelantan  to  introduce  hudud  codes.  62  Although  passed  in  Kelantan  as  a 
State  Act  in  1993,  the  introduction  of  hudud  law  requires  Federal  approval  to  become 
constitutionally  enshrined,  something  which  Mahathir  has  fiercely  resisted.  63  In  the 
debate  over  its  attempted  implementation,  Mahathir  has  sought  to  portray  Nik  Aziz  and 
PAS  as  latter-day  exponents  of  the  Kaum  Tua.  Challenging  Nik  Aziz's  `benign' 
assurance  that  hudud  does  not  apply  to  non-Muslims  where  conventional  legal 
268 punishments  exist,  64  Mahathir  has  shown  a  remarkable  ability  to  present  the  message  in 
his  own  populist  terms.  The  appeal  to  moderation  here  is  not  simply  informed  by  liberal 
precepts,  but  by  practical  reference  to  the  ideals  of  mercy,  forgiveness  and  social  justice 
contained  in  the  Quran.  Thus,  in  seeking  to  illustrate  the  injustice  of  hudud,  Mahathir 
offers  the  following  argument: 
A  woman  who  has  been  raped,  and  is  unable  to  produce  four  witnesses,  would  not  be  able  to  have  the 
rapist  punished  even  if  she  knows  who  he  is...  On  the  other  hand,  if  she  were  to  have  a  child  as  a  result, 
she  would  be  guilty  of  zina  [adultery]  and  could  be  punished  by  stoning  to  death.  By  no  stretch  of  the 
imagination  can  this  be  considered  justice.  65 
While  stressing  the  need  for  a  moderate  and  innovative  Islam,  rather  than  a 
concern  with  form,  attire  and  spiritual  observance,  Mahathir  has  walked  a  fine  line  in  his 
relations  with  the  mufti  over  the  interpretation  of  Islamic  teaching  and  civil-Islamic  law. 
This  was  evident,  for  example,  in  Mahathir's  brooding  stand-off  with  the  Islamic 
Religious  Affairs  Department  (IRAD)  following  the  Selangor  beauty  pageant  incident  in 
July  1997  where  female  contestants  had  been  arrested  for  `violating'  Islamic  dress  codes. 
As  a  consequence,  the  head  Selangor  mufti  Ishak  Baharum  found  his  position 
`unrenewed',  illustrating  Mahathir's  determination  to  push  ahead  with  further  reform  of 
Islamic  administration  in  the  country  and  the  role  of  the  mufti.  66  Other  such  responses 
have  included  consideration  of  whether  to  invoke  the  specific  Sunni  form  of  Islam  -  the 
faith  of  99%  of  the  country's  Muslims  -  into  the  Malaysian  constitution  as  a  way  of 
marginalising  Shia  sects  and  militant  Islamic  teaching.  67  Implicit  here  was  a  vigilant 
warning  to  alleged  militant  Islamic  intellectuals  within  the  universities  and  other  civil 
institutions. 
However,  the  UMNO  network  has  sought  to  manage  the  challenge  from  PAS, 
the  IRAD  and  other  Islamic  agencies  in  more  consensual  ways.  An  important  factor  here 
was  Anwar's  populist  appeal  to  Islamic  moderation,  casting  him,  largely  through  the 
media,  as  a  vital  part  of  Mahathir's  containment  strategy.  68  Another  such  feature,  has 
been  the  considerable  media  space  given  to  `modernist  Islamic'  dialogue,  such  as  the 
Sisters  in  Islam's  critique  of  hudud  and  other  aspects  of  syariah  law.  69  The  key  point  of 
this  discourse  is its  agenda-setting  purpose  in  helping  to  popularise  Vision-Islam  as  the 
principal  discussion  site  for  checking  Islamic  extremism.  This  is  not  to  deny  the  integrity 
269 of  such  discourse  or  the  illumination  offered.  For  one  thing,  it  served  to  dispel  some  of 
the  more  simplistic  interpretations  of  the  PAS/Islamic  issue  in  the  Western  press  (viz  the 
`dark  threat  of  fundamentalism')  as  the  crisis  unfolded.  70  The  more  subtle  point, 
however,  is  the  way  in  which  much  of  this  discussion  `fits  into'  a  discursive  media 
argument  about  the  value  of  Islamic  modernity  and,  ipso  facto,  Vision-Islam,  even  where 
that  involves  meaningful  criticism  of  Mahathir  himself. 
An  example  of  such  can  be  gleaned  in  the  Sun  piece,  `A  new  form  of  Islamic 
revival?  '71  Here,  Chandra  Muzaffar  and  ABIM's  Ahmad  Azam  Abdul  Rahman  both 
argue,  rather  convincingly,  that  what  was  broadly  seen  as  `aggressive'  action  by  the 
IRAD  officers  in  Selangor  was  in  fact  a  reaction  to  perceived  pressure  on  them  to  uphold 
Islamic  codes.  Azam  even  questions  Mahathir's  intemperate  tone  towards  the  mufti,  in 
view  of  the  "high  esteem"  in  which  they  are  still  held  by  Malays.  Yet,  these  and  other 
critical  qualifications  still  provide  `modernist'  counterpoints  to  the  version  of  Islam 
emerging  from  within  the  IRAD,  an  institution  which  both  Azam  and  Chandra  identify  as 
the  new  source  of  the  Islamic  revival.  A  further  variant  of  this  discourse  can  be  seen  in 
Ghani  Ismail's  columns  in  the  Sun  pointing  out  the  many  injustices  of  syariah  law,  such 
as  marital  constraints.  72  In  another  Sun  piece,  73  Akbar  Ali  states  the  message  more 
directly  by  suggesting  that  while  there  is  a  need  to  address  what  constitutes  an  `Islamic 
deviant',  this  does  not  diminish  the  security  threat  posed  by  some  of  these  elements,  such 
as  Al  Arqam  and  other  shia  groups.  Noting  that  Pusat  Islam  now  have  over  one 
hundred  groups  listed  as  `Islamic  deviants',  the  case  is  made  here  for  the  necessary 
intervention  of  the  Special  Branch  to  help  control  this  threat  to  `democracy'  and 
religious  harmony.  Thus,  while  debate  and  opinion  range  here,  it  is  the  `concerned 
language'  of  Vision-Islam,  viz  the  need  for  moderation,  public  vigilance  and  modernity, 
which  provides  the  contextual  framework  for  its  elaboration. 
In  this  regard,  let  us  now  consider  the  sense  in  which  Vision-Islam  has  been 
received  by  the  wider  PAS-Islamic  community  and  what  alternative  form  of  Islamic 
project  PAS  leaders  and  intellectuals  have  offered  to  displace  it. 
270 Visions  of  Islam,  party  politics  and  the  crisis:  the  view  from  PAS  (1) 
This  section  explores  some  of  these  issues  and  their  relevance  to  the  crisis  through  the 
thoughts  of  some  key  PAS  leaders.  The  first  component  considers  aspects  of  the 
Kelantan  situation  and  the  PAS  agenda  by  recounting  selected  views  offered  in 
discussion  with  Husam  Musa,  Political  Secretary  to  Nik  Aziz.  This  is  complemented  by 
consideration  of  responses  from  Nik  Aziz  himself  during  a  subsequent  discussion.  74 
While  still  exploring  PAS's  Islamic  `countervision',  the  second  component  looks  more 
closely  at  party  politics  and  the  problems  faced  by  PAS  in  developing:  (a)  a  working 
relationship  with  other  political  groupings;  (b)  a  meaningful  base  of  national  popular 
support  amongst  the  broad  Malaysian  electorate.  Noted  in  this  case  are  the  views  of 
PAS  President  Fadzil  Noor  and  Supreme  Council  members/high-ranking  figures  Azizan 
Abdul  Razak,  Mohamad  Muslim  Osman,  Mohamad  Taulan  Rasul  and  Abdul  Halim 
Aishad.  7S  The  responses  garnered  here  help  illustrate  PAS's  evaluation  of  the  crisis  at 
this  point  and  its  view  of  Anwar  prior  to  his  fall. 
Husam  Musa 
In  the  discussion  with  Husam  Musa,  it  was  apparent  that  he  was  speaking  not  just  as  a 
party  official,  but  as  someone  with  deep  intellectual  convictions  about  an  Islamic 
community.  In  this  regard,  he  spoke  of  Islam  as  an  historical  entity,  emphasising  its  ideas 
of  a  just  society. 
Given  the  rapid  rate  of  development  and  wide  support  for  the  BN  elsewhere  in 
Malaysia,  why  have  the  people  of  Kelantan  maintained  support  for  PAS? 
There  is  a  need  for  a  model  of  Islamic  community  which  reflects  the  ideals  of  morality, 
social  collectivism  and  civil  justice,  a  set  of  principles  which  the  people  of  Kelantan  have 
come  to  subscribe  to  through  their  support  for  PAS.  The  Kelantanese  genuinely  desire 
an  agenda  which  is  distinct  from  the  Vision  model  offered  by  Mahathir.  This  is  not  to 
dismiss  the  current  development  process.  However,  PAS  can  bring  a  more  spiritual 
element  to  it  by  stressing  Islamic  values  of  community.  There  are  practical  ways  in  which 
271 ideas  of  social  collectivism  and  redistribution  could  be  realised  through  Islamic  practices, 
such  as  alms  to  the  poor  and  the  prohibition  of  interest. 
Were  these  principles  implicit  in  PAS  's  1995  election  manifesto  Progress  With  Islam? 
Yes,  they  were  not  only  implicit  but  recognised  as  such  by  the  people  of  Kelantan  who 
understand  the  type  of  community  PAS  are  trying  to  construct.  This  is  also  significant  in 
view  of  UMNO's  still  considerable  influence  at  the  local  kampong  (JKKK)  level, 
contradicting  some  claims  that  PAS  has  an  effective  control  over  village  affairs.  In  this 
regard,  the  power  of  the  BN  media  is  very  difficult  to  overcome,  making  it  all  the  more 
remarkable  that  PAS  have  been  able  to  sustain  its  mandate  in  Kelantan. 
Is  that  political  base  in  danger  of  breaking  down  now  that  Razaleigh  and  his  supporters 
have  left  the  ruling  coalition  in  Kelantan  and  returned  to  the  UMNO  fold? 
This  defection  was  a  piece  of  political  opportunism  given  that  parties  outside  the  BN  are 
constantly  disconnected  from  political  patronage.  Moreover,  Razaleigh's  move  was 
greeted  with  cynicism  by  the  Kelantanese,  thus  enhancing  PAS  in  the  longer-run  rather 
than  the  BN. 
Mahathir  appears  to  have  been  operating  on  three  fronts  in  relation  to  PAS  in 
Kelantan:  the  economic,  through  promotion  of  government-led  development  and 
UMNO  business  patronage;  the  political,  through  the  courting  of  Razaleigh;  and  the 
ideological,  through  his  engagement  of  the  hudud  issue.  How  do  you  see  this  scenario? 
Mahathir  is,  indeed,  an  astute  political  operator  and  charismatic  figure.  It  is  also  possible 
that  Mahathir's  economic  interventions  might  prove  difficult  for  the  Kelantanese  to  resist 
if  the  crisis  worsened  and  the  BN  were  seen  as  a  last  resort  in  holding  things  together. 
Mahathir  has  also  been  successful  in  promoting  his  view  of  Islam  to  Malaysians  as  a 
[hybrid]  model  of  capitalist  development  and  Islamic  principles.  However  [leading  on 
from  the  latter  aspect],  hudud  law  has  to  be  defended  as  a  concept  which,  contrary  to  the 
false  stereotypes  of  `fundamentalism'  foisted  by  the  West,  is  a  protective  Islamic 
convention  designed  to  maintain  the  integrity  and  security  of  all  in  society.  One  should 
remember  that  hudud  punishment  itself  only  applies  to  Muslims  and  that  there  are  around 
fifteen  stages  of  censure  before  the  removal  of  limbs.  While  Mahathir  has  gained  much 
272 mileage  in  portraying  PAS  efforts  to  introduce  hudud  in  Kelantan  as  `backward- 
thinking',  a  survey  shows  70%  of  all  Malaysians  in  Kelantan  supporting  its  introduction. 
As  a  complex  set  of  ideas  and  practices,  Islam  has,  indeed,  been  distorted  for  selective 
purposes  in  the  West  (viz,  Huntington's  'clash  of  civilization'  thesis  and  alarmist  NATO 
reports)  and  used  selectively  by  UMNO  itself.  But  do  you  really  believe  that  other 
ethnic  communities  in  Malaysia,  notably  the  Chinese,  can  ever  accept  such  a  form  of 
Islamic  society? 
The  Chinese  community  would  be  better  accommodated  under  PAS.  For  example,  while 
the  BN  in  Kelantan  once  rejected  proposals  for  Chinese  cultural  projects,  PAS  have  been 
prepared  to  approve  them  on  coming  to  office.  Another  example  of  PAS  efforts  to 
disprove  its  `fundamentalist'  image  is  the  state  government's  assertive  promotion  of 
tourism  -  notably  that  which  expresses  the  real  Kelantanese  heritage. 
What  are  your  thoughts,  in  this  respect,  on  the  suppression  of  Malay  culture  to  that  of 
Islam,  for  example  with  regard  to  the  banning  of  Malay  dance  in  Kelantan. 
There  is  a  need  to  recognise  here  the  dangers  of  assabiyah  and  chauvinistic  practices 
which  promote  ethnic  identity  over  Islamic  identity.  Much  of  what  is  thought  of  as 
Malay  culture  is  in  fact  derived  from  other  cultural  forms,  including  animism. 
Consequently,  there  is  a  requirement  to  develop  a  more  creative  culture  infused  with 
Islamic  ideals  -  hence  the  `relegation'  of  Malay  cultural  forms.  As  an  example,  Dikir 
Barat  music  [the  popular  ethnic  sound  particular  to  Kelantan]  has  been  modified  to 
reflect  this  new  awareness. 
Isn't  there  a  contradiction  in  this  argument?  If  Chinese  culture  is  to  be  allowed  free 
expression  and  development,  as  argued  by  PAS,  why,  effectively,  suppress  it  in  the 
Malay  form?  After  all,  Malay  dance  is  part  of  Malay  cultural  heritage. 
There  is  also  an  issue  of  haya  (modesty).  [Some  of  the  above  argument  was  reiterated 
here  to  support  this.  76  ] 
Can  you  or  PAS  defend,  in  this  regard,  the  actions  of  the  muftis  during  the  Selangor 
beauty  pageant  incident? 
273 Once  women  reveal  themselves  in  this  way,  they  not  only  demean  themselves,  but  are 
forced  to  assume  all  the  other  accoutrements  of  Western  identity,  such  as  make-up  and 
short  clothes.  Mahathir  has  handled  this  situation  badly  by  showing  his  displeasure  with 
the  muftis.  Their  actions  did  not  signify  `Islamic  intolerance',  but  the  need  to  protect 
Islamic  convention. 
(This  led  into  the  issue  of  the  ISA  and  Mahathir's  crackdown  on  Islamic  groups.  ) 
PAS  has  also  been  consistent  in  denouncing  the  ISA  as  a  form  of  detention. 
[Acknowleged  here  was  Aliran's  stance  in  defending  free  expression  to  all  Islamic 
groups.  ]  The  recent  arrest  of  `shia  activists'  was  a  political  diversion,  a  way  of  re- 
focusing  public  attention.  However,  [upholding  the  sunni  model  of  Islam  practiced  in 
Malaysia  and  echoing  Nik  Aziz],  PAS  does  not  endorse  shia  teachings  and  is  not 
subversive  in  these  matters. 
Why  does  PAS  appear  to  be  so  concerned  about  denying  any  Shia  links  if  it  believes  in 
the  free  expression  of  other  Islamic  streams?  " 
Again,  because  PAS  needs  to  emphasise  that  it  has  not  been  engaged  in  any  form  of 
supposed  shia  conspiracy  to  undermine  the  government.  [This  response  indicates  the 
fine  line  PAS  walks  in  promoting  its  own  Islamic  agenda  while  avoiding  implied 
suggestions  that  it  is  helping  to  import  `fundamentalist'  teachings.  ]  The  irony  here  is  that 
it  is  the  BN's  own  view  of  Islam  which  is intolerant  and  narrow-minded  in  that  it  does 
not  allow  expression  of  the  rich  complexity  of  Islamic  ideas,  as  represented  by  diverse 
Islamic  elements. 
(This  led  into  the  practical  implications  of  Islamic  ideas  in  relation  to  the  economic 
crisis.  )  Given  the  number  of  articles  in  Harakah  critical  of  Soros  and  the  prevailing 
international  financial  system,  what  alternative  form  of  'Islamic  financial 
arrangements'  do  you  envisage  for  a  country  like  Malaysia? 
While  such  speculators  have  afflicted  Malaysia,  Soros  et  al  cannot  be  blamed  solely  for 
the  crisis.  Myself  and  others  forecast  this  situation  two  years  ago.  One  of  the  central 
causes  is  the  extent  to  which  the  ringgit  has  been  tied  into  the  existing  global  capitalist 
trading  order. 
274 The  implication  of  this  claim  is  that  Malaysia  could  somehow  find  a  way  of  disengaging 
from  the  global  financial  order.  Isn't  this  somewhat  utopian  given  the  integrated 
nature  of  Malaysia's  economy  within  the  capitalist  system? 
While  problematic,  there  is  an  urgent  need  to  return  to  some  version  of  a  gold  standard 
in  order  to  control  the  trade  in  money,  something  which  is  both  antithetical  to  Islamic 
practice  and  detrimental  to  economic  development.  [It  is  instructive  to  note  that  within  a 
year  of  this  statement,  Mahathir  had  halted  the  ringgit's  convertibility,  effectively 
removing  Malaysia  from  the  global  exchange  system.  In  making  the  case  for  an  Islamic 
financial  system,  specific  reference  was  also  made  here  to  the  contents  of  Islamic 
Trading:  A  New  World  Order,  an  Islamic  policy-type  document  by  Umar  Ibrahim 
Vadillo.  In  line  with  Husam's  argument,  this  text  posits  the  need  for  an  open  Islamic 
Market  in  order  to  end  monopolies  and  the  practice  of  financial  speculation  propagated 
by  Western  Economics,  itself  a  structural  pretext  for  the  practice  of  money  trading  and 
usury.  The  Islamic  Market  proposes  an  end  to  the  use  of  paper  money  -  the  choice  of 
the  modem  state  -  something  which,  it  is  argued,  has  come  to  limit  any  free  medium  of 
exchange,  the  flourishing  of  a  real  marketplace  and  processes  of  open  production  and 
entrepreneurship.  The  case  for  a  return  to  gold  as  a  more  stable  and  less  corruptible 
form  of  exchange,  through  `trading'  of  the  Islamic  Dinar  in  Islamic  countries,  78  is 
complemented  by  the  promotion  of  other  Islamic  business  practices  such  as  qirad 
(Islamic  business  loan)  and  the  waqf  system  in  preference  to  conventional  taxation.  Also 
integral  to  the  waqf  is  the  renewal  of  guild  associations  and  imarets,  a  civic  arrangement 
with  the  mosque  and  market  at  its  centre.  At  the  heart  of  such  practices  lies  a  belief  in 
free  and  just  access  to  the  market,  both  as  a  right  and  as  a  form  of  communal  service  to 
others.  ]79  PAS  has  also  consistently  opposed  Mahathir's  privatisation  process,  which  I 
and,  I  believe,  the  Kelantanese  people  associate  with  clientalism  and  corruption.  [Note 
also,  in  this  regard,  how  PAS  has  denounced  the  use  of  the  NEP  for  similar  reasons.  ] 
While  not  wholly  opposing  privatisation  in  principle,  there  is  a  need  to  return  the  utilities 
to  common  ownership  and  resist  the  lurch  towards  corporatisation  within  the 
universities.  [Again,  these  and  other  views  were  seen  in  idealistic  terms,  reflected,  for 
example,  in  further  observations  on  Nik  Aziz's  own  wish  to  live  a  moderate  lifestyle.  ] 
While  materialism  is  valid,  it  must  be  fused  with  ideals  of  spirituality.  [Amplifying  the 
earlier-noted  concern],  social  development  must  be  based  on  concepts  of  compassion 
275 and  social  collectivism.  [This  took  us  to  some  final  exchanges  on  false  representations  of 
Islam.  ] 
While  retaining  a  critical  view  towards  some  of  these  perspectives,  the  views  here  helps 
delineate  the  nature  of  the  `Islamic  countervision'  in  Kelantan,  suggesting  what  an 
expanded  PAS  agenda  might  look  like  in  practice.  Also  implicit  here  is  the  view  that 
what  has  been  projected  by  Mahathir  as  `Islamic  banking'  is,  in  reality,  not  Islamic  at  all, 
but  (as  expressed  by  Islamic  writers  like  Umar  Vadillo  and  Mahamad  Hakimi  Ibrahim)  a 
convenient  pretext  for  `secular'  capitalist  accumulation.  80  At  another  level,  such  ideas 
illustrate  the  essence  of  the  traditional  intellectual  in  seeking  to  advance  the  PAS  project, 
not  only  as  a  party  political  exercise  but  as  an  alternative  model  of  the  moral  society.  81 
Nik  Aziz  Nik  Mat 
In  Nik  Aziz  we  find  the  very  model  of  the  engaged  traditional  intellectual.  Evoking  a 
serene  demeanour,  it  is  immediately  apparent  to  the  observer  why  he  is  regarded  as  Tok 
Guru.  Yet,  Nik  Aziz  exudes  not  only  charisma  and  the  aura  of  a  revered  Islamic 
figurehead,  but  considerable  acumen  as  a  political  leader. 
What  is  it  in  particular  that  motivated  you  in  your  endeavours  to  develop  Kelantan  as 
an  Islamic-based  state? 
It  was  my  own  personal  experiences  in  Pakistan  and  the  Indian  subcontinent  that  led  me 
to  a  way  of  thinking  about  Islam  and  the  ways  in  which  a  model  of  Islamic  community 
could  be  realised  in  Kelantan.  [The  impression  conveyed  here  was  that  he  had 
undergone  a  long  spiritual  journey.  ] 
What  might  the  main  elements  of  such  an  Islamic  community  look  like  and  how  might 
they  be  reconciled  as  a  model  of  political  society  for  all  Malaysians? 
There  is,  most  importantly,  the  need  to  convey  a  tolerant  image  of  Islam  as  the  main 
element  of  such  a  community,  notably  to  the  Chinese.  It  is  notable  that  there  was  no 
racial  conflict  in  Kelantan  in  1969.  In  this  regard,  the  Chinese  community  in  the  state 
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identity. 
Yes,  I  see  this,  but  do  you  believe  Chinese  Malaysians,  more  generally,  could  ever  fully 
accept  the  PAS  model,  given  Mahathir's  'success'  to  date  in  promoting  a  Vision  2020 
agenda  which  appears  more  inclusive  than  the  NEP. 
Agreed,  there  are  difficulties  in  overcoming  such  perceptions.  However,  in  time,  the 
Chinese  and  other  ethnic  groups  in  Malaysia  could  come  to  accept  Islam  in  a  spirit  of  co- 
operation  and  understanding.  In  this  regard,  many  Chinese  people  have  visited  me  in  the 
course  of  the  crisis  to  offer  assurances  of  support.  What  is  needed  here  is  a  closer 
understanding  of  Islamic  principles.  [As  above,  some  similar  points  were  offered 
concerning  the  distortion  of  Islamic  practices,  both  in  Kelantan  and  more  generally.  ] 
While  there  are  evident  tendencies  towards  distortion  of  Islam  through  certain,  mainly 
Western  discourses,  I  still  wonder  whether  in  Malaysia  itself  the  Chinese  can,  in  reality, 
reconcile  their  own  wider  fear  of  a  PAS-Islamic  agenda. 
PAS  in  Kelantan  can  provide  a  practical  example  of  a  tolerant  community  founded  on 
Islamic  teachings  conducive  to  other  races.  [The  point  was  then  developed  in  a  rather 
more  coded  way.  ]  The  Chinese  must  be  free  to  come  and  articulate  any  concerns  over 
such  an  Islamic  community,  but  they  would  also  have  to  show,  specifically,  what  was 
wrong  with  such  a  community  in  terms  of  undermining  their  economic,  political  or 
cultural  rights.  Again,  to  emphasise,  PAS  must  not  be  seen  as  a  coercive  force.  A 
Muslim  who  persecutes  another  person  is  not  acting  in  accordance  with  true  Islamic 
teaching.  Rather,  the  PAS  way  has  to  be  more  `missionary'  in  approach,  thus  allowing 
people  to  recognise  the  validity  and  practicality  of  Islamic  ideas  within  their  own  lives. 
Widely  acknowledged  by  all  political  elements  in  Malaysia  to  be  untainted  by  cronyism  or 
corrupt  practices,  there  can  be  little  doubt  about  Nik  Aziz's  moral  convictions  in  seeking 
to  build  an  Islamic  community  in  Kelantan.  Indeed,  much  of  the  populist  support  for 
PAS  in  Kelantan  comes  from  an  acknowledgement  of  his  own  personal  and  political 
practices:  he  lives  in  a  simple  house,  gives  almost  half  his  monthly  allowance  to  PAS  and 
the  State  Treasury  (40%  and  5%  respectively),  refuses  his  RM3000  monthly  housing 
277 allowance,  places  similar  obligations  on  State  Exco  members,  disallows  them  any 
gratuities  and  insists  on  their  availability  for  mosque  and  teaching  activities.  82  What 
remains  problematic  here  for  PAS  is  non-Malay  endorsement  of  that  agenda,  particularly 
in  relation  to  hudud.  Certainly,  Nik  Aziz  and  PAS  understand  the  need  to  promote 
consensual  relations  with  the  Chinese.  Yet,  even  if  PAS  has  provided,  to  date,  a 
practical  model  of  economic  security  and  political/cultural  assurance  to  non-Malays  in 
Kelantan,  the  question  remains  as  to  how  it  might  extend  that  message  at  the  national 
level  to  make  the  breakthrough  as  a  mainstream  party. 
Fadzil  Noor  and  other  PAS  figures 
Discussions  with  the  PAS  leadership  in  Kedah  concentrated  more  specifically  on  the 
PAS-Islamic  model  in  relation  to  party  issues.  Again,  it  was  apparent  that  the 
participants  here  were  intellectually  engaged  figures  keen  to  present  their  account  of 
politics  and  society  to  interested  observers,  while  also  showing  receptiveness  to  outside 
views  of  PAS  and  the  crisis. 
Could  Fadzil  Noor  (through  the  group)  explain  PAS's  basic  view  of  Vision  2020  and 
offer  comments  on  it  as  a  development  process? 
PAS  are  not  opposed  to  development  and  the  broad  growth  agenda.  What  needs  to  be 
stressed,  though,  is  a  much  more  moral  dimension,  a  view  of  development  which 
embraces  spiritual  values.  [Again,  the  problem  of  false  nationalism,  or  assabiyah,  within 
the  Vision  message  was  noted  here,  something  which  contradicted  the  idea  of  a  higher 
Islamic  community.  ]  Nonetheless,  it  is  still  the  case  that  Malays  are  often  discriminated 
against  in  many  sectors  of  society. 
Does  this  and  other  such  factors  mean  continued  Malay  support  for  the  Barisan? 
Not  necessarily.  Support  for  the  BN  is  now  very  fluid,  as  indicated  by  the  reduced 
majorities  of  the  two  BN  candidates  at  the  recent  by-elections,  a  significant  indication  of 
growing  unease  across  the  country. 
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the  1995  election,  why  would  they  ever  come  to  support  a  PAS  agenda? 
Two  factors  are  important  here:  the  economic  interests  of  the  Chinese  and  Chinese 
political  rights.  Under  Islamic  codes,  other  races/peoples  must  be  protected.  In  this 
regard,  the  Chinese  may  come  to  see  their  economic  interests  as  being  more  secure  under 
PAS  than  the  BN.  This  also  involves  the  need  for  greater  political  security  to  ensure  that 
property  rights  are  duly  protected.  In  the  final  analysis,  the  Chinese  will  act  rationally  in 
backing  the  party  which  best  serves  Chinese  interests,  particularly  in  times  of  economic 
crisis. 
(This  led  us  more  specifically  to  the  issue  of  Mahathir's  influence  and  the  power  of  the 
BN  network.  )  Mahathir  has  been  rather  successful  in  projecting  the  PAS  model  in 
Kelantan  as  'backward'  by  posing  it  as  a  simple  choice:  'if  you  want  to  follow  this  road 
rather  than  our  modernist  one,  you  will  be  left  behind'.  Given  that  this  view  is 
presented  and  reproduced  so  efficiently  through  the  BN  media  and  institutions  like 
IKIM,  how  could  PAS  even  begin  to  counter  it? 
Yes,  we  agree  that  there  is  a  problem  here.  However,  while  UMNO/BN  have  this 
considerable  monopoly  over  the  media  and  other  civil  institutions,  PAS  believes  that, 
quietly  and  studiously,  it  can  influence  the  younger  generation,  notably  in  the  schools  and 
universities.  [Interestingly,  the  group  appeared  to  be  well  informed  about  cultural  trends 
and  the  impact  of  the  media,  notably  on  the  young.  ]  This  is  indicative  of  a  new  sense  of 
fluidity  in  younger  people's  thinking.  We  regard  this  generation  as  the  key  players  in 
effecting  social  change  and  believe  that  their  influence  over  this  group  is  spreading, 
evidenced  by  the  increasing  level  of  younger  PAS  members. 
What,  in  this  regard,  are  your  views  on  the  use  of  the  ISA  against  'deviationist'  Islamic 
groups  and  the  crackdown  on  Shia  teachings  in  the  universities. 
This  'fear  factor'  does  not  signify  paranoia  on  Mahathir's  part,  but  concerted 
propaganda  in  order  to  distract  attention  from  the  current  crisis.  In  reality,  Malays  can 
distinguish  between  the  UMNO  version  of  Islam  and  that  of  'true  Islam'.  In  effect,  they 
support  UMNO  for  pragmatic  economic  reasons,  while  implicitly  recognising  the 
authenticity  of  the  PAS  model  of  Islam. 
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again,  the  three  fronted  strategy  being  used  to  undermine  PAS,  namely:  the  economic 
control  of  development  funds  and  promotion  of  UMNO  corporate  sponsorship;  the 
political  courting  of  Razaleigh/S46;  and  the  ideological  attack  on  hudud  law/'PAS 
fundamentalism')  What  are  PAS  's  impressions  of  Mahathir's  strategy  in  Kelantan  and 
how  might  the  party  respond? 
[Here,  the  responses  were  more  specifically  directed  by  the  PAS  President.  ]  As  regards 
the  economic  aspect,  UMNO  have  failed.  PAS  has  lasted  much  longer  in  Kelantan  than 
anyone  predicted.  Moreover,  every  time  Mahathir  changes  his  stance  on  economic 
issues,  the  people  of  Kelantan  feel  more  alienated  from  UMNOBN.  In  relation  to  the 
political  aspect,  the  courting  of  Razaleigh  has  also  failed.  There  are  two  elements  here. 
The  first  is  Razaleigh's  betrayal,  which  has  led  to  more  popular  support  for  PAS,  not 
less,  and  more  party  defections  from  S46  to  PAS  rather  than  the  other  way  round. 
Secondly,  Razaleigh's  defection  to  UMNO  has  not  only  undermined  his  own  credibility, 
but  has  helped  cause  disruptions  and  increased  factionalism  within  UMNO  itself.  With 
regard  to  the  ideological  aspect,  when  Mahathir  attacked  PAS  over  hudud,  people 
believed  he  was  bluffing.  The  reality  is  that  most  people  in  Kelantan  want  hudud  law. 
But  what  about  the  rest  of  the  Malays  and  other  Malaysians  in  the  country? 
Yes,  we  agree  [very  openly],  there  is  no  clear  cut  evidence  to  suggest  national  support 
for  hudud.  -  However,  PAS  can  demonstrate  the  case  for  hudud  through  example  in 
Kelantan,  as  well  as  in  the  case  for  its  introduction  in  the  state  of  Terengganu. 
Yes,  but  hudud  law  hasn't  been  introduced  in  Kelantan,  so  doesn't  this  prove 
Mahathir's  success  in  engaging  PAS  and  controlling  this  agenda? 
In  the  short  term,  yes.  But  in  the  longer  term  he  will  not  succeed,  basically  because  the 
people  do  not  oppose  it.  The  main  problem  facing  PAS  here  is  the  constitutional  one  [in 
reference  to  the  necessary  approval  of  Federal  legislation  for  hudud  to  become  statutory 
law.  ]  But,  longer  term,  and  more  generally  in  Malaysia,  people  will  come  to  see  the 
benefits  of  hudud  as  a  set  of  social  and  moral  codes.  The  key  point  about  hudud  is  not 
simply  its  use  as  a  form  of  public  retribution,  but  as  an  instrument  of  protection  for 
people  within  society.  Indeed,  hudud  is  needed  more  than  ever  to  help  address  the 
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associated  with  the  development  process  in  Malaysia. 
Aside  from  Chinese  and  Malay  reservations  over  hudud  and  the  broader  PAS  model,  do 
you  believe  that  this  would  suit  the  international  business  community,  who,  whatever 
their  concerns  about  Mahathir,  might  not  welcome  an  Islamic  state? 
This  does  not  appear  to  have  discouraged  investment  in  Saudi  Arabia.  Moreover,  PAS  is 
not  opposed  to  foreign  investment  in  principle. 
While  one  can  see  how  Huntingtonian-type  discourse  in  the  West  serves  to  distort 
Islamic  ideas  and  practices,  I  still  wonder  how  PAS  can  make  the  idea  of  PAS-Islam  a 
populist  one  in  the  way  that  Mahathir  has  projected  'Vision  Islam'? 
[Here,  the  group  offered  a  number  of  critical  judgements  on  the  PM's  own  Islamic 
credentials,  the  thrust  of  this  being  the  expedient  promotion  of  a  false  Islam].  Mahathir 
has  consciously  used  Islam  for  his  own  political  purposes.  Assisted  by  UMNOBN's 
control  of  the  media,  Mahathir's  purge  on  Islamic  'deviationists'  has  been  used  as  a 
diversionary  strategy  and  a  way  of  implicating  PAS  by  false  association.  In  similar  ways, 
the  PR  campaign  throughout  the  crisis  has  also  been  used  to  distract  attention,  even  to 
the  extent  of  paying  people  to  attend  supporting  rallies. 
With  Mahathir's  denunciation  of  Soros  sending  the  markets  plummeting,  how  can  PAS 
itself  make  political  capital  from  the  crisis? 
We  recognise  that  the  party  has  limited  access  to  the  popular  media.  However,  the 
message  is  getting  across  through  ceramahs  and  other  popular  gatherings,  all  of  which 
have  seen  increased  turnouts  since  the  crisis  began.  The  other  significant  development 
here  has  been  the  cross-political  nature  of  such  gatherings,  as  illustrated  by  Jomo's 
address  to  one  recent  ceramah. 
(Pursuing  this  aspect,  I  noted  an  article  by  the  PRM  leader  Syed  Husin  Ali  in  a  current 
edition  of  Harakah  defending  human  rights  in  Malaysia.  )  With  this  in  mind,  what  is  the 
relationship  between  PAS  and,  what  may  be  termed,  parties  of  'the  left'?  Also,  can  PAS 
work  with  the  DAP? 
281 With  regard  to  the  general  question,  yes,  PAS  do  share  sufficient  `left-of-centre'  ideas 
and  social  collectivist  principles  to  be  able  to  work  with  other  `left-leaning'  parties, 
notably  the  PRM.  However  [still  at  a  point  prior  to  the  reformasi],  the  answer  to  the 
latter  question  is  no.  While  there  can  be  genuine  co-operation,  DAP  policy  cannot  be 
reconciled  with  PAS's  own  specific  role  as  an  Islamic  party. 
How,  then,  can  any  comprehensive  coalition  come  together  -  doesn't  this  necessarily 
require  major  compromises? 
[Again,  there  was  an  emphatic  no  to  the  possibility  of  an  alliance  with  the  DAP.  ]  PAS  as 
a  party  must  uphold  its  Islamic  principles.  [While  this  response  was  unambiguous,  it  can 
be  seen,  in  retrospect,  as  a  basic  insistence  on  retaining  an  Islamic  profile  rather  than  an 
unwillingness,  in  practice,  to  work  together,  as  the  subsequent  rapprochement  between 
Fadzil  Noor  and  Lim  Kit  Siang  through  GERAK,  GAGASAN  and  the  Barisan  Alternatif 
was  to  show.  ] 
(This  brought  us,  finally,  to  a  longer  discussion  on  PAS  's  electoral  prospects  if,  and 
when,  Anwar  came  to  power.  At  this  point,  Mahathir  was  still,  apparently,  'backing' 
Anwar  as  his  successor  and  supporting  his  IMF-type  recovery  strategy.  )  Do  you  think 
an  Anwar  succession  would  mean  a  stabilisation  of  the  economic  crisis  and  a 
strengthening  of  UMNO? 
[Here  Fadzil  Noor  and  the  group  expressed  a  clear,  and  apparently  long-held,  belief  that 
Anwar  would  not  succeed  Mahathir.  ]  All  of  Mahathir's  deputies  have  fallen  by  the 
wayside.  In  Anwar's  case,  Mahathir  has  been  engaged  in  a  long-term  game-plan  to  keep 
his  deputy  in  position,  but  never  allow  him  to  assume  office.  Someone  else  is  waiting  in 
the  wings.  Moreover,  unlike  Mahathir,  Anwar  lacks  the  political  acumen  to  hold 
together  the  factions  within  UMNO  and  the  Barisan  coalition  itself. 
But  there  are  three  mitigating  factors  here:  firstly,  Anwar's  subsidiary  position  in 
relation  to  Mahathir,  making  it  difficult  for  him  to  develop  a  populist  base;  secondly, 
despite  this,  his  support  amongst  the  Chinese,  notably  in  Penang;  and,  thirdly,  that 
notwithstanding  his  compromises,  he,  alone,  has  the  necessary  Islamic  credentials  to 
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base  together  and  maintain  UMNO's  Islamic  profile? 
The  point  about  Anwar's  Chinese  support  base  is  valid.  However,  this  does  not  mean  he 
has  the  political  prowess  to  hold  the  wider  alignment  together.  With  regard  to  Islam, 
neither  Anwar,  nor  UMNO  generally,  any  longer  enjoys  the  overall  confidence  of  the 
Malays.  [It  was  intimated  here  that  while  Fadzil  Noor  had  been  close  to  Anwar  during 
their  `early  days'  as  Islamic  activists,  he  now  regarded  him  as  having  lost  much  of  his 
Islamic  awarenesss.  ]  There  has  also  been  a  serious  deterioration  of  UMNO's  claim  to  be 
the  voice  of  the  Malays.  Once  they  were  genuine  upholders  of  Malay  interests, 
motivated  by  a  higher  set  of  principles.  Now  they  are  nothing  more  than  career 
individuals.  In  the  rural  areas  in  particular,  Malays  are  no  longer  impressed  by  UMNO, 
and  have  only  supported  them  in  the  absence  of  any  other  credible  alternative.  However, 
that  is  now  changing  as  people  see  in  PAS  a  party  better  able  to  articulate  Malay 
feelings.  PAS,  unlike  UMNO,  are  now  being  seen  as  the  true  repository  of  Islamic- 
Malay  identity. 
Again,  alongside  the  political  impressions  conveyed,  the  noteworthy  feature  of  the  PAS 
participants  here  was  their  intellectual  energy  and  keen  interest  in  the  outsider's  view. 
While  the  argument  for  hudud  was  still  problematic  to  this  observer,  one  could  see  more 
clearly  the  wider  context  within  which  the  case  for  its  introduction  was  being  made. 
Also  apparent  was  PAS's  own  close  understanding  of  how  the  BN  media  and  wider 
UMNO  network  works  to  monitor  and  control  the  exposure  of  PAS-Islam  as  a 
contender  to  Vision-Islam.  Another  significant  element  was  the  receptiveness  of  PAS  to 
`left  discourse'  vis-ä-vis  collectivist  views  of  social  and  economic  development, 
suggesting  an  emerging  basis  for  meaningful  co-operation  and  political  realignment  with 
other  parties  and  NGOs. 
At  another  level,  though,  PAS's  specific  Islamic  commitment  still  distinguishes  it 
from  the  other  mainstream  parties  in  Malaysia.  One  can  denote  this  in  the  sentiments  of 
any  active  PAS  member.  For  example,  in  a  casual  lunchtime  conversation  with  a  young 
party  worker  in  Alor  Setar  (prior  to  the  above  meeting),  I  learned  of  how  he  combined 
his  role  as  a  religious  teacher  in  the  local  school  with  long  hours  and  minimal  pay 
working  for  PAS.  Without  a  trace  of  hostility,  this  was,  as  he  saw  it,  an  expression  of  his 
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Again,  it  is  easy  to  misinterpret  this  jihad  as  a  belligerent  threat  rather  than  a  statement 
of  belief.  And  herein  lies  the  tension  and  complexity  within  the  PAS-Islamic  model. 
That  is,  one  can  be  impressed  by  many  of  PAS's  basic  ideas  of  ethnic  tolerance, 
compassion,  political  transparency,  fair  distribution  and  social  justice,  while  remaining 
circumspect  about  whether  a  PAS-Islamic  society  would  be  either  acceptable  or  desirable 
to  a  wider  Malaysian  community.  However,  in  advancing  an  intellectual  alternative  to 
the  Vision,  PAS  also  appear  to  be  sincere  in  building  broad  ethnic  consent  for  its  project 
at  the  national-popular  level.  Whatever  other  impressions  of  PAS  derived  above,  the 
image  of  the  coercive  Islamic  zealot  was  not  one  of  them. 
PAS,  Anwar  and  the  reformasi:  setting  the  scenario 
Before  coming  to  the  Anwar  crisis  and  its  implications  for  PAS,  let  us  note  at  this  point 
some  of  the  scenarios  thought  possible  for  the  emergence  of  an  Islamic  polity  in 
Malaysia.  In  Islam  in  Malaysia  -  From  Revivalism  to  Islamic  State?  Husin  Mutalib 
outlines  four  main  scenarios  for  the  emergence  of  Islam  as  a  political  force.  Although 
written  before  the  crisis,  it  provides  a  useful  basis  upon  which  to  develop  our  analysis  of 
the  PAS  countervision  and  the  Anwar  issue. 
In  Hussein's  first  scenario,  an  Islamic  polity  could  emerge  if  PAS  were  able  to  capture 
more  states,  such  as  Kedah,  Perlis  and  Terengganu.  For  PAS  to  develop  in  this  regard, 
two  conditions  would  have  to  be  met:  (a)  PAS  would  have  to  reveal  itself  as  a  more 
tolerant/progressive  party;  and  (b)  the  internal  tensions  within  UMNO  would  have  to 
degenerate  further. 
With  regard  to  the  first  of  these  conditions,  Russin  sees  a  basis  for  development, 
given  PAS's  record  of  political  integrity  in  Kelantan  and  the  apparent  confidence  of  the 
Chinese  constituency  there.  Confirming  the  above,  the  author  cites  assurances  given  to 
Lim  Kit  Siang  and  a  survey  in  Berita  Harlan  showing  eight  out  of  nine  Chinese  in  the 
state  happy  with  PAS,  in  terms  of  economic  and  political  security.  With  regard  to  the 
second  aspect,  Hussin  notes  that,  despite  UMNO's  apparent  control,  competition 
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could  unravel  further. 
The  second  scenario  posits  a  possible  UMNO-PAS  rapprochement  (there  being  a 
precedent  for  this  in  PAS's  previous  membership  of  the  BN).  In  this  scenario,  UMNO 
may  also  have  to  find  other  ways  of  bringing  the  Chinese  on  board,  given  the  increasing 
liability  of  the  MCA  in  electoral  terms.  A  merger  between  UMNO  and  DAP  is  not  ruled 
out  within  this  scenario. 
The  third  scenario  considers  the  possibility  of  an  Islamic  coup  led  by  Malay 
generals,  concerned  that  Malay-Islamic  interests  were  being  dangerously  eroded. 
Although  unlikely,  the  author  retains  the  view  that  there  is  no  guarantee  that  the  military 
would  not  intervene  in  circumstances  of  extreme  instability. 
The  fourth  scenario,  and  the  one  seen  most  likely  by  the  author,  is  an  Anwar 
succession.  The  basic  argument  here  (again,  note,  pre-crisis)  is  that  with  Anwar  still 
committed  to  the  Islamisation  process,  PAS  could  rejoin  the  BN  if  Anwar  became  PM. 
(Extending  this  scenario,  somewhat,  one  might  include  here  a  possible  future  coalition 
between  Anwar  and  PAS  itself  in  some  post-crisis  arrangement).  Hussin  backs  this  view 
through  reference  to  Anwar's  long-standing  `relationship'  with  some  of  the  PAS 
leadership  (going  back,  notably,  to  Anwar's  ABIM  days).  There  is  the  suggestion  here 
of  a  PAS/Anwar/ABIM  triumvarite. 
Hussin  also  considers  the  nature  of  an  `Islamic  state'  in  this  scenario.  If  defined 
as  a  doctrinal  state,  reflective  of  an  older  traditional  order,  then  this  would  not  happen. 
If  defined  in  terms  of  the  permeation  of  Islamic  values,  then,  yes,  there  could  be  such  a 
state,  including  an  amended  form  of  hudud.  However,  the  author  also  sees  a  number  of 
counterposing  elements  here,  most  notably  the  complex  dynamics  of  Malay  culture 
(adat)  and  identity,  as  a  still  resilient  set  of  forces  holding  Islamic  identity  in  check. 
Using  some  of  the  above-noted  thoughts  of  the  PAS  leadership  (and  the  benefit  of 
hindsight)  let  us  consider  some  of  the  main  propositions  contained  within  these 
scenarios.  The  third  scenario  of  a  military  option  remains  unlikely,  as  acknowledged  by 
Hussin,  though  extended  forms  of  policing  and  surveillance  appear  probable.  As  regards 
the  second  scenario,  while  any  future  UMNO-PAS  merger  cannot  be  discounted,  it 
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permeating  PAS,  that  this  possibility  is  also  highly  unlikely. 
Let  us  turn,  immediately,  then,  to  Hussin's  last  scenario,  the  Anwar  factor. 
Leaving  aside  for  the  moment  the  circumstances  of  Anwar's  ouster,  two  related  features 
of  Hussin's  scenario  need  to  be  qualified:  firstly,  Anwar's  supposed  (pre-crisis)  closeness 
to  the  PAS  leadership;  and  secondly,  his  suitability  in  carrying  forward  an  Islamisation 
process  suitable  to  PAS.  -  Although  Anwar  had  maintained  a  strong  Islamic  profile  and 
may  have  been  held  in  some  regard  by  PAS  members,  his  role  in  pushing  Mahathir's 
Islamic  agenda  had  undermined  his  Islamic  credentials  for  the  PAS  leadership.  Thus,  in 
the  aftermath  of  his  dismissal,  a  certain  schadenfreude  could  be  denoted,  with  Fadzil 
Noor's  own,  quieter,  `I  told  you  so'  echoing  a  long-held  distrust  of  the  Anwar  view  that 
meaningful  Islamisation  could  be  effected  from  within  the  BN.  83  Moreover,  while  PAS 
had  defended  Anwar  immediately  after  his  sacking,  this  did  not  simply  translate  into 
outright  support  for  him  at  this  point.  Not  only  was  Anwar  required  to  explain  his 
conduct  while  in  office,  including  his  support  for  the  repressive  acts  now  being  used 
against  him,  he  also  had  to  renew  his  Islamic  values  and  acknowledge  the  fallacy  of 
trying  to  work  within  the  `secular'  system.  84 
As  will  be  discussed  below,  PAS  support  for  Anwar  was  to  strengthen 
considerably  as  the  trial  continued,  with  the  party  linking  itself  more  closely  to  the 
reformasi  (viz  GERAK  and  ADIL).  However,  this  did  not  mean  that  PAS  considered 
Anwar  an  eventual  Islamic  leader  in  waiting.  As  was  intimated  to  this  writer  by  various 
PAS  people,  PAS  had  been  pushing  both  Islamic  values  and  the  demand  for  civil  justice 
long  before  the  Anwar  crisis.  One  can  only  speculate  as  to  the  shape  of  any  Islamic 
programme  initiated  by  Anwar  in  any  `post-detention  situation'.  However,  even  this 
extended  Anwar  scenario  seems  problematic  given  the  adverse  impact  of  the  whole 
debacle  on  Anwar's  political  career. 
So  this  brings  us  back  to  Hussin's  first  scenario,  one  which,  due  to  the 
unforeseen  circumstances  of  the  Anwar  crisis,  and  his  conviction  by  mid-1999,  had  come 
to  look  the  more  likely.  In  particular,  we  can  say  that  the  two  conditions  noted  as 
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PAS,  the  Anwar  crisis 
and  counterhegemony 
As  the  Anwar  trial  settled  into  a  long  litany  of  sordid  testimony,  the  UMNO  network  was 
now  engaged  in  a  new  PR  strategy  to  soften  Mahathir's  image  and  limit  adverse  public 
reaction.  In  January  1999,  Mahathir  finally  announced  Abdullah  Ahmad  Badawi  as  his 
new  Deputy,  overturning  the  plan  to  hold  elections  for  the  post  and  postponing  the 
UMNO  elections  till  after  the  general  election.  Despite  the  media's  laudatory  greetings, 
it  was  apparent  to  discerning  observers  that  this  was  a  stop-gap  appointment  to  take  the 
heat  off  Mahathir.  Indeed,  Abdullah's  very  `dullness'  may  have  served  as  a  useful 
contrast  to  the  still  charismatic  Mahathir  in  the  public  mind. 
That  same  month,  Mahathir  ordered  an  `independent'  inquiry  into  Anwar's 
beating,  led  by  the  former  Attorney-General,  Abu  Talib  Othman  and  the  former  Chief 
Judge  of  Malaya,  Anuar  Zainal  Abidin.  Rahim  Noor,  the  IGP  at  the  centre  of  the 
allegations,  had  resigned,  though  had  not  been  named  as  the  culpable  figure  in  the 
immediate  police  investigation.  As  acting  IGP,  Noriam  Mai  also  announced  a  `major 
reshuffle'  of  senior  police  figures  as  part  of  a  confidence-restoring  `review'  of  the  force., 
In  February  1999,  Rahim  finally  admitted  assaulting  Anwar  in  the  lock-up.  The  media 
reports  here,  predictably,  played  on  Rahim's  claim  that  he  had  been  provoked  by 
Anwar's  alleged  retort:  "Ni,  bapa  anfing"  (Here's  the  father  of  dogs),  though  there  was 
some  variation  of  this  in  the  press.  2  Rahim's  admission  and  the  Inquiry's  doubts  over 
Anwar's  alleged  remark  appeared  to  reveal  some  `new  transparency'  within  the  system. 
In  reality,  it  was  apparent  that  efforts  to  conceal  Rahim's  guilt  was  now  a  lost  cause. 
The  Inquiry  could,  thus,  be  seen  as  a  damage  limitation  exercise  with  the  more  particular 
purpose  of  showing  that  the  ex-IGP  had  acted  alone.  What  did  not  emerge  in  the 
testimony  was  any  background  information  concerning  senior  figures  such  as  the 
Attorney-General. 
Around  this  time,  plans  were  also  being  drawn-up  by  the  authorities  for  an  all 
news  TV  channel  to  help  counter  negative  foreign  reports.  Illustrating  the  inner 
291 workings  of  the  UMNO  network,  the  leading  executive  role  was  to  be  given  to  Nordin 
Sopiee,  chairman  of  the  `independent'  think-tank  ISIS.  Sopiee  had  previously  taken-out 
a  full-page  advert  in  the  New  Straits  Times  castigating  foreigners  for  criticising 
Mahathir.  3 
These  public  overtures  were  also  being  used  to  pave  the  way  for  a  smooth  and 
longer-term  handover  of  power.  Having  given  over  the  Finance  Ministry  to  Daim  and 
the  Home  Ministry  to  Abdullah,  Mahathir  could  now  offer  `assurances'  of  such  to  the 
public.  4  Meanwhile,  the  friendly,  low-key  approach  of  `Pak  Lah'  (Abdullah)  was  being 
projected  by  the  media  as  a  valuable  asset,  complementing  his  appointment  as  Deputy 
Chairman  to  the  NEAC  to  work  alongside  Daim.  Razaleigh  and  Najib  were  also  now 
being  seen  to  `close  ranks',  though,  with  Mahathir  continuing  to  send  conflicting  signals 
about  the  eventual  `suitability'  of  his  new  Deputy,  both  still  harboured  ambitions  of  an 
eventual  succession. 
PAS,  the  reformasi  and  Malay  discontent 
While  these  and  other  damage  limitation  efforts  had  helped  neutralise  the  reformasi,  they 
could  not  disguise  brooding  Malay  resentment  at  the  handling  of  the  Anwar  situation  and 
the  damage  to  UMNO's  populist  base.  Though  economic  recovery  still  remained  central 
for  most  Malaysians,  other  concerns  were  now  emerging.  One  was  an  increasing 
disregard  for  the  courts,  the  police  and  other  law  enforcement  agencies.  As  central 
participants  in  the  purging  of  Anwar,  they  had  brought  the  judicial  system  into  disrepute. 
Notwithstanding  public  support  for  the  BN's  `foreign  bias'  line,  many  Malaysians  felt 
aggrieved  at  the  debasement  of  their  legal  system  in  the  eyes  of  the  world.  The  second 
concern  involved  a  more  culturally-rooted  resentment  at  the  `un-Malay'  treatment  of 
Anwar  and  his  family.  More  particular  to  Malay  culture  and  Islamic  convention,  there 
was  a  growing  feeling  that  Mahathir  had  overstepped  the  bounds  of  decent  conduct. 
Whatever  the  substance  of  the  sexual  and  corruption  allegations,  most  of  which  had 
begun  to  look  questionable,  there  had  been,  for  many  Malays,  not  only  a  failure  of 
justice,  but  a  lack  of  social  decorum.  Despite  Anwar's  social  initiatives,  such  as  low-cost 
housing,  and  concern  for  the  poor,  many  rural  Malays  had  come  to  see  him  as  part  of  the 
UMNO  machine,  increasingly  detached  and  urban-centred.  However,  this  was  being 
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persecuted,  contrary  to  Malay  social  norms  of  how  to  treat  `one  of  their  own'.  Even 
many  middle  and  low-ranking  Malay  policemen  now  felt  a  sense  of  shame  at  Anwar's 
treatment.  5 
As  these  feelings  spread,  PAS  emerged  as  the  main  beneficiary  of  Malay 
discontent.  Taking-up  this  new  `moral  politics'  and  linking  it  to  a  more  `secular' 
language  of  justice,  PAS  were  also  now  courting  other  political  constituencies,  Malay 
and  non-Malay.  Through  GERAK,  GAGASAN  and  ADIL  an  understanding  almost 
unthinkable  in  previous  years  was  now  taking  shape  between  PAS  and  DAP.  Alongside 
stood  a  large  body  of  displaced  Anwarites  and  other  UMNO  dissidents  looking  for  a 
political  home.  Indeed,  notwithstanding  his  custodial  problems,  so  too  was  Anwar. 
Weighing  together  these  groupings,  the  sensitive  issue  of  Malay  rights  and  the 
constitutional  importance  of  Islam,  the  balance  still  tipped  towards  a  `Malay  agenda', 
with  many  Chinese  still  considering  the  Anwar  crisis  a  `Malay  affair.  '  Yet,  while  still 
holding  to  an  Islamic  worldview,  problematic  to  non-Malays,  PAS  had  also  revealed 
itself  as  an  egalitarian  `left-of-centre'  party,  engaged  in  mainstream  social  issues  and 
receptive  to  other  opposition  parties,  NGOs  and  civil  organisations. 
In  populist  terms,  the  Anwar  affair  had  helped  re-position  PAS  as  the  `natural' 
Malay/Islamic  party.  Yet,  far  from  simply  re-distributing  electoral  support  across  ethnic 
party  lines,  Malaysians  of  all  races  and  persuasions  now  appeared  more  receptive  to  a 
new  kind  of  non-racial  politics.  Despite  the  domestic  media's  depiction  of  inter-ethnic 
violence  in  Indonesia,  the  turmoil  had  not  descended  into  racial  scapegoating.  In 
particular,  the  Chinese  community  had  not  been  targeted.  Even  though  Anwar  had  lost 
Chinese  business  support,  he  still  appealed  to  other  lower-middle  and  working-class 
Chinese,  a  complement  to  his  main  base  of  young  Malay  followers,  notably  within 
ABIM. 
Although  this  more  fluid  situation  had  helped  bring  together  varying  opposition 
elements,  it  was  PAS  which  stood  to  gain  most  from  Mahathir's  predicament.  The 
reasons  for  this  were,  essentially,  twofold:  firstly  because  of  PAS's  existing  resources 
and  party  machinery,  something  which  gave  them  a  greater  ability  than  NGOs  or  other 
ad  hoc  bodies  to  organise  and  absorb  dissent  towards  UMNO/BN;  secondly,  because  of 
their  strategic  position  vis-ä-vis  the  Malays.  An  important  factor  here  concerns  the  new 
293 generation  of  highly  committed  members  now  emerging  within  PAS.  Educated, 
professional  and  with  extensive  links  to  other  Islamic  groups,  they  have  come  to  play  a 
key  role  in  influencing  the  leadership,  explaining  Islam's  `non-fundamentalist'  side  and 
organising  party  presentation.  6 
In  seeking  to  redress  this,  the  media  were  now  making  a  more  conscious  effort  to 
highlight  Mahathir's  Malay  and  Islamic  profiles.  For  example,  during  the  PM's  Hari 
Raya  open  house  in  Kuala  Lumpur,  the  larger  than  expected  crowds  were  claimed  to  be 
an  indication  of  resilient  support  for  the  government.  7  Unfortunately,  this  impression 
was  rather  undermined  by  widespread  TV  news  and  press  coverage  criticising 
Malaysians  for  lack  of  manners  and  using  Raya  open  houses  for  free  food.  '  There  were 
also  stories  circulating  that  the  finance  group  Mbf  had  encouraged  many  of  its  employees 
to  attend  the  function.  Similarly,  TV  news  coverage  of  the  PM's  pre-Hari  Raya  visit  to 
his  home  town  of  Kubang  Pasu  in  Kedah  made  no  mention  that  very  few  people  had 
turned  out  to  welcome  him,  indicating  that  support  within  UMNO's  traditional  kampong 
base  was  now  at  a  dangerously  low  level. 
Aware  of  rural  disenchantment  and  the  Islamic  factor,  the  Barisan  were  now 
making  political  overtures  and  promises  of  new  development  to  the  Kelantanese 
electorate.  This  coincided  with  Mahathir's  pre-Hari  Raya  visit  to  Kota  Bharu  and  his 
first-ever  meeting  with  Nik  Aziz  at  the  state  office,  Kota  Darulnaim.  With  the  limited 
prospect  of  winning  back  Kelantan,  the  visit  and  rallying  call  to  the  local  party  could  be 
seen  as  an  attempt  to  enhance  UMNO's  rural  and  Islamic  image.  However,  this  was  part 
of  an  intensifying  effort  to  drive  a  wedge  between  PAS  and  other  parts  of  the  reformasi. 
The  modus  operandi  here  can  be  gleaned  from  statements  made  in  a  press  column  at  this 
point  by  Abdullah  Ahmad,  the  government's  Special  Envoy  to  the  UN.  While  reminding 
Malaysians  of  Mahathir's  free-market  development  agenda  which  had  given  years  of  all- 
round  prosperity  and  growth,  he  raises  the  spectre  of  PAS  ambitions  as  a  re-enactment 
of  the  `communist  threat'  and  its  use  of  the  reformasi  as  a  convenient  front: 
The  notion  that  reformasi  is  secular,  liberal  and  democratic  is  troubling.  Reformasi  is  PAS  in  thinly 
disguised  form.  The  DAP  and  the  others  will  have  to  work  out  for  themselves  how  they  can  identify 
their  policies  with  PAS's  rigid  syariah.  Will  they  ride  the  "Islamic  tiger"  simply  on  account  of  their 
animosity  towards  Mahathir?  The  "Islamic  tiger"  is  as  dangerous  as  the  once  powerful  "communist 
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be  stymied  by  reformasi  and  the  Islamists.  9 
Despite  this  alarmist  language,  confidence  was  growing  within  PAS.  Through 
GERAK,  it  had  raised  its  political  profile  significantly  in  the  urban  centres,  notably  Kuala 
Lumpur.  In  the  Malay  heartlands  of  Perlis,  Kedah  and  Terengganu,  anti-Mahathir 
sentiment  was  spreading,  with  well  organised  ceramahs  bringing  PAS  and  other 
reformasi  figures  onto  common  platforms.  In  this  regard,  there  was  some  validity  in  the 
above  claim  in  that  PAS  and  reformasi  were  becoming  synonymous  in  the  public  mind. 
What  was  driving  it,  though,  was  not  some  dark  Islamic  agenda,  but  a  more  grassroots 
disillusionment  and  concern  for  social  justice. 
Again,  the  PAS  party  machinery  was  critical  here.  For  example,  alongside  the 
ceramahs,  PAS  and  GERAK  were  distributing  videos,  cassette  tapes,  leaflets,  pamphlets 
and  downloaded  material  from  Internet  sites  around  local  villages.  Travelling  through 
Kedah  and  Perlis  in  early-1999,  the  `flag  war'  now  in  progress  was  also  a  colourful 
illustration  of  PAS  support  in  these  areas,  the  proliferation  of  green  and  white  circled 
flags  along  the  rural  roadways  indicative  of  the  battle  to  come  at  the  polls.  Not  to  be 
outdone,  the  BN  had  launched  a  substantive  campaign  to  get  their  own  blue-backed 
scales  of  justice  flag  displayed,  the  BN  in  Kedah  promising  at  one  point  to  have  10,000 
flags  out  in  response.  Excitement  was  also  growing  around  the  Kubang  Pasu  area, 
Mahathir's  Kedah  constituency,  where,  having  addressed  a  20,000  crowd,  Wan  Azizah 
was  considering  appeals  for  her  to  stand  against  the  PM.  Signifying  the  growing 
collaboration  between  PAS  and  ADIL,  Fadzil  Noor  had  made  it  known  that,  wherever 
she  stood,  PAS  would  withhold  its  own  candidate  and  support  her  campaign. 
PAS,  the  reformasi  and  Harakah 
Perhaps  the  most  significant  indication  of  PAS's  new  surge  was  the  rapid  growth  of 
Harakah  (Movement),  its  bi-weekly  publication.  10  From  the  start  of  the  Anwar  crisis  to 
the  end  of  1998,  its  circulation  had  grown  from  around  60,000  to  around  300,000.11  By 
early-1999,  Harakah  had  established  itself  not  only  as  a  party  organ,  but  as  an  open 
space  for  opposition  opinion  and  a  focal  point  for  the  reformasi.  As  the  paper's  editor 
Zulkifli  Sulong  noted  with  candid  satisfaction:  "We  try  to  be  an  alternative  paper  for 
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allowing  critical  discourse  against  PAS  itself  within  its  pages.  One  such  example 
included  an  expansive  piece  on  the  subordinate  role  of  women  in  PAS,  something  which, 
as  argued,  was  inconsistent  with  any  true  understanding  of  Islam.  13  In  an  apparent 
attempt  to  reach-out  to  non-Malays,  one  could  also  denote  in  Harakah  new  open 
discussion  of  Muslim  codes  and  their  place  within  a  multi-ethnic  society.  14  In  this  vein, 
other  pieces  were  enjoining  PAS  to  expand  its  English  Section  and  build  a  moderate 
support  base.  As  one  wide-ranging  Letter  to  the  Editor  put  it: 
Judging  by  the  number  of  non-Muslims  who  have  managed  to  get  their  letters  and  articles  published 
shows  that  Harakah  is  being  widely  accepted  by  people  outside  the  PAS,  Malay  and  Muslim  circles. 
Therefore,  Harakah  is  said  to  have  achieved  one  of  its  major  objectives  and  in  order  to  keep  more 
readers  coming  it  must  maintain  its  existing  stand  of  being  moderate  and  remain  sensitive  to...  other 
races  and  religions...  it  is  imperative  for  all  of  us  to  realise  that  non-Muslim  and  non-Malay  votes  are 
crucial  [in  deciding]  the  next  government  ... 
First  of  all,  we  have  to  realise  that  a  big  majority  of  non- 
Muslims  in  this  country  does  not  have  the  faintest  idea  of  what  Islam  is  all  about...  However,  PAS  can 
still  be  in  the  government  if  non-Muslim  based  political  parties  are  willing  to  cooperate  and  support  our 
common  cause  of  toppling  the  BN...  PAS  members  must  accept  the  hard  fact  that  this  is  the  only  avenue 
left  for  us  if  we  are  going  to  get  anywhere  in  the  next  general  elections.  PAS  through  its  mouthpiece 
Harakah  must  remain  moderate  in  its  views  both  in  the  English  and  Bahasa  Malaysia  sections  so  that  its 
views  can  gain  acceptance  by  all  non-Muslims  of  this  country... 
Moderate  Muslim,  Ipoh,  Perak.  '  3 
In  taking  up  this  task,  both  PAS  and  Harakah  were  providing  a  vital  medium  of 
cross-political  exchange.  To  some  extent,  the  appearance  of  DAP,  PRM,  JUST  and 
other  party/NGO  output  was  part  of  a  reciprocal  networking  of  articles  and 
commentaries  between  opposition  organs  and  websites.  However,  as  a  well  established 
Malay  newspaper  with  an  expanding  English  section,  Harakah  was  in  a  more  significant 
position  to  bring  together  an  amalgam  of  opposition  viewpoints.  As  one  Harakah 
editorial  comment  put  it,  PAS: 
... 
is  an  Islamic  movement  whose  lifeblood  in  this  information  age  is  correct  information  on  all  aspects  of 
our  environment,  political  and  religious,  not  just  propaganda  spewed  out  by  the  official  media.  This  is 
good  reason  for  Harakah  to  allow  space  for  the  oppressed  of  other  communities  and  sections  of  the 
people.  The  role  of  media  to  break  down  the  barriers  between  peoples  cannot  be  overstated.  Harakah 
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world.  A  one  track  mind  is  the  most  dangerous  thing  for  anyone  who  aspires  to  influence  people  and 
fight  for  justice.  16 
The  pages  of  Harakah  were  by  this  point  also  a  fair  reflection  of  growing  PAS 
support  for  Anwar.  While  questions  remained,  the  broad  attitude  had  now  shifted 
significantly  from  that  of  UMNO  foe  to  `Saudara  (brother)  Anwar',  as  shown  in  the 
following  sentiments  in  a  piece  by  the  regular  Harakah  columnist  Sadirah  K.: 
Having  followed  closely  the  events  of  the  last  six  months,  there  is  increasing  disbelief  that  Saudara 
Anwar  Ibrahim  is  the  man  the  ruling  elite  paints  him  to  be.  If  anything  stands  against  Saudara  Anwar  it 
is  that  he  was  party  to  several  questionable  events  which  took  place  during  his  sixteen  years  tenure  in 
Government.  This  he  has  to  seriously  reflect  upon.  One  prays  that  he  would  be  open  about  collective 
decisions  which  have  had  a  negative  impact  both'  upon  institutions  and  individuals  in  the 
country  ... 
[However,  is  it]  too  difficult  to  accept  the  view  that  there  were  concerted  hands  behind  the 
scenes?  Had  Saudara  Anwar  become  a  serious  threat  to  people  in  the  higher  echelons  of  power?  The 
economic  issues  of  mid  1997  did  cast  a  shadow  on  relationships.  He  was  beginning  to  hold  llis  own  and 
differed  from  the  PM  on  economic  strategies.  He  took  a  stance  on  bailouts  hence  attracting  corporate 
pressure.  Would  this  not  be  the  best  time  for  anti-Anwar  factions  to  move  in,  especially  at  a  time  when 
Dr  Mahathir  was  also  vulnerable?  " 
The  sentiments  at  the  end  of  this  piece  are  also  a  telling  commentary  on  Malay 
resentment  at  this  point: 
As  a  father  with  daughters  myself,  I  find  the  allegations  an  affront  to  the  family.  Innocent  people  are 
being  hurt.  Saudara  Anwar's  innocence  is best  championed  by  his  wife  and  children.  Many  enjoin  in 
their  cause  'Justice  for  Papa'.  When  political  intrigues  descend  to  levels  of  indecency  then  people  must 
act,  for  not  to  act  will  be  a  contradiction  to  our  faith.  '$ 
As  other  Harakah  output  showed,  the  crisis  was  also  exposing  the  moral  and 
intellectual  claims  of  Vision  2020: 
So  we  end  up  as  a  nation  with  fine  slogans  and  great  characters  like  the  Rukunegara,  Vision  2020  and  a 
host  of  others  preached  annually  on  the  occasion  of  our  Independence  Day.  We  see  the  tremendous 
chasm  between  such  noble  aspirations  and  the  state  of  our  institutions,  be  it  the  Police,  the  Judiciary  or 
the  Banking  sector.  We  have  the  vision,  but  no  examples  of  how  to  work  it.  This  breeds  cynicism.  It  is 
all  preaching  with  no  involvement  to  instil  experience.  We  want  development,  but  not  the  climate  of 
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the  flower  of  our  nation  are  stunted  by  the  University  and  University  Colleges  Act.  They  can  neither  say 
nor  act  but  have  to  be  eternally  grateful.  " 
As  a  consequence  of  all  this,  PAS  now  claimed  to  have  increased  its  membership 
applications  by  tenfold  in  the  six  months  leading  up  to  the  Anwar  crisis,  with  a  record 
15,000  applications  in  October  1998  alone.  20  Pointing  to  the  growing  number  of  PAS 
members  in  Kubang  Pasu  in  the  wake  of  Anwar's  persecution,  Fadzil  Noor  now  asserted 
that  "...  the  people  hate  Mahathir.  UMNO  members  who  have  an  independent  mind  are 
leaving  the  party  and  joining  PAS 
. 
"2'  The  PAS  MP  Hashim  Josin,  who,  in  July  1998, 
had  captured  Arau  from  the  BN  for  the  first  time,  also  noted  that  many  civil  servants  in 
Perlis  were  now  joining  the  party  and  forming  new  branches.  22 
Despite  the  partisan  claims  here,  the  PAS  leadership  had  largely  refrained  from 
over-confident  language.  Its  approach  had  been  more  cautious,  using  the  Anwar  issue  to 
highlight  the  iniquities  of  the  BN  system  and  draw  Malay  intellectuals  closer  to  the  PAS 
project.  Admiring  Nik  Aziz's  model  of  a  corrupt-free  administration,  many  middle-class 
Muslims  now  saw  the  PAS  alternative  as  the  only  way  of  cleansing  the  government.  23 
Indeed,  many  key  UMNO  figures  had  also  quietly  conceded  PAS's  appeal  here.  Thus, 
the  BN/media  stereotype  of  PAS  as  a  backward,  fundamentalist  party  with  little  `secular' 
support  was  being  eroded,  notably  by  the  new  intellectual  and  popular  appeal  of 
Harakah.  At  the  same  time,  though,  this  was  being  mediated  by  an  ongoing  affirmation 
of  Islamic  values  in  the  paper,  for  example  through  Nik  Aziz's  regular  Tazkirah  column. 
Again,  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  party  propaganda  and  the  more 
meaningful  subtext  of  PAS  discourse.  Much  of  Harakah's  own  output  certainly  belongs 
to  the  former  -  as  skilfully  directed  by  Subky  Latif,  the  party's  Information  Chief.  Yet, 
the  party  has  also  been  engaged  in  a  more  nuanced  dialogue  with  non-Muslim 
intellectuals  and  political  forces  in  an  effort  to  bring  them  into  a  PAS-Islamic  orbit  of 
thought,  while  seeking  a  more  mainstream  political  and  civil  position  consistent  with  its 
own  Islamic  base.  Here,  PAS  is,  at  once,  appealing  to  other  ethnic  and  religious  streams 
to  recognise  its  ideas,  while  `subjecting  itself  (dialectically,  one  might  say)  to  internal 
reappraisal.  This  does  not  suggest  compromise  per  se.  Rather,  it  denotes,  viz  war  of 
position,  a  more  mature  attempt  to  confront  the  realities,  strategic  and  intellectual,  of 
building  an  alternative  project  to  Mahathirism. 
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was  seeking  to  project  the  fear  factor  in  two  ways.  The  first  was  by  warning  the 
Chinese,  notably  via  the  MCA  and  Gerakan,  not  to  support  PAS  for  fear  of  being 
relegated  as  second-class  citizens.  (The  irony  of  this  claim  vis-ä-vis  Chinese  status  under 
the  NEP  should  not  be  lost  here.  )  In  January  1999,  with  reports  now  emerging  of  a 
possible  electoral  pact  between  PAS  and  DAP,  MCA  spokesman  Lim  Si  Cheng  urged 
the  DAP  to  state  its  position  on  PAS  plans  for  an  Islamic  state:  "Malaysians,  especially 
the  Chinese  community,  also  have  a  right  to  know  whether  DAP  supports  the  policies 
carried  out  by  the  Kelantan  PAS  government.  i24  The  second  aspect  of  the  communal 
message  involved  warnings  that,  under  PAS,  Malays  risked  losing  their  existing  political 
rights,  the  implication  here  being  that  PAS's  refutation  of  false-nationalism  would  mean, 
in  practice,  a  denial  of  the  Malays'  special  constitutional  position. 
We  need  not  detain  ourselves  with  the  implicit  contradiction  in  this  dual  message. 
In  a  sense,  its  has  its  own  quintessential  `logic'  within  Malaysian  politics.  More 
significant  is  PAS's  own  response  to  the  BN's  communal  agenda.  Allowing  for  PAS's 
continued  goal  of  an  Islamic  state,  one  may  denote  a  certain  rational  candour  in  its 
appeals  to  the  Chinese.  Firstly,  taking  basic  tenets  of  faith,  PAS  argue  that  Islam  and 
racism  cannot  co-exist  -  ergo  PAS  cannot  be  a  racist  party.  One  illustration  of  this  is 
PAS's  insistence  that  it  has  no  problem  in  sharing  top  political  or  cabinet  posts  with 
other  ethnic  party  figures  or  allowing  non-Muslim  institutions  to  function  both  within 
and  outwith  government.  Secondly,  in  the  context  of  the  NEP/NDP,  PAS's  rejection  of 
Bumiputeraism  as  a  framework  for  socio-economic  distribution  assumes,  at  least  in 
principle,  a  more  level-playing-field  for  the  Chinese.  While  this  still  includes  a 
commitment  to  `special  assistance'  for  Malays  (notably,  in  the  poorer  rural  locations),  it 
also,  as  claimed  above,  offers  the  Chinese  more  economic  rights  than  under  UMNOBN. 
PAS  are  also  attentive  to  the  tension  between  Malay  and  Islamic  identities  -  two  forms 
which,  although  socially  integral,  cannot  always  be  conjoined.  But,  in  claiming  to 
`represent'  all  these  ethnic-religious  currents,  the  party  has  sought  to  extend  its  presence 
within  the  `secular'  political  arena  without  compromising  its  Islamic  agenda. 
As  the  Anwar  trial  commenced,  a  Harakah  Comment  piece  signalled  how  the 
party  was  intent  on  making  it  a  particular  issue  of  public  morality,  as  captured  in  the 
headline  `Are  liars  and  slanderers  qualified  to  lead  a  Muslim  nation?  '25  Here,  PAS  was 
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rather  than  dwelling  on  the  `merits'  of  the  sodomy  charges,  the  alleged  details  of  which 
represented  an  affront  to  Islamic  codes.  It  should  be  noted  here  that  this  was  not  mere 
political  pragmatism  on  PAS's  part.  In  the  first  instance,  it  reflected  a  strong  feeling 
amongst  Malays  that  the  Islamic  syariah  court,  rather  than  the  conventional  court,  was 
the  appropriate  place  to  hear  these  allegations  -a  sentiment  quietly  expressed  at  the 
time  by  many  within  and  around  UMNO  itself.  Secondly,  it  was  in  keeping  with  the 
party's  long-standing  denunciation  of  the  ISA  and  other  repressive  instruments,  a 
position  which  could  now  be  linked  into  the  Anwar  affair  as  a  PAS  call  for  wholesale 
reform  of  the  legal  and  judicial  system. 
PAS's  careful  negotiation  of  a  `secularised'  moral  discourse  via  Harakah  and  the 
reformasi  had,  thus,  given  it  both  a  mainstream  electoral  profile  and  a  leading  role  in 
renewing  the  body  politic.  This  did  not  mean  that  Malays  and  non-Malays  were 
blinkered  to  PAS's  Islamic  aims.  But  it  did  show  that  PAS  could  find  common  ground 
within  the  wider  anti-BN  community.  This  was  evident  in  the  many  joint  statements 
given  at  this  point  by  Fadzil  Noor  (for  GERAK)  and  Tian  Chua  (for  GAGASAN)  on  the 
Anwar  situation.  26  Many  other  networked  pieces,  such  as  articles  on  the  Renong  bail- 
out,  were  also  being  co-published  in  Harakah  and  at  various  reformasi  sites,  providing  a 
vital  channel  of  communication  for  reformasi  activity  and  detailed  insights  into  the 
specifics  of  BN  money  politics. 
Against  this  background,  the  critical  Malaysian  journalist  MGG  Pillai  advanced 
the  view  that  a  new  type  of  social/class  cleavage  was  now  evident.  Noting  also  the  open 
secret  of  Cabinet  figures'  own  sexual  peccadilloes,  one  could  see  the  emergence  of. 
two  distinct  camps...  that  of  the  amoral  corporate  bigwigs  on  the  one  hand  and  the  moral  fundamentalist 
Muslim  on  the  other.  If  this  hardens,  then  everyone  in  between  will  be  neutralised,  and  the  situation  set, 
in  the  future,  for  a  clash  between  the  two  extreme  groups.  27 
In  this  scenario,  Mahathir  was  himself  being  egged-on  by  big  corporate  cronies  who 
stood  to  lose  much  under  Anwar.  As  this  sector  pressed  for  a  more  repressive  use  of 
state  instruments  to  protect  their  interests,  the  moral  vacuum  created  was  being  filled  by 
a  new  Islamic-centred  politics. 
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tensions  within  domestic  capital  at  this  point  as  well  as'  the  concerns  of  foreign  capital, 
while  omitting  to  mention  that  the  `moral  camp'  was  both  Islamic  and  secular. 
Nonetheless,  there  was  an  interesting  point  to  be  extrapolated  in  that  PAS  were,  indeed, 
now  centring  themselves  as  the  `vanguard'  of  that  `new  moral  order',  with  support  for 
PAS  reflecting  not  only  Malay  dissent  towards  Mahathir,  but  a  more  fundamental 
antipathy  towards  the  BN  system. 
PAS,  the  opposition  bloc  and  national-popular  support 
In  perhaps  the  most  critical  impasse  since  Merdeka,  the  question  for  PAS  now  was  how 
to  negotiate  this  new  political  fluidity  and  assume  responsibility  for  building  a  coherent 
popular  alliance.  As  one  Opinion  piece  in  Harakah  put  it: 
If  PAS  does  not  read  the  mood  of  the  people  correctly,  it  will  amount  to  a  betrayal  of  the  people.  28 
Here,  PAS  had  to  brook  the  inevitable  question  of  its  relationship  with  the 
opposition,  and  the  DAP  in  particular.  As  this  debate  unfolded,  one  could  discern  how 
short-term  priorities  were  now  being  linked  with  longer  term  aims.  As  one  view  in 
Harakah  put  it,  PAS  should: 
... 
focus  on  leading  a  government  in  coalition  with  other  groups  to  give  Malaysia  a  clean  government,  all 
the  time  emphasising  that  such  clean  government  is  the  result  of  their  being  Islamic.  They  should  talk 
more  about  a  Moral  Order  which  is  acceptable  to  all...  [They  should  also]  open  a  dialogue  with  non- 
Muslim  base  parties,  such  as  the  DAP,  as  a  potential  partner  in  a  future  clean  government.  DAP  also 
claims  to  be  a  multi-racial  party  but  in  the  people's  mind,  like  its  Malay  counterpart  PAS,  it  is  a  Chinese 
party.  For  this  reason,  any  alliance  with  DAP  will  give  PAS  a  minus  vote  and  this  is  what  PAS  is  afraid 
of.  This  can  be  overcome  once  DAP  realises  that  without  PAS,  they  too  cannot  dream  of  ruling  the 
Centre  [sic]  unless  they  join  the  corrupt  Barisan.  DAP  too  has  to  climb  down  on  many  provocative 
issues  which  it  used  in  the  past  as  communal  bait  aiming  at  Chinese  votes.  It  is  also  necessary  to  re- 
negotiate  with  the  DAP  and  other  secular  groups  a  definition  for  `state  religion'  and  what  it  exactly 
means  to  them...  This  has  to  be  debated  openly  and  convincingly  in  the  interests  of  stability  just  as  we 
have  done  in  the  case  of  Malay  privileges  to  bring  about  an  economic  parity  between  the  races.  In  our 
opinion  this  is  more  important  in  the  long  run  so  that  we  can  take  the  country  out  of  the  communal  cul 
301 de  sac  which  must  be  the  first  step  on  the  long  march  to  an  Islamic  moral  order  based  on  Justice  for 
A1129 
But  while  there  appeared  strong  and  growing  support  for  a  PAS-DAP  coalition, 
both  parties  remained  circumspect  about  its  nature  and  timing.  Of  the  two,  PAS  now 
looked  the  more  positive,  its  `needs  time'  approach  indicating  a  patient  game  plan,  with  a 
decision  being  held  back  for  the  full  party  assembly  in  May  1999.3°  This  `needs  time' 
approach  by  the  PAS  leadership  indicated  a  patient  and  strategic  game  plan,  an 
understanding  of  the  scale  and  resilience  of  the  UMNO  network.  From  the  DAP  side, 
Lim  Kit  Siang  was  also  playing  a  prudent  game.  The  DAP  had  also  been  consistent  in  its 
co-operation  with  GERAK  and  the  other  reformasi  bodies.  However,  behind  the  scenes, 
the  DAP  leadership  were  engaged  in  a  more  detailed  debate  over  the  implications  of  a 
coalition  with  PAS,  the  issue  of  Islam  and  the  potential  loss  of  Chinese  support.  Another 
concern  here  was  that  with  PAS  likely  to  dominate  any  contest  in  the  Northern  states, 
DAP  had  little  to  gain  from  a  formal  pact.  On  the  other  hand,  any  refusal  to  enter  a 
coalition  would  be  seen  as  narrow  sectarianism,  provoking  popular  rejection  and  internal 
crisis  in  any  event. 
By  January  1999,  these  tensions  were  more  evident.  One  indication  of  such  was 
Nik  Aziz's  statement  in  a  Star  article  noting  that  PAS  would  be  prepared  to  form  a  pact 
with  the  DAP,  "even  Satan",  to  oust  the  BN,  though  he  later  clarified  this  by  insisting 
that  he  did  not  intend  to  make  the  equation.  31  While  acknowledging  this,  Lim, 
nonetheless,  suggested  that  as  a  political  leader  in  a  multi-cultural  society,  Nik  Aziz  had 
to  be  "more  careful..  . 
in  his  public  statements...  "32  However,  alongside  the  rebuke  was 
Lim's  message  that,  despite  their  "great  political  differences",  the  DAP  would  be 
"prepared  to  work  with  PAS  and  other  political  parties,  including  those  in  the  Barisan 
33  Nasional,  on  common  objectives.. 
While  the  `satan'  remark  was  ably  exploited  by  the  BN  media  'M  a  less  obvious,  if 
still  biased,  reportage  posing  as  liberal  polemic  could  be  seen  in  Akbar  Ali's  Sun  column, 
`Premature  for  opposition  parties  to  fly  flags'.  35  Remarking  on  the  proliferation  of  PAS 
flags  in  Kedah,  the  article  asserted  that  the  PAS-DAP  relationship  was  a  marriage  of 
convenience  flawed  by  ideological  differences:  "turbans,  robes  and  liberal  socialist 
principles  do  not  mix  very  well.  "  More  important,  he  thought,  was  the  need  to 
concentrate  on  "the  more  important  goal  of  restoring  the  economy  and  maintaining  the 
302 peace.  "  Thus,  again,  we  see  a  perennial  discourse  of  insiderism  at  play,  with  `critical' 
opinion  speaking  through  a  self-restrained,  `national  problem-solving'  idiom. 
By  the  end  of  Hari  Raya  and  the  anticipated  announcement  of  the  Sabah  state 
elections,  the  case  for  an  accommodation  with  the  DAP  was  becoming  more  urgent. 
With  Mahathir's  rural  support  base  now  badly  damaged,  PAS  saw  the  real  prospect  of 
taking  the  four  Northern  states  of  Kelantan,  Terengganu,  Kedah  and  Perlis.  Under  Wan 
Azizah,  ADIL  was  also  now  building  steady  support  across  the  country,  despite  the 
refusal  of  the  authorities  to  allow  it  formal  registration.  The  sacking  of  Chandra,  ADIL's 
now  active  chairman,  from  his  academic  position  at  University  of  Malaya  had  helped 
galvanise  student  reaction,  a  boldness  that  was  beginning  to  grow  with  Rahim  Noor's 
admission  of  guilt  over  the  Anwar  beating.  The  idea  of  breaking  the  BN's  two-thirds 
majority  was  now  finding  popular  resonance,  though  more  sober  evaluations  prevailed 
among  PAS  and  DAP  leaders.  Yet  even  if  this  psychological  barrier  could  not  be 
broken,  a  sizeable  show  of  seats  would  create  the  basis  for  a  working  opposition  and  a 
viable  alternative  to  the  BN  in  the  public  mind.  Thus,  a  new  set  of  realities  were 
emerging  for  the  PAS  leadership.  As  Narni  Saila  put  it  in  four  key  question  themes  for  a 
Harakah  Opinion  piece: 
1.  How  prepared  is  PAS  to  govern  the  country?  Will  they  find  several  more  clones  of  'Tok  Guru'  [Nik 
Aziz]  so  that  the  MBs  in  the  other  states  will  match  the  stature  and  integrity  of  the  MB  in  Kelantan? 
2.  Assuming  Fadhil  Noor,  President  of  PAS,  will  be  the  next  PM,  who  will  be  in  his  cabinet?  Will  his 
cabinet  have  quality  and  earn  confidence  and  respect  from  the  people?  Will  Fadhil's  government  also 
attract  its  own  cronies?  Will  PAS  meet  the  hopes  and  aspirations  of  the  young  while  attracting  the  trust 
of  the  rest? 
3.  Will  PAS  have  the  wisdom  to  invite  talents  from  other  political  parties? 
4.  As  PAS  moves  with  gusto  on  certain  issues,  will  it  exercise  deliberate  restraint  on  other  issues  and 
out  of  respect  for  the  sensitivity  of  a  multi-racial  citizenry? 
What  bothers  many  of  us  is  most  simply  whether  the  PAS  elite  have  quietly  addressed  these  issues  - 
and  more  -  among  themselves...  Although  there  are  signs  of  a  new  teamwork,  there  is  also  a  perceived 
silence  on  many  issues.  36 
303 Responding  to  the  above  pointers,  and  illustrating  the  new  populist  tone  of 
debate  within  Harakah,  a  subsequent  piece,  rejecting  the  view  that  PAS  lacked 
competent  people,  addressed  the  crisis  of  confidence  within  UMNO: 
They  have  seen  what  has  happened  to  Anwar  as  proof  of  UMNO's  extreme  secularism...  Ordinary 
Muslims  who  have  no  need  to  rely  on  UMNO  handouts  are  definitely  choosing  PAS  as  the  only 
alternative  for  the  cause  of  Islam  in  this  country  ... 
Consider  this  scenario.  UMNO  is  declining,  yet 
UMNO  is  the  main  component  of  the  ruling  BN.  If  UMNO  doesn't  obtain  sufficient  support  from  the 
Malay  Muslims,  how  can  it  claim  leadership  of  the  BN?  And  how  can  the  BN  survive,  or  for  that  matter 
any  other  coalition,  if  it  is  led  by  a  non-Malay,  non-Muslim  party?  MCA  cannot  take  the  lead.  This  is 
realpolitik.  What  follows  is  that  BN  will  cease  to  exist  unless  there  is  another  Malay  based  party  ready 
to  fill  in  UMNO's  shoes.  In  the  Malaysian  context,  one  must  accept  the  reality  that  the  Malays  cannot 
accept  another  alternative  besides  PAS.  37 
Yet,  while  support  for  a  PAS-DAP  alignment  was  growing,  it  remained  stalled  by 
restraining  voices,  notably  within  DAP.  Some  of  the  tension  had  come  to  focus  on  a 
`resurrected'  remark  by  the  Penang  DAP  Chairman  and  lawyer  Karpal  Singh  that  there 
would  be  an  Islamic  state  only  "over  my  dead  body".  Made  in  an  off-the-cuff  manner 
during  the  1990  Election,  and  given  a  `new  airing'  by  the  BN  media,  the  remark  was, 
nonetheless,  symptomatic  of  the  PAS-DAP  dilemma.  To  some  extent,  the  acrimony  over 
this  statement  was  to  have  something  of  a  cathartic  effect  on  PAS-DAP  relations. 
However,  before  a  more  contemplative  language  could  emerge,  Karpal's  view  had  been 
subject  to  critical  rebuke,  as  in  this  Harakah  editorial: 
It  is  a  pity  that  [Karpal]  knows  very  little  about  Islamic  state  [sic]  and  must  be  swallowing  all  the 
garbage  spewed  out  by  the  media  about  Islam...  Election  or  no  election,  it  is  the  religious  duty  of  every 
Muslim  to  establish  an  Islamic  state  in  every  land-But  what  is  an  Islamic  state?  I  do  not  blame  Karpal 
Singh  for  misunderstanding  the  concept...  Islam  recognises  the  rights  of  other  religious  groups  not 
because  Karpal  or  other  human  rights  activists  demand  it.  It  is  because  the  Muslims  are  bound  by  a 
revealed  paradigm  which  enshrines  the  rights  to  freedom  of  religion  to  all  peoples.  38 
In  a  further  example  of  PAS's  adherence  to  Quranic  principles  of  religious  tolerance,  the 
Comment  also  notes  how,  in  Kelantan,  Nik  Aziz: 
304 ...  refused  to  ban  the  sale  of  liquor  to  the  non-Muslims  for  he  could  not  find  sanctions  (even  if  we  can 
argue  that  it  will  be  in  the  interest  of  non-Muslims  themselves)  under  the  Shariah.  Is  this  not  enough 
guarantee  to  Karpal  Singh  that  in  an  Islamic  state  the  Rule  of  Law  will  be  supreme  and  justice  will  be 
the  cornerstone  of  every  move  it  makes  vis-ä-vis  a  non-Muslim  community?  39 
By  the  same  token,  argued  PAS,  the  Quranic  principle  can  be  applied  to  the  constitution 
and  power  sharing: 
PAS  has  already  committed  itself  to  power  sharing  with  non-Muslims,  not  as  a  political  expediency,  but 
[as]  sanctioned  by  the  Shariah.  Since  PAS  has  also  committed  to  democratic  means  in  the  struggle  for 
an  Islamic  state,  the  issue  is  actually  a  non-issue  as  PAS  would  never  be  able  to  change  the  constitution 
as  it  stands  now  on  it  own  without  the  support  of  its  partners  in  government.  40 
In  its  inability  to  manage  BN  provocation  and  contain  this  tension,  the  `Karpal 
affair'  showed-up  a  certain  naivety  among  the  main  opposition.  On  the  other  hand,  by 
allowing  the  issue  into  the  open,  a  qualitative  exchange  of  views  had  taken  place, 
signalling  a  new,  if  still  cautious,  understanding.  In  the  spirit  of  tolerance,  both  Lim's 
and  Karpal  Sing's  views  were  being  allowed  free  and  respectful  expression  in 
Harakah.  4'  Karpal  was  also  given  critical  space  to  remind  PAS  of  the  country's 
constitutional  guarantees  with  regard  to  other  religions,  and  asking  it  to  "carefully 
consider  Article  3  and  not  persist  in  what  is  clearly  unconstitutional  . 
5)42  Yet,  while 
reflecting  many  non-Malay  (and  Malay)  concerns,  much  of  this  debate  could  be  seen  as 
academic,  given  the  reality  that  PAS  would  need  either  its  own  two-thirds  parliamentary 
majority  or  considerable  coalition  support  to  initiate  an  Islamic  state,  neither  scenario 
seeming  likely. 
However,  it  was  the  growing  desire  for  a  new  type  of  non-partisan  politics  that 
was  now  driving  the  PAS-DAP  issue.  Alongside  Malay  disenchantment  at  the  un-Malay 
treatment  of  Anwar  was  a  considerable  undercurrent  of  distaste  for  Mahathir  among 
non-Malays.  While  Chinese  business  and  older  Chinese  remained,  for  the  most  part, 
behind  Mahathir  and  the  BN,  one  could  discern  from  casual  conversations  a  growing 
ambivalence  amongst  professional  and  middle-class  Chinese  and  Indians,  notably  within 
academia.  Among  lower  middle-class  Chinese  (such  as  Penang  and  KL  taxi  drivers),  one 
could  also  hear  political  sensitivities  ranging  from  moderate  concern  to  outright 
condemnation.  Building  on  this  non-Malay  empathy  with  Anwar,  Wan  Azizah  and  ADIL 
305 were  giving  impetus  to  a  new,  if  still  gradual,  non-racial  politics.  43  The  more  important 
nuance,  however,  was  the  message  that  many  Chinese  were  holding  back  their  verdict  on 
the  BN  for  election  time.  Moreover,  while  sharing  common  cause  with  non-Malays,  a 
growing  stream  of  PAS  members  and  supporters  now  saw  very  clearly  the  more 
immediate  value  of  a  PAS-DAP  alignment  as  a  necessary  stepping-stone  to  meaningful 
political  power,  and  thereafter  to  some  form  of  Islamic  state. 
A  number  of  these  tensions  had  come  to  the  surface  at  a  keynote  DAP  `Justice 
For  All'  forum  in  Penang.  44  The  event  was  especially  significant,  being  the  first  time,  as 
an  ADIL  figure,  that  Wan  Azizah  had  addressed  the  more  varied  ethnic  gathering  of  a 
Penang  crowd.  Notably,  UMNO  Youth  had  called  on  all  Malays  not  to  attend  the 
gathering  -  for  fear  of  "break[ing]  Malay  unity  in  the  nation  and  the  state  [sic].  s45  In 
the  event,  over  4000  people  packed  the  main  auditorium  and  an  overflow  hall  to  hear 
Wan  Azizah,  Karpal  Singh,  Lim  Kit  Siang,  the  lawyer  Cecil  Rajendra  and  the  journalist 
Rustan  Sani.  46  Opening  the  forum,  Karpal  criticised  the  boycott  call  as  a  symptom  of  the 
Barisan's  racial  politics,  calling,  like  the  other  speakers,  for  closer  co-operation  between 
opposition  parties  and  NGOs.  In  her  entrance  and  speech,  Wan  Azizah  was  given  an 
emotional  reception  by  cheering  Malays  and  non-Malays  (roughly  equal  in  number) 
chanting  the  reformasi  slogan.  Yet,  while  she  and  others_  spoke  eloquently  of  the  need 
for  unity,  at  no  point  was  the  DAP-PAS  issue  addressed  directly.  It  was  only  following 
the  speeches,  from  within  a  now  more  tense  audience,  that  a  self-declared  PAS  member 
and  Islamic  teacher  finally  raised  the  matter,  challenging  Karpal,  with  courteous 
argument,  to  substantiate  his  `over  my  dead  body'  statement.  This  prompted  another 
such  question  from  a  Malay,  unconnected  to  PAS,  but  motivated  by  Islamic  ideas  of 
justice,  to  ask  why  DAP  could  not  join  with  PAS  to  break  the  BN.  Following  other  such 
statements  (and  cheering)  from  Malays  -  Chinese  comments  from  the  floor  being 
noticeably  absent  -  Karpal,  in  a  principled  statement,  reiterated  (as  a  Sikh)  his  belief  in 
free  and  equal  expression  for  all  religions  and  their  progressive  capacities.  However, 
insisting  that  DAP  was  not  anti-Muslim,  he  also  apologised  if  he  had  given  any  false 
impression  of  his  regard  for  Islam  (a  sentiment  warmly  applauded  by  all),  but,  in  the  final 
analysis,  all  faiths  had  to  be  protected  under  the  constitution.  47 
While  Karpal's  apology  and  the  gathering  itself  illustrated  the  potential  for 
Malays  and  non-Malays  to  work  together  for  reform,  it  also  revealed  some  of  the  deep- 
306 lying  sensitivities  of  religion  within  Malaysian  politics.  In  another  brief,  but  telling, 
moment,  one  Muslim  speaking  from  the  floor  advised  Wan  Azizah  not  to  shake  hands 
with  males,  given  its  un-Islamic  association  and  the  fear  that  it  might  be  used  by  the 
media  to  cast  aspersions  on  her  own  morality.  In  a  tactful,  and  well-received,  response, 
she  had  noted  that  her  duties  as  a  doctor  required  her  to  touch  the  human  body  -though 
it  was  noticeable  that  Wan  Azizah  did  come  to  `follow  this  advice',  to  some  extent,  by 
covering  her  palm  when  shaking  hands.  48  At  the  same  time,  other  small  gestures  of 
good  faith  were  helping  to  build  trust.  Karpal,  for  example,  had  offered  (to  wide 
applause)  legal  help  to  an  old  Muslim  man  who  had  never  received  compensation  for 
being  assaulted  during  the  Memali  incident.  Wan  Azizah  had  expressed  empathy  with 
Lim,  whose  son  Lim  Guan  Eng  had  been  unjustly  incarcerated  like  her  husband; 
recognition  of  a  Chinese  sacrificing  his  liberty  to  help  a  defenceless  Muslim  girl  and  her 
family.  Wan  Azizah's  use  of  Chinese  greetings  (as  taught  by  Anwar)  was  also  well 
received. 
In  another  such  gesture,  with  more  chilling  implications,  Lim  Guan  Eng  had  sent 
Anwar  a  letter  of  reply,  wishing  him  well,  but  regretting  to  inform  him  that: 
...  the  prison  authorities  here  in  Kajang  are  making  feverish  preparations  for  your  cell  even  though  your 
trial  is  still  continuing.  One  is  curious  how  they  can  be  so  certain  of  your  impending  conviction.  49 
Consistent  with  growing  public  perceptions,  and  the  present  writer's  own  observations  in 
court  during  Anwar's  testimony,  "  this  gave  credence  to  claims  that  the  trial  was,  indeed, 
being  `prejudged.  ' 
. 
As  the  hearing  neared  its  inevitable  conclusion,  ADIL's  promotion  of  a  non-racial 
front  was  helping  to  draw  the  opposition  together.  However,  while  working  closely  with 
the  DAP,  ADIL  were  now  finding  voice  as  a  proto-party  and  alternative  option  to  the 
DAP  for  non-Malays.  At  the  same  time,  Wan  Azizah  was  moving  closer  to  PAS,  as 
reflected  in  the  latter's  ongoing  support  of  her  candidacy.  51 
This  had  also  helped  bring  about  a  new  relationship  between  PAS  and  ABIM. 
Although  having  been  `brought  in'  by  the  BN,  ABIM  was  being  closely  monitored  at  this 
point.  52  In  particular,  the  BN  feared  not  only  that  element  supportive  of  Anwar  within 
ABIM,  but  of  more  mainstream  members  and  associates  now  going  over  to  PAS  or 
ADIL,  a  rapport  evident,  for  example,  in  Wan  Azizah's  address  to  a  10,000  crowd  at  an 
307 ABIM  Hari  Raya  gathering  in  Perak.  53  There  was  also  a  growing  appeal  from  PAS  to 
ABIM  to  realise  the  futility  of  their  `courtship'  with  UMNO.  In  seeking  to  build  its 
Islamic  base,  PAS  argued  that  they  should  "close  ranks  with  other  Muslims  with  humility 
and  determination  to  continue  the  struggle  under  the  true  Islamic  leadership.  sS4  As  PAS 
pointed  out,  Anwar's  predicament  now  proved  the  folly  of  trying  to  bring  about  Islamic 
transformation  through  UMNO,  this  having  served  to  neutralise,  rather  than  give  voice 
to,  Islam.  "  So,  while  PAS,  DAP,  PRM,  ARIL,  GERAK,  GAGASAN  and  the  various 
NGO  groupings  continued  to  build  a  de  facto  alliance  based  on  broad  political  goals, 
another,  more  particularised,  realignment  was  occurring  as  Malay  and  Islamic  elements 
now  de-linked  from  UMNO  and  drew  closer  to  PAS. 
The  PAS  leadership  view  (2):  the  thoughts  of  Fadzil  Noor 
As  a  further  set  of  pointers  to  PAS's  political  collaborations  and  the  Anwar  affair  by 
early-1999,  let  us  note  here  some  of  the  observations  offered  in  a  follow-up  discussion 
with  the  PAS  President  Fadzil  Noor.  56 
The  last  time  we  discussed  Anwar  prior  to  his  removal  and  arrest,  you  intimated:  (a) 
that  he  would  never  be  PM  and  (b)  that  he  lacked  the  ability  to  hold  UMNO  together. 
Do  you  now  feel  vindicated  in  that  set  of  views? 
It  was  always  going  to  be  difficult  for  Anwar  to  become  PM.  Anwar  will  be  convicted 
and  jailed,  perhaps  for  two-four  years.  Barred  from  office,  he  will  be  kept  out  of  the 
way,  his  political  career  conveniently  curtailed,  possibly  for  ten  years.  [It  was  apparent 
here  that  Fadzil  Noor  did  not  want  to  push  the  `I  told  you  so'  line,  concentrating,  rather, 
on  the  reasons  for  Anwar's  removal.  ] 
Do  you  see  any  chance  of  an  acquittal? 
No.  The  judiciary  is  under  the  control  of  the  executive.  There  is  no  effective  separation 
of  power.  Mahathir  and  the  executive  have  encroached  over  every  section  of  the  state, 
with  the  police  also  now  under  the  direct  control  of  Mahathir.  The  PM  has  now  come  to 
see  Anwar  as  a  direct  challenge.  Allied  to  this  has  been  the  clique  around  Mahathir, 
who,  more  `secular-minded'  than  Anwar,  came  to  see  him  as  a  threat,  particularly  after 
308 1993  as  Anwar's  profile  increased.  This  is  when  the  conspiracy  to  stop  him  really  began 
to  develop. 
Ybu  also  spoke  last  time  about  how  Anwar  had  moderated  his  Islamic  values.  Had 
Anwar  lost  his  Islamic  values  to  UMNO  secularism'  and  if  so  was  this  part  of  his 
downfall? 
When  Anwar  joined  UMNO,  he  changed  to  moderate  Islam  -  became  more  secular  in 
outlook.  Because  of  his  Islamic  background  and  his  popularity,  he  had  been  specifically 
needed  by  UMNO  to  oppose  PAS.  In  fact,  because  of  this,  he  still  has  many  supporters 
within  UMNO. 
So,  what  was  the  main  basis  of  Anwar's  threat  to  the  clique  within  UMNO? 
In  the  main,  it  was  his  differing  economic  policy  agenda  with  Mahathir.  This  ties  into  the 
korupse,  kronisme,  nepotisme  (KKN)  issue  and  the  challenge  posed  on  Anwar's  behalf 
by  a  section  of  UMNO  Youth.  Mahathir  also  fears  Anwar's  popularity  amongst  the 
lower-income  groups.  Mahathir  himself  has  no  such  regard  for  these  groups,  seeking 
only  to  protect  his  own  personal  family  interests  and  cronies. 
So  Mahathir  had  a  secret  agenda  all  along  never  to  let  Anwar  become  PM? 
Yes. 
Given  that  Anwar  may  never  again  be  part  of  UMNO,  is  there  a  place  for  him  within 
PAS? 
[The  PAS  President  avoided  a  direct  answer  here,  but  the  inference  was  that  this  was 
unlikely.  ]  PAS  have  gained  a  lot  of  new  members  since  the  crisis  began  -  from  400,000 
to  600,000.  Anwar  may  set  up  a  new  party  altogether.  In  such  an  event,  we  could  work 
together. 
Could  this  include  a  formal  coalition? 
Perhaps,  depending  on  the  prevailing  situation. 
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of  the  recent  DAP  forum.  )  Now  literally  does  PAS  take  Karpal  Singh's  statement?  In 
sum,  will  there  be  a  PAS-DAP  coalition? 
[Fadzil  Noor's  main  line  here  was  that  this  relationship  `needs  time'  to  develop.  He  also 
recognised  that  DAP  has  its  own  views.  ]  What  is  important  here  is  the  need  to  explain 
more  fully  the  principles  of  Islam  to  non-Muslims.  Much  of  this  is  now  being  done 
through  the  pages  of  Narakah.  But,  alongside  this,  there  is  an  ongoing  need  to  forge 
ever  closer  ties  with  other  opposition  parties,  NGOs  and  the  newly  formed  reformasi 
groups.  The  Chinese,  as  well  as  the  Malays,  also  want  change.  More  and  more  people 
of  all  races  are  coming  to  focus  on  the  common  issue  of  justice. 
Yes,  but  how  does  PAS  overcome  that  remaining  resistance  within  the  DAP? 
[Isere,  I  was  asked  for  my  own  impressions  of  Karpal's  statements.  Fadzil  Noor 
appeared  to  accept  the  sincerity  of  his  position  and  his  apology.  ]  It  is  not  unusual  for 
Karpal  and  others  like  him  to  oppose  an  Islamic  state  -a  position  also  apparent  within 
UMNO.  Again,  PAS  need  to  explain  Islamic  ideas  more  fully,  something  they  are  trying 
to  do  through  GERAK,  GAGASAN  and  ADIL.  What  UNINO  really  fear  here  is  that 
more  Muslims  will  now  support  PAS.  At  the  same  time,  what  is  holding  DAP  back  is  its 
fear  of  losing  its  Chinese  support  base. 
Yes,  but  isn't  the  crra  of  the  matter  here  that  in  order  to  challenge  BN  hegemony,  most 
parties  must  come  together?  How  is  PAS  preparing  itself  for  that  challenge  and  what  is 
the  current  thinking  within  the  party  about  possible  power  sharing? 
DAP  his  moderated  its  tone  on  this  issue  while  still  having  a  legitimate  agenda.  There  is 
a  need  on  both  sides  to  appear  less  chauvinistic.  PAS  also  has  to  present  itself  as  less 
fundamentalist  in  image.  This  has  been  difficult  with  the  media  presenting  a  negative 
picture,  particularly  in  Kelantan.  Yet,  Lim  Kit  Siang  himself  declared  his  own 
satisfaction  with  Chinese  feeling  there  after  the  General  Election  in  1990.  As  regards  a 
formal  coalition,  it  is  still  too  early  to  decide.  More  important  is  the  need  to  prepare 
people  generally  for  the  contest  against  BN.  [An  implicit  concern  here  was  that  the  BN 
media  would  use  any  pre-electoral  pact  as  a  divisive  tactic  by  claiming  a  PAS-DAP 
sellout  of  their  principles.  ) 
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understanding'? 
Yes,  exactly  so. 
Realistically,  how  well  can  PAS  do  at  the  General  Election?  Do  you  envisage  a  North- 
South  split? 
People  are  now  rejecting  the  BN  all  over.  PAS  will  promote  Anwar's  cause  as  a  main 
issue  of  justice  for  the  country  and  link  it  to  other  issues  of  corruption,  cronyism  and 
nepotism.  Kelantan  provides  a  model  of  how  to  present  the  Islamic  message,  so  if 
people  see  a  number  of  such  states  working  together,  it  will  enhance  PAS's  overall  case. 
[The  PAS  President  was  non-committal  on  whether  he  thought  PAS  would  actually  take 
more  of  the  Northern  seats.  ] 
In  any  post-electoral  scenario  where  PAS  and  the  other  opposition  had  a  strong 
showing,  what  would  Fadzil  Noor's  own  role  be? 
[Too  cautious,  and  perhaps  humble,  to  discuss  his  own  position,  he  talked,  again,  of  the 
need  for  co-operation,  while  making  a  specific  remark  about  foreign  relations  in  any  such 
scenario.  ]  Foreign  governments  and  external  forces  must  be  prepared  to  trust  any  new 
government  and  not  interfere  in  its  running  of  the  country  -  just  as  it  would  not 
interfere  in  their  affairs. 
(At  this  point,  Fadzil  Noor  asked  for  my  own  view  on  Western  coverage  of  the  Anwar 
affair.  In  relating  this,  I  suggested  that  parts  of  the  Western  media  had  rather  failed  to 
note  Anwar's  own  role  within  the  'IMF  circle'  and  his  IMF-type  recovery  policy.  ) 
Yes,  there  has  been  general  antipathy  in  the  country  towards  this  type  of  policy 
associated  with  Anwar.  However,  this  remains  a  separate  issue  from  the  wider  concern 
for  justice  in  Anwar's  case.  With  the  strategy  to  control  and  silence  Anwar  now  evident, 
it  is  imperative  that  co-operation  be  developed  in  the  run-up  to  the  election. 
311 Planting  the  seed:  party  co-operation  and  PAS  influence  by  mid-1999 
This  more  gradual  view  could  also  be  discerned  in  comments  made  by  Nik  Aziz  at  this 
point.  Asked  in  a  newspaper  interview  about  a  possible  coalition,  he  stressed  that  groups 
like  GERAK  were  an  important  "first  step": 
... 
GERAK  is  the  seed  which  unites  DAP  and  PAS...  Maybe  one  day,  the  seed  sown  will  grow  and  bring 
about  co-operation.  Our  condition  is  that  whoever  wants  to  co-operate  with  us,  if  they  don't  want  to 
embrace  Islam,  should  at  least  accept  the  Islamic  concept.  It  is  not  impossible  that  one  day,  DAP  with 
its  concept,  and  PAS  with  its  concept,  will  find  a  common  meeting  point.  57 
However,  it  was  significant  that,  here  again,  Nik  Aziz  was  extending  this  message  to 
UMNO,  or,  at  least,  a  disenchanted  element  within  UMNO: 
There  is  no  reason  for  the  rivals  to  fight  PAS...  I  use  PAS  as  a  bridge  to  promote  Islam.  I  would  like  to 
repeat  my  statement,  if  UMNO  can  act  to  strengthen  Islam  in  terms  of  faith,  guidance,  morals  and 
practice,  there  is  no  reason  for  PAS  to  fight  UMNO.  58 
Yet,  Nik  Aziz  also  sees  in  his  religious  beliefs  a  political  duty  to  remove  UMNO: 
... 
I  cannot  retire  from  politics.  Muslims  cannot  retire  from  politics.  Islam  came  to  the  world  to  correct 
man's  being.  To  correct  man's  condition  is  political  work.  Political  work  does  not  mean  to  find  money 
to  put  into  a  politician's  pocket.  That's  wrong.  That's  why  the  people  hate  UMNO.  59 
This  required  a  restatement  of  Vision-Islam.  In  preparing  for  a  main  tour  of  the 
states  before  leaving  for  the  Haj,  Mahathir  signalled  his  intent  by  attacking  Nik  Aziz's 
assertion  that  UMNO  was  a  `secular  party'.  60  Commencing  the  tour  in  his  home  town  of 
Alor  Setar,  Mahathir  then  launched  into  one  of  his  most  scathing  denunciations  to  date 
of  the  PAS  leadership,  its  view  of  women  (in  reference  to  the  Tok  Guru's  statement),  its 
`enticement'  to  students  to  riot  and  its  willingness  to  "collaborate  with  Satan". 
Condemning  Wan  Azizah,  ADIL  and  Al  Gore,  Mahathir  also  gave  descriptive  examples 
of  `nauseating'  homosexual  liaisons  (noting  a  marriage  between  a  Dutch  Minister  and  his 
male  partner),  an  allusion,  of  course,  to  Anwar's  alleged  conduct:  Thus,  in  seeking  to 
312 `explain'  the  current  situation  to  the  people,  one  could  see  that  the  use  of  inference  and 
smear  tactics  would  be  a  key  part  of  UMNOBN's  forthcoming  electoral  strategy.  6' 
Yet,  this  old  politics  of  fear  was  becoming  increasingly  redundant.  The  `Islamic 
issue'  had,  indeed,  now  been  raised  to  a  new  level  of  political  sensitivity.  From  within 
the  UMNO  network,  this  was  still  being  presented  as  a  straight  choice  between  an 
imposed  Islamic  state  or  a  moderate,  Vision-led,  version  of  Islamic  development.  But 
the  issue  of  political  morality  and  Anwar's  persecution  was  now  serving  to  dismantle  this 
modernist-fundamentalist  construct.  The  artifice  of  Vision-Islam  as  a  basis  for  managing 
traditional  Islam  had  been  called  into  question,  principally  because  UMNO  had  lost  much 
of  its  `moral  authority'  to  speak  on  behalf  of  Islam. 
By  the  time  of  its  45th  Annual  Muktamar  (General  Assembly)  in  May  1999,  PAS 
had  effectively  agreed  on  some,  as  yet  to  be  finalised,  form  of  party  co-operation. 
Debating  this  and  other  issues  of  development,  education,  social  policy  and  the  role  of 
IT,  Fadzil  Noor's  keynote  speech  `Standing  Together  for  Justice'  had  sought  to  blend 
traditional  concepts  of  Islamic  collectivism  with  `modernist'  ideas  on  electoral 
partnership,  economic  reform  and  social  justice.  62  The  DAP  also  now  signalled  its 
assent  to  a  pact  and  form  of  electoral  understanding.  As  Lim  was  to  note  shortly  after 
the  Muktamar:  "The  [only  remaining]  question  to  be  decided  is  the  final  shape  and  form 
"63  of  such  an  Opposition... 
So,  from  these  observations  of  the  unfolding  situation,  we  can  make  the  following 
summary  of  the  `PAS  project'  by  late-1999: 
In  political  terms,  PAS  had  emerged  as  a  more  mature  political  outfit,  increasingly  aware 
of  how  the  power  game  with  UMNO/BN  had  to  be  conducted.  Using  the  crisis  and  the 
Anwar  affair,  it  had  embraced  both  Islamic  and  non-Islamic  energies  in  an  attempt  to 
build  a  new  political  bloc.  While  this  process  had  revealed  key  tensions  between  PAS 
and  DAP  over  the  Islamic  issue,  PAS,  could  now,  as  the  principal  Malay  alternative  to 
UMNO,  assume  a  leading  role  within  the  opposition  alignment.  In  particular,  the 
cultivation  of  a  new  `moral  politics'  had  seen  a  major  expansion  of  its  national  popular 
base.  However,  the  political  cohesion  of  this  arrangement  still  depended  on  meaningful 
accommodations  with  the  other  parties  and  the  wider  reformasi. 
313 In  class/economic  terms,  the  PAS  project  was  focused  on  a  renewal  of  the  state,  greater 
political-corporate  transparency  and  a  set  of  Islamic  alternatives  for  development, 
financial  practices  and  social  planning.  Based  mainly  on  localised  forms  of  development 
in  Kelantan,  the  PAS  model  here  does  not  constitute  a  major  structural  blueprint.  But  it 
does  suggest  a  tentative  challenge  to  the  `hybrid'  version  of  `Islamic  economics',  viz 
`Islamic  banking',  promoted  by  Mahathir  in  pursuit  of  Vision-led  capitalism.  While  this 
was  unlikely  to  gain  mainstream  support  or  threaten  existing  capitalist  institutions,  it  had 
served,  in  the  wake  of  the  financial  crisis,  to  highlight  the  abuses  of  economic  power 
within  the  BN  system. 
In  ideological  terms,  the  party  was  now  contesting  Vision  ideas  more  ably  through  a 
range  of  civil  institutions.  This  reflects  the  role  now  being  played  by  a  new  generation  of 
committed  professional  party  members  through  political  education,  media  presentation, 
linkages  with  wider  Islamic  groupings  and  other  forms  of  populist  organisation.  Again, 
while  PAS-Islam  was  not  acceptable  to  many  Malaysians,  its  principles  were  being  fused 
with  broader  secular  concerns  about  justice,  transparency  and  good-governance.  As  a 
proto-project  involving  wider  cross-ethnic  support  and  intellectual  streams,  this  still  had 
to  find  direction.  But  it  did  illustrate  the  contextual  space  within  which  the  arguments 
and  ideas  for  such  a  project  were  now  located,  thus  laying  the  foundations  for  an 
alternative  bloc. 
Yet,  while  the  PAS  project  was  evidence  of  an  `integration'  of  Islamic,  non-Islamic  and 
reformasi  oppositions,  it  suggested  other  questions  about  the  status  of  `left'  politics  and 
ideas  within  that  process,  a  set  of  issues  to  which  we  now,  finally,  turn. 
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Counterhegemony: 
reformasi,  left  politics  and 
the  conditions  of  dissent 
This  final  chapter  makes  some  assessment  of  the  emerging  opposition  alignment  as  it 
approached  the  1999  General  Election.  With  a  new  set  of  political  and  intellectual  forces 
coming  together  under  the  aegis  of  the  reformasi,  it  also  considers  the  extent  to  which 
`left  ideas'  were  now  part  of  this  alternative  bloc.  Invoking  Gramsci's  view  of 
intellectual  development  as  historically  specific  and  Said's  reflections  on  the  intellectual 
as  outsider,  this  requires  us  to  note  four  key  senses  in  which  a  `left  community'  has  been 
'conditioned':  firstly,  with  regard  to  its  own  definition  of  what  `left'  means;  secondly  in 
relation  to  its  `negotiation'  of  the  `Islamic  factor';  thirdly,  with  respect  to  cultural-ethnic 
cleavages;  and,  fourthly,  through  the  co-optive  efforts  of  the  UMNO  network. 
However,  we  are  also  concerned  to  show  here  how  left-ideas  were  finding  possible  new 
direction  through  the  language  and  praxes  of  reformasi  politics. 
The  emerging  bloc  and  Anwar's  denouement 
On  April  4th  1999,  ten  days  before  the  Anwar  verdict,  and  following  mounting  signals  of 
intent,  Wan  Azizah  and  the  ADIL  leadership  announced  the  formation  of  Parti  Keadilan 
Nasional  (PKN)  (National  Justice  Party).  A  cross-ethnic  party  open  to  all  Malaysians, 
the  PKN  had  `circumvented'  government  restrictions  by  assuming  the  credentials  of  a 
dormant  party  previously  registered  in  1900.  '  Held  at  the  appropriately  named 
Renaissance  Hotel  in  Kuala  Lumpur,  the  launch  had  been  a  tumultuous  affair,  with  the 
PAS,  DAP  and  PRM  leaders  given  special  invitations  to  join  other  reformasi  activists 
within  the  packed  3000  crowd,  while  many  more  exuberant  supporters  celebrated 
outside.  2  In  her  first  speech  as  party  leader,  Wan  Azizah  spoke  of  an  historical  moment, 
allaying  fears  of  splits  and  emphasising  the  need  for  all  the  opposition  to  work  together: 
317 PKN  will  not  split  the  Opposition.  We  will  work  with  all  parties  that  have  justice  as  the  foundation  of 
their  struggle.  Our  party  is  prepared  to  sacrifice  its  own  interests  in  order  to  achieve  the  larger  goal  of 
forging  a  credible  alternative  to  the  Barisan  Nasional,  an  alternative  government  that  will  be  accepted  by 
3  the  people. 
Coinciding  with  his  return  from  exile  in  Indonesia,  Anwar's  former  political  secretary 
Mohamad  Ezam  Noor  read  out  a  prepared  statement  on  Anwar's  behalf  noting  his 
endorsement  of  the  party.  Significantly,  though,  Anwar  would  not  be  joining  the  PKN  in 
a  formal  capacity,  the  strategic  view,  at  this  point,  being  that  he  should  act  as  a  unifying 
figure  for  all  the  opposition  parties. 
Yet,  while  resolving  to  work  with  other  parties,  the  PKN's  arrival  now  altered 
the  basic  configuration  of  opposition  politics.  In  the  first  place,  it  now  undercut  the 
DAP's  nominal  role  as  the  main  opposition  party.  4  By  mid-1999,  there  was  also  some 
tension  over  the  movement  of  some  DAP  members  to  the  PKN,  s  though  the  extent  of 
this  was  being  played-up  by  the  BN  media  while  the  opposition  parties  met  to  mend  the 
damage.  Secondly,  the  PKN's  emergence  offered  a  meaningful  alternative  for 
mainstream  Malaysians  uncomfortable  with  the  perceived  religio-ethnic  options  of  PAS 
and  DAP.  Ezam  had  noted  in  an  earlier  interview  that  while  the  reformasi  would  still 
work  with  PAS  and  DAP,  "I  sense  that  certain  sectors  are  more  comfortable  with  having 
a  new  party  that  is  more  moderate  and  captures  the  middle  ground.  s6  Of  the  two 
parties,  this  was  of  lesser  concern  to  PAS,  who,  as  noted  by  Fadzil  Noor,  had  `foresaw' 
this  development,  adjusting  its  strategy  accordingly  to  concentrate  on  the  four  Northern 
states  while  allowing  the  other  `cross-ethnic  parties'  to  lead  the  challenge  (with  its 
support)  in  the  more  urban  areas. 
The  announcement  had  also  been  hastened  by  the  extent  of  the  BN's  victory  in 
the  Sabah  state  elections  (March  12th  &  13th  1999)  which,  despite  some  evidence  of 
electoral  chicanery,  had  seen  the  BN  take  31  of  the  48  seats  (down  from  43  in  1994),  the 
other  17  seats  going  to  the  opposition  PBS.  7  While  the  Anwar  situation  had  not  been  a 
key  issue  in  the  Sabah  election,  and,  thus,  not  a  true  test  of  political  feeling  in  Peninsular 
Malaysia,  it  had  served  as  a  salutary  lesson  on  the  need  for  opposition  unity.  A  timely 
reminder  of  this  was  Jomo's  warning  to  the  opposition  not  to  underestimate  the  power 
and  influence  of  the  BN  machine  on  the  ground,  while  pointing  out  some  political 
realities  to  the  DAP: 
318 That's  why  the  opposition  has  to  get  its  act  together,  present  a  solid  united  front  on  the  basis  of  a 
common  minimum  program  and  strict  party  internal  discipline  and,  very  importantly,  achieve  the  co- 
operation  and  co-ordination  at  all  levels  which  is  now  a  BN  monopoly...  [T]he  DAP  must  also  appreciate 
that  for  the  Malay-based  opposition,  especially  reformasi,  it  is  crucial  to  offer  a  superior  alternative  to 
the  public,  especially  the  Malay  population...  But  my  emphasis  on  the  problems  facing  the  opposition  is 
mainly  due  to  the  naive  wishful  thinking  which  is  quite  widespread  among  opposition  sympathizers  and 
well-meaning  analysts,  not  only  among  reformasi  supporters  new  to  politics,  especially  opposition 
politics,  but  also  among  more  experienced  people  encountering  an  unprecedented  political  situation  in 
the  country.  ' 
Reinforcing  Jomo's  point  here  was  the  UMNO  network's  increased  offensive 
against  the  foreign  media  and  opposition  academics.  In  February  1999,  all  government 
agencies  were  instructed  to  cancel  their  subscriptions  to  the  International  Herald 
Tribune,  Asiaweek  and  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review.  9  Earlier  that  month,  Mirzan 
Mahathir  had  issued  a  writ  against  the  Malaysian  printers  of  the  Asian  Wall  Street 
Journal  for  US$39.5  million  following  an  account  of  how  his  financial  success  had  been 
linked  to  favoured  deals  and  money  politics.  The  network  was  also  engaged  here  in  an 
attempt  to  ruin  Jomo  himself  for  `slandering'  Vincent  Tan  of  Berjaya  in  the  AWSJ  piece. 
Still  outstanding  was  a  similar  RM60  million  suit  aganst  the  human  rights  lawyer  and  UN 
rapporteur  Param  Cumaraswamy.  The  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review  journalist  Murray 
Hiebert  was  facing  a  jail  sentence  as  he  prepared  to  appeal  a  conviction  for  writing  a 
`defamatory'  article  about  the  speedy  processing  of  a  lawsuit  brought  by  the  wife  of  a 
prominent  Appeals  Court  judge.  10  And,  with  an  election  imminent,  the  government's 
anti-slander  campaign  was  stepped-up  to  sue  Ruslan  Kassin,  the  PKN's  information 
chief,  over  claims  that  Megat  Junid  had  RM80  million  `stashed  away'  in  Israeli  banks.  " 
In  another  warning  shot,  Chandra  had  been  sacked  from  his  post  as  Director  of 
Civilisational  Dialogue  at  University  Malaya,  partly  as  a  move  to  manage  the  Centre's 
influence  (including  its  links  with  Anwar)  12  and  as  a  more  direct  response  to  Chandra's, 
by  now,  prominent  role  in  ADIL  and  the  proto-PKN. 
On  April  14th  1999,  after  77  days  of  testimony,  Justice  Augustine  Paul  handed  down  his 
verdict  in  the  Anwar  case.  In  a  394  page  ruling  (based  on  the  case  of  Public  Prosecutor 
versus  Nunis),  13  Anwar  was  found  guilty  on  the  four  corruption  charges  and  sentenced 
to  six  years  on  each  count  (to  run  concurrently.  )  His  seven  months  detention  was  not 
319 deducted  from  the  sentence  and  no  bail  was  allowed  pending  appeal.  The  verdict  came 
as  little  surprise  to  close  observers,  14  Anwar  or  his  defence  team,  though  Wan  Azizah 
was  said  to  be  shocked  at  the  length  of  the  sentence.  Many  foreign  governments 
`expressed  concern',  "  while  Amnesty  reconfirmed  Anwar  as  a  prisoner  of  conscience.  16 
Street  protests  and  sporadic  rioting  followed,  again  met  by  water  cannon  and  the  beating 
of  protesters  by  a  well-prepared  deployment  of  police  and  FRU.  Alongside  other 
activists,  Tian  Chua  was,  again,  arrested.  That  evening,  PAS  held  a  mass  protest 
gathering  addressed  by  reformasi  figures  at  its  Taman  Melewar  headquarters  in  Kuala 
Lumpur.  17  In  a  damage  limitation  exercise,  the  BN  issued  statements  calling  for  calm, 
asking  the  public  to  respect  the  verdict  and  the  judicial  process.  This  coincided  with  the 
Royal  Commission  of  Inquiry's  judgement  into  Anwar's  beating,  recommending  Rahim 
Noor's  prosecution  as  the  sole  offender,  "  this  and  other  such  news  being  timed  for 
release  through  Bernama. 
While  there  would  be  no  repetition  of  the  September  1998  riots,  Anwar's 
incarceration  as  a  leading  political  prisoner  now  offered  the  reformasi  a  potent  new 
symbol.  In  this  sense,  the  trial  and  verdict  illustrated  the  dilemma  for  Mahathir  and  the 
power  bloc:  whether  to  allow  a  fair  hearing  and  risk  letting  Anwar  loose  as  a  political 
combatant,  thus  restoring  the  credibility  of  the  judiciary  and  wider  system;  or  ensure 
Anwar's  conviction,  risking  loss  of  faith  in  the  legal  process,  but  keeping  him  under 
political  wraps.  As  a  strategy,  Mahathir  appeared  to  have  gambled  that  recourse  to  the 
latter  might  be  disguised  by  the  pretence  of  an  impartial  trial.  However,  it  was  evident  to 
many  that  Augustine  Paul's  handling  of  the  case  was  consistent  with  more  critical 
judgements  being  made  within  the  UMNO  network  about  the  need  to  protect  the  power 
structure  itself.  Lacking  space  here  for  a  full  survey  of  the  trial  and  its  tangled  detail,  the 
following  aspects  illustrate  both  the  concerns  expressed  over  its  conduct  and  the  fears  of 
key  elites  behind  the  scenes:  19 
*  Justice  Augustine  Paul's  refusal,  at  the  outset,  to  grant  special  observer  status  to  human  rights  groups 
and  other  official  foreign  figures. 
*  The  Judge's  negation  of  key  evidence  from  the  main  prosecution  witness,  Special  Branch  Director 
Mohamed  Said  Awang,  admitting  in  a  letter  to  Dr.  Mahathir  that  the  sodomy  and  adultery  allegations 
made  by  Azizan  Abu  Bakar  (Anwar's  wife's  driver)  and  Ummi  Hafilda  Ali  (businesswoman  and  sister 
320 of  Anwar's  former  private  secretary  Mohamed  Azmin  Ali)  were  baseless.  20  Said  had  also  admitted  the 
`possible  existence'  of  a  second  police  report  naming  Daim,  Consumer  Affairs  Minister  Megat  Junid 
Megat  Ayob  and  Mahathir's  Political  Secretary  Aziz  Shasuddin  as  the  main  conspirators  in  a  smear 
campaign  against  Anwar.  Despite  `instructions'  to  the  prosecution  to  look  for  the  report,  it  was  never 
produced  in  court. 
*  The  Judge's  acceptance  of  claims  made  by  Said,  Amir  Junus,  the  Deputy  Director  of  Special  Branch, 
and  Special  Branch  officer  Abdul  Aziz  Hussin  that  Anwar  had  instructed  them  to  'gempar'  (frighten) 
Azizan  and  Ummi  into  retracting  their  `statements'  (concerning  Anwar's  `sexual  impropriety)  to  the 
PM,  this  being  the  `substance'  of  the  prosecution's  corruption  case.  Azizan's  own  testimony, 
contradicting  his  claim  (made  to  Ummi  and  sent  as  part  of  her  letter  to  the  PM)  to  have  been  sodomised 
by  Anwar,  was  also  allowed  to  stand  despite  defence  attempts  to  have  it  thrown  out. 
*  Said's  own  admissions  that  he  might,  if  required,  `lie  for  Mahathir'  and  that  intense  mental  pressure 
and  other  menggemparnya  (fear  instilling)  police  techniques  had  been  used  to  `turn-over'  Azizan  and 
Ummi. 
*  The  Judge's  acceptance  of  chief  CID  officer  Musa  Hassan's  account  of  an  alleged  `cover-up' 
discussion  he  had  with  Anwar  in  the  presence  of  the  Attorney-General  (AG)  (directing  him  not  to 
proceed  with  the  investigation)  despite  Anwar's  denial  and  lack  of  evidence  that  Musa  was  present.  21 
*  The  Judge's  disregard  for  Azmin  Ali's  testimony  that  his  sister  Ummi  was  a  "compulsive  liar"  and 
had  been  disowned  by  her  family,  that  Megat  Junid  had  written  Ummi's  letter  to  the  PM  and  that  Azmin 
himself  had  not  been  sodomised  by  Anwar  despite  police  threats  to  confess.  Azmin's  wife  Shamsidar 
Taharin  also  denied  having  an  affair  with  Anwar,  as  alleged  by  Ummi. 
*  The  decision  to  disallow  the  defence's  presentation  of  taped  conversations  between  Ummi  Hafildi  and 
businessman  Sng  Chee  Hua  in  London.  The  Judge  also  later  barred  media  reporting  of  names  referred 
to  in  telephone  conversations  made  by  Ummi  from  London  to  Malaysia,  taped  by  businessman  Nor 
Azman  Abdullah,  as  noted  in  his  testimony.  22' 
*  The  decision,  at  the  prosecution's  request,  to  amend  the  wording  of  the  corruption  charges  and 
(having,  in  effect,  failed  to  prove  the  sodomy  charges)  the  amendment  of  the  overall  charges  to  include 
only  the  corruption  charges.  The  `evidence'  from  the  sodomy  charges  (including  the  production  of  a 
semen-stained  mattress  allegedly  linked  to  an  affair  with  Shamsidar)  had  been  allowed  extensive  public 
display,  thus  serving  the  intended  purpose  of  casting  doubt  on  Anwar's  character. 
321 *  The  constant  blocking  of  the  defence's  lines  of  enquiry  -  eliciting  the  considerable  skills  of  its  lead 
counsel  Raja  Aziz  Adrusse.  The  most  critical  aspect  of  this  constant  `not  relevant'  refrain  was  the 
ruling  that  the  defence  could  not  pursue  examination  of  the  case  for  `political  conspiracy',  despite  the 
defence's  attempt  to  prove  that  police  malafide  was  linked  to  an  orchestrated  conspiracy  from  above. 
*  The  ruling  that  Mohtar  Abdullah,  the  Attorney-General,  could  take-over  the  role  of  lead  prosecutor 
from  Abdul  Ghani  Patail  at  a  crucial  stage  of  the  trial  (Anwar's  testimony)  despite  himself  being  a 
potential  witness  and  alleged  figure  in  the  conspiracy. 
*  The  decision  to  embargo  key  parts  of  Anwar's  testimony  in  order  to  maintain  the  confidentiality  of 
sensitive  conversations  Anwar  had  (as  related  in  court)  with  Mahathir  and  the  IGP  Rahim  Noor. 
Reference  to  discussions  with  Trade  and  Industry  Secretary  Rafidah  Aziz  were  also  barred  to  the 
media.  23 
*  The  `not  relevant'  ruling  on  defence  evidence  (by  Anwar's  former  aide  Zull  Aznam  Harun)  that 
Azizan  had  been  paid  money  to  send  a  letter  to  the  PM  containing  allegations  of  sexual  misconduct. 
*  The  Judge's  petty  interruptions  and  slow  note-taking  during  the  defence's  questioning,  stemming  the 
flow  and  spontaneity  of  their  case,  in  contrast  to  that  afforded  to  the  prosecution. 
*  The  ruling  disallowing  the  defence  from  producing  ten  of  its  last  key  witnesses. 
*  The  contempt  of  court  ruling  and  three-month  (suspended)  sentence  against  one  of  Anwar's  defence 
lawyers,  Zainar  Zakaria,  for  moving  to  disqualify  two  public  prosecutors. 
*  Augustine  Paul's  own  rejection  of  a  defence  application  to  have  him  disqualified  on  grounds  of  bias. 
What  also  emerges  from  the  court  transcripts  is  the  very  close  and  often  cordial 
relationships  Anwar  had  with  the  two  Special  Branch  figures,  the  AG  and  the  IGP  prior 
to  his  downfall.  Another  is  his  close  dealings  with  a  number  of  key  business  elites.  This 
indicates  two  main  things:  firstly,  the  extent  to  which  Anwar  had  been  a  privileged  part 
of  the  power  structure,  even  allowing  for  Daim's  watchful  eye  and  the  unfolding  plot  to 
oust  him;  secondly,  the  crisis  within  the  power  bloc  which,  when  the  purge  on  Anwar 
was  decided  upon,  saw  these  and  other  top  figures  turn  against  Anwar.  This  also  gives 
credence  to  the  defence  claim  that  the  police  conspiracy  formed  an  internal  part  of  the 
political  conspiracy  from  above,  suggesting,  in  turn,  a  necessary,  if  unpalatable,  set  of 
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corporate  interests. 
By  late-1999,  the  opposition,  comprising  PAS,  DAP,  PKN  and  PRM,  had  gathered  itself 
into  the  Barisan  Alternatif  (Alternative  Front),  its  manifesto,  `Towards  a  Just  Malaysia', 
pronouncing  the  party's  new  co-operative  intentions.  24  Despite  his  ongoing  sodomy  trial 
(and  new  moves  by  the  Anti-Corruption  Agency  to  investigate  his  financial  probity  while 
in  office),  the  Front  confirmed  Anwar  as  their  nominal  leader.  Recognising  his  custodial 
position,  the  BA  stated  that  it  would  appoint  an  interim  leader,  based  on  majority 
support  in  the  Dewan  Rakyat,  should  it  be  elected.  Thereafter,  there  would  be  a  full 
judicial  inquiry  into  the  political  conspiracy  which  had  led  to  Anwar's  imprisonment, 
allowing  him  to  take  his  rightful  place  as  Prime  Minister. 
Despite  doubts  over  its  imediate  electoral  abilities,  the  Front's  importance  also 
lay  in  its  potential  to  establish  longer-term  structures,  alliances  and  intellectual  challenges 
to  the  prevailing  power  bloc.  To  what  extent,  then,  had  the  crisis  created  new  space  for 
political  mobilisation?  In  particular,  with  regard  to  Gramscian  conceptions  of  a  socialist 
praxes,  what  kind  of  `left  agenda'  could  be  noted  within  and  around  the  reformasi  by 
this  point?  To  address  these  questions,  let  us  consider  four  main  factors  which  have 
served  to  `condition'  ideas  within  the  `left  intellectual  community',  beginning  with  the 
problem  of  definition  itself. 
Situating  the  left:  conditions  and  legacies 
Some  of  the  historical  context  of  `left  politics'  in  Malaysia  has  been  noted  in  the 
preceding  chapters.  However,  it  is  necessary  to  offer  some  kind  of  defining  statement  of 
what  we  mean  by  `the  left'  in  order  to  situate  it  vis-ä-vis  the  reformasi.  In  particular,  it 
is  important  to  make  the  distinction  between  `left'  and  `liberal'  ideas  within  this 
relationship.  With  specific  reference  to  the  left  in  Southeast  Asia,  Hewison  and  Rodan 
provide,  in  both  regards,  a  helpful  point  of  departure: 
The  `Left'  is  a  term  which  is  often  used  loosely  to  refer  to  a  variety  of  reformist  movements  and  ideas. 
However,  we  understand  the  common  denominator  of  the  `Left'  to  be  an  emphasis  on  alternatives  to  the 
individualism  of  market  relationships  and  a  commitment  to  values  which  advance  public  and  collective 
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carrying  a  vision  of  an  alternative  social  system,  such  as  socialism  or  Communism.  It  can,  however, 
also  involve  reformism  of  a  social  democratic  nature  which  may  challenge  the  prerogatives  of  capital 
and  the  market  within  much  tighter  limits,  and  without  any  serious  vision  of  an  alternative  social 
system.  Both  these  variants  of  the  Left  can  be  differentiated  from  liberal  reformism  which  may 
champion  individual  human  rights,  the  rule  of  law  and  liberal  democracy,  for  example,  without 
embracing  collectivism  and  challenges  to  the  market.  25 
Assuming  this  basic  definition  and  distinction,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  decisive  part  of 
left  activity  in  Malaysia  lies  somewhere  between  the  `left-social-democratic'  and  the 
`liberal  reformist'  variants.  Two  main  points  can  be  made  in  this  regard. 
Firstly,  the  left  have  always  been  a  marginal  (and  marginalised)  political  force  in 
Malaysia  -  certainly  if  we  are  to  take  the  outlawed  status  of  the  Malayan  Communist 
Party  as  an  historical  indicator.  A  key  reason  for  this,  as  noted,  has  been  the  BN's  use  of 
communal  politics  as  a  form  of  class  control.  Another  is  the  sense  in  which  neo- 
liberalism,  global  accumulation  and  the  search  for  low-cost  investment  sites  undermined 
socialism  as  a  strategy  for  developing  countries  in  the  region  and  elsewhere.  26  To  some 
extent,  the  BN's  practical  commitment  to  basic  social  spending  and  rural  development 
has  also  kept  left  politics  in  check.  -  For  this  and  other  such  reasons,  domestic  NGOs  are 
less  numerous  and  active  than  their  Indonesian,  Thai  and  Philippine  counterparts.  27 
Thus,  secondly,  those  groups  one  might  associate  with  holding  `leftist'  credentials  cannot 
simply  be  viewed  as  such.  For  example,  since  its  initiation  in  1977,  Aliran  has  provided 
a  broad  forum  for  reformist  discourse  among  the  broad  NGO  community.  Its  position 
on  most  issues  is  strongly  egalitarian  and  underwritten  by  a  sincere  desire  for  the  just 
society.  This  has  been  informed,  in  the  main,  by  liberal  values  and  `spiritual'  concerns, 
particularly  under  Chandra's  presidency.  But  while  reflecting  a  nominally  (middle-class) 
`moral-left'  politics,  this  does  not  denote  any  particular  `socialist  agenda.  '  Nor  has  the 
`Aliran  community'  been  specifically  engaged,  in  the  past,  as  a  direct  action  group  - 
though,  by  the  time  of  the  crisis,  it  appeared  to  be  taking  a  more  `mainstream'  role  in 
breaking-down  ethnic  tensions  and  encouraging  new  forms  of  cross-ethnic 
politicisation.  28 
In  contrast  to  Aliran,  Suaram  denotes  a  more  grassroots  activism,  even  if,  again, 
its  political  motif  is  that  of  a  human  rights  organisation.  Although  politically  peripheral, 
Suaram  and  other  bodies  such  the  women's  grouping  Tenaganita,  the  Community 
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ground  activities  in  support  of,  for  example,  plantation  labour  and  other  low-paid 
workers  inside  the  (FTZ)  electronics  and  textile  factories.  Tenaganita  has  also  taken-up 
diverse  issues  such  as  trafficking  in  women  and  the  impact  of  the  crisis  on  migrant 
workers.  29  Through  consistent  campaigns,  opposition  seminars,  workshops  and  other 
gatherings,  these  groups  had  provided  the  nucleus  of  a  small,  but  active,  `left- 
democratic'  community  prior  to  the  reformasi.  30  Indeed,  it  was  not  coincidental  that 
Tenaganita's  support  for  Lim  Guan  Eng  and  the  reformasi  saw  its  director  Irene 
Fernandez  subject  to  prosecution  in  1998-99  for  highlighting  the  harsh  conditions  of 
illegal  migrants  in  Malaysian  detention  camps.  Thus,  while  many  NGOs  are  de  facto 
government  forums,  liberal-reformist  groups,  through  single-issue-type  campaigns,  have 
helped  build  significant  support  bases  within  the  emerging  opposition.  31 
At  the  formal  level  of  politics,  only  the  Parti  Rakyat  Malaysia  (PRM),  under 
Syed  Husin  Ali,  has  any  real  credentials  as  a  meaningful  socialist  party.  However,  within 
the  context  of  ethnic  party  arrangements,  it  has  always  been  a  peripheral  part  of  the 
opposition,  even  compelled  to  guard  against  alleged  communist  associations  -  hence 
the  dropping  'of  the  word  `socialist'  from  its  name.  As  part  of  the  inter-communal 
Socialist  Front  (1957-66),  the  PRM,  (with  the  Labour  Party)  opposed  Alliance 
`consociationalism',  its  continued  collaboration  with  British  colonial  interests  and  its 
laissez-faire  policies.  Although  `left-social-democratic',  rather  than  `far-left',  PRM 
policy  objectives  are  strongly  weighted  towards  meaningful  control  of  capital,  social 
ownership  and  strong  institutions  of  participative  democracy.  32  Perhaps  more  than  any 
other  leader,  Syed  Husin  Ali  has  been  consistent  in  his  denunciation  of  US  foreign  policy 
-a  position  uncompromised  by  US  support  for  Anwar  in  1998.33 
The  lack  of  a  left  agenda  is  most  apparent  within  the  DAP.  As,  perhaps,  its 
foremost  critic,  the  leftist  writer,  activist  and  academic  Kua  Kia  Soong  has  offered  a 
number  of  searching  assessments  of  the  DAP  leadership  and  the  party's  lack  of  a 
coherent  set  of  socialist  policies.  A  detailed  critique  can  be  found  in  his  key  expose, 
Inside  the  DAP,  based  on  Kua's,  Lim  Ban  Chen's  and  other  civil  rights  activists'  decision 
to  join  the  party  in  1990  (Kua  being  appointed  head  of  Political  Education),  their  inside 
analysis  and  their  decision  to  leave  after  1995.  Here,  four  main  indictments  can  be 
noted:  34 
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Here,  notes  Kua,  there  was  an  absence  of  any  radical  alternative  to  BN  policies  on  public  spending, 
taxation,  privatisation  and  social  services.  Rather,  the  DAP  leadership  pandered  to  a  soft  reformism 
under  the  (Vision-type)  slogans  of  `Malaysian  Malaysia'.  Democratic  socialism  was  rarely  used  or 
discussed  as  a  policy  basis.  Reflecting  this,  the  Central  Executive  Committee  (CEC)  had  insisted  on 
using  "Full  Liberalisation"  as  a  campaign  slogan  and  agenda  for  the  1995  Election,  an  implicit 
admission  of  UMNOBN's  `partial  liberalisation',  suggesting  that  the  DAP  could  complete  this  task. 
This  "out  and  out  reformist",  rather  than  socialist,  view  denotes  the  sense  in  which  the  DAP  leadership 
accept  the  rules  of  the  game  by  giving  credence  to  BN  reform  as  an  agenda-setting  discourse.  35 
*  The  party's  'fixation"  on  retaining  its  Chinese  electoral  base. 
This  concerns  the  DAP  leadership's  deep-lying  ethnic  chauvinism  in  tying  Chinese  sensibilities  to  party 
interests.  Many  of  the  aforementioned  problems  between  the  DAP  and  PAS  can  be  traced  to  the  internal 
debates  within  the  CEC  after  1990.  The  decision  to  withdraw  from  the  Gagasan  Rakyat  on  'the  eve'  of 
the  1995  Election,  notes  Kua,  was  specifically  informed  by  this  fear  of  being  too  closely  associated  with 
PAS,  still  seen  as  'the  main  enemy'  by  some  CEC  figures.  As  Secretary  General  (SG),  Lim  Kit  Siang's 
eventual  decision  to  withdraw  from  the  coalition  was  opposed  only  by  Kua  and  Lim  who,  maintaining 
the  case  for  a  multi-racial  Opposition  Front,  argued  that  any  differences  with  PAS  and  S46  were 
secondary  to  that  of  defeating  the  real  enemy,  the  BN.  36 
*  Lim  Kit  Siang's  leadership  style,  factionalism  and  absence  of  democratic  procedures. 
Through  a  `central  faction',  the  SG  has  maintained  tight  authority  over  the  party,  as  in  his  monopoly 
over  the  candidate  selection  process,  a  "form  of  patronage"  which,  in  places  like  Selangor,  had  given 
rise  to  opportunists  and  local  factionalisms.  While  Kua  and  Lim  sought  to  democratise  the  selection 
process  and  infuse  "intellectually  uninspiring"  CEC  meetings,  Lim  Kit  Siang's  'top-down'  manner 
could  be  seen  in  his  lack  of  empathy  for  rank  and  file  elements,  including  women's  groupings,  an 
inclination  for  'edict-style'  press  releases,  his  grooming  of  Lim  Guan  Eng  as  leader  and  his  refusual  to 
37  stand  down  after  the  party's  worst-ever  defeat  in  1995. 
*  The  party's  marginalisation  of  the  PRM. 
During  the  1995  Election,  the  DAP  leadership  refused  to  give  ground  to  other  opposition  elements, 
notably  the  PRM.  Despite  Kua's  and  Lim's  interventions  on  behalf  of  Syed  Husin  Ali  (and  their 
recognition  of  the  many  intellectuals  who  supported  PRM),  the  hostile  and  "non-bargainable"  position 
towards  him  and  other  PRM  candidates,  notes  Kua,  was  indicative  of  narrow,  sectarian  party  politics 
and  the  attempted  monopolisation  of  the  opposition  space  for  immediate  political  and  careerist 
reasons.  38 
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leading  party  elements  were  making  a  bid  for  party  control  by  the  time  of  the  crisis, 
resulting  in  the  purging  of  three  Central  Executive  Committee  (CEC)  members  in  mid- 
1998.  As  noted  by  Kua  in  a  key  Aliran  article,  39  this  signified  an  ironic  power  struggle, 
with  disaffected  "`Old  Turks'  squaring  off  against  the  `Young  Guards'  of  the  Kit 
Siang/Guan  Eng  status  quo.  "  It  also  mirrored  complaints  by  the  Old  Guard  that  Lim  had 
been  less  than  consistent  in  relation  to  past  campaigns  by  giving  special  promotion  to  the 
Guan  Eng  roadshow  to  protest  his  jailing.  The  CEC  members'  `failure  to  support'  the 
campaign  (disguised  as  not  having  dispensed  their  duties  properly)  thus  provided  a 
pretext  for  their  removal,  a  move  supported  by  the  new  generation  `wanabee'  party 
figures  who  had  backed  Lim's  grooming  of  Lim  Guan  Eng  as  party  leader  prior  to  his 
imprisonment.  Even  if,  as  the  DAP  claim,  Kua's  "tirade"  was  motivated  by  the  need  to 
justify  his  own  past  actions  (itself  a  questionable  charge)  4'  his  account  fitted  with  more 
widely-held  concerns  by  this  point  over  DAP  policies  and  internal  practices. 
Neither  did  this  limit  Kua's  and  other  leftists'  support  for  Lim  Guan  Eng  or  the 
broad  reformasi.  It  constituted,  rather,  a  broad  coalition  of  left/liberal-reformist 
elements  based  around  the  persecution  of  Anwar,  Guan  Eng,  Irene  Fernandez  and  others. 
While  not  a  `left  movement'  in  any  radical  sense,  the  reformasi  was  creating  new  space 
for  debate  and  opportunities  for  left  expression,  as  in  Syed  Husin  Ali's  Harakah 
contributions  on  issues  of  social  justice.  This,  of  course,  is  intrinsic  to  most  left 
discourse.  But  the  invocation  of  a  moral  politics  was  also  helping  to  augment  a  proto- 
class  politics  by  providing  a  context  for  ordinary  Malaysians  to  look  behind  the  scenes 
and  think  more  critically  about  political-corporate  power  and  the  nature  of  the  UMNO 
network.  Thus,  while  left-intellectual  discourse  had  been  `conditioned'  by  liberal- 
reformist  language,  the  reformasi  was  allowing  a  more  meaningful  articulation  of  left 
ideas. 
Left  intellectuals  and  the  Islamic  condition 
Left-intellectual  discourse  in  Malaya/Malaysia  has  also  been  deeply  conditioned  by  Islam. 
As  closely  interacting  forms  of  religious  and  social  identity,  Islamic  and  Malay  codes 
have  had  a  profound  bearing  on  the  values  and  emancipatory  perspectives  of  many  Malay 
left  intellectuals.  Likewise,  non-Malay  left-intellectuals  have  been  conditioned  by  their 
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As  noted  by  Clammer,  in  relation  to  both  cases,  it  is  important  to  recognise  the  particular 
nature  of  intellectual  identity  in  Southeast  Asia: 
... 
in  the  West  the  intellectual  is  associated  with  secularisation,  but  in  Asia,  very  much  to  the  contrary, 
the  emancipatory  intellectual  is  more  likely  to  be  religious,  and  to  be  very  much  concerned  with,  as  his 
primary  interest,  the  relationship  of  religion  to  society,  including  its  economic  and  political 
dimensions.  " 
In  this  regard,  the  internalisation  of  religious  and  cultural  identity  has  created  a 
certain  ambivalence  and  `introspection'  amongst  the  wider  `left-intellectual  community' 
in  Malaysia.  As  Jomo  also  notes,  manipulation  from  above,  through  `fears'  of  another 
May  13th,  has  created  an  environment  in  which  intellectual  ideas  are  formed  as 
communal  messages  and  received  as  such  by  the  public.  In  this  sense,  "an  idea  is  often 
associated  with  its  promoter,  and  is  evaluated  in  relation  to  one's  own  personal  or  ethical 
agenda.  i42 
The  Quran,  of  course,  offers  an  explicit  statement  of  compatibility  between  Islam 
and  a  `left  politics'  of  social  justice.  Its  message  is: 
...  reformist,  if  not  revolutionary  ... 
The  socio-economic  reforms  of  the  Quran  are  among  its  most  striking 
features.  Exploitation  of  the  poor,  weak,  widows,  women,  orphans  and  slaves  is  vividly 
condemned...  The  Quran  demands  that  Muslims  pursue  a  path  of  social  justice,  rooted  in  the  recognition 
that  the  earth  belongs  ultimately  to  God  and  that  human  beings  are  its  caretakers.  While  wealth  is  seen 
as  good,  a  sign  of  hard  work  and  God's  pleasure,  its  pursuit  and  accumulation  are  limited  by  God's  law. 
Its  rewards  are  subject  to  social  responsibility  toward  other  members  of  the  community,  in  particular  the 
poor  and  needy...  43 
Thus,  at  one  level,  there  is  a  consistency  of  thought  linking  Islam  and  progressive 
intellectuals.  At  another,  however,  the  interpretation  of  social  phenomena  by  that 
intellectual  community  has  become  tied-up  with  an  Islamic  ethics  to  such  an  extent  that  it 
may  have  served,  inadvertently,  to  constrain  radical  political  energies  in  Malaysia.  This 
has  been  due,  in  part,  to  the  complex  task  of  fusing  Islamic  jurisprudence  and  concepts  of 
secular  freedoms  into  a  coherent  reformist  agenda.  But  it  also  relates  to  the  idea  of  a 
`benevolent  universalism'  of  Islamic  values  as  a  basis  for  social  reconstruction  and 
justice.  Allowing  for  the  egalitarian  integrity  of  Islamic  civil  and  political  codes,  this 
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communities  within  Malaysian  society  can  be  built  around  an  Islamic  ethics. 
A  key  illustration  of  this  `ethical  vision'  is  contained  in  a  seminal  article  by 
Chandra  Muzaffar,  `Quranic  universalism,  way  to  fuse  diversity',  presented  as  part  of  a 
major  three-part  series  in  the  New  Straits  Times,  1994,  and  in  Harakah  during  the  Anwar 
crisis.  44  Although  an  Indian  Malaysian  and  convert  to  Islam,  the  tone  and  context  of 
Chandra's  argument  here,  and  in  the  related  articles,  are  symptomatic  of  the  `Islamic 
condition'  as  it  confronts  the  issues  of  Malay  identity,  the  historical  compromise  of 
Malay  nationhood  and  the  accommodation  of  non-Malay  interests: 
In  order  to  strengthen  accommodation,  it  is  imperative  that  Chinese  and  Indian  Malaysians  understand 
the  nature  and  extent  of  accommodation  that  has  taken  place  in  our  society.  It  is  a  pity  that  there  is  so 
little  understanding  and  appreciation  of  this  among  the  non  Malays.  How  many  non  Malay  leaders  and 
intellectuals  have  shown  any  appreciation  at  all  of  the  colossal,  monumental  sacrifice  on  the  part  of  the 
Malays  -  consenting  to  equal  citizenship  for  the  non  Malays  and  thereby  surrendering  their  dream  of  a 
Malay  nation  and  becoming  a  community  among  communities  in  a  new  multi  ethnic  society?  One  of  the 
reasons  why  the  magnitude  of  this  sacrifice  is  not  appreciated  is  because  the  non  Malays  as  a  whole  have 
an  external  rather  than  an  internal  view  of  Malaysian  history.  45 
While  Malay  intellectuals  may  not  express  a  consistent  or  homogeneous  view  of 
Islam  or  Islamic  universalism,  Chandra's  argument  here  represents  a  central  problem  for 
them  and  left  intellectuals  generally.  Juxtaposing  these  problems  of  ethnic 
accommodation,  he  posits  the  need  for  a  new  awarenes  of  `common  history'  and  the 
values  of  Quranic  universalism: 
Socialising  non  Malays  and  Malaysian  society  into  their  internal  view  of  history  through  schools,  the 
media,  community  organisations  and  the  like,  should  be  one  of  our  most  immediate  and  urgent  tasks. 
As  non  Malays  and  non  Muslims  understand  their  accommodation  through  an  internal  view  of  history, 
they  should  be  made  aware  of  the  role  of  Islam  in  casting  the  Malay  value  system  in  a  more  inclusive, 
less  exclusive  mould  -  so  much  so  that  acceptance  of  the  other  has  become  part  and  parcel  of  Malay 
political  culture.  More  than  that,  the  non  Muslim  communities  as  a  whole  should  develop  a  more 
profound,  a  more  balanced  outlook  on  Islam...  In  this  connection,  one  cannot  help  observe  with  a  tinge  of 
sadness  that  since  Merdeka  hardly  any  non  Muslim  scholar,  theologian,  journalist,  politician  or  social 
activist  has  made  it  his  mission  to  reduce  the  negative  perceptions  of  Islam  within  the  non  Muslim 
communities  in  the  country  ... 
By  incorporating  genuine  Islamic  values  and  principles  into  public  policies 
which  impact  upon  non  Muslims  in  education,  commerce  and  industry,  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  they 
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the  application  of  the  Islamic  concept  of  social  justice.  The  Malay  Muslim  leadership  has  one  of  those 
rare  opportunities  in  history  to  establish  a  society  which  embodies  the  spirit  of  universalism  contained 
in  the  Holy  Quran  in  all  its  manifestations...  a6 
Chandra's  polemic  here  shows  how  an  Islamic  ethics  superimposes  itself  over 
Malaysian  society  and  the  special  context  within  which  progressive  Islamic  ideas  are 
framed.  While  the  linkages  between  state,  civil  society  and  shariah  law  in  Muslim 
societies  may  assume  a  variety  of  hybrid  forms,  what  is  envisaged  here  is  a  benign 
infusion  of  Islamic  values,  initiated  through  policies  and  institutions  which  reach  across 
the  racial  spectrum.  It  suggests  ideals  of  reciprocity,  contract  and  communal  regard  for 
Islam  as  the  principal  source  and  provider  of  social  justice. 
While  the  Anwar  affair  had  prompted  a  new  mood  of  cross-ethnic,  social- 
reformist  politics,  the  realisation  of  these  aims  and  values  within  a  multi-cultural 
environment  like  Malaysia  remained  problematic.  The  idea  of  a  `primary'  Islamic  value 
system  for  non-Muslims  appeared  to  negate  the  basic  concept  of  equal  consultation  and 
ethical  freedoms  of  other  `contracting'  parties.  47  On  the  other  hand,  contract-type 
approaches  also  tend  to  reify  the  ideals  of  `social  pacts',  failing  to  recognise  the  unequal 
power  relations  underlying  them.  It  is  also  important  to  see  that  `universalism'  is  a  key 
principle  of  hegemony.  Thus,  while  Islamic  universalism  may  offer  egalitarian  pointers 
for  ethnic  co-operation,  it  is  not  clear  whether  it  can  offer  an  actual  basis  for  social 
integration  across  the  ethnic  spectrum. 
A  related  factor  for  Malay  intellectuals  has  been  the  attempt  to  link  domestic 
political  ideas  with  calls  from  within  Islamic  scholarship  for  a  "new  self-image  for 
Islam".  48  Chandra's  own  defence  of  Islamic  moderation  has  involved,  in  this  regard,  an 
ongoing  critique  of  PAS-Islam.  Yet,  in  less  `liberal'  tones,  Chandra,  alongside  PAS  and 
other  Malay  intellectuals,  has  also  denounced  Salman  Rushdie  as  a  blasphemer  and  The 
Satanic  Verses  as  a  debasement  of  free  speech.  While  repudiating  the  fatwah  as  lacking 
spiritual  legitimacy  and  the  compassionate  essence  of  Islam,  Chandra  notes  the  way  in 
which  characters  and  events  in  the  book  were  distorted  "to  suit  the  author's  vile 
imagination.  "49 
It  is  not  necessary  to  proceed  with  any  detailed  examination  of  the  Rushdie 
case.  50  The  key  point  is  that  Chandra's  response  helps  convey  the  particular  context 
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the  explicit  view  of  Said  who,  in  reference  to  the  Rushdie  affair,  argues  that: 
...  the  intellectual  must  be  involved  in  a  lifelong  dispute  with  all  the  guardians  of  sacred  vision  or  text, 
whose  depredations  are  legion-Uncompromising  freedom  of  opinion  and  expression  is  the  secular 
intellectual's  main  bastion...  This  is  why  the  defence  of  Salman  Rushdie's  Satanic  verses  has  been  so 
central  an  issue,  both  for  its  own  sake  and  for  the  sake  of  every  other  infringement  against  the  right  to 
the  expression  of  journalists,  essayists,  poets,  historians.  And  this  is  not  just  an  issue  for  those  in  the 
Islamic  world,  but  also  in  the  Jewish  and  Christian  worlds  too.  Freedom  of  expression  cannot  be  sought 
invidiously  in  one  territory,  and  ignored  in  another.  51 
Thus,  for  Said,  intellectuals  must  remain  free  to  explore  and  dispute  all  forms  of  social 
and  spiritual  convention,  all  realms  of  thought. 
Of  course,  what  emerges  from  that  process  of  reflection  itself  may  be  seen  as  a 
valid  contribution  to  intellectual  understanding.  In  its  pursuit  of  social  justice, 
progressive  Islam,  in  contrast  to  conservative  Islam,  is  more  clearly  motivated  by  the 
spirit  and  emotion  of  Quranic  reason  rather  than  textual  orthodoxy,  much  of  which 
denies  open  reflection  and  understanding.  32  Intrinsic  to  Chandra's  view,  also,  is  the  idea 
that  progressive  Islam  can  act  as  a  catalyst  for  encouraging  egalitarianism  among  other 
religions  and  cultures  in  Malaysia  -  Taoism,  Hinduism,  Sikhism,  Confucianism.  53 
Nonetheless,  the  idea  of  Islamic  universalism  as  a  keystone  for  the  socially  just 
society  does  highlight  the  problem  of  bringing  Malay  and  non-Malay  intellectual 
communities  together.  If  the  common  aim  of  both  is  to  achieve  cultural  accommodation, 
economic  fairness  and  social  justice,  the  difficulty  for  many  Malay  intellectuals  lies  in 
how  best  to  fuse  that  project  with  Islam,  while  for  non-Malay  intellectuals  it  is  how  best 
to  realise  universal  rights  based  on  secular  rather  than  Quranic  values. 
Left  intellectuals:  ethnic  and  cultural  conditions 
Intellectual  tension  between  the  Malay  and  non-Malay  left  has  also  been  evident  at  the 
more  specific  level  of  culture.  In  particular,  the  problem  of  cultural  rights  and  practices 
has  led  to  a  considerable  degree  of  estrangement  among  some  leftist  intellectuals.  Thus, 
many  left-based  organisations  in  Malaysia  have  been  shaped  to  a  considerable  extent  by 
communal  identity.  54 
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as  a  `defining'  issue.  This  was  evident,  for  example,  in  debates  from  the  early-1970s 
over  the  National  Culture  and  the  issue  of  vernacular  education,  a  tension  expressed  in  a 
series  of  exchanges  between  Chandra  and  Kua  Kia  Soong.  Defending  the  Chinese  school 
system,  Kua  argued  that  just  as  the  ethnic  Chinese  have  adjusted  to  a  "learning  of  the 
Malay  literature,  language  and  culture",  so  too  should  Malays  make  a  greater  "attempt  to 
understand  Chinese  and  Tamil  literature  in  the  vernacular.  ""  Challenging  Chandra's 
contention  that  some  non-Malay  grievances  were  unjustified,  S6  he  also  charged  that  there 
had  been  a  conspicuous  lack  of  support  under  the  National  Cultural  Policy  for  non-Malay 
practices.  This  included  the  periodic  proscription  of  Chinese  signboards,  the  refusal  of 
police  permits  for  non-Malay  cultural  performances,  the  identification  of  Malay  literature 
as  `national  literature',  the  teaching  of  Islam  during  school  hours,  with  no  similar  facility 
for  non-Malay  students,  and  the  absence  of  non-Malay  university  Chancellors.  Thus,  for 
Kua: 
Dr.  Chandra's  detached  position  gives  cold  comfort  to  the  ethnic  minorities...  [It  is  a]  sociologism 
[which]  fails  to  clarify  the  objective  plight  and  situation  that  confront  the  ethnic  minorities  in 
Malaysia.  57 
While  Kua's  agenda  here  was  informed  by  leftist  universal  principles,  the  case  for 
Chinese  cultural  rights  was  also  finding  expression  as  latent  anti-Bumiputeraism. 
Throughout  the  1980s,  other  non-Malay  resentments  were  being  voiced  over  the 
proliferation  of  Islamic-Malay  institutions,  such  as  the  Islamic  University  and  Bank 
Bumiputera.  By  1987,  Chinese  grievances  over  vernacular  education  and  other  cultural 
issues  had  intensified  ethnic  tensions,  providing  Mahathir  with  a  pretext  to  detain  left 
intellectuals  and  academics,  including  Kua  and  Chandra,  under  Operation  Lalang. 
But  while  Malay  intellectuals  may  see  the  issue  of  Malay  identity  as  a  problem  for 
the  collective  left,  a  view  prevails  that  non-Malay  intellectuals  still  need  to  recognise  the 
special  symbolism  of  Malayness  as  an  historical  experience:  that  is,  not  merely  as  an 
ethnic  category,  but  as  a  displaced  nationalist  community.  As  Muhammad  Ikmail  Said 
argues,  in  part  following  Chandra:  " 
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Malay  left  in  communal  politics  and  their  inability  to  get  out  of  the  `ethnic  trap'.  It  also  continually 
manifests  itself  in  the  continuing  debate,  political  or  otherwise,  on  the  special  rights  of  Malays  and  the 
equal  rights  of  the  minorities...  For  Malays,  including  the  Malay  left,  Malaya/Malaysia  is  not  a  newly 
founded  social  space,  over  which  anyone  can  determine  its  character  merely  on  the  basis  of  the  modem 
claim  that  everyone  has  a  right  to  citizenship  (and,  by  implication,  the  right  to  vote).  In  fact,  it  was  a 
land  of  the  Malays.. 
. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  non  Malay  left  asserts  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  is 
based  upon  equal  rights,  not  only  to  vote,  but  to  (practice)  their  culture,  language  and  to  equal  economic 
opportunity.  59 
The  potential  for  left  intellectual  exchange  across  ethnic  lines  has  been 
constrained  by  other  historical  factors.  The  colonial  division  of  labour,  founded  on  class 
interests,  fostered  ethnic  enmities  which  found  expression  in  the  Malay  demands  of  1969. 
But  the  NEP  settlement  and  Bumiputeraism  merely  replaced  one  contradiction  with 
another  for  the  left,  allowing  ethnic  polarities  to  cut  further  across  class  politics.  The 
historical  absence  of  a  Malay  left-intellectual  stratum,  notes  Alatas,  could  also  be  traced 
to  the  colonial  education  system,  the  promotion  of  an  inert  administrative  class,  a  non- 
revolutionary  struggle  for  independence  and  the  smooth  transfer  of  power  to  the 
Alliance,  thus  ensuring  a  climate  detrimental  to  radical  ideas.  60 
Under  the  consociational  settlement,  conservative  Chinese  forces  also  constrained 
left  thinking  by  `locking'  intellectual  concerns  into  a  discourse  of  self-cultural 
preservation.  Despite  the  vibrancy  of  an  earlier  left  Chinese  community,  and  latter-day 
instances  of  such  in  the  Dong  Jiao  Zong  (DJZ)  educationalist  movement  (through  Kua's 
directorship),  the  political  legacy  of  this  under  the  Vision  project  has  been  a  reluctance 
on  the  part  of  mainstream  Chinese  intellectuals  to  challenge  the  status  quo.  With  the 
Chinese  BN  parties  now  an  integrated  part  of  the  ruling  order,  Chinese  politics  has 
become  more  reactive  than  proactive.  Such  fears  have  been  used  by  the  Chinese  BN  to 
anchor  ethnic  political  arrangements  and  inhibit  cross-ethnic/class  solidarity.  The  very 
proximity  between  religious  and  ethnic  identity  has  also  served  to  crystallise  these 
concerns  among  non-Malays.  Thus,  in  a  society  deeply  conditioned  by  ethnic 
psychology,  progressive  ideas  for  many  non-Malay  intellectuals  have  become  subsidiary 
to  that  of  managing  the  harboured  fears  of  religious  and  cultural  imposition. 
And  yet,  here  we  find  a  contradiction  with  significant  import  for  the  left.  By  the 
early-1990s,  Mahathir  and  Anwar  were  promoting  a  more  balanced  position  on  cultural 
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construct  of  ethnic  politics  still  prevailed,  Mahathir  was  also  embarked  on  a  strategy  of 
`cultural  liberalisation',  a  process  which  was  serving  to  fragment  the  traditional  identities 
and  ethnic  symbols  which  had  held  the  structure  together.  As  Loh  has  shown,  this  was 
linked  in  the  1990s  to  an  intensifying  discourse  of  developmentalism,  marketisation, 
corporatisation  (notably  of  higher  education  institutions)  and  the  ideology  of  consumer 
individualism,  providing  the  impetus  for  a  shift  away  from  the  politics  of  ethnicism.  61 
Thus,  by  the  late-1990s,  in  contrast  to  the  1970s  and  1980s,  the  issue  of  `national 
culture'  had  lost  much  of  its  acrimony.  Reflecting  this,  a  1996  document  on  the  National 
Cultural  Policy  sponsored  by  the  Federation  of  Chinese  Assembly  Halls  recommended  a 
more  conciliatory  position  in  view  of  the  government's  more  liberal  approach  towards 
Chinese  education  and  other  cultural  practices.  62  With  the  new  market  for  foreign- 
sponsored  colleges,  the  use  of  English  was  also  being  encouraged  by  the  Education 
Ministry.  Indeed,  despite  its  stated  aims  of  promoting  Bahasa  and  related  cultural 
institutions,  many  were  now  questioning  the  government's  commitment  to  the  national 
language.  63 
Vision  developmentalism  has,  thus,  helped  `consumerise'  Malaysians,  reorientate 
cultural  identities  and  stimulate  cross-ethnic  middle-classness.  Indeed,  beyond  any 
semiotic  significance,  it  was  fitting  that  the  weekly  demonstrations  in  support  of  Anwar 
were  taking  the  form  of  `shopping  protests.  '  As  the  economic  crisis  deepened,  middle- 
class  fears  were  finding  complementary  expression  alongside  the  `moral  politics'  of  the 
reformasi,  creating  new  hybrid  forms  of  social  dissent  around  which  left  reformers  could 
organise.  However,  this  does  not  denote  a  `left  discourse'  in  any  organic  sense.  This  is 
partly  because  much  of  this  exchange  has  been  absorbed,  channelled  and  articulated 
through  government  forums,  Islamic  and  Chinese  bodies,  policy  think  tanks  and  media 
discourse  -  civil  institutions  mainly  serving  the  intellectual  agenda  of  Mahathirism.  Still 
caught  up  in  the  constructed  discourse  of  ethnic  politics,  the  left  has  lacked  an  alternative 
agenda  of  its  own  -a  set  of  common  ideas  around  which  disparate  intellectual 
communities,  institutions  and  the  national-popular  element  can  identify. 
334 Insiderism:  the  conditions  of  dissent 
Intellectual  conditioning  in  Malaysia  is  also  effected  through  more  subtle  forms  of  `moral 
persuasion.  '  This  encouragement  of  `insiderism'  does  not  in  itself  eliminate  dissent. 
Rather,  it  neutralises  it  by  inviting  dissent  to  be  expressed  from  within.  Conversely, 
`insistent  outsiders'  can  be  portrayed  as  recalcitrants  and  deviants  impeding  social 
cohesion. 
Here,  the  government  seek  to  pacify  left  intellectuals  and  academics  by  bringing 
them  into  consultative  forums,  think  tanks  and  other  policy-planning  bodies.  One  such 
instance  was  the  inclusion  of  academics  in  the  National  Economic  Consultative  Council 
(NECC).  Set  up  in  1990  to  discuss  policy  options  following  the  end  of  the  Outline 
Policy  Perspective  (OPP1),  their  participation  reflected  Mahathir's  need  for 
`consultation'  and  `consensus'  in  the  run-up  to  the  NEP-NDP  transition,  the  outcome 
having  already  been  determined  at  a  higher  level. 
It  is  also  worth  noting  here  Anwar's  own  once  reproachful  view  of  agencies 
outside  the  Barisan  fold.  For  example,  during  the  1995  General  Election,  Anwar 
threatened  a  `withdrawal'  of  support  for  Penang  state  if  it  backed  the  DAP,  warning  that 
the  BN  would  not  work  with  a  party  that  promoted  racial  tension.  64  He  had  also  noted 
that: 
...  we  do  not  need  the  Opposition  for  the  so  called  check  and  balance[sic]  in  the  administration...  They 
only  create  issues  and  confuse  the  people...  Instead,  the  people  should  support  and  co-operate  with  the 
Government  to  ensure  continuous  progress  and  unity.  65 
In  another  such  instance  in  1987,  following  various  conferences  on  human  rights  and  the 
Malaysian  constitution  organised  by  Aliran,  the  CAP  and  the  Malaysian  Bar  Council, 
both  Mahathir  and  Anwar  denounced  the  organisations  concerned  as  seditious 
influences,  with  Anwar  condemning  Aliran  in  particular  as  "arrogant  intellectuals" 
, 
66 
Notwithstanding  this,  the  keynote  speech  at  the  December  1994  Just  World  Trust 
conference  on  human  rights,  organised  by  Chandra,  was  made  by  Mahathir,  with 
Chandra  speaking-out  in  common  denunciation  of  Western  human  rights  postures  and 
`universal  standards.  '  Mahathir's  conference  address,  maintaining  the  case  for  a  qualified 
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international  human  rights  groups.  67 
Opposition  party  stances  on  international  issues  are  also  used  to  foster 
impressions  of  national  affinity  with  Mahathir.  One  such  example  was  the  broad 
condemnation  of  the  US/UK  bombing  of  Iraq  in  late-1998.  Here,  PAS,  DAP,  PRM  and 
many  NGOs  had  all  stated  their  own  positions  in  questioning  the  legality  and  morality  of 
the  strikes.  In  a  key  Harakah  article,  Syed  Husin  Ali  also  noted  that  Mahathir  was 
condemning  Western  aggression  while  maintaining  a  convenient  security  relationship 
with  the  US.  68  Yet,  against  the  backdrop  of  Ramadan,  what  emerged  as  the  agenda- 
setting  message  via  the  mainstream  media  was  `Malaysian  parties  united  against 
bombing',  allowing  the  suggestion  of  support  for  Mahathir's  own  anti-Western  line.  69 
Complicating  this,  somewhat,  PAS  had  applauded  Al  Gore  in  Harakah  statements  for 
supporting  Anwar  and  the  reformasi,  articles  which  now  appeared,  in  the  wake  of  the 
bombing,  to  compromise  PAS's  anti-US  stance.  70  However,  this  scenario  of  `strange 
bedfellows'  also  illustrated  the  new  dynamics  of  the  reformasi  situation  and  the  more 
complex  set  of  political  exchanges  now  emerging. 
The  more  deep-rooted  issue  here  has  been  intellectual  endorsement  of  the  system. 
Intrinsic  to  this,  again,  is  the  way  in  which  the  language  of  power  becomes  accepted  as 
agenda-setting  discourse.  For  example,  among  fifteen  crisis-tackling  proposals  made  by 
Lim  Kit  Siang  in  early-1998,  one  was  a  call  to:  "Implement  Vision  2020  concept  of 
Bangsa  Malaysia.  01  Concerning  the  need  for  economic  recovery  allocations  to  be 
spread  fairly  and  without  discrimination,  it  was  instructive  to  note  here  that  while 
`criticism'  -  was  being  voiced,  it  was  using  the  accepted  idiom  of  Vision-speak  within 
which  to  express  it. 
A  slightly  different  variation  on  this  was  the  campaign,  led  by  Lim,  to  free  Lim 
Guan  Eng  through  a  pardon  petition  to  the  Yang  Di  Pertuan  Agong.  Leaving  aside  the 
immediate  politics  of  the  case,  this  can  be  seen  as  another  such  instance  of  insiderism.  In 
effect,  it  gave  credence  to  a  system  which  had  falsely,  and  without  regard  for  civil  liberty, 
imprisoned  him.  At  the  outset,  there  was  minor  debate  within  the  NGO  community  over 
this  strategy.  One  must  also  note  the  forms  of  custom  and  tradition  behind  the  request. 
From  a  humanistic  point  of  view,  Lim's  attempts  to  save  his  son  from  the  pain  of  penury 
was  also  understandable.  But  with  any  such  pardon  comes  an  effective  admission  of 
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dimension  of  the  tacit  respect  given  by  the  opposition  to  the  prevailing  order.  Though 
helping  to  focus  popular  opposition,  it  also  tended  to  undermine  all  the  other  people  who 
had  been  unjustly  detained,  either  under  the  ISA  or  through  the  conventional  courts. 
Again,  this  ties  into  Kua's  critique  of  the  DAP  leadership  and  the  party's  `soft 
radicalism.  ' 
But  the  incorporation  of  intellectuals  also  works  at  a  more  socialised  level.  The 
increasing  disconnection  of  the  new  middle-class  from  `the  rest'  has  complicated  the  task 
of  constructing  any  broad-populist  agenda.  Alongside  the  ethnic  conditionalities  noted, 
this  is  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  intellectuals  themselves  form  an  intrinsic  part  of  the 
new  middle-class.  For  many,  its  attendant  culture  of  self  aspiration  forms  a  mirror-image 
of  their  own  class  `predicament.  '  In  A  Portrait  of  the  Intelligentsia  as  an  Aspiring 
Class,  Kua  paints  a  vivid  picture  of  this  bourgeois  paradox: 
Middle  class  ideology  provides  an  amusing  -  if  exasperating  -  object  of  study.  Its  ideology  is  the 
product  of  the  influence  of  the  dominant  ideology  on  the  former's  own  aspirations.  This  middle  class  is 
thus  in  an  ambiguous  class  position  -  it  aspires  to  join  the  upper  class  and  this  aspect  often  takes  elitist 
forms.  It  is  an  attitude  that  is  widespread  among  intellectuals  as  we  see  them  wear  their  PhD's  and 
LLB's  and  other  such  academic  titles...  to  demand  unjustified  privilege  and  status  in  the 
community...  That  these  intellectuals  feel  the  need  to  borrow  from  working  class  ideology  is  also  seen  in 
the  way  some  mouth  `socialist'  slogans...  The  devotees  of  these  intellectuals  [embrace  this]  since  it 
provides  them  comfort  in  their  secure  middle  class  niche  and  steadies  their  conscience  as  supporters  of 
an  undemocratic  government  ... 
[I]n  every  society  there  are  always  intellectuals  who  are  clear  about  their 
political  and  ideological  (rather  than  just  their  economic  class)  orientation,  who  preserve  their  moral 
integrity...  My  advice  to  aspiring  intellectuals  is  this:  don't  mystify  knowledge  even  if  you  do  not  see  the 
truth...  To  the  non  aspiring  intellectuals:  do  not  despair.  Continue  to  defend  democracy,  to  serve  the 
72  people... 
This  suggests  a  need  for  critical  self-examination  within  the  intellectual 
community.  The  attraction  of  academic  status  and  penchant  for  `proletarian  language' 
denote  instances  of  intellectual  vanity  which,  in  turn,  provide  a  `lifestyle  context'  for 
`middle-class  dissent.  '  In  more  subtle  ways,  intellectual  analysis  in  itself  may  serve  to 
`desensitise'  issues  by  turning  them  into  `respectable'  areas  of  investigation,  `specialised 
pQlicy  problems'  or  `seminar  room  dissent.  '  Thus,  by  speaking  'of,  rather  than  talking 
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detaching  the  intellectual  from  any  broader  organic  relationship. 
This  reflects  Gramsci's  concern  with  translating  alternative  intellectual  ideas  into 
popular  political  consciousness.  Here,  Gramsci  stresses  the  interdependent  nature  of  this 
relationship  and  the  idea  that  while  exercising  a  key  directive  role  as  organisers  of 
counter-hegemony,  the  intelligentsia  does  not  become  a  detached  elite: 
The  process  of  development  is  tied  to  a  dialectic  between  the  intellectual  and  the  masses...  The  popular 
element  `feels'  but  does  not  always  know  or  understand;  the  intellectual  element  `knows'  but  does  not 
always  understand  and  in  particular  does  not  always  feel...  One  cannot  make  politics-history  without  this 
passion,  without  this  connection  of  feeling  between  intellectuals  and  people-nation.  73 
The  historical  analogy  Gramsci  draws  on  here  is  that  of  the  Reformation  and  the 
way  in  which  a  unity  of  ideas  was  created  through  the  articulation  of  a  new  ethics  from 
the  intellectual  to  the  masses.  In  this  regard,  the  idea  of  `populism'  itself  must  be 
qualified,  in  that  any  moral  bloc  must  demonstrate  a  sensitivity  to  popular  feeling,  while 
promoting  self-education  and  common  consciousness;  a  reciprocal  form  of  interaction 
and  learning  which  draws  leaders  and  led  into  an,  organic  unity.  74 
This  is  not  to  argue  that  dialogue  with  power  institutions  is  an  invalid  part  of 
intellectual  activism.  Hence,  while  many  bourgeois  intellectuals  regard  such  processes  as 
reflecting  `professional  neutrality'  and  `academic  objectivity,  '  the  liberal  intellectual  is 
likely  to  see  it  as  a  pragmatic  opportunity  to  highlight  a  particular  issue  -  the  Chandra- 
Mahathir  shared  platform  on  human  rights  being,  perhaps,  a  case  in  point.  This  may  also 
take  on  more  Faustian  connotations,  allowing  differing  positions  to  be  advanced 
simultaneously.  Yet,  in  a  country  where  the  line  between  `consultation'  and  co-optation 
is  so  finely  drawn,  so  subtly  blended,  such  positions  have  undermined  intellectual- 
populist  engagement.  Mohd  Nasir  Hashim  (imprisoned  in  1987  under  the  ISA)  has 
called,  in  this  regard,  for  intellectuals  to  address  their  own  role  in  the  dialectics  of 
struggle  by  confronting  their  own  bourgeois  proclivities: 
[I]t  is  up  to  us  to  break  away  from  any  stereotyped  relationships  that  perpetually  make  one  the  leader  and 
the  other  the  follower;  or  the  artificial  separation  between  theory  and  practice;  and  between  mental  and 
menial  work  ... 
[W]e  must  be  able  to  move  tactically  and  dialectically  from  one  position  to  the  other  and 
must  never  be  bogged  down  by  some  rigid,  mechanical  and  compartmentalised  forms  of 
relationships....  In  short,  we  are  the  intellectual-activist  and  not  one  or  the  other.  Only  then  a  person 
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people  to  help  themselves  so  as  to  achieve  their  full  potentials.  75 
These  vacillations  among  many  intellectuals,  he  notes,  were  evident  during  the  ISA 
clampdown  of  1987,  where: 
...  the  intellectuals  started  to  falter  and  suddenly  became  unnecessarily  elusive,  petty,  erratic  and 
thoroughly  bogged  down  by  theoretical  possibilities  and  trivialities...  We  often  aspire  to  be  open  minded 
when  we  communicate  with  the  people,  but  inwardly  we  are  going  through  a  deep  process  of  self 
reflection  and  self  criticism  on  issues  relating  to  our  values  in  life;  on  our  inherited  bourgeois 
mentality...  But  if  we  chose  to  flirt  with  racial,  religious  and  provincial  tendencies...  then  we  are  no 
different  from  the  capitalists  who  used  such  opportunistic  tactics  to  control,  exploit  and  divide  the 
people.  We  must  understand  that  as  we  work  with  the  people  to  change  this  oppressive  environment,  we 
get  transformed  in  the  process.  76 
Hashim's  call  for  intellectual  activism  through  direct  confrontation  with  "the 
entire  State  machinery  ...  the  police,  politicians,  government  agencies  [and]  judiciary...  " 
would  find  some  realisation  by  1998.  "  Yet,  integral  to  this  process  was  his  injunction 
that  intellectuals  must  engage  in  an  ongoing  process  of  self-demystification  and  fuller 
involvement  in  grass-roots  struggle.  To  what  extent,  then,  had  the  Anwar  imbroglio 
galvanised  the  reformasi,  the  left  and  the  ordinary  citizen  for  such  a  task? 
Hegemonic  crisis, new  conditions:  situating  the  left  and  the  reformasi 
In  his  address  to  the  Justice  for  All  Forum  in  Penang,  Cecil  Rajendra  had  talked  of  the 
need  for  more  collective  responsibility.  Citing  past  violations,  such  as  the  UMNO 
Youth's  attack  on  the  East  Timor  conference  (Kuala  Lumpur  1997)  and  the  persecution 
of  Irene  Fernandez,  Lim  Guan  Eng  and  Anwar,  he  noted  how: 
...  a  few  of  us  raised  our  voices  while  the  vast  majority  stood  back  and  kept  quiet.  This  was  an  NGO 
problem,  the  law  must  take  its  course  and  never  mind  about  justice...  Are  we  still  going  to  stand  on  the 
sidelines  and  refuse  to  make  our  voices  heard?...  What  is  happening  in  this  country  is  not  [the 
responsibility]  of  PAS  or  DAP  or  ADIL,  but  the  concern  of  every  ordinary  citizen,  citizens  like  you  and 
I. 
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ouster  had  given  this  process  a  vital  fillip.  It  had  aroused  domestic  and  international 
support  for  a  new  political  and  civil  order.  It  had  split  UMNO  and  opened-up  a  new 
front  against  the  BN.  It  had  brought  about  new  cross-party  coalitions,  with  people 
packing  halls  to  hear  Wan  Azizah  and  the  other  party  leaders  speak  from  shared 
platforms.  78  Now  it  was  finding  fuller  expression  through  the  BA.  Thus,  a  key  feature 
of  left-liberal  politics  by  this  point  was  its  new  alignment  with  Anwar. 
Yet  this  also  raised  questions  about  how  easily  many  intellectuals  and  activists 
had  slipped  into  pro-Anwar  mode.  After  all,  here  was  someone  who  had  spent  sixteen 
years  beside  Mahathir  upholding  the  UMNO  system.  Anwar's  liberal  credentials 
throughout  that  period  can  certainly  be  seen  as  more  pronounced  than  Mahathir's  or 
most  others  within  the  party.  Nor  was  it  easy  to  promote  internal  change  with  Mahathir 
and  Daim  firmly  in  control.  Yet  Anwar's  `passive'  position  in  UMNO  or  the  Asian 
Renaissance  profile  he  projected  could  not  disguise  his  prior  policy  agreements  with 
Mahathir,  his  denunciation  of  opposition  groups,  his  political-corporate  connections  or 
his  close  links  with  the  `Washington  nexus.  '  This  is  not  to  say  that  left  or  liberal 
reformers  could  not  work  with  Anwar  to  help  realise  Mahathir's  removal.  But  it  did 
illustrate  the  sense  in  which  some  intellectuals  had  re-grouped  around  Anwar  as  more 
than  an  adopted  symbol  of  the  reformasi. 
This  was  evident  in  Chandra's  (Just  World)  declaration  of  support  for  Anwar 
after  his  arrest,  the  culmination  of  an  ongoing  association  between  the  two.  To  some 
extent,  this  was  indicative  of  Chandra's  `acknowledgement'  of  a  `liberal'  stream  within 
UMNO.  Chandra  reasoned  that  Anwar  had  been  constrained  by  his  situation  and  that  he 
had  often  talked  in  reformist  language  with  regard  to  civil  society,  participatory 
democracy  and  the  corruption  issue.  Yet,  Anwar  had  also  placed  his  own  people  in  key 
positions,  worked  with  Daim,  the  architect  of  privatisation,  and  declared  his  allegiance  to 
Mahathir  after  being  removed  from  office.  Having  also  denounced  the  IMF's  recovery 
agenda,  there  was  also  the  question  of  how  Chandra  and  others  could  now  rationalise 
Anwar's  own  links  with  it. 
However,  while  indicating  how  intellectuals  become  absorbed  into  new  networks 
of  influence,  we  have  to  differentiate  here  between  the  type  of  intellectual  incorporation 
being  cultivated  by  Anwar  and  his  circle  while  in  office  and  the  emergent  support  for  him 
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ambivalent  recognition  of  Anwar's  `other  sides',  a  tension  evident,  for  example,  in  some 
of  the  output  in  Aliran,  Harakah  and  Saksi.  However,  for  figures  like  Chandra  and  Tian 
Chua  (now  Vice  President  of  the  PKN),  this  was  being  mediated  by  wider  considerations 
of  injustice  and  the  need  to  close  ranks  against  the  BN.  To  some  extent,  Wan  Azizah's 
emergence  as  a  leader  and  symbol  of  the  reformasi  now  offered  a  more  `respectable', 
and,  in  many  ways,  more  powerful,  imagery  for  many  left/liberal  intellectuals. 
A  related  issue  was  the  left's  inability  to  develop  debate  which  moved  beyond 
the  `drama'  of  the  Anwar  affair  itself.  As  noted  by  some  left-leaning  activists  and 
journalists  seeking  to  create  a  more  expansive  web-output,  there  had  been  a  distinct 
absence  of  intellectual  exchange  over  secular  political  values.  Although  complementing 
reformasi  aims,  PAS-Islam  was  now  assuming  a  contextual  role  in  shaping  opposition 
discourse,  raising  concerns  among  writers  like  Farish  A.  Noor  that  basic  secular  tenets 
were  being  too-easily  conceded,  thus  allowing  Islamic  forces  new  social  and  political 
influence,  particularly  within  the  universities.  Within  GAGASAN  too,  those  attempting 
to  open-up  this  debate  had  found  themselves  isolated.  While  this  was  being  done  in  the 
name  of  unity  -  as  a  pragmatic  gesture  to  GERAK  and  PAS  -  it  illustrated  the  nature 
of  the  new  politics  unfolding. 
Nonetheless,  overlapping  the  party  co-operation  issue,  a  more  open  exchange 
with  PAS  intellectuals  was  now  taking  place.  In  prominent  new  Harakah  pieces, 
Chandra's  previous  critique  of  `PAS  traditionalism',  79  for  example,  was  giving  way  to  a 
new  stress  on  `civilisational  dialogue',  drawing  Islamic  elements  together  while  reaching 
out  to  the  non-Malay  intellectual  community.  80  As  a  key  political  figure  within  ADIL, 
the  PKN  and  the  wider  reformasi,  Chandra's  intellectual  overtures  to  Malays  and  non- 
Malays  now  suggested  a  new  effort  to  construct  meaningful  alliances.  Drawing  more 
consciously  on  the  civilisational  tenets  of  Confucianism,  as  well  as  the  universalising 
ideals  of  the  Medina  polity,  here  was  a  more  balanced  template  of  what  cross-ethnic 
social  collectivism  might  represent  in  a  modern  context.  81  While  Mahathir  had  `claimed' 
Islamic  modernity  for  the  Vision  project,  the  reformist  message  being  evoked  through 
this  `new  modernist'  dialogue  was  finding  resonance  for  PAS  traditionalists,  mainstream 
Muslims  and  non-Muslims  alike.  In  offering  a  `new  set'  of  guiding  principles  for  Islam 
and  cross-ethnic  unity,  Vision-Islam  was,  thus,  being  undermined.  In  this  respect,  the 
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from  within  the  UMNO  network  to  check  the  institution's  influence  and  its  `new 
dialogue'  with  PAS-Islam. 
Mahathirism,  reformasi  and  the  left:  the  dialectics  of  change 
Alongside  various  forms  of  intellectual  conditioning,  left  ideas  have  been  marginalised  by 
Vision  discourse.  Yet,  taking  the  more  sanguine  view,  the  Mahathir  project,  exposed  by 
the  contradictory  nature  of  its  own  `liberalisation'  agenda,  has  been  unravelling  from 
within.  Vision  capitalism  has  also  created  a  more  fluid  and  `globally-located'  middle- 
class,  82  new  social  mobility  and  a  more  pronounced  consumer  politics.  Together  with 
collectivist  forms  of  ethnic  and  religious  identity,  these  are  now  interacting  in  more 
complex  ways  with  class  identities.  83  Thus,  the  crisis  has  helped  accentuate  political, 
cultural  and  class  shifts  already  unfolding. 
This  greater  fluidity  suggests  new  opportunities  for  drawing  disparate  elements 
into  the  opposition  alignment.  Although  taking  form  through  the  main  parties  and  the 
reformasi,  the  emergence  of  left-reformist  NGOs  also  denotes  a  strong  basis  for 
intellectual-populist  mobilisation  -a  more  open  means  of  popular  dissent,  as  indicated 
by  GERAK's  and  ADIL's  roles  in  encouraging  cross-ethnic  involvement  and  party 
alliances. 
However,  much  still  depends  'on  the  ability  of  this  and  other  mainstream  elements 
to  work  together  as  an  organic  entity  by  thinking  strategically  and  avoiding  narrow  party 
interests.  As  an  injunction  to  the  Italian  Communist  Party  (PCI),  Gramsci  showed  how 
any  such  party  must  avoid  the  `fetishisation'  of  the  organisation  itself.  Through  a  varied 
critique  of  Leninism,  Trotsky's  `permanent  revolution'  and  Luxemburg's  `mass  strike', 
Gramsci  was  pointing  to  the  dangers  of  detached  cadres  and  bureaucratic  centralism. 
Thus,  the  party  had  to  be  open,  democratic  and  dynamic,  with  intellectuals  who  could 
bridge  the  feelings  of  people  and  their  leaders,  while  forming  a  bulwark  against 
careerists  and  opportunists.  84  UMNO  has  managed  this  fetishism  by  maintaining  the 
ideal,  if  not  the  practice,  of  `popular  participation,  '  its  past  aura  as  a  party  in  the  struggle 
for  Malay  independence  still  permeating  popular  consciousness.  Yet,  Vision  populism 
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an  inreasingly  remote  monolith  for  many  Malays. 
The  cultivation  of  a  looser  politics  may  be  seen  as  a  way  of  breaking-down 
support  for  the  BN  parties.  One  of  the  main  features  of  `New  Social  Movement'  (NSM) 
politics  is  the  relative  absence  of  hierarchical  structures,  allowing  a  fuller  sense  of 
participation.  This  is  precisely  because  it  lies  outside  conventional  forms  of  political 
representation  -  reflecting  a  wider  phenomenon  of  popular  disengagement  from 
mainstream  political  parties.  To  some  extent,  the  PKN  has  sought  to  cultivate  this  type 
of  NSM-style  politics  based  on  intellectual  integration  and  popular  participation,  an 
approach  perhaps  more  conducive  to  the  expansion  of  left  ideas. 
The  opposition  has  also  become  more  adept  at  spreading  its  ideas.  Like  Gramsci, 
Anwar  had  to  be  removed  from  the  stage  by  a  leader  who  feared  subversive  polemic  and 
its  threat  to  the  power  bloc.  85  But  unlike  Gramsci,  the  reformasi  has  had  the  Internet,  an 
unprecedented  medium  through  which  to  transmit  Anwar's  prison  writings,  reformasi 
books  and  a  whole  raft  of  `street  literature.  16  Thus,  the  use  of  IT,  publication  networks 
and  the  global  mass-media  has  allowed  reproduction  of  its  message  into  urban  homes, 
rural  kampongs  and  Western  living  rooms.  Alongside  the  success  of  Harakah,  this  has 
helped  bring  about  new  pressures  for  change  within  the  media  itself.  Indeed,  as  a  gag 
order  was  announced  for  Anwar's  second  sodomy  trial,  ß7  581  journalists  from  11 
newspapers  submitted  a  petition  to  the  government  calling  for  repeal  of  the  Printing 
Presses  and  Publication  Act.  88  Hence,  while  the  UMNO  network  seeks  to  consolidate  its 
control  over  civil  institutions,  the  intellectual  terrain  is  still  being  contested. 
Hegemony  is,  therefore,  a  conceptually  infinite  task  -  not,  in  the  Fukuyama  worldview, 
an  ultimate  state  of  affairs,  an  historical  contest  decided.  89  If  history  illustrates  anything, 
it  is  that  social  relations  are  contingent,  ever-evolving  and  open  to  human  intervention;  a 
dialectic  constantly  unfolding.  Activists  and  intellectuals  may  reflect  pessimistically  on 
the  power  of  multinationals  and  state  elites  or  the  chasm  between  rich  and  poor.  But  the 
`TINA  syndrome'  -  another  instance  of  hegemonic  discourse  -  belies  the  open-realm 
of  human  agency  and  the  possibilities  of  long-term  alternatives.  90 
By  late-1999,  there  remained  a  deep-lying  ambivalence  among  many  comfortable 
Malaysian  intellectuals,  professionals  and  other  parts  of  the  middle-class.  9'  Thus,  one 
343 might  invoke  the  Gramscian  maxim:  `pessimism  of  the  intellect,  optimism  of  the  will'. 
Nonetheless,  the  crisis  and  the  Anwar  affair  had  galvanised  the  Malaysian  public  in 
unprecedented  ways,  from  mass  turnouts  at  reformasi  ceramahs  to  a  new  critical  view  of 
state  and  civil  institutions,  most  notably  the  media.  92  Neither  the  left  or  the  wider 
reformasi  appeared,  as  yet,  strong  enough  to  threaten  a  resilient  BN  machine.  But  it  did 
signal  a  key  shift  in  popular  consciousness  and  change  in  the  political  landscape,  opening 
up  new  and  meaningful  challenges  to  Mahathirism  and  the  prevailing  bloc. 
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348 Conclusions: 
Mahathirism  and 
the  crisis  of  hegemony 
In  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  first  Anwar  trial,  to  what  extent  did  Mahathirism  and 
the  Vision  project  still  have  hegemonic  legitimacy?  In  lieu  of  a  longer-term  verdict,  let 
us  conclude  here  with  a  brief  summation  of  the  project  in  Gramscian  terms  and  a  resume 
of  its  economic,  political  and  ideological  crises  points  by  late-1999. 
The  project  reviewed 
Hegemony  and  Mahathirism 
Transcending  liberal  analyses,  the  Gramscian  meaning  of  hegemony  helps  delineate  a 
particularised  mode  of  legitimacy  based  on  leading  class  relations  together  with  political 
and  ideological  forms  of  power.  Articulation  of  the  leading  group's  ideas  and  values  are 
built  around  strategic  alliances  and  moral  leadership  over  subsidiary  groups  and  at  the 
national  popular  level.  Hegemony  is  also  premised  on  processes  of  civil  consent  rather 
than  state  coercion.  In  these  regards,  Mahathirism's  attempted  shift  from  domination  to 
hegemony  has  been  exposed  at  various  junctures,  most  notably  in  the  crisis  from  1997. 
The  power  bloc  in  Malaysia 
Hegemonic  relations  are  expressions  of  the  historical/power  bloc,  the  concrete 
specification  of  a  national  (and,  in  its  wider  application,  transnational)  system  of  power. 
The  bloc  is  not  just  a  standard  political  alliance,  but  a  protean  ensemble  of  state-class 
relations  based  around  a  leading,  but  always  accommodating,  set  of  interests.  In  tracing 
the  evolution  of  such,  from  colonialism  to  Alliance  consociationalism  and  NEP  statism, 
Mahathir's  efforts  to  advance  Vision  capitalism  has  seen  radical  alterations  within  the 
bloc  and  ongoing  tensions  over  its  development. 
349 Intellectuals  and  the  UMNO  network 
In  this  regard,  the  UMNO  network  performs  the  role  of  organic  intellectual  in  the 
organisation,  reproduction  and  crisis  management  of  the  bloc.  Here,  state  and  civil 
actors/institutions  construct  policy  ideas,  agenda-setting  discourses  and  populist 
representations  to  legitimate  the  prevailing  order.  The  filtering  of  Vision  ideology 
through  an  expansive  range  of  civil  agencies,  from  schools  and  universities  to  the  media 
and  Islamic  forums,  involves  a  continuous  effort  to  build  consensus  and  incorporate 
oppositions,  a  process  encompassing  the  intellectual  struggle  between  Vision-Islam  and 
PAS-Islam.  Responding  to  the  crisis  and  the  Anwar  affair,  the  network  has  also  been 
engaged  in  emergency  strategies  to  rebuild  public  support. 
The  Vision  as  national-popular  discourse 
While  relative  cohesion  may  exist  between  political  elements  and  class  fractions  within 
the  bloc,  hegemony  still  depends  on  national-popular  consent.  This  does  not  require 
outright  support  for  leading  ideas  or  a  given  political  party.  Rather,  it  involves  a  more 
quiescent  acknowledgement  of  those  ideas  as  internal  to  the  system,  whether  through 
passive  resignation  or  common-sense  approval.  This  suggests  ways  of  receiving  and 
internalising  social  meaning  which  cannot  be  reduced  to  imposed  ideology  or  false 
consciousness.  In  this  sense,  acceptance  of  Vision  discourse  as  a  synonym  for  `national 
development'  has  been  significantly  eroded  by  the  crisis. 
The  Malaysian  state-class  and  organic  crisis 
Organic  crisis  denotes  a  crisis  of  the  entire  system;  that  is,  a  culmination  of 
economic/class,  political/party  and  moral/ideological  disjunctions  affecting  the  bloc. 
From  1997,  contradictions  at  the  economic  level  had  generated  crises  at  the  political  and 
ideological  levels.  In  seeking  to  hold  the  various  social  and  class  alliances  together, 
Mahathir  had  used  political  and  ideological  diversions  to  disguise  the  economic  element 
in  its  early  phase,  and  a  reverse  emphasis  on  economic  recovery  to  mask  the  political  and 
ideological  fallout  of  the  Anwar  purge.  However,  the  `resolution'  of  organic  crises 
suggests  the  need  for  a  qualitative  renewal  of  consensual  relations  at  all  three  levels. 
350 Mahathirism  as  a  hegemonic  project 
Thus,  the  legitimacy  of  the  BN  bloc  has  been  subject  to  crisis  management,  allowing  the 
nucleus  of  an  alternative  bloc  to  emerge  from  the  contradictions  of  the  old  one.  Let  us 
summarise  the  Mahathir  project's  evolving  elements,  taking  us  to  some  final  comments 
on  the  crisis  and  the  counter-project  by  early-2000. 
Early  Mahathirism  (1981-85) 
Mid-Mahathirism  (1986-90) 
Late  Mahathirism  (1991-96) 
Crisis  Mahathirism  (1997-99) 
Early  Mahathirism  (1981-85) 
We  have  noted  the  antecedents  of  the  Mahathir  project  in  the  ethnic  constructions  of  the 
colonial,  Alliance  and  NEP  states.  In  its  transition  from  the  latter,  Mahathirism  emerged 
as  a  new,  and  more  complex,  project  striving  to  negotiate  the  tensions  between  Malay 
nationalism  and  economic  developmentalism.  From  the  UMNO  campaign  of  1946  to  the 
1969  crisis,  Mahathir  had  linked  himself  to  the  prevailing  idiom  of  Malay  nationalism  and 
Malay  populism,  his  challenge  to  the  Tunku  providing  a  precedent  for  his  attack  on  the 
royals  by  the  early-1980s.  Yet,  while  upholding  the  `Malay  cause'  and  NEP  ideals,  the 
project  was  being  conditioned  by  the  push  for  capitalist  development.  The  problem  of  a 
subordinate  Malay  bourgeoisie,  diagnosed  by  Mahathir  in  the  Malay  Dilemma,  had  re- 
manifested  itself  as  a  new  form  of  state  dependency,  a  tension  expressed  in  Mahathir's 
struggle  with  the  civil  service  and  NEP  bureaucracy  for  control  of  state  institutions. 
Thus,  in  the  rush  for  growth,  Mahathir  was  moving  away,  albeit  cautiously,  from  NEP 
principles  towards  an  apparent  liberalisation  of  the  state  and  civil  society  while  seeking 
to  consolidate  executive  power  at  the  centre.  The  class  base  of  the  power  bloc  was  also 
being  widened  to  allow  a  more  `inclusive'  role  for  Chinese  and  transnational  capital, 
while  maintaining  a  select  place  for  Malay  capital.  In  seeking  consensus  for  a  new  social 
reward  structure,  Mahathir  was  also  attempting  to  re-fashion  political  culture,  a  key 
aspect  being  an  unfolding  discourse  on  capitalist  development  vis-a-vis  Islamic 
modernity. 
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In  the  mid-Mahathir  period,  neo-liberalism  provided  the  economic/class  rationale  for 
deregulation  and  privatisation,  hegemonic  opportunities  used  by  Mahathir  and  Daim  to 
shift  patronage  from  the  state  to  the  more  flexible  site  of  UMNO/BN  control.  This 
allowed  a  new  political-corporate  network  to  be  built  through  concessions  to  strategic 
interests.  The  period  also  saw  major  expansions  in  IT  and  the  financial  sector/KLSE  as 
emergent  development  strategies. 
In  political  terms,  Operation  Lalang  and  the  threat  from  Tengku  Razaleigh  was 
symptomatic  not  just  of  a  factional  challenge,  but  of  a  critical  policy  struggle  within 
UMNO  by  1987/88  -  part  of  an  organic  crisis  of  hegemony.  Attempts  by  the  `NEP 
class'  to  check  Mahathir's  reconstruction  of  the  state  had  seen  internecine  conflict,  a 
recourse  to  authoritarian  populism  and  a  purge  of  those  political  elements  obstructing  the 
project.  Thus,  while  splitting  UMNO  in  the  process,  Mahathir  had  kept  control  of  the 
bloc.  Following  the  BN's  good  showing  at  the  1990  election,  there  had  been  some 
movement  back  along  the  continuum  towards  hegemonic  control,  evidenced  by  a  relative 
`relaxation'  of  the  media. 
At  the  ideological  level,  Mahathir's  ideas  on  civil  reform  and  Islamic  modernity 
were  finding  intellectual  and  national-popular  resonance,  much  of  this  being  fashioned 
around  the  lingua  franca  of  The  Challenge.  Despite  the  mid-1980s  recession  and 
middle-class  unrest,  Mahathir  had  also  managed  to  cloak  Malaysia's  new  foreign 
dependency  around  the  nationalist  ideologies  of  Malaysia  Inc  and  Look  East.  Coincident 
with  the  shift  from  the  NEP  to  the  NDP,  media  outlets  were  now  giving  rise  to  a  more 
pronounced  discourse  of  developmentalism. 
Late  Mahathirism  (1991-96) 
In  economic/class  terms,  late-Mahathirism  saw  both  a  consolidation  within  the  bloc  and 
the  nadir  of  national-popular  support  for  the  project.  The  social  changes  effected  by 
rapid  development  from  the  1980s  now  required  a  more  inclusive  conception  of  the 
project.  While  ethnic  identity  remained  a  perennial  part  of  social  consciousness, 
Malaysians  were  being  urged  to  make  the  country  more  competitive  in  the  new  global 
marketplace.  Renewed  overtures  to  foreign  capital,  political  courting  of  non-Malays  and 
calls  for  ethnic  co-operation  were  now  being  fitted  more  consciously  around  the  Vision 
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towards  a  `post-ethnic  nationalist'  conception  of  state-class  arrangements.  As 
`spokesman'  and  `role-model'  for  the  South,  Mahathir  was  also  now  a  major  figure  on 
the  world  stage.  However,  while  many  Malaysians  basked  in  `reflected  glory', 
Mahathir's  promotion  of  Vision  development  and  investment  strategies  in  Kelantan  had 
not  managed  to  break  PAS's  now-emerging  project. 
Following  a  fortuitous  turn  in  the  economy,  the  political  high  point  of  late 
Mahathirism  was  the  1995  Election,  the  BN's  greatest  victory,  a  key  aspect  being  the 
now  concentrated  support  of  Chinese  voters  and  business  institutions.  By  now,  Mahathir 
was  approaching  reverential  status.  Reflecting  insider  processes,  Mahathir's  attempts  to 
drive  a  wedge  between  PAS  and  the  coalition  in  Kelantan  had  also  seen  Razaleigh  and 
Semangat  `46  back  in  the  UMNO  fold  by  1997.  However,  while  Mahathir's 
management  of  the  `Anwar  succession'  had  helped  keep  the  political  bloc  stable,  a  more 
intensive  campaign  against  Anwar  was  now  taking  shape  within  UMNO  and  the  political- 
corporate  network. 
Nonetheless,  the  project  had  found  its  ideological  pinnacle  by  the  mid-1990s. 
With  the  economy  booming,  the  messages  behind  Vision  adverts  and  Bangsa  Malaysia 
was  becoming  associated  with  the  not  inconsiderable  level  of  social  progress  now 
evident.  For  Mahathir,  it  was  `Asian  values'  and  `Malaysia  boleh'  rolled  into  one.  This 
sense  of  national-popular  confidence  also  included  a  tacit  admiration  for  Mahathir  among 
many  `critical'  intellectuals.  Thus,  at  its  high-point,  late-Mahathirism  had  provided  a 
system  of  rewards  and  incentives  sufficient  to  realise  a  considerable  level  of  legitimacy  in 
the  system. 
Crisis  Mahathirism  (1997-99) 
In  contrast  to  late-Mahathirism,  crisis-Mahathirism  had  seen  recourse  not  only  to 
emergency  economic  measures,  but  coercive  political  and  ideological  attempts  to  hold 
the  bloc  and  the  populist  element  together.  While  claims  of  Malaysia's  drift  to 
dictatorship  were  premature,  the  catalogue  of  state-coercive  interventions  leading  to,  and 
beyond,  Anwar's  ouster  had  set  in  motion  a  series  of  state-class  conflicts,  political 
divisions  and  national-populist  resentments  which  now  threatened  the  cohesion  of  the 
bloc.  The  following  are  indicative  of  the  coercive  responses  by  mid-1999: 
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secured  for  the  foreseeable  future. 
*  Following  on  from  Augustine  Paul's  deliberations,  the  authorities  were  now  seeking  to  ruin  Anwar's 
(and  Sukma's)  character  through  the  prosecution  of  a  second  sodomy  trial. 
*  Lim  Guan  Eng  had  been  jailed,  a  warning  to  others  not  to  transgress  the  government  by  spreading 
`false  news'. 
*  Nalla,  Anwar's  business  associate,  had  been  jailed  for  42  months  -  his  charge  reduced  from  treason 
to  illegal  arms  possession  only  because  the  authorities  feared  the  public  impact  of  his  execution. 
*  Sukma  had  been  jailed,  and  refused  permission  to  travel  during  his  appeal. 
*  Munawar  Anwees  had  been  jailed  and  vilified  in  the  press. 
*  Tian  Chua  and  others  had  faced  proceedings  for  being  part  of  the  reformasi  protests.  Another  126 
Orang  Kena  Tuduh  (OKTs)  (accused  persons)  had  been  arraigned  before  the  courts. 
*  Zainar  Zakaria,  Anwar's  lawyer,  had  been  convicted  of  contempt  charges  in  the  course  of  discharging 
his  duty. 
*  Irene  Fernandez  faced  a  prison  sentence  for  spreading  `false  news'  about  the  inhumane  treatment  of 
migrant  internees. 
*  The  government  and  UMNO  network  had  pursued  a  concerted  `anti-slander'  campaign  to  ruin 
political  opponents  and  punish  the  foreign  media. 
While  these  actions  were  presented  as  legally  constituted  responses,  the  reversion 
to  1987-style  authoritarian  populism  suggested  a  crisis  of  the  Vision  project.  Though 
avoiding  an  Operation  Lalang-type  clampdown,  similar  coercive  forms  had  been  used  to 
contain  the  reformasi.  Thus,  the  economic  crisis  had  revealed  fundamental 
contradictions  at  the  political  and  ideological  levels  -  all  told,  a  three-fronted  crisis  of 
hegemony. 
354 Crisis  of  hegemony:  economic 
To  some  extent,  populist  consent  was  still  apparent  by  this  point,  as  evidenced  in  the 
support  for  Mahathir's  economic  recovery  measures,  a  set  of  adjustments  which,  for 
small  business  in  particular,  had  been  necessary  to  stave-off  further  crisis.  Many, 
including  Chinese  business,  still  supported  Mahathir  as  the  man  who  had  brought  about  a 
new  form  of  `inclusive'  economic  development.  There  also  remained  a  general  level  of 
support  for  Mahathir's  decision  to  oppose  the  IMF  agenda  and  Anwar's  deflationary 
policies  on  the  grounds  that  it  had  not  delivered  recovery  and  had  been  based  on  external 
rather  than  domestic  interests. 
By  mid-late-1999,  a  significant  picture  of  recovery  could  be  noted.  Moody's  had 
raised  Malaysia's  credit  rating  from  `negative'  to  `stable',  industrial  production  was  up 
2.6%,  exports  (in  $US  terms)  were  up  13%,  unemployment  had  peaked  at  around  3%, 
inflation  had  fallen  from  a  high  of  3.85%  to  2.8%  (February  to  May  1999),  foreign 
reserves  stood  at  a  record  $US  31  billion,  interest  rates  had  fallen  again  to  a  pre-crisis 
base  rate  of  7%  and  Merril  Lynch  had  revised  Malaysia's  growth  projection  up  from  2% 
to  4.9%  for  1999.  ' 
On  the  other  hand,  small  business  was  still  resentful  at  Mahathir's  bailout  of  big 
corporate  capital,  while  foreign  capital  was  now  increasingly  estranged.  With  a 
forthcoming  election,  artificial  attempts  had  been  made  to  bolster  the  stock  market,  as  in 
the  Treasury's  `acclaimed'  RM1  billion  bond  issue  which,  in  reality,  was  sold  at  reduced 
cost  to  save  government  face.  2  Moreover,  as  noted  by  Jomo,  stock  market 
`improvement'  did  not  necessarily  signify  `healthy  recovery'.  3  While  many  analysts  now 
agreed  that  recovery  was  now  on  the  horizon,  there  was  still  deep  concern  that  financial 
reforms  had  been  piecemeal,  that  the  debt  agencies  had  been  ineffective  and  that  the 
euphoria  of  recovery  was  recreating  the  illusion  that  there  had  never  been  anything 
wrong  with  the  `Malaysian  way'  of  doing  things  in  the  first  place.  4  While  many  neo- 
Keynesian  analysts  saw  Mahathir's  capital  control  policy  as  a  legitimate  counterpoint  to 
textbook  IMF  austerity,  '  others,  such  as  the  Nobel  economist  Merton  Miller,  argued  that 
it  had  achieved  nothing  and  that  having  abandoned  convertibility  once,  the  possibility  of 
doing  it  again  had  diminished  investor  confidence.  6  Many  fund  managers  also  remained 
unhappy  over  the  preferential  treatment  still  being  shown  by  the  CDRC,  Danaharta  and 
Danamodal  to  well-connected  companies.  '  Referring  to  a  survey  in  March  1999  by 
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Jorgen  Bornhoft  outgoing  president  of  the  Malaysian  International  Chamber  of 
Commerce  and  Industry  noted  that  the  debt  agencies  had  to  be  stronger  in  rooting  out 
those  who  had  allowed  irresponsible  borrowing  and  lending,  while  the  government  had 
to  be  more  consistent  in  dealing  with  foreign  investors.  '  As  one  member  of  a  Far 
Eastern  Economic  Review  business  panel  summarised  it  in  a  survey  on  the  Asian 
economies: 
...  the  only  consistent  thing  in  Malaysia  is  the  inconsistency  of  macroeconomic  policy...  Secondly,  the 
amount  of  restructuring  is  not  enough.  They're  hiding  a  much  higher  level  of  bad  debt  than  Thailand  or 
Indonesia...  I  think  Thailand  is  trying  to  bite  the  bullet  fairly  seriously,  but  I  don't  think  Malaysia  is.  9 
Thus,  while  still  Mahathir's  strongest  card,  the  recovery  measures  could  not 
disguise  the  state's  rupture  with  foreign  capital.  At  the  same  time,  the  crisis  had  been 
artificially  characterised  as  the  latest  instalment  of  liberal  transition  in  the  region:  Suharto 
falls,  Mahathir  is  next,  a  liberal-business  view  which  obscured  both  the  deeper  policy 
issues  and  state-class  conflicts  at  stake  here.  As  one  informed  source  had  noted  to  this 
writer,  it  was  necessary  to  look  beyond  the  public  gaze  of  the  Anwar  drama  and  its 
actors  to  understand  the  more  critical  roles  of  the  directors  behind  the  scenes. 
Crisis  of  hegemony:  political 
The  consensual  element  realised  during  the  period  of  late-Mahathirism  could  not  be 
easily  dismissed.  Indeed,  it  was  largely  due  to  the  very  real  regard  for  Mahathir,  and 
what  he  had  `delivered'  during  this  phase,  that  kept  him  from  meeting  the  same  fate  as 
Suharto. 
Yet,  while  BN  incumbency  was  unlikely  to  be  broken,  this  could  not  conceal  the 
crisis  within  the  political  bloc.  Beneath  the  surface  lay  brooding  discontent  among 
UMNO  members.  For  these  and  many  more  Malaysians,  faith  in  the  political  institutions, 
the  courts,  the  police,  the  media  and  other  parts  of  the  network  had  been  severely 
damaged.  The  crisis  had  alienated  a  younger  generation,  notably  in  the  universities,  but 
also  beneficiaries  of  the  NEP.  '°  While  as  yet  unable  to  compete  with  UMNO's  party 
organisation,  the  PKN  had  recruited  an  impressive  150,000  members  by  mid-1999,  " 
though,  with  around  600,000  members,  PAS  was  now  the  centrepoint  of  Malay 
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influential  figures  such  as  Hasan  Mohamad  Ali,  a  leading  businessman,  popular  at 
ceramahs,  well  regarded  in  intellectual  circles  and  able  to  draw  others  into  the  party.  13 
Nonetheless,  Mahathir  was  still  resolved  in  leading  the  party  into  the  polls.  '4 
This  was  due  to  the  lack  of  any  charismatic  replacement  and  a  desire  to  secure  his  own 
interests.  But  it  was  also  due  to  tensions  over  who  could  hold  the  wider  bloc  together. 
As  UMNO  marshalled  its  pre-election  forces  at  the  1999  Assembly,  former  Anwar  ally 
Zahid  Hamidi  now  appeared  on  television,  in  an  act  of  insiderism,  to  declare  that  he  had 
been  manipulated  by  Anwar.  15  With  election  fever  mounting,  a  number  of  personnel 
changes  had  been  made  in  a  bid  to  present  a  new  image,  notably  the  replacement  of 
Mohamed  Rahmat  with  Mohamad  Khalil  Yaakob  as  Information  Minister  and  Secretary 
General,  16  and  the  appointment  of  Razaleigh  as  head  of  Kelantan  UMNO.  Yet,  despite 
this  and  a  visceral  anti-foreign  campaign  of  posters,  speeches  and  media  messages 
claiming  `economic  recovery  in  adversity',  PAS  were  now  drawing  major  crowds  in  the 
rural  areas  as  people  flocked  to  hear  Nik  Aziz  and  show  solidarity  with  Wan  Azizah.  l7 
As  ever,  though,  Mahathir  appeared  resolute  about  his  actions  and  unfazed  by  the 
task  to  come.  As  he  asserted  in  one  interview  at  this  point: 
I've  gone  against  the  stream  many,  many  times,  and  it  just  so  happens  that  in  most  instances  I  have  been 
proved  correct.  18 
Thus,  just  as  the  crisis  had  unfolded  as  an  economic-political-ideological  sequence, 
Mahathir  was  tackling  it  from  that  direction.  However,  having  realised  progress  through 
economic  recovery,  Mahathir  was  now  facing  a  new  type  of  political  uncertainty  and  test 
of  the  project's  ideological  legitimacy. 
Crisis  of  hegemony:  ideological 
Two  essential  reasons  for  this  ideological  crisis  can  be  noted.  Firstly,  the  new  social 
order  promoted  by  the  Vision  was  calling  for  a  more  sophisticated  model  of  contestation 
and  control  over  the  civil  space.  Although  recourse  to  coercion  had  always  been 
threatened,  the  emphasis  during  late-Mahathirism  had  been  towards  the  cultivation  of 
consensuality.  Ideas  of  an  emergent  civil  society  were  still  being  linked  with  Vision 
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had  impacted  at  the  national-popular  level,  while  causing  internal  disquiet  within  the 
political  bloc.  To  some  extent,  the  PR  initiatives  and  `Asia  responds'-  type  discourse  (as 
in  Mahathir's  treatise  A  New  Deal  for  Asia,  launched  in  the  wake  of  the  Anwar  crisis) 
had  seen  renewed  contestation  of  the  civil  space.  Playing  on  middle-class  themes  of 
`responsible  dialogue',  `common  recovery'  and  other  problem-solving  discourse,  much 
public  dissent  had  been  tempered.  However,  with  undercurrent  anger  at  Anwar's 
treatment,  and  the  media's  role  within  it,  Vision  ideas  of  civil  expression  had  been 
brought  to  a  new  point  of  disrepute. 
Thus,  secondly,  a  crisis  of  ideology  was  now  evident  in  the  power  bloc's  loss  of 
moral  authority.  In  persecuting  Anwar  and  his  family  to  protect  political-corporate 
elites,  Mahathir  had  crossed  the  fine  line  between  realpolitik  and  offending  socio-cultural 
conventions.  Indeed,  the  decision  to  proceed  with  a  second  sodomy  trial  indicated  a  last 
attempt  to  discredit  Anwar's  character  and  counteract  this  earlier  transgression.  While 
expressed  initially  in  street  demonstrations  and  shopping  protests,  anti-Mahathir  feeling 
now  took  quieter  forms  in  the  kampongs  and  in  middle-class  conversation.  But  it  had 
not  disappeared.  Even  the  literary  Laureate  Shahnon  Ahmad  joined  in  with  a  bitter  satire 
in  the  story  Shit,  an  allegory  of  the  political  system,  wherein  the  leader  of  the  `faeces 
world'  (a  name  shortened  to  PM)  refuses  to  be  expelled  from  within  the  foul  intestine, 
the  putrid  region  of  power  where  all  his  coterie  reside.  After  the  hero  Wiwaran's  failed 
revolt,  he  is  expelled  from  the  intestine's  rear  end,  leaving  him  to  be  regenerated  by  the 
pure  elements  of  the  earth  and  the  warmth  of  the  people.  20  The  book  sold  out  its  first 
print  run  immediately  despite  condemnation  from  Mahathir  and  others  BN  figures. 
Thus,  indicating  a  more  qualified  form  of  consent,  a  certain  ambivalence  now 
prevailed  among  Malaysians.  Many  were  tacitly  supporting  Mahathir  on  the  economy 
while  backing  Anwar,  PAS  and  the  reformasi  on  the  moral  front. 
The  reformasi  and  war  of  position 
This  term,  perhaps,  best  describes  the  nature  of  the  reformasi's  challenge  to  the  BN  bloc 
by  late-1999.  While  significant  new  forms  of  popular  dissent  had  been  born,  this  was 
not,  as  yet,  enough  to  break  adherence  to  the  BN.  Again,  it  is  the  tacit  and  longer-term 
acceptance  of  the  prevailing  system  that  signifies  hegemonic  order,  even  where  that 
358 involves  considerable  levels  of  popular  disaffection  and  pressure  for  reform.  In  these 
regards,  any  counter-bloc  will  have  to  develop  a  coherent  and  consensual  alternative  to 
the  BN's  ethnic  politics  and  the  class  basis  on  which  they  are  built.  Recognising  the 
cross-ethnic  nature  of  the  task  before  it,  an  increasingly  galvanised  community  of  parties, 
NGOs  and  critical  intellectuals  were,  thus,  increasingly  focused  on  building  the  coalition. 
The  once  `unthinkable'  idea  of  a  non-BN  Malaysia  still  required  a  further  shift  in 
Malay  support  towards  PAS  and  the  PKN  and  a  consolidation  of  Chinese  support 
through  the  PKN  or/and  DAP.  While  PAS  still  held  to  an  Islamic  state  and  hudud  law  as 
eventual  goals,  this  was  being  mitigated  by  its  `low-key'  discussion  of  these  issues  and  by 
the  two-thirds  majority  needed  to  make  this  constitutional  change.  It  is  possible  that 
PAS  could  push  for  new  Islamic  laws  through  a  future  parliamentary  alliance  with  the 
PKN.  Yet,  even  this  prospect  seems  unlikely,  given  the  PKN's  need  to  appeal  to  urban 
middle-class  Muslims. 
With  this  new  political  fluidity,  contestation  of  the  civil  space  has  taken  on 
greater  significance  for  the  UMNO  network  and  the  proto-opposition  alike,  opening  up 
new  possibilities  for  meaningful  challenges  to  the  BN  system. 
1  See:  Asiaweek  (Country  analysis),  May  7th  1999;  'Spoiling  For  a  Fight',  Far  Eastern  Economic 
Review,  May  27th  1999;  'Merril  Lynch  revises  Malaysia's  GDP  to  4.9%',  AFP,  July  7th  1999;  'Capital 
Idea?  ',  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  July  Ist  1999;  'Forgive  and  Forget',  Far  Eastern  Economic 
Review,  June  24th  1999. 
2  See,  for  example,  'The  Name  is  Bond:  Junk  Bond',  afreeMalaysia  article  published  in  Harakah,  June 
7th  1999;  Shroff,  'Costly  Lesson',  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  June  10th  1999. 
3  As  economic  adviser  to  the  PKN,  Jomo  was  now  producing  a  series  of  sustained  counter-arguments  to 
the  government's  economic  claims.  See,  for  example,  'More  economic  disinfo',  published  at 
freeMalaysia,  June  10th  1999. 
A  set  of  concerns  stated,  for  example,  by  Lim  Say  Boon,  'Malaysia  looking  good,  but...  ',  Straits  Times 
(Weekly),  May  29th  1999. 
5  See  Larry  Elliot  and  Charlotte  Denny,  'Asia  tiptoes  warily  back  to  work',  Finance  feature,  Guardian, 
July  6th  1999.  Noted  here  was  the  extent  to  which  countries  had  begun  to  fall  back  on  Keynesian 
instruments  to  overcome  domestic  crises,  a  trend  which,  now  endorsed  by  people  like  Paul  Krugman  and 
Joseph  Stiglitz  (Chief  Economist  at  the  World  Bank),  signalled  a  "crisis  of  laissez-faire"  and  a  new 
departure  from  orthodox  neoliberal  economic  management. 
6  See  Miller's  remarks  in  'Malaysian  banking  remains  weak',  Financial  Times,  July  9th  1999. 
'  See  Michael  Shari,  'Malaysian  clean-up  misses  a  lot  of  dirt',  Businessweek,  July  5th  1999.  Noted 
here  was  the  CDRC's  debt  advisory  help  and  'intervention'  in  persuading  the  banks  not  to  call-in 
Renong  and  UEM  loans,  while  allowing  Halim  Saad  and  other  key  management  figures  to  stay  in 
control  of  both  companies.  The  CDRC  was  also  used  to  work  out  a  favourable  debt  arrangement  for 
Tongkah  Holdings,  a  hospital  equipment  company  run  by  Mahathir's  son  Mokhzani.  In  a  further 
example,  Danaharta,  the  state  resolution  trust  company,  had  assumed  RM8  million  of  Capitalcorp 
Securities,  while  allowing  insiders  from  its  parent  company  Kumpulan  Fima  to  act  as  new  directors.  In 
effect,  foreign  bankers  and  investors  argued  that,  in  contrast  to  Western  practices,  easy  debt  schedules 
and  lack  of  clearout  procedures  were  still  being  used  to  protect  politically  connected  figures. 
8  'Foreign  investors  want  reform',  (Dow  Jones  report)  published  atfreeMalaysia,  June  15th  1999. 
359 9  The  comments  were  made  by  David  Roche,  President  of  International  Strategy,  one  of  a  select  five- 
member  panel  assessing  the  Asian  recovery  process.  `Reduced  Speed  Ahead',  Far  Eastern  Economic 
Review,  July  8th  1999. 
10  See  Chen  May  Yee,  'UMNO  alienates  the  young',  Asian  Wall  Street  Journal,  June  9th  1999. 
11  `The  Will  to  Win',  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  June  24th  1999. 
12  See  'Sign  of  the  Times'  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  July  1st  1999. 
13  Ibid.  Hasan  was  a  classmate  of  Anwar's. 
14  'Combative  Mahathir  vows  to  lead  Malaysia  into  next  millennium',  AFP,  June  18th  1999. 
13  See  Anil  Netto,  'Anwar's  Shadow  Looms  Over  UMNO',  Aliran  Monthly,  July  1999,19:  6. 
16  Replaced  Information  Chief  Mohamed  Rahmat  was  allowed  to  retain  his  position  as  BN  General 
Secretary.  See  'New  party  secretary  has  work  cut  out  ahead  of  Malaysian  polls',  AFP,  May  20th  1999. 
17  See  'Man  of  Faith'  and  'Bogeymen  Beware',  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  July  Ist  1999. 
18  Cited  in  'I  was  Shocked  -  Mahathir  talks  about  the  black  eye,  and  other  issues',  Far  Eastern 
Economic  Review,  June  24th  1999. 
19  As  in  Abdullah  Badawi's  message:  'Civil  society  will  emerge  if  Vision  2020  objectives  met',  New 
Straits  Times,  August  11th  1997. 
20  See  'Below  the  Belt',  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  May  13th  1999. 
360 Postscript 
Implications  of  the  1999  General  Election 
On  November  29th  1999,  the  Barisan  Nasional  retained  its  mandate  and  long-standing 
two-thirds  majority  at  the  country's  tenth  General  Election,  thus  ensuring  Mahathir.  a 
fifth  successive  term  in  office  and  his  place  as  longest-serving  Asian  leader.  ' 
Malaysian  General  Election  results,  November  29th  1999 
Parliament  State 
Barisan  Nasional  148  281 
Barisan  Alternatij  42  113 
Parti  Bersatu  Sabah  3 
Parliament  State 
BN  BA  Other  BN  BA  Other 
Federal  Territory  64 
Labuan  1 
Johor  20  40 
Kedah  78  24  12 
Kelantan  1  13  2  41 
Malacca  41  21  4 
Negri  Sembilan  7  32 
Pahang  11  30  8 
Penang  65  30  3 
Perak  20  3  44  8 
Perlis  3  12  3 
Sabah  17  3 
Sarawak  28 
Selangor  17  42  6 
Terengganu  84  28 
TOTAL  148  42  3  281  113 
*(Sabah  and  Sarawak  states  elected  at  other  times) 
Following  major  tax  and  spend  inducements  in  the  October  Budget,  Mahathir  had 
called  a  snap  poll,  allowing  only  nine  days  for  campaigning.  Coinciding  with  the  election 
call,  Anwar's  trial  had  been  postponed  indefinitely  by  Judge  Arifin  Jaka,  removing  it 
361 from  the  political  limelight.  Critically,  the  choice  of  date  also  meant  that  680,000  new 
voters  (equivalent  to  around  7%  of  the  existing  9.5  million  electorate)  would  not  be 
eligible  to  vote  on  time.  Registered  the  previous  April  and  May,  many  having  reached 
the  requisite  voting  age  of  21,  the  Electoral  Commission  insisted  it  could  not  process  this 
group  until  January  2000,  a  claim  dismissed  as  gross  bias  by  the  opposition. 
Malaysian  General  Election,  1999:  seats  by  party 
Parliament  State 
Barisan  Nasional 
UMNO  71  175 
MCA  29  69 
MIC  7  15 
Gerakan  6  21 
Other  BN  35 
Barisan  Alternatif 
PAS  27  98 
DAP  10  11 
PKN/Keadilan  55 
PR11i 
Other  opp. 
PBS  3 
Smear  tactics  were  much  in  evidence  during  the  campaign.  For  example, 
Chandra  Muzffar  and  Aliran  were  accused  öf  having  received  money  from  Anwar  while 
in  office,  the  claim  by  Abdul  Murad,  a  former  Bank  Negara  assistant  governor,  being 
subject  to  defamation  proceedings  by  the  Aliran  executive.  Videotapes  depicting 
`pornographic'  references  to  Anwar  and  a  PAS  party  member  were  being  distributed  in 
public  places.  BN  adverts  were  also  fabricated  to  insinuate  that  Wan  Azizah  did  not 
trust  her  husband.  Election  monitors  also  observed  a  number  of  polling  irregularities, 
including  the  mishandling  of  postal  votes,  the  circulation  of  fake  identity  cards  and  other 
gerrymandering,  though  this  was  not  considered  enough  to  invalidate  the  overall  poll. 
As  part  of  the  UMNO  network,  the  media  had  played-up  the  ethnic  issue,  using 
various  images  to  suggest  that  a  PAS  victory  would  mean  a  return  to  racial  conflict. 
This  notional  threat  of  an  Islamic  state  was  reinforced  by  indications  of  BN  support  from 
the  Malaysian  Council  of  Buddhism,  Christianity,  Hinduism  and  Sikhism,  a  move 
362 acknowledged  by  Lim  Kit  Siang  as  a  significant  blow  to  the  Alternatif.  In  a  timely  move, 
Mahathir  had  also  used  the  Chinese  premier  Zhu  Rongji's  state  visit  and  public 
statements  on  new  trade  deals  with  Malaysia  to  send  signals  of  ongoing  rewards  for  the 
Chinese  community  under  the  BN.  Campaigning  in  Kelantan  and  the  other  PAS 
strongholds,  Mahathir  had  sought  to  depict  PAS  as  a  party  of  devious  fanatics  bent  on 
using  the  Alternatif  as  a  front  for  its  own  Islamic  goals. 
Notwithstanding  the  media  bias,  campaign  chicanery  and  other  network 
enterprise,  the  result  did  signify  an  ongoing  endorsement  of  Mahathirism.  While  bringing 
about  a  new  political  challenge,  the  Anwar  factor  alone  could  not  make  Malaysians 
revoke  completely  the  practical  accomplishments  of  the  Vision  project. 
However,  the  result  could  not  disguise  the  more  particular  damage  done  to 
UMNOBN.  UMNO's  own  share  of  parliamentary  seats  fell  from  88  to  72  and  from  231 
to  175  in  the  11  state  seats  contested.  The  BN's  overall  parliamentary  seats  fell  from 
162  to  148,  while  its  share  of  the  popular  vote  dropped  from  65%  to  56%.  Many 
majorities  were  drastically  reduced,  and  a  number  of  key  government  figures  removed, 
signifying,  in  particular,  the  Malay  electorate's  deep  disquiet  with  the  UMNO  hierarchy. 
Alongside  the  loss  of  six  deputy  ministers  were  a  number  of  senior  party  figures,  notably, 
Finance  Minister  Mustapa  Mohamed  and  Rural  Development  Minister  Annuar  Musa, 
both  in  Kelantan,  in  Kedah,  Abdul  Hamid Othman  of  the  Prime  Minister's  Department, 
Domestic  Trade  and  Consumers  Minister  Megat  Junid  in  Perak  and  UMNO  Information 
Chief  Yusof  Nor  in  Terengganu.  The  removal  of  the  latter  two  can  be  seen  as 
particularly  symbolic  given  their  roles  in  the  Anwar  affair  and  the  filtering  of  government 
information.  Another  key  casualty  was  Terengganu  Menteri  Besar  Wan  Mokhtar 
Ahmad,  while  Education  Minister  Najib  Razak  held  on  with  a  tiny  majority.  Despite 
local  disenchantment,  Mahathir's  own  Kubang  Pasu  seat  was  never  seriously  threatened, 
though  his  1995  majority  was  reduced  from  around  17,000  to  10,000. 
At  the  outset,  the  four  main  Alternatif  parties  had  formed  an  amicable  agreement 
allowing  the  strongest-chance  candidate  to  contest  each  seat.  In  winning  Anwar's 
Permatang  Pauh  constituency  with  a  9000  majority,  Wan  Azizah  was  now  an  iconic  part 
of  a  new  and  more  organised  opposition.  However,  the  PKN/Keadilan  had  failed  to 
make  serious  inroads,  picking  up  only  5  parliamentary  and  5  state  seats,  with  Chandra, 
the  PKN  Deputy,  failing  to  make  it  to  parliament.  The  PKN's  small  showing  can  be 
363 linked,  in  various  parts,  to  political  inexperience,  the  infancy  of  its  party  machinery  and 
more  general  caution  among  its  hoped-for  urban  middle-class  constituency.  The  PRM 
did  not  win  a  seat,  though  having  slashed  BN  majorities  by  critical  amounts  in  its  alloted 
constituencies  (including  Syed  Husin  Ali's  20,000  to  the  BN's  24,000  in  PJ  Selatan),  it 
was  now  an  integral  part  of  the  BA. 
More  particularly,  the  election  saw  a  serious  crisis  for  the  DAP.  Despite  winning 
10  seats,  up  1  from  1995  (3  more  than  in  the  previous  parliament),  the  DAP  leader  Lim 
Kit  Siang  and  its  national  chairman  Karpal  Singh  were  ousted  in  both  their  parliamentary 
and  state  seats.  Lim,  thereafter,  resigned  as  party  leader,  following  Chen  Man  Hin,  the 
party  chairman,  who  also  lost  his  seat.  While  the  DAP-PAS  arrangement  had  augured 
well  for  the  emergence  of  a  more  mature  coalition,  it  now  left  the  DAP  exposed  to  new 
political  uncertainty,  notably  over  the  party's  relationship  with  PAS  and  its  role  within 
the  coalition.  The  DAP's  poor  showing  reflected  ongoing  Chinese  fears  over  DAP's 
alignment  with  PAS,  the  BN's  ability  to  foster  images  of  racial  instability  and  other 
conservative  business  concerns.  But  rejection  of  the  DAP  can  also  be  attributed  to  its 
own  unattractiveness  as  a  party,  particularly  to  the  young,  its  internal  tensions  and  Lim's 
own  autocratic  style.  Yet,  the  DAP  failure  also  indicated  a  more  decisive  statement  of 
Chinese  support  for  the  BN,  a  continuation  of  the  pragmatic  vote  for  economic  rewards 
and  `Vision  inclusion'  seen  in  1995. 
This  made  problematic  Lim's  claim  that  Chinese  support  for  the  BN  was 
specifically  motivated  to  stop  a  PAS-Islamic  state.  Here,  the  outgoing  DAP  leader 
warned  that  DAP  exclusion  and  PAS  gains  now  posed  a  serious  threat  to  secular  politics 
as  UMNO  prepared  to  retake  the  Islamic  ground.  However,  one  could  also  see  here, 
vis-ä-vis  the  Vision  factor,  the  anomaly  of  UMNO's  own  shift  away  from  its  Malay  base, 
suggesting  something  of  a  dilemma  over  whether  to  develop  this  broad-ethnic  base  or 
seek  to  reclaim  its  lost  Malay  following  through  a  more  pronounced  religious  agenda. 
On  balance,  it  is  not  clear  that  UMNO  must  follow  this  latter  route  in  order  to  hold  the 
Muslim  vote.  For  it  is  still  the  case  that  many,  notably  urban  middle-class,  Malays  seek 
more  economic  prosperity  and  political  reform  rather  than  more  Islamisation  policies. 
Nonetheless,  the  loss  of  Malay  support  to  PAS  is  a  factor  that  UMNO  cannot  ignore. 
Paradoxically,  it  is  here  that  Mahathir  and  UMNO  may  now  reflect  on  the  loss  of  Anwar 
as  a  prized  figure  in  mediating  the  Islamic  dimension. 
364 Reflecting  its  `coming-of-age',  PAS  now  stood  as  the  main  opposition,  picking 
up  much  of  the  new  floating  Malay  vote,  evidenced  by  its  rise  in  parliamentary  seats  from 
8  to  27.  The  party  also  lost  by  slender  margins  in  10  other  parliamentary  seats.  As  a 
newly  elected  member  in  Kedah,  the  much  respected  Fadzil  Noor,  an  MP  after  many 
attempts,  was  now  set  to  lead  the  parliamentary  opposition.  In  Kedah  itself,  PAS  had 
taken  a  third  of  the  state  seats  and  more  parliamentary  seats  than  the  BN.  In  Kelantan, 
the  PAS  victory  was  almost  total,  the  party  taking  13  of  the  14  parliamentary  seats,  the 
other  going  to  Razaleigh.  PAS  also  took  41  seats  in  the  state  to  the  BN's  2. 
However,  the  single  most  damaging  aspect  of  the  election  for  UMNO,  taking  the 
gloss  off  the  BN's  victory,  was  the  loss  of  Terengganu  to  PAS.  Here,  28  of  the  32  state 
seats  were  won  by  the  PAS-led  Alternatii  The  Alternatif  also  won  all  8  parliamentary 
seats  (PAS,  7,  PKN,  1).  Thus,  with  PAS,  under  new  Menteri  Besar  Abdul  Hadi  Awang, 
now  in  charge  of  a  second  state,  and  having  made  substantial  new  inroads  in  Kedah  and 
Perlis,  the  party's  presence  in  the  North  was  now  a  worrying  scenario  for  Mahathir  and 
the  wider  power  bloc.  Another  key  factor  here  is  the  massive  oil  and  gas  revenues  which 
PAS  will  derive  from  Petronas  royalties  to  the  Terengganu  state.  Utilising  these 
resources  for  purposes  other  than  feeding  the  UMNO/BN  machine,  this  also  `joins'  oil- 
rich  Terengganu  to  the  less  prosperous  Kelantan,  setting-up  more  consolidated  trade 
links,  economic  crossovers  and  other  mutual  state  projects;  in  effect,  an  expanded  PAS- 
economic  region. 
But  the  PAS  gains  also  illustrate  the  wide  cleavage  now  evident  across  Malay 
society.  Here  we  see  the  prospect  of  a  growing  rural-urban/north-south  divide,  a 
rejection  of  Vision  developmentalism  and  new  impetus  for  the  PAS-Islamic 
countervision.  Among  Hadi's  first  tasks,  with  incoming  state  exco  members,  were 
proposals  to  form  a  new  Islamic  advisory  council,  ban  gambling,  prohibit  alcohol  and 
initiate  other  measures  to  cleanse  corruption  within  the  state.  As  MP  for  Marang,  Hadi 
has  also  been  an  assertive  proponent  of  hudud  law  at  the  Federal  level.  While  offering 
assurances  to  the  other  BA  parties,  PAS  was  now  extending  its  version  of  an  Islamic 
politics  beyond  Kelantan  as  a  real  alternative  to  the  UMNO  system.  Thus,  reflecting 
these  divisions,  the  Sun  warned  on  the  morning  after  the  poll  that:  "The  Malay  world  is 
in  turmoil,  and  nothing  has  made  that  more  evident  than  this  general  election.  " 
365 2000:  the  new  political  landscape 
Noting  a  number  of  `optimistic'  economic  indicators,  Mahathir  reaffirmed  his  claim  that 
the  country  was  still  on  course  for  Vision  2020  status.  Yet,  neither  this  nor  the  BN's 
electoral  victory  signalled  a  resolution  of  the  crisis.  There  are  four  main  reasons  for  this. 
Firstly,  notwithstanding  the  result,  UMNO  had  been  seriously  damaged  by  the  crisis, 
both  as  a  party  and  in  the  eyes  of  a  new  generation  of  critical  Malaysians.  Secondly,  a 
more  visible  and  coherent  opposition  has  now  been  established,  signifying  a  real 
alternative  to  the  BN,  particularly  in  the  minds  of  younger  Malaysians.  Thirdly,  in 
securing  another  untouchable  mandate,  the  problems  of  corruption  and  cronyism  within 
the  system  were  likely  to  go  unaddressed,  thus  limiting  any  serious  reform  or  adaptation 
of  the  state-class  to  the  new  political  landscape.  This  aspect  is  also  likely  to  foster 
ongoing  tensions  with  foreign  capital,  thus  limiting  the  scope  of  Vision  capitalism.  And, 
fourthly,  UMNO/BN  are  now  faced  with  a  new  and  more  systematic  Islamic  counter- 
force  in  the  northern  states,  a  problem  now  situated  around  the  loss  of  UMNO's  `model' 
Islamic  state  in  Terengganu.  Taken  together,  these  factors  comprise  an  ongoing  set  of 
tensions  and  contradictions  for  the  Vision  project  and  the  wider  power  bloc. 
'  The  following  analysis  of  the  election  and  its  fallout  is  drawn  fom  a  generalised  survey  of  domestic 
media  reports,  internet  sites  and  opposition  literature.  All  votes  noted  as  approximate. 
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ABIM 
ACA 
ADB 
Adil 
Aliran 
AFP 
AMCJA 
ANC 
APEC 
APU 
ARF 
Arqam 
ASEAN 
ASTRO 
Bank  Negara 
Bhd 
BOT 
BN 
CAP 
CCC 
CDRC 
CM 
Dakwah  Foundation 
DAP 
Dewan  Rakyat 
DJZ 
Angkatan  Belia  Islam  Malaysia  (Malaysian  Islamic  Youth 
Movement) 
Anti  Corruption  Agency 
Asia  Development  Bank 
Pergerakan  Keadilan  Sosial  (Movement  for  Social 
Justice) 
Aliran  Kesedaran  Negara  (National  Consciousness 
Movement) 
Agence  France  Presse 
All  Malay  Council  of  Joint  Action 
African  National  Congress 
Asia  Pacific  Economic  Co-operation 
Angkatan  Perpaduan  Ummah  (Muslim  Unity  Force) 
ASEAN  Regional  Forum 
DarulArqam  (House  of  Arqam) 
Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations 
All  Asia  Television  and  Radio  Company 
National  Bank  (central  bank) 
Berhad  (limited  company) 
Build-Operate  Transfer 
Barisan  Nasional  (National  Front) 
Consumers  Association  Penang 
Chinese  Consultative  Committee 
Corporate  Debt  Restructuring  Committee 
Chief  Minister 
Revival  Foundation 
Democratic  Action  Party 
People's  Parliament 
DongJiao  Zong  (Chinese  Education  Movement) 
367 EAEC 
EPSM 
EPU 
EPF 
EU 
FDI 
FELDA 
FOMCA 
FTZ 
Gerak 
Gerakan 
East  Asian  Economic  Caucus 
Environmental  Protection  Society  of  Malaysia 
Economic  Planning  Unit 
Employers  Provident  Fund 
European  Union 
Foreign  Direct  Investment 
Federal  Land  Development  Authority 
Federation  of  Malaysian  Consumers  Association 
Free  Trade  Zone 
Malaysian  People's  Movement  for  Justice 
Parti  Gerakan  Rakyat  Malaysia  (People's  Movement 
Party  Malaysia) 
Gagasan  Coalition  for  People's  Democracy 
Gagasan  Rakyat  Malaysia  Malaysian  People's  Front 
G7/G8  Group  of  7/Group  of  8  (leading  industrialised  countries) 
HAKAM  Kebangsaan  Hak  Asasi  Manusia  Malaysia  (National 
HICOM 
IADC 
ICA 
ICB 
IEF 
IFC 
IKIlVi 
IMP 
IMTGT 
IPR 
IRAD 
ISA 
ISIS 
IT 
IPR 
Human  Rights  Society  Malaysia) 
Heavy  Industries  Corporation  of  Malaysia 
Islamic  Affairs  Development  Committee 
Industrial  Co-ordination  Act 
Islamic  Consultative  Body 
Islamic  Economic  Foundation 
International  Finance  Corporation 
Institute  for  Islamic  Understanding  Malaysia 
Independence  of  Malaya  Party 
Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Thailand  Growth  Triangle 
Institute  for  Policy  Research 
Islamic  Religious  Affairs  Department 
Internal  Security  Act 
Institute  of  Strategic  International  Studies 
Information  Technology 
Institute  of  Policy  Research 
368 JIM 
JPP 
Development 
JKKK 
JUST 
KLSE 
MAI 
MAS 
MB 
MBC 
MBF 
MCA 
MCCC 
MCP 
MDC 
MIC 
MIER 
MITI 
MNC/TNC 
MNPA 
MPH 
MSC 
MSRC 
NAFTA 
NATO 
NCP 
NDP 
NEAC 
NECC 
NERP 
Jemmah  Islah  Malaysia  (Congregation  of  Peace  Malaysia 
-  formerly  IslamicRepresentative  Council) 
Jabatan  Pembangunan  Persekutuan  (Federal 
Department) 
Jawatankuasa  Kemajuan  dan  Keselamatan  Kampung 
(Village  Security  and  Development  Committee) 
International  Movement  for  a  Just  World 
Kuala  Lumpur  Stock  Exchange 
Multilateral  Agreement  on  Investment 
Malaysian  Airlines  Service 
Menteri  Besar  (Chief  Minister) 
Malysian  Business  Council 
Malaysia  Borneo  Finance  (Bhd) 
Malaysian  Chinese  Association 
Malaysian  Chinese  Chamber  of  Commerce 
Malayan  Communist  Party 
Multimedia  Development  Corporation 
Malaysian  Indian  Congress 
Malaysian  Institute  for  Economic  Research 
Ministry  of  International  Trade  and  Industry 
Multinational/transnational  corporation 
Malaysian  Newspaper  Publishers  Association 
Multi  Purpose  Holdings 
Mutimedia  Super  Corridor 
Malaysian  Strategic  Research  Centre 
North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation- 
National  Cultural  Policy 
New  Development  Policy 
National  Economic  Action  Committee 
National  Economic  Consultative  Council 
National  Economic  Recovery  Plan 
369 New  Economic  Policy 
Non-Government  Organisation 
Newly  Industrialising  Country 
National  Information  Infrastructure 
National  IT  Agenda 
National  Information  Technology  Council 
National  Operations  Council 
New  Social  Movements 
New  Straits  Times  Press 
Natseven  TV  station 
Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and 
Development 
Outline  Perspective  Plan 
People's  Action  Party  (Singapore) 
Parti  Islam  SeMalaysia  (Islamic  Party  of  Malaysia) 
Parti  Besaka  Bumiputera  Bersatu,  (United 
Bumiputera  Party)  (Sarawak) 
Parti  Bersatu  Sabah  (United  Sabah  Party) 
Penang  Chinese  Chamber  of  Commerce 
Malay  Nationalist  Party 
Parti  Keadilan  Nasional  (National  Justice  Party) 
National  Association  of  Muslim  Students  Malaysia 
Permodalan  Nasional  Berhad  (National  Equity 
Corporation) 
People's  Progressive  Party 
Parti  Rakyat  Malaysia  (Malaysian  People's  Party  - 
formerly  Parti  Sosialis  Rakyat  Malaysia,  Malaysian 
People's  Socialist  Party) 
Islamic  Centre 
Central  Force  of  the  Malay  People 
Radio  Televisyen  Malaysia 
Structural  Adjustment  Programmes 
370 SB 
SDRs 
SERI 
S46 
SLORC 
SMIs 
STMB 
SUARAM 
Tenaganita 
UEM 
UMNO 
UMNO  Baru 
UM 
USM 
Wanita  MCA 
Wanita  UMNO 
Wawasan  2020 
WTo 
Yang  di  Pertuan  Agong 
Special  Branch 
Special  Drawing  Rights 
Socio-Economic  &  Environmental  Research  Institute 
Semangat  `46  (Spirit  of  `46) 
State  Law  and  Order  Restoration  Council  (Burma) 
Small-Medium  Industries 
Sistem  Televisyen  Malaysia  Bhd 
Voice  of  the  Malaysian  People 
Women's  Force 
United  Engineers  (M)  (Bhd) 
United  Malays  National  Organisation 
New  UMNO 
University  of  Malaya 
Universiti  Sains  Malaysia  (Science  University  Malaysia) 
Women's  MCA 
Women's  UMNO 
Vision  2020 
World  Trade  Organisation 
The  King 
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